How genocidal war on Gaza is shaping Israel’s election

Israel’s election appears less a demand for change than a further entrenchment of the jingoism that surged after October 7, 2023.

Ultra-Orthodox Jewish men stand next to a billboard depicting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alongside leaders of opposition parties, with the slogan 'Right or Palestine', before Israel's general election, in Ashdod, Israel [Ohad Zwigenberg/AP]

As Israel entered the final month before its October 27 election, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had a chilling warning to share.

Israel’s enemies, he said on September 29, were plotting an attack on the country before the vote. Without providing any evidence, he then quickly referred to continuing attacks by Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip, where he said they had killed more than 100 “terrorists” in recent weeks.

That link drawn by Netanyahu – between the genocidal war on Gaza that began after the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attacks, the upcoming elections, and Israel’s national security – was not coincidental, say analysts.

Netanyahu’s insistence that he alone can secure Israelis from a range of threats they face from across the country’s borders, they say, lies at the heart of his re-election campaign, even as his alleged failures during the attack three years ago and in securing the quick release of captives have offered his opponents ammunition.

When a Flydubai flight packed with Israeli passengers on their way from Dubai to Tel Aviv a day after his recent warning nearly crashed after a co-pilot attacked his pilot with an axe in the cockpit, Netanyahu was quick to seize on the incident to argue that he is still man for the country’s top job.

Polls suggest that he faces a stiff test in what is the first general vote since the 2023 attacks, which led to the killing of 1,139 people in Israel and triggered the genocidal war on the Gaza Strip, where Israeli have attacks have since killed more than 74,000 Palestinians.

Three years later, the war has become inseparable from the domestic debate over Israel’s direction while also accelerating a political shift to the right – with once-fringe positions on Palestinians now very much the mainstream view.

Few embody this transformation more than Israel’s far-right financial Minister Bezalel Smotrich, sanctioned by a number of Western countries and known for his incendiary and racist language and policies towards Palestinians.

In one of his characteristically inflammatory statements , Smotrich told Israeli outlet Ynet late last month that the Israeli army should “go to war” in the occupied West Bank and “do there what we did in Gaza”.

Less than two weeks later, Smotrich’s electoral ally Moshe Feiglin added fuel to the fire.

“The enemy is Gaza, not Hamas”, he told the Jerusalem Post, calling for the annexation of the besieged territory after the election. “The baby that will be born tomorrow in Gaza will do exactly the same,” he said, in reference to the 2023 attacks.

Palestinian political analyst Ahmed Najar said these are not “stray comments” from marginal figures but an electoral message from power-seeking politicians aimed at portraying Palestinians as “not a people with rights, but a demographic and security problem to be expelled, conquered or destroyed”.

He added: “The frightening reality is that the coming election risks becoming a competition not over whether Palestinian life should be protected, but over who can promise to erase it most aggressively.”

Following October 7, the younger generation in particular slid rightwards, said Ahron Bregman, an Israeli security analyst and senior teaching fellow at King’s College London.

He said the forces driving Israel to the right had been gathering for decades.

“The trend toward the right began after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, but it has intensified dramatically since October 7,” Bregman told Al Jazeera, referring to the bloody 19-day October War , or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War – a conflict between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria.

More recently, the far right has been emboldened through electoral politics as part of Netanyahu’s government since 2022 – the most right-wing government in Israeli history.

Another outspoken cabinet member alongside Smotrich is Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir , a far-right provocateur who has previously been convicted of inciting racism and of supporting a terrorist organisation.

“Netanyahu’s greatest mistake – among many – was bringing figures like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich into his coalition,” said Bergman. “By doing so, he legitimised them as influential forces in Israeli politics.”

Ben-Gvir has been so cemented into Israel’s political system, he has hopes pinned on becoming the next Israeli defence minister, the analyst pointed out.

“This is madness. But that’s contemporary Israel,” said Bergman.

Attendees listen and applaud during an election campaign meeting on October 5, 2026 in Tel Aviv, Israel [Erik Marmor/Getty Images]

Analysts also pointed out that several parties running, including ones that are currently in power and a number that are challenging the current coalition, all advocate for the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza, as one of the examples of the shift to the right.

Omar Baddar, director of Palthink for Strategic Studies, said the messaging from across the Israeli political and military spectrum in the lead-up to the election shows that there is “a consensus” to continue the attacks on Gaza, where nearly 1,500 have been killed since a “ceasefire” last year.

“They’re using the threats to get more votes,” he said, pointing out to what he described as the radicalisation of the society.

With the election approaching, added Baddar, Israeli leaders are seeking to undo one another: “Who[ever]’s more radical is more likely to get more votes.”

As Ehab Jabareen, a Palestinian political analyst and researcher from inside Israel, writes , “what it means to be ‘right-wing’ in Israel today is above all to take a harder line on Palestinian national claims, security and territorial control.”

He adds: “On security and the Palestinians, a large part of Jewish Israeli politics already works from assumptions that would have been treated as right-wing a generation ago: Deep suspicion of a sovereign Palestinian state, a high tolerance for prolonged military control, and a stronger insistence on Jewish sovereignty as the starting point rather than one value among others.”

Observers and rights groups say the disparity is even evident in the electoral process. A prominent politician and Palestinian citizen of Israel, Sami Abu Shehadeh, has been forced to withdraw from the election over his remarks about the Gaza war, while Israeli far-right leaders have remained untouched despite their violent rhetoric against Palestinians.

Netanyahu’s security credentials endure

Recent polling indicates that the events of October 7 are top of mind for Israelis, who also have questions about who was responsible for the security failures of that day.

Just last month, reports surfaced indicating that Netanyahu had received two separate warnings about an imminent Hamas attack in 2023, from Egypt’s intelligence chief, Abbas Kamel, and United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

Netanyahu’s two main rivals in the race for prime minister have cited the alleged warnings to call the prime minister “unfit” to remain at the helm of the country.

But Netanyahu has denied suggestions that he had been forewarned about the attack, and the reports do not appear to have had a significant effect on opinion polls.

While October 7 represents a profound rupture in Israelis’ sense of security, public trust in the Netanyahu government had already been badly shaken by its controversial judicial overhaul , introduced when the prime minister’s current coalition first came to power, said Mairav Zonszein, an Israel-Palestine analyst at the International Crisis Group based in Tel Aviv.

Despite these breaches of trust, the Israeli leader retains support.

“Israelis in general still see Netanyahu as kind of the guy on security. And more to the point, they don’t really see an alternative,” Zonszein told Al Jazeera.

A June survey by Mitvim – the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies found that the Israeli public supports its government’s military and security solutions, and rejects resolving the Palestinian issue and ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. This is the case even while it has been concerned about international isolation and the decline of Israel’s international standing since the beginning of the genocidal war on Gaza, the survey reported.

Yet Israelis are also increasingly war-weary, even as they back the use of more force. Its troops – stretched between six fronts of war in the last few years – are bearing the brunt of this fatigue in Israeli society.

Israel’s Ministry of Defence said on Tuesday that nearly 30,000 soldiers and security personnel are facing psychological trauma since the war.

The ministry said its rehabilitation department’s budget has increased by 88 percent over the past three years to 10 billion shekels ($3.3m), with the majority supporting treatment for mental health conditions and post-traumatic stress disorder.

As Israel expands, the two-state solution fades

Still, Israel in recent months has been more and more vocal about its expansionist vision, with officials brazenly stating the goal of “ Greater Israel ”. The claim for the conquest is based on a biblical verse (Genesis 15:18-21).

For decades, Israel has ignored international law in its continuous occupation of Palestinian and Syrian land, and has shown little respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty, occupying more land in Syria, as well as in Lebanon in more recent years.

According to Najar, the political economist, the “complete dehumanisation” of Palestinians as evidenced during the campaign reveal that Gaza “is being presented to Israeli voters not as a catastrophe or a crime for which there must be accountability, but as a blueprint to be repeated elsewhere”.

In southern Lebanon, where Israel has been carrying out near daily attacks and and has occupied large swathes of land, residents have told Al Jazeera they expect little to change even if Netanyahu is defeated in the election.

Netanyahu’s main political challenger, Gadi Eisenkot – head of the Yashar party and former army chief of staff – is the father of the so-called Dahiyeh Doctrine, and is just as hawkish about expansion. That doctrine, since Israel’s war with the Lebanese group Hezbollah in 2006, calls for the use of huge force, even against civilian infrastructure, as a deterrent against enemies and was deployed in Israel’s recent wars, particularly in Beirut’s southern suburbs.

If it were up to Eisenkot, the Lebanon front of war would have never scaled down: He has accused Netanyahu of bowing to US pressure to halt operations in Beirut, and has insisted that the military should be able to attack Hezbollah anywhere in Lebanon.

For Israelis still reeling from the events of October 7, Eisenkot could fill the security void many are feeling, said Zonszein.

“They really … see the world as kind of very hostile towards them, the world not understanding what they went through on October 7, and [therefore why] the need to have these security buffer zones in Lebanon, in Syria, and Gaza,” she said.

A two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict is therefore out of the question, said the analysts – and has not even made a blip of an appearance in campaigning before the election.

The idea first emerged during the Oslo Accords more than 30 years ago, which set out a negotiating process aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, predicated on the belief that the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel was imperative to forge peace.

But since the Oslo process began in 1993, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank has ballooned from about 260,000 to more than 700,000, embedded deep inside West Bank areas that would be needed for a contiguous Palestinian state.

“The concept of a two-state solution is currently irrelevant and likely will remain so for another decade or two, if not longer,” said Bergman. “It is unlikely to become a reality in the foreseeable future, as no Israeli leader can propose it to the Israeli public after the events of October 7.”

The only way it could regain prominence is if there is substantial international pressure, including severe sanctions on Israel, and a non-violent intifada, or an uprising by Palestinians, he said.

The outright rejection of Palestinian statehood has simply become much more “acceptable”, said Zonszein.

“There’s several parties who advocate these views, whereas there isn’t a single Jewish Zionist Party that puts the need for a two-state solution or a Palestinian political process at the forefront,” she said.

Taken all together, Israel’s election appears less a demand for change than a further entrenchment of the jingoism that surged after October 7, 2023.

“[There’s] more and more movement towards more military force, more need for pushing the borders … out of a lot of fear that another October 7 could happen,” said Zonszein.

以色列的选举与其说是对变革的诉求，不如说是对2023年10月7日之后兴起的沙文主义的进一步巩固。

在以色列大选前夕，以色列阿什杜德，一群极端正统派犹太男子站在一块广告牌旁，广告牌上印着以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡和反对党领导人的画像，标语是“正义还是巴勒斯坦”。[Ohad Zwigenberg/AP]

在以色列10月27日大选前的最后一个月，总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡发出了一条令人不寒而栗的警告。

9月29日，他声称以色列的敌人正在密谋在投票前袭击该国。在未提供任何证据的情况下，他随即迅速提及以色列军队在加沙地带持续不断的袭击，并称最近几周以色列军队已击毙100多名“恐怖分子”。

分析人士表示，内塔尼亚胡将哈马斯领导的 2023 年 10 月 7 日袭击事件后开始的加沙种族灭绝战争、即将到来的选举和以色列国家安全联系起来，这并非巧合。

他们说，内塔尼亚胡坚持认为只有他才能保护以色列人免受来自国界的各种威胁，这是他竞选连任的核心，尽管他在三年前的袭击事件中以及在确保迅速释放人质方面所受到的指责，为他的对手提供了攻击的弹药。

就在内塔尼亚胡发出警告的第二天，一架载满以色列乘客的迪拜航空航班从迪拜飞往特拉维夫，途中一名副驾驶在驾驶舱内用斧头袭击了正驾驶，险些坠毁。内塔尼亚胡迅速抓住这一事件，辩称自己仍然是国家最高领导人的最佳人选。

民调显示，他将面临严峻考验。这是自 2023 年袭击事件以来的首次大选，该袭击事件导致以色列 1139 人丧生，并引发了对加沙地带的种族灭绝战争，此后以色列的袭击已导致超过 74000 名巴勒斯坦人丧生。

三年后，这场战争已与以色列国内关于其发展方向的辩论密不可分，同时也加速了政治向右翼的转变——曾经的边缘立场，如今已成为主流观点。

很少有人比以色列极右翼财政部长贝扎莱尔·斯莫特里奇更能体现这种转变，他受到许多西方国家的制裁，并因其对巴勒斯坦人的煽动性和种族主义言论和政策而闻名。

上个月底，斯莫特里奇在接受以色列媒体 Ynet 采访时发表了一番典型的煽动性言论，称以色列军队应该在被占领的西岸“开战”，并“在那里做我们在加沙所做的事”。

不到两周后，斯莫特里奇的选举盟友摩西·费格林又火上浇油。

“敌人是加沙，而不是哈马斯，”他告诉《耶路撒冷邮报》，并呼吁在选举后吞并这片被围困的领土。“明天在加沙出生的婴儿也会做同样的事情，”他指的是2023年的袭击事件。

巴勒斯坦政治分析家艾哈迈德·纳贾尔表示，这些并非边缘人物的“零星评论”，而是渴望权力的政客们发出的选举信号，旨在将巴勒斯坦人描绘成“不是拥有权利的人民，而是需要被驱逐、征服或消灭的人口和安全问题”。

他补充说：“可怕的现实是，即将到来的选举有可能演变成一场关于巴勒斯坦人的生命是否应该受到保护的竞争，而是谁能够承诺以最激进的方式抹杀他们的生命。”

以色列安全分析师、伦敦国王学院高级教学研究员阿伦·布雷格曼表示，10月7日之后，年轻一代尤其向右翼靠拢。

他说，推动以色列向右翼靠拢的力量已经积聚了几十年。

“右倾趋势始于 1973 年赎罪日战争之后，但自 10 月 7 日以来急剧加剧，”布雷格曼告诉半岛电视台，他指的是血腥的 19 天十月战争，即 1973 年阿以战争——以色列与以埃及和叙利亚为首的阿拉伯国家联盟之间的冲突。

近年来，极右翼势力通过选举政治变得更加大胆，自 2022 年以来，内塔尼亚胡政府一直是以色列历史上最右翼的政府。

与斯莫特里奇一起直言不讳的内阁成员还有国家安全部长伊塔马尔·本-格维尔，他是一名极右翼煽动者，曾因煽动种族主义和支持恐怖组织而被定罪。

伯格曼说：“内塔尼亚胡犯下的最大错误——当然还有很多其他错误——就是将本-格维尔和斯莫特里奇这样的人物纳入他的联合政府。这样做，他实际上使他们在以色列政坛拥有了举足轻重的地位。”

分析人士指出，本·格维尔在以色列政治体系中的地位如此稳固，他甚至希望成为下一任以色列国防部长。

“这太疯狂了。但这就是当代的以色列，”伯格曼说道。

2026年10月5日，在以色列特拉维夫举行的一次竞选集会上，与会者聆听并鼓掌。[Erik Marmor/Getty Images]

分析人士还指出，包括目前执政的政党和一些挑战现有执政联盟的政党在内的几个参选政党都主张将巴勒斯坦人驱逐出加沙，这是政治右倾的一个例子。

战略研究机构 Palthink 的主任奥马尔·巴达尔表示，在选举前夕，以色列政治和军事界发出的信息表明，各方“一致”要继续对加沙发动袭击。自去年“停火”以来，加沙已有近 1500 人丧生。

“他们利用威胁来获取更多选票，”他说道，并指出他所描述的社会激进化现象。

巴达尔补充说，随着选举临近，以色列领导人正试图击败对方：“谁越激进，就越有可能获得更多选票。”

正如身处以色列境内的巴勒斯坦政治分析家和研究员伊哈卜·贾巴林所写，“如今在以色列，‘右翼’的含义首先在于对巴勒斯坦的民族诉求、安全和领土控制采取更强硬的立场。”

他补充道：“在安全和巴勒斯坦问题上，很大一部分以色列犹太人的政治观点已经基于上一代人会视为右翼的假设：对巴勒斯坦主权国家抱有深深的怀疑，对长期军事控制持高度容忍态度，并且更加坚持将犹太主权作为出发点，而不是众多价值观中的一个。”

观察人士和人权组织表示，这种差异甚至在选举过程中也显而易见。以色列著名政治家、巴勒斯坦裔公民萨米·阿布·谢哈德因其对加沙战争的言论被迫退出选举，而以色列极右翼领导人尽管发表了针对巴勒斯坦人的暴力言论，却未受到任何影响。

内塔尼亚胡的安全信誉依然稳固

最近的民意调查显示，10 月 7 日的事件是以色列人最为关注的，他们也想知道谁应该为当天的安全失误负责。

就在上个月，有报道称内塔尼亚胡曾收到埃及情报局长阿巴斯·卡迈勒和阿联酋总统谢赫·穆罕默德·本·扎耶德·阿勒纳哈扬分别发出的关于哈马斯将在 2023 年发动袭击的警告。

内塔尼亚胡在总理竞选中的两位主要竞争对手都援引了这些所谓的警告，称这位总理“不适合”继续执掌国家政权。

但内塔尼亚胡否认了他事先得到袭击警告的说法，而且这些报道似乎并未对民意调查产生重大影响。

特拉维夫国际危机组织以色列-巴勒斯坦问题分析师迈拉夫·宗斯泽因表示，虽然10月7日标志着以色列人安全感的深刻破裂，但内塔尼亚胡政府备受争议的司法改革已经严重动摇了公众对内塔尼亚胡政府的信任。这项改革是在总理现任联合政府首次上台时推出的。

尽管发生了这些信任危机，这位以色列领导人仍然获得了支持。

“以色列人普遍仍然把内塔尼亚胡视为安全领域的领军人物。更重要的是，他们并没有真正看到其他选择，”宗斯泽因告诉半岛电视台。

以色列区域外交政策研究所（Mitvim）6月份的一项调查显示，以色列公众支持政府的军事和安全解决方案，并拒绝解决巴勒斯坦问题和结束以色列对巴勒斯坦领土的占领。调查报告指出，尽管自加沙种族灭绝战争开始以来，以色列一直担忧国际孤立和国际地位的下降，但公众的这种态度依然存在。

然而，即便以色列人支持使用更多武力，他们也日益厌倦战争。过去几年里，以色列军队疲于奔命，疲于应对六条战线，而以色列社会也正承受着这种疲惫感的冲击。

以色列国防部周二表示，自战争以来，近3万名士兵和安保人员正面临心理创伤。

该部表示，其康复部门的预算在过去三年中增长了 88%，达到 100 亿谢克尔（330 万美元），其中大部分用于支持精神健康状况和创伤后应激障碍的治疗。

随着以色列的扩张，两国方案逐渐式微。

然而，近几个月来，以色列越来越公开地宣扬其扩张主义愿景，官员们甚至肆无忌惮地宣称其目标是“大以色列”。这一征服主张的依据是《圣经》中的一节经文（创世记 15:18-21）。

几十年来，以色列无视国际法，持续占领巴勒斯坦和叙利亚的土地，并且对邻国的主权缺乏尊重，近年来不仅占领了叙利亚的更多土地，还占领了黎巴嫩的更多土地。

政治经济学家纳贾尔表示，竞选期间对巴勒斯坦人的“彻底非人化”表明，加沙“在以色列选民眼中，不是一场必须追究责任的灾难或罪行，而是一份可以在其他地方复制的蓝图”。

在以色列几乎每天都发动袭击并占领大片土地的黎巴嫩南部，居民们告诉半岛电视台，即使内塔尼亚胡在选举中落败，他们也预计不会有太大改变。

内塔尼亚胡的主要政治挑战者，亚沙尔党主席、前陆军总参谋长加迪·艾森科特，是所谓“达希耶主义”的创始人，他对扩张的立场同样强硬。自2006年以色列与黎巴嫩真主党的战争以来，该主义主张动用巨大武力，甚至攻击民用基础设施，以此威慑敌人。以色列在近期的战争中，尤其是在贝鲁特南部郊区的战争中，都运用了这一理论。

如果一切都由艾森科特说了算，黎巴嫩战线就不会缩小：他指责内塔尼亚胡屈服于美国的压力，停止在贝鲁特的军事行动，并坚持认为军方应该能够在黎巴嫩的任何地方打击真主党。

Zonszein表示，对于仍未从10月7日事件中恢复过来的以色列人来说，艾森科特可以填补许多人感受到的安全空白。

她说：“他们真的……觉得世界对他们非常敌视，世界不理解他们在10月7日经历了什么，因此也不理解为什么需要在黎巴嫩、叙利亚和加沙设立这些安全缓冲区。”

分析人士表示，因此，以巴冲突的两国方案根本不可能实现——而且在选举前的竞选活动中，这一方案甚至连一丝迹象都没有出现。

这一理念最早出现在 30 多年前的奥斯陆协议中，该协议制定了一项旨在解决以巴冲突的谈判进程，其前提是建立一个与以色列并存的巴勒斯坦国对于实现和平至关重要。

但自 1993 年奥斯陆进程开始以来，西岸的以色列定居者人数已从约 26 万激增至 70 多万，他们深居简出地居住在西岸地区，而这些地区对于建立一个领土完整的巴勒斯坦国至关重要。

伯格曼表示：“两国方案的概念目前已经过时，而且可能在未来十年或二十年甚至更长时间内都不会改变。在可预见的未来，两国方案不太可能成为现实，因为在10月7日事件之后，没有一位以色列领导人能够向以色列公众提出这一方案。”

他说，巴勒斯坦要想重新获得关注，唯一的办法就是施加巨大的国际压力，包括对以色列实施严厉制裁，以及爆发非暴力起义。

Zonszein表示，彻底拒绝巴勒斯坦建国已经变得更加“可以接受”。

她说：“有好几个政党都支持这些观点，但没有一个犹太复国主义政党将两国方案或巴勒斯坦政治进程的必要性放在首位。”

总的来说，以色列的选举与其说是对变革的诉求，不如说是对2023年10月7日之后兴起的沙文主义的进一步巩固。

“（现在）越来越多的人倾向于动用更多军事力量，越来越需要推进边境……这是因为很多人担心会再次发生10月7日那样的事件，”宗斯泽因说。