[COVER STORY] From Tiger to Align, shareholder activism takes root in Korea

Shareholder activism has evolved from a foreign threat in Korea to a mainstream governance tool, with domestic funds like KCGI and Align Partners now challenging controlling families and outside directors. The shift has been helped by stronger minority-shareholder protections, retail investor coordination, and government governance reforms. In 2026, 60 Korean companies faced activist demands in the first quarter alone. Still, questions remain over whether these campaigns create lasting governance change.

Tiger Management took a 6.6 percent stake in SK Telecom in 1999 and later sold it for about 630 billion won, after the Chey family spent about 2 trillion won defending control of SK Group.

Align Partners won a major victory in 2022 when SM Entertainment accepted all of its demands, including the appointment of an independent auditor and changes to transactions tied to Lee Soo-man’s private company.

Sixty Korean companies faced activist demands in the first quarter of 2026, matching the total for all of 2025, and governance accounted for 34 percent of those demands.

Hwang Sei-woon of the Korea Capital Market Institute said activism is likely to grow as investors seek returns in Korea’s structurally low-growth environment.

Yun Jung-in of Fibonacci Asset Management Global said foreign activist investors still draw more controversy in Korea because control has long been viewed as the prerogative of controlling shareholders.

Published Sep 6, 2026 7:00 am KST

Once cast as corporate raiders, activist funds become accepted force in Korea's push for governance reform

Shareholders of Samsung Electronics attend the company’s annual general meeting at a convention center in Suwon, Gyeonggi Province, in March 2022. Newsis

When a U.S. fund began challenging SK Telecom in 1999, corporate Korea was only beginning to learn what shareholder activism looked like. The country had only recently emerged from the depths of the Asian financial crisis, and its capital markets were opening rapidly to foreign investors.

Tiger Management built a 6.6 percent stake in the country's largest wireless carrier and pressed for changes, including stronger external oversight and a greater say in how the company was run.

The Chey family, one of Korea's chaebol dynasties and the controlling family behind SK Group, spent about 2 trillion won defending its grip on the group. Within months, Tiger had reaped about 630 billion won ($463.6 million) from selling its stake.

The idea that an outside investor could buy into a major Korean company and publicly demand change was still novel — and deeply unsettling to many companies. Tiger's windfall only deepened suspicions that foreign funds were enriching themselves at Korea's expense.

That wariness persisted. Sovereign challenged SK Corp. in 2003. Carl Icahn took on KT&G in 2006. Elliott Management clashed with Samsung C&T in 2015. Activist investors, particularly foreign ones, were often portrayed in Korea as corporate raiders.

In 2004, the Kyunghyang Shinmun described them as "ruthless corporate raiders." Three years later, the Dong-A Ilbo warned that Korean firms stood "naked before hostile takeovers."

James Peter, then-CEO of Sovereign Asset Management, speaks to reporters about its demands to SK Corp. at a hotel in Seoul, in November 2003. Korea Times photo by Bae Woo-han

By the late 2010s, however, the mood was beginning to change.

A new generation of domestic activists, including KCGI and Align Partners, emerged as the ranks of retail investors swelled, a trend accelerated by the pandemic. Increasingly, the funds found common cause with minority shareholders, challenging controlling families over governance, capital allocation and the independence of outside directors.

One of the clearest breakthroughs came in 2022, when K-pop powerhouse SM Entertainment agreed to all of Align’s demands. With a stake of just about 1 percent, the fund had sought the appointment of an independent auditor and changes to transactions involving a private company owned by SM founder Lee Soo-man.

C.Y. Wang, a professor at Harvard Business School, said institutional investors had historically enjoyed "very limited success in influencing the management of listed companies," citing the prevalence of circular ownership and public resentment toward foreign shareholder activists.

Align's campaign marked the "first time in Korean history that a listed company accepted all the demands made by a local shareholder," Wang said. He later published a case study on the episode.

Activist funds, once associated with foreign raiders extracting value from Korean companies, were beginning to acquire a different image: a check on entrenched management and controlling shareholders. In early 2023, the Dong-A Ilbo said activist funds were becoming "white knights for retail investors."

Graph by Cho Sang-won

Activism goes mainstream

Activist investing involves taking a stake in a company and pressing for changes intended to raise its value. Those demands can range from strategic and operational shifts to better capital allocation, mergers and acquisitions, board changes and broader governance reform.

The strategy is spreading rapidly in Korea, helped by government efforts to overhaul corporate governance. Minority shareholders have gained stronger protections, while online platforms have made it easier for retail investors to coordinate and pool their voting power. Together with other policy changes, this has allowed activist funds to exert influence well beyond the size of their stakes.

Sixty Korean companies faced activist demands in the first quarter of 2026, according to Diligent Market Intelligence, matching the total for all of 2025. Governance was the most common focus, accounting for 34 percent of demands.

The tactics vary. Some activist firms launch tender offers to increase their holdings and strengthen their leverage. Others prefer quieter campaigns, engaging management privately rather than mounting a public fight.

The demands are becoming more structural, too. Earlier campaigns often focused on putting cash directly into shareholders' pockets through higher dividends. Activists are increasingly seeking board seats, changes to executive pay and greater disclosure — measures aimed at changing how companies are governed, rather than merely extracting near-term payouts.

Hwang Sei-woon, a senior research fellow at the Korea Capital Market Institute, said shareholder activism is likely to become more prominent as investors search for returns in an economy that has been stuck in a structurally low-growth environment since around 2010, despite the recent boom in semiconductor exports.

"Investors have a stronger incentive to push companies to unlock value and improve shareholder returns in such an environment," Hwang said.

Graphic by Cho Sang-won

Questions over lasting change

Questions remain over how durable the shift will prove, and whether campaigns framed as governance reform will produce lasting changes in the way Korean companies are run.

"It is still too early to judge whether activist funds are genuinely improving corporate governance over time," a researcher at a global nonprofit organization said on condition of anonymity in order to speak more candidly. "There is still limited research showing how far those interventions have produced lasting changes."

The debate becomes more charged when foreign funds are involved.

Foreign activist investors tend to provoke controversy more readily in Korea than in other major markets, according to Yun Jung-in, CEO of Fibonacci Asset Management Global in Singapore. He attributed that to a corporate culture in which control of a company has long been viewed as the prerogative of its controlling shareholder, as well as to lingering resentment towards some foreign capital.

"Activism should be judged not by the nationality of the investor, but by whether its proposals serve the long-term value of the company and the interests of shareholders as a whole," Yun said.

Calls to fix inefficient capital allocation or challenge decisions that disadvantage minority shareholders are a normal part of capital markets, he said.

"From a foreign investor's perspective, the rise of activism should, over time, improve corporate governance and capital efficiency in Korea and raise the overall quality of the market," he added.

在韩国，股东维权已从一种外来威胁演变为主流的公司治理工具，韩国资本投资集团（KCGI）和Align Partners等本土基金如今正挑战控股家族和外部董事。这一转变得益于更强有力的少数股东保护、散户投资者协调以及政府治理改革。2026年第一季度，就有60家韩国公司面临维权诉求。然而，这些维权行动能否带来持久的公司治理变革，仍存在疑问。

1999 年，Tiger Management 收购了 SK Telecom 6.6% 的股份，后来以约 6300 亿韩元的价格出售。此前，崔氏家族花费了约 2 万亿韩元来捍卫对 SK 集团的控制权。

2022 年，Align Partners 取得了重大胜利，SM Entertainment 接受了其所有要求，包括任命独立审计师和更改与李秀满私人公司相关的交易。

2026 年第一季度，共有 60 家韩国公司面临激进投资者的要求，与 2025 年全年总数持平，其中 34% 的要求与公司治理有关。

韩国资本市场研究所的黄世云表示，由于韩国结构性低增长环境，投资者寻求回报，因此激进主义可能会增加。

斐波那契资产管理全球公司的尹正仁表示，外国激进投资者在韩国仍然会引起更多争议，因为控制权长期以来一直被视为控股股东的特权。

发布于2026年9月6日上午7:00（韩国标准时间）

曾经被视为企业掠夺者的激进资金，如今已成为韩国推动政府改革的一股公认力量。

2022年3月，三星电子股东在京畿道水原市会展中心出席公司年度股东大会。（Newsis）

1999年，当一家美国基金开始挑战SK电信时，韩国企业界才刚刚开始了解股东维权主义的含义。当时，韩国刚刚走出亚洲金融危机的阴霾，其资本市场正迅速向外国投资者开放。

Tiger Management 收购了该国最大的无线运营商 6.6% 的股份，并推动进行改革，包括加强外部监督和在公司运营中拥有更大的发言权。

韩国财阀世家之一的崔氏家族，作为SK集团的控股家族，斥资约2万亿韩元捍卫其对该集团的控制权。短短几个月内，老虎基金就通过出售其持有的股份获利约6300亿韩元（约合4.636亿美元）。

外部投资者能够入股韩国大型企业并公开要求变革，这种想法在当时还很新颖，也令许多公司深感不安。老虎基金的意外之财更加深了人们的怀疑：外国资金正在以牺牲韩国利益为代价来中饱私囊。

这种警惕情绪一直持续着。2003年，Sovereign公司挑战了SK集团。2006年，卡尔·伊坎(Carl Icahn)与KT&G公司交锋。2015年，埃利奥特管理公司(Elliott Management)与三星物产(Samsung C&T)发生冲突。在韩国，激进投资者，尤其是外国投资者，常常被描绘成企业掠夺者。

2004年，《京乡新闻》将他们描述为“冷酷无情的企业掠夺者”。三年后，《东亚日报》警告说，韩国企业“在恶意收购面前赤裸裸地暴露无遗”。

2003年11月，时任主权资产管理公司首席执行官詹姆斯·彼得在首尔一家酒店向记者介绍该公司向SK集团提出的要求。（韩国时报 裴宇汉 摄）

然而，到了 2010 年代后期，这种情绪开始发生变化。

随着散户投资者队伍的壮大，包括KCGI和Align Partners在内的新一代国内维权投资者应运而生，而疫情加速了这一趋势。这些基金越来越多地与少数股东站在一起，就公司治理、资本配置和外部董事的独立性等问题向控股家族发起挑战。

2022年，双方取得了最显著的突破之一，韩国流行音乐巨头SM娱乐公司同意了Align的所有要求。Align基金仅持有SM娱乐公司约1%的股份，却要求任命独立审计师，并修改涉及SM创始人李秀满名下私人公司的交易条款。

哈佛商学院教授王志远表示，机构投资者在历史上“对上市公司的管理施加影响的成功非常有限”，他指出循环所有权的普遍存在以及公众对外国股东激进主义者的不满。

王先生表示，Align的行动标志着“韩国历史上上市公司首次接受本土股东提出的所有要求”。他随后发表了一篇关于此事的案例研究。

激进投资基金曾一度被认为是外国掠夺者从韩国公司榨取价值的工具，如今却开始呈现出不同的形象：它们成为制衡根深蒂固的管理层和控股股东的力量。2023年初，《东亚日报》称，激进投资基金正在成为“散户投资者的白衣骑士”。

图表由赵相元绘制

行动主义走向主流化

激进投资是指投资者持有公司股份，并推动公司进行旨在提升其价值的变革。这些诉求涵盖战略和运营调整、更优化的资本配置、并购、董事会改组以及更广泛的公司治理改革。

在韩国，这一策略正迅速蔓延，这得益于政府大力改革公司治理。少数股东的权益得到了更强有力的保护，而网络平台则让散户投资者更容易协调和集中投票权。加之其他政策变化，这些因素使得激进投资者基金能够发挥远超其持股规模的影响力。

据 Diligent Market Intelligence 的数据显示，2026 年第一季度，共有 60 家韩国公司面临激进投资者的诉求，与 2025 年全年总数持平。公司治理是最常见的关注点，占诉求总数的 34%。

策略各不相同。一些激进投资者会发起要约收购，以增加持股比例并增强自身影响力。另一些则更倾向于低调行事，私下与管理层沟通，而不是公开对抗。

这些诉求也变得更加结构化。早期的维权活动往往侧重于通过提高股息直接让股东获利。而如今，维权人士越来越多地寻求董事会席位、调整高管薪酬以及提高信息披露水平——这些措施旨在改变公司的治理方式，而不仅仅是追求短期收益。

韩国资本市场研究院高级研究员黄世云表示，尽管半导体出口近期出现繁荣，但自 2010 年以来，韩国经济一直处于结构性低增长状态，投资者寻求回报，因此股东维权可能会变得更加突出。

黄表示：“在这种环境下，投资者更有动力推动公司释放价值，提高股东回报。”

插图：赵相元

关于持久变革的问题

这种转变能否持久，以及以治理改革为名的运动能否给韩国企业的运营方式带来持久改变，仍然存在疑问。

“现在判断维权资金是否真的能随着时间的推移改善公司治理还为时过早，”一家全球非营利组织的研究人员匿名表示，以便更坦诚地发言。“目前的研究仍然有限，无法表明这些干预措施在多大程度上产生了持久的改变。”

当涉及外国资金时，争论会变得更加激烈。

据新加坡斐波那契资产管理全球公司首席执行官尹正仁 (Yun Jung-in) 称，外国激进投资者在韩国比在其他主要市场更容易引发争议。他将此归因于韩国的企业文化，在这种文化中，公司控制权长期以来被视为控股股东的特权，以及韩国民众对某些外国资本根深蒂固的不满。

“评判激进主义的标准不应该是投资者的国籍，而是其提议是否符合公司的长期价值和全体股东的利益，”Yun说道。

他表示，要求纠正低效的资本配置或质疑不利于少数股东的决定是资本市场的正常组成部分。

他补充说：“从外国投资者的角度来看，激进主义的兴起应该会随着时间的推移，改善韩国的公司治理和资本效率，并提高市场的整体质量。”