Midterms and Iran: Congress could change hands, but Trump would still control the war

Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden. The reviews were not kind.

On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced a surge of tens of thousands of additional troops to Iraq — among the least popular decisions of his presidency. As a senior adviser, I watched from National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley’s West Wing office.

Hadley had ordered pizza, and a small group of us gathered around his television. When Bush finished speaking, Hadley began flipping through channels to gauge the reaction.

Sen. Dick Durbin was delivering the official Democratic response. “Escalation of this war is not the change the American people called for in the last election,” he declared. Sen. Barack Obama was next. He pledged to “actively oppose the president’s proposal.”

Hadley turned off the television.

“This’ll be a fight,” he said.

The next morning, traveling with Bush to Fort Benning, Georgia, I reviewed the press coverage. Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel called the surge “the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam.”

Democrats had just swept both houses of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections, an outcome Bush himself called a “thumping,” driven largely by public opposition to the Iraq War.

The message from voters seemed clear. Bush defied it.

Chris Hondros/Getty Images

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Over the coming months, he fired his secretary of defense; appointed new generals; a new ambassador to Iraq; and most importantly, approved a new strategy to double-down on a war that much of Washington had written off as lost.

Bush later wrote that it was among the most difficult decisions of his presidency.

The surge dramatically reduced violence and stabilized Iraq, giving it a chance to survive. Congress sought to reverse it with timetables to withdraw US forces and even cut funding from US troops. Bush vetoed such measures, and Congress lacked the votes to override him.

The politics in Washington may have changed, but Congress was not in the chain of command, and the commander in chief determined the course and conduct of an ongoing war.

Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

Iran apparently believes that the November 3 midterm elections will determine its fortunes in the ongoing war with the US.

According to a Washington Post report published Monday, Iranian officials are escalating attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz to raise energy prices, punish American consumers and weaken Trump and the Republican Party before the midterm elections.

An Arab diplomat described Tehran as “obsessed” with the elections. Iranian state television has tracked Trump’s approval ratings and speculated that Republican losses will constrain the war and force concessions to Iran.

But Iran may discover that weakening an American president politically is not the same as constraining him strategically. Congress has powers over war and peace, including authority over military spending. But using those powers to force a determined president to change course is another matter.

A president can veto legislation restricting military operations, and Congress needs a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override that veto. Even if Democrats win a wave election in November, they will almost certainly lack those kind of numbers.

Legislators are also reluctant to cut off funding for American forces already in harm’s way.

Bush is but one example. Nixon escalated the war in Vietnam in 1972 even with Democrats in the majority of both houses and opposed to the war. Clinton conducted a 78-day NATO air campaign in the Balkans in 1999, even after the House refused to authorize the operation. Obama launched extended military operations in Libya in 2011 without congressional approval.

Democratic majorities in Congress would surely complicate life for Trump, bringing investigations, hearings and potentially efforts to restrict military operations. Yet Trump will remain commander in chief for another two years. And the most consequential decisions on Iran will still be made in the White House.

Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

History suggests Trump will retain a relatively free hand, leaving him three broad options:

Trump could declare the principal military objectives achieved, reduce operations and accept a costly accommodation with Iran to restore normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

This may bring near-term political and economic benefits, particularly if energy prices declined.

But such an outcome could leave Iran claiming victory, having survived the American military campaign and demonstrated that it could threaten international commerce to extract concessions. Iran would also be able to invest its resources to reconstitute its nuclear and missile program, undermining the stated logic of the military campaign altogether.

If Trump intended to pull back for political reasons, he had every incentive to do so before the midterms. His decision to maintain the blockade despite the political costs makes a sudden retreat after November unlikely.

The US has blockaded Iranian ports while helping commercial vessels transit the Strait of Hormuz, increasing Gulf oil flows while imposing growing economic costs on Iran.

But the strategy has produced something close to a stalemate.

Iran can no longer close the Strait of Hormuz, but it continues threatening ships and regional infrastructure and imposing costs on those who use it.

Meanwhile, the US believes its economic blockade will soon force Iran to make concessions at the table, including on its nuclear program.

Both sides appear to believe time is on their side.

Trump could seek to break this stalemate by responding more aggressively to Iranian attacks, targeting the military infrastructure that supports them.

Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander of US military forces in the region, previewed such an approach in September, saying, “If you shoot at two of our ships, we will impose an even higher cost – taking out three of yours.”

The objective would be to impose clear expectations on Tehran, deter further attacks in the strait and calibrate military pressure to support negotiations and diplomacy.

Tehran could escalate in response, and the conflict might widen. Even so, this approach would aim to balance military pressure and diplomacy to end the war altogether.

Trump may decide that Iran is the defining foreign policy challenge of his second term and that he has a limited opportunity to reshape the Middle East before leaving office.

That could mean expanding the campaign with Israel against Iran and its regional partners, including greater support for Saudi Arabia against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.

US Navy/Getty Images

Trump might pursue a larger objective, as well: expanding the Abraham Accords through an Israeli-Saudi agreement before his presidency ends.

Such a deal was in sight shortly before Hamas’ attacks into Israel on October 7, 2023, as I describe in the first chapter of Brink, my new book on the crisis.

It is not out of the realm of the possible over the next two years, and Trump will likely do all that he can to achieve such a deal. But doing so will be extraordinarily difficult. The region has changed since October 7.

Saudi Arabia would need new security assurances from Washington. Israel would face difficult decisions on Gaza and agreeing to the “pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” that’s already established in UN Security Council Resolution 2803, passed last year.

Israel’s own elections later this month may determine whether this is possible.

Still, presidents approaching the end of their terms often become more ambitious, not less.

Whatever Trump may decide, this path — a new military campaign, tied to a diplomatic achievement — will be a tempting one.

Kacey Chapman/Reuters

If I was in the White House today, I’d probably advise something in the realm of the second option: maintain economic pressure, respond more forcefully to Iranian military attacks and preserve an avenue for a negotiated settlement.

The objective should be a sustainable strategic outcome, with the means calibrated to achieve it.

If a deal with Saudi Arabia becomes possible, pursue it — but do not assume military escalation will improve the odds.

But presidents make the final decisions, not their advisers.

After the midterms, Trump may feel less constrained by politics and more determined to achieve something lasting.

Tehran might want to remember that history.

Trump has two years left. The midterms may make him weaker politically. They could also make him more determined to settle the conflict with Iran on his terms.

布雷特·麦格克是CNN的全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登四位总统手下担任高级国家安全职务。评价并不友好。

2007年1月10日，乔治·W·布什总统宣布向伊拉克增派数万名士兵——这是他总统任期内最不受欢迎的决定之一。作为一名高级顾问，我当时在国家安全顾问斯蒂芬·哈德利的白宫西翼办公室里目睹了这一切。

哈德利订了披萨，我们几个围坐在他的电视机旁。布什讲话结束后，哈德利开始换台，想看看观众的反应。

迪克·德宾参议员代表民主党发表了官方回应。他宣称：“这场战争升级并非美国人民在上届选举中呼吁的变革。” 随后是巴拉克·奥巴马参议员。他承诺将“积极反对总统的提议”。

哈德利关掉了电视。

“这将是一场恶战，”他说。

第二天早上，我陪同布什前往佐治亚州本宁堡，期间我浏览了媒体报道。共和党参议员查克·哈格尔称这次增兵是“自越南战争以来美国最危险的外交政策失误”。

民主党在 2006 年中期选举中横扫国会两院，布什本人称这一结果为“惨败”，这主要是由于公众反对伊拉克战争。

选民的意愿似乎很明确，但布什却置若罔闻。

克里斯·洪德罗斯/盖蒂图片社

David Furst/AFP via Getty Images

在接下来的几个月里，他解雇了国防部长；任命了新的将军；任命了新的驻伊拉克大使；最重要的是，他批准了一项新的战略，要加倍投入这场华盛顿大部分人已经认为会失败的战争。

布什后来写道，这是他总统任期内最艰难的决定之一。

增兵行动显著降低了暴力事件，稳定了伊拉克局势，使其得以生存下去。国会试图通过制定撤军时间表甚至削减美军经费来推翻增兵行动。布什否决了这些措施，而国会也缺乏足够的票数推翻他的否决。

华盛顿的政治格局或许已经改变，但国会并不在指挥链中，总司令决定着正在进行的战争的走向和行动。

Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

伊朗显然认为，11月3日的中期选举将决定其在与美国的持续战争中的命运。

据《华盛顿邮报》周一发表的一篇报道，伊朗官员正在加大对霍尔木兹海峡商船的袭击力度，以抬高能源价格，惩罚美国消费者，并在中期选举前削弱特朗普和共和党。

一位阿拉伯外交官形容德黑兰对此次选举“痴迷”。伊朗国家电视台一直在追踪特朗普的支持率，并推测共和党的败选将限制战争进程，迫使美国对伊朗做出让步。

但伊朗或许会发现，在政治上削弱美国总统并不等同于在战略上约束他。国会拥有战争与和平的权力，包括军费开支的控制权。但利用这些权力迫使一位意志坚定的总统改变路线则是另一回事。

总统可以否决限制军事行动的法案，而国会需要参众两院三分之二的多数票才能推翻总统的否决。即便民主党在11月的大选中取得压倒性胜利，他们也几乎肯定无法获得足够的票数。

立法者们也不愿削减已经身处险境的美国军队的经费。

布什只是其中一个例子。1972年，尼克松在两院民主党占多数席位且反对越南战争的情况下，仍然升级了越南战争。1999年，克林顿在众议院拒绝授权的情况下，仍然在巴尔干地区发动了为期78天的北约空袭行动。2011年，奥巴马未经国会批准，就对利比亚发动了长期军事行动。

民主党在国会占据多数席位无疑会给特朗普带来诸多麻烦，包括调查、听证会，甚至可能限制军事行动。然而，特朗普仍将担任三军统帅两年。而对伊朗问题最重要的决策，仍将在白宫做出。

Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

历史经验表明，特朗普将拥有相对自由的行动空间，他大致可以有三种选择：

特朗普可能会宣布主要军事目标已经实现，减少军事行动，并接受与伊朗达成代价高昂的妥协，以恢复霍尔木兹海峡的正常航运。

这可能会带来短期的政治和经济利益，尤其是在能源价格下降的情况下。

但这样的结果可能使伊朗宣称取得胜利，因为它不仅在美国的军事行动中幸存下来，还表明了它有能力通过威胁国际贸易来迫使对方让步。伊朗还可以利用其资源重建其核计划和导弹计划，从而彻底破坏这场军事行动的既定逻辑。

如果特朗普出于政治原因打算撤回封锁，他完全有理由在中期选举前这样做。但他不顾政治代价坚持维持封锁的决定，使得他在11月之后突然撤退的可能性不大。

美国封锁了伊朗港口，同时帮助商船通过霍尔木兹海峡，增加了海湾石油的输送量，同时也给伊朗造成了日益增长的经济损失。

但这一策略却造成了近乎僵局的局面。

伊朗虽然无法再封锁霍尔木兹海峡，但它仍然威胁船只和地区基础设施，并向使用该海峡的人施加压力。

与此同时，美国认为其经济封锁很快将迫使伊朗在谈判桌上做出让步，包括在核计划问题上。

双方似乎都认为时间站在自己这边。

特朗普可能会寻求打破这种僵局，对伊朗的袭击做出更积极的回应，打击支持这些袭击的军事基础设施。

美国驻该地区军事力量指挥官布拉德·库珀海军上将在9月份预告了这种做法，他说：“如果你们攻击我们的两艘军舰，我们将让你们付出更高的代价——击沉你们的三艘军舰。”

其目标是向德黑兰施加明确的期望，阻止海峡内进一步的袭击，并调整军事压力以支持谈判和外交。

德黑兰可能会采取升级行动作为回应，冲突也可能扩大。即便如此，这种方法旨在平衡军事压力和外交手段，以期彻底结束战争。

特朗普可能会认为伊朗是他第二个任期内外交政策面临的最严峻挑战，并且他卸任前重塑中东格局的机会有限。

这可能意味着扩大与以色列联合对抗伊朗及其地区伙伴的行动，包括加大对沙特阿拉伯对抗伊朗支持的也门胡塞武装的支持力度。

美国海军/盖蒂图片社

特朗普可能还会追求一个更大的目标：在他总统任期结束前，通过以色列和沙特阿拉伯达成协议来扩大《亚伯拉罕协议》的适用范围。

正如我在我的新书《边缘》第一章中所描述的那样，在哈马斯于 2023 年 10 月 7 日袭击以色列之前不久，这样的协议就已近在眼前。《边缘》是一本关于这场危机的书。

未来两年内达成协议并非完全不可能，特朗普很可能会竭尽全力促成此事。但这样做将极其困难。自10月7日以来，该地区的局势已经发生了变化。

沙特阿拉伯需要华盛顿提供新的安全保证。以色列将面临关于加沙问题的艰难抉择，以及是否同意联合国安理会去年通过的第2803号决议中确立的“巴勒斯坦自决和建国之路”。

以色列本月晚些时候举行的选举可能会决定这是否可行。

不过，即将卸任的总统往往会变得更有野心，而不是更消沉。

无论特朗普做出怎样的决定，这条道路——一场新的军事行动与一项外交成就挂钩——都将极具诱惑力。

凯西·查普曼/路透社

如果我今天身在白宫，我可能会建议采取类似于第二种方案的做法：保持经济压力，对伊朗的军事袭击做出更有力的回应，并保留通过谈判解决的途径。

目标应该是实现可持续的战略成果，并为此调整实现手段。

如果与沙特阿拉伯达成协议成为可能，就去争取——但不要认为军事升级会增加成功的几率。

但最终的决定权在总统手中，而不是他们的顾问手中。

中期选举之后，特朗普可能会感到政治束缚减少，并更加决心取得一些持久的成就。

德黑兰或许应该记住这段历史。

特朗普还有两年任期。中期选举可能会削弱他的政治实力，但也可能让他更加坚定地按照自己的条件解决与伊朗的冲突。