Who is Gadi Eisenkot, Netanyahu’s main challenger in Israel’s elections?

One of Gadi Eisenkot’s strongest electoral assets is a simple, undeniable fact: He is not Benjamin Netanyahu. And for many voters in one of the most critical elections in Israel’s history, that may well be enough.

But one of his other assets became the center of a political firestorm when Yinon Magal, a prominent TV host widely considered a mouthpiece for Benjamin Netanyahu, blasted the prime minister’s main rival. In a series of race-baiting remarks, Magal called Eisenkot a “monkey” of “a Mizrahi-Moroccan” heritage managed by “Ashkenazi elites.”

The remarks struck at longstanding inequalities between Jews of European origin and Jews hailing from the Middle East, setting off a political and media firestorm. Magal later claimed he did not mean to mock Eisnekot’s ethnic origins; rather, he was using an underworld term for a frontman managed from behind the scenes. Even Netanyahu, not known for contrition, condemned the remarks.

Still, the episode put a spotlight on Eisenkot’s family history.

For years, many Mizrahi voters have traditionally supported Netanyahu’s Likud party. Eisenkot, 66, a son of Moroccan immigrants who became Israel’s top general, grew up in Tiberias and Eilat, outside the country’s centers of political power. His story contrasts sharply with Netanyahu’s elite Jerusalem upbringing in the circles of power.

Eisenkot rarely mentions his ethnicity, but analysts believe it is part of his appeal. Despite polling in single digits a year ago, he has emerged as the opposition’s leading candidate to unseat Netanyahu in the October 27 vote. Israel has never had a Mizrahi prime minister. If Eisenkot comes out on top, it will be a first.

Eisenkot is the second of nine children and a father of five. He is a relative newcomer to politics after spending most of his life in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

He enlisted in the Golani Brigade in 1978 and rose over a 40-year career to become chief of staff from 2015 to 2019, serving under Netanyahu.

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His tenure included one of the most contentious episodes in recent Israeli military history. In 2016, Sgt. Elor Azaria shot and killed a wounded Palestinian attacker in Hebron. Despite pressure from right-wing politicians – including Netanyahu – Eisenkot backed a military investigation and trial, saying he was defending the army’s discipline and ethics.

He entered politics in 2022 alongside another former chief of staff, Benny Gantz. After the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, the two joined Netanyahu’s emergency war cabinet. But they left in June 2024, pointing to the absence of a clear post-war strategy.

By then, the war had already exacted a heavy toll from Eisenkot’s family. His youngest son, Gal, 25, was killed fighting in Gaza in December 2023, two months into the war. Two of his nephews died in combat as well.

Dima Vazinovich/Middle East Images/AFP/Getty Images

“Over Gal’s grave, I swore that the price he paid, he and his friends, those he knew and those he didn’t, would not be in vain,” Eisenkot wrote in the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth in April 2026. He has called that singular promise central to his political mission.

Eisenkot enters the final stretch as the opposition’s strongest candidate.

Most of the recent opinion polls project that his Yashar party will take 20 to 23 seats of the 120 up for grabs in the Knesset, more than Likud. He also leads Netanyahu in polling on who is most suitable to be prime minister.

But victory is far from assured, and the polling numbers – which can be inaccurate – matter less than Israel’s coalition arithmetic.

Under Israel’s system, even if Eisenkot’s party finishes first, the president does not automatically task him with forming the government. The mandate goes to the lawmaker most likely to assemble a coalition. And that’s where the math begins.

Opinion polls suggest neither Netanyahu’s bloc, which includes far-right and ultra-Orthodox parties, nor the anti-Netanyahu bloc are on track to reach a 61-seat majority. Political deadlock is a very real possibility.

Eisenkot’s path to power runs through left, right and centrist parties, and could depend on the Arab parties in some scenarios. Netanyahu has spent years working to delegitimize any cooperation with the Arab parties, and some of other opposition leaders have already declared they will not work with them.

Eisenkot has said he will try to form a government even without 61 seats, raising the possibility of a minority government sustained by the Arab parties from outside. But right-wing parties that would need to be part of his coalition could reject that option.

A former military planner, Eisenkot is unlike Netanyahu in character, style and temperament. His campaign billboards cast him as “a warrior, a leader, a unifier.” His party is named “Yashar” – “straight” in Hebrew – inspired by former October 7 hostage Eli Sharabi’s phrase, “It’s not right, it’s not left, it’s straight.”

His central campaign promises are domestic and accountability. He pledges a state commission of inquiry into the failures of October 7, which Netanyahu has resisted since the war began. He also promises mandatory military conscription or national service for all citizens; the outgoing coalition depends on parties that demand continued blanket exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews.

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On security, however, he is a hawk who shares many of Netanyahu’s positions. Like nearly all of Netanyahu’s rivals, he broadly supported Israeli military operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. Within the IDF, he is associated with the “ Dahiyeh doctrine” – using overwhelming force against civilian infrastructure to deter future militant attacks – and the “campaign between wars,” a strategy of covert and low-intensity operations meant to erode enemy capabilities without triggering full-scale conflict.

On Iran, he shares Netanyahu’s central goals of preventing it acquiring a nuclear weapon and of weakening Tehran’s proxy network. But he has criticized the lack of strategy in the latest conflict and argues that military gains need to be accompanied by diplomacy.

He lambasted Netanyahu over his handling of the Gaza war, accusing the prime minister of prolonging the conflict and endangering the Israeli hostages for political reasons, a charge which eventually led him to leave the war cabinet.

Eisenkot comes from the security establishment, and some of his coalition partners are likely to be right-wing parties, unwilling to accept radical change to Israel’s strategic direction. On Gaza, he has pledged to end Hamas rule within 18 months, either by implementing Trump’s ceasefire plan or through what he called “creative” military operations.

In practice, Netanyahu’s stated aims are broadly similar, but Eisenkot argues that “as long as Netanyahu is in office, Hamas stays in power.”

Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP/Getty Images

Before entering politics, Eisenkot warned that continued Israeli control over the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank risked creating a bi-national state, which he called “the end of the Zionist vision.” Since October 7, however, he has rejected the two-state solution, recently stating in an interview that anyone who still advocates for it is “delusional,” without presenting any alternative vision.

He does oppose formal annexation and illegal outposts and has called the Israeli government’s plan to build in the controversial E1 area of the West Bank a “mistake” because of the international cost. And he has vowed to crack down on settler violence and what he blatantly labeled “Jewish terrorism,” accusing the government of tying the hands of security forces.

Trump has made his preference clear: on Sunday, he gave Netanyahu his “complete and total endorsement,” calling him a “great warrior prime minister.” Anyone else, he warned, would be the “wrong leader” – suggesting the US would then have to confront Iran by itself.

Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters

Eisenkot and other opposition leaders urged the White House, through intermediaries including Republican megadonor Miriam Adelson, to stay out of the race, according to Israeli sources familiar with the efforts. It did not work. Netanyahu and Trump share a long history, spanning through the 2017 US embassy move to Jerusalem, the 2018 exit from the Iran nuclear deal, the 2020 Abraham Accords and the 2025-2026 strikes on Iran.

When Trump was asked by political analyst Barak Ravid whether he could work with another prime minister, he replied: “Maybe I will, maybe I won’t, who wants to take the chance?”

Yet over the past year, Netanyahu has taken steps that angered Trump and others in his administration, including strikes in Lebanon and Gaza that undercut his regional peace efforts.

A government led by Eisenkot, without Netanyahu’s far-right partners Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, would probably be more moderate and give Trump more room to pursue regional diplomacy, including in the the path of Saudi normalization, a long-held ambition.

While Riyadh still demands a credible path to Palestinian statehood, a coalition that does not depend on the far right would likely find it easier to move in that direction.

加迪·艾森科特最强大的选举优势之一，是一个简单而无可辩驳的事实：他不是本杰明·内塔尼亚胡。对于以色列历史上最关键的选举之一的许多选民来说，这或许就足够了。

但他的另一项资产却引发了一场政治风暴。当时，被广泛认为是本杰明·内塔尼亚胡代言人的知名电视主持人伊农·马加尔猛烈抨击了这位总理的主要竞争对手。马加尔发表了一系列煽动种族仇恨的言论，称艾森科特是“猴子”，拥有“米兹拉希-摩洛哥”血统，并被“阿什肯纳兹精英”操控。

这些言论触及了欧洲裔犹太人和中东裔犹太人之间长期存在的不平等，引发了一场政治和媒体风暴。马加尔后来声称，他并非有意嘲讽艾斯内科特的种族出身；他只是用了一个黑社会术语来指代幕后操纵的傀儡。就连素来不以悔过著称的内塔尼亚胡也谴责了这些言论。

不过，这一集也让人们关注到了艾森科特的家族史。

多年来，许多米兹拉希选民一直支持内塔尼亚胡的利库德集团。现年66岁的艾森科特是摩洛哥移民的儿子，后来成为以色列最高将领。他成长于提比里亚和埃拉特，这两个地方都位于以色列政治权力中心之外。他的经历与内塔尼亚胡在耶路撒冷精英阶层、身处权力中心的成长经历形成了鲜明对比。

艾森科特很少提及自己的族裔背景，但分析人士认为这正是他吸引选民的原因之一。尽管一年前的民调支持率仅为个位数，他如今已成为反对派最有力的候选人，有望在10月27日的选举中击败内塔尼亚胡。以色列历史上从未有过米兹拉希裔总理。如果艾森科特最终胜出，这将是历史上的第一次。

艾森科特在家中九个孩子中排行第二，育有五个子女。他一生的大部分时间都在以色列国防军 (IDF) 服役，因此在政坛上算是新人。

他于 1978 年加入戈兰尼旅，并在 40 年的职业生涯中一路晋升，于 2015 年至 2019 年担任内塔尼亚胡的参谋长。

Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images

在他的任期内，发生了以色列近代军事史上最具争议的事件之一。2016年，埃洛尔·阿扎里亚中士在希伯伦开枪打死了一名受伤的巴勒斯坦袭击者。尽管面临包括内塔尼亚胡在内的右翼政客的压力，艾森科特仍支持对此事进行军事调查和审判，称他是在捍卫军队的纪律和道德。

他于2022年步入政坛，与另一位前幕僚长本尼·甘茨一同加入政坛。2023年10月7日哈马斯领导的袭击以色列后，两人加入了内塔尼亚胡的紧急战时内阁。但他们于2024年6月离职，理由是缺乏明确的战后战略。

那时，战争已经给艾森科特的家庭带来了沉重的打击。他最小的儿子加尔，年仅25岁，在战争爆发两个月后的2023年12月，在加沙的战斗中阵亡。他的两个侄子也在战斗中牺牲。

Dima Vazinovich/中东图片社/法新社/盖蒂图片社

“在加尔的墓前，我发誓，他、他的朋友、他认识的和不认识的人所付出的代价，绝不会白费，”艾森科特在2026年4月的《新消息报》（Yedioth Ahronoth）上写道。他称这一独特的承诺是他政治使命的核心。

艾森科特作为反对派中最有力的候选人进入了竞选的最后阶段。

最近的大多数民意调查预测，他的亚沙尔党将在以色列议会120个席位中赢得20至23席，超过利库德集团。在最合适的总理人选民调中，他也领先于内塔尼亚胡。

但胜利远未得到保证，民意调查数字（可能不准确）远不如以色列的联盟算计重要。

在以色列的体制下，即使艾森科特的政党赢得选举，总统也不会自动委任他组建政府。组阁权会授予最有可能组建联合政府的议员。而这正是关键所在。

民意调查显示，无论是内塔尼亚胡的阵营（包括极右翼和极端正统派政党），还是反内塔尼亚胡阵营，都难以获得61个席位的多数优势。政治僵局极有可能出现。

艾森科特的权力之路横跨左翼、右翼和中间派政党，在某些情况下，阿拉伯政党也可能对其产生影响。内塔尼亚胡多年来一直致力于消除与阿拉伯政党合作的合法性，一些反对派领导人已经公开表示不会与阿拉伯政党合作。

艾森科特表示，即使无法获得61个席位，他也会尝试组建政府，这使得由阿拉伯政党从外部支持组建少数派政府的可能性增加。但那些需要加入其联盟的右翼政党可能会拒绝这一方案。

艾森科特曾是一名军事策划人员，他的性格、风格和气质都与内塔尼亚胡截然不同。他的竞选广告牌将他塑造成“战士、领袖、团结者”。他的政党名为“Yashar”（希伯来语意为“正直”），灵感来源于10月7日事件中被劫持的人质埃利·沙拉比的名言：“既不偏不倚，也不偏不倚，只有正直。”

他竞选的核心承诺是国内事务和问责制。他承诺成立一个国家委员会，调查10月7日事件的失败之处，而内塔尼亚胡自战争爆发以来一直拒绝这样做。他还承诺对所有公民实行强制兵役或国民服务；即将卸任的联合政府依赖于那些要求继续给予极端正统犹太教徒全面豁免的政党。

Erik Marmor/Getty Images

然而，在安全问题上，他是一位鹰派人物，与内塔尼亚胡的许多立场不谋而合。与内塔尼亚胡几乎所有对手一样，他广泛支持以色列在加沙、黎巴嫩和伊朗的军事行动。在以色列国防军内部，他与“达希耶理论”（即利用压倒性武力摧毁民用基础设施以威慑未来武装分子袭击）以及“战间行动”（一种旨在削弱敌方能力而不引发全面冲突的隐蔽低强度行动战略）密切相关。

在伊朗问题上，他与内塔尼亚胡的核心目标一致，即阻止伊朗获得核武器并削弱德黑兰的代理人网络。但他批评了最近冲突中缺乏战略，并认为军事胜利必须与外交手段相辅相成。

他猛烈抨击内塔尼亚胡对加沙战争的处理方式，指责这位总理出于政治原因延长冲突并危及以色列人质的安全，这一指控最终导致他离开了战时内阁。

艾森科特出身于安全机构，他的一些联盟伙伴很可能是右翼政党，这些政党不愿接受以色列战略方向的根本性改变。在加沙问题上，他承诺在18个月内结束哈马斯的统治，要么通过执行特朗普的停火计划，要么通过他所谓的“创造性”军事行动。

实际上，内塔尼亚胡所宣称的目标大体相似，但艾森科特认为，“只要内塔尼亚胡还在执政，哈马斯就会继续掌权。”

Jaafar Ashtiyeh/法新社/盖蒂图片社

在步入政坛之前，艾森科特曾警告说，以色列继续控制被占领的西岸巴勒斯坦人，有可能建立一个双民族国家，他称之为“犹太复国主义愿景的终结”。然而，自10月7日以来，他却拒绝了两国方案，最近在一次采访中表示，任何仍然支持两国方案的人都是“妄想”，却没有提出任何替代方案。

他反对正式吞并和非法定居点，并称以色列政府在西岸备受争议的E1地区建设定居点的计划是“错误”，因为这会引发国际争议。他还誓言要严厉打击定居者暴力和他公然称之为“犹太恐怖主义”的行为，并指责政府束缚了安全部队的手脚。

特朗普已明确表达了自己的倾向：周日，他给予内塔尼亚胡“完全彻底的支持”，称其为“伟大的战士总理”。他警告说，任何其他人都是“错误的领导人”——暗示美国届时将不得不独自对抗伊朗。

伊芙琳·霍克斯坦/路透社

据熟悉内情的以色列消息人士透露，艾森科特和其他反对派领导人曾通过包括共和党巨额捐款人米里亚姆·阿德尔森在内的中间人，敦促白宫不要干预内塔尼亚胡的竞选。但这一努力并未奏效。内塔尼亚胡和特朗普有着长期的交集，从2017年美国将大使馆迁至耶路撒冷、2018年退出伊朗核协议、2020年签署《亚伯拉罕协议》到2025年至2026年对伊朗发动空袭，双方关系密切。

当政治分析家巴拉克·拉维德问特朗普是否愿意与其他总理合作时，他回答说：“也许会，也许不会，谁愿意冒这个险呢？”

然而，在过去一年里，内塔尼亚胡采取了一些激怒特朗普及其政府其他成员的措施，包括在黎巴嫩和加沙发动袭击，破坏了他为实现地区和平所做的努力。

如果艾森科特领导的政府没有内塔尼亚胡的极右翼盟友伊塔马尔·本-格维尔和贝扎莱尔·斯莫特里奇，那么该政府可能会更加温和，并给特朗普更多空间来推行地区外交，包括推进沙特关系正常化——这是他长期以来的夙愿。

尽管利雅得仍然要求巴勒斯坦建国有一条可信的道路，但一个不依赖极右翼的联盟可能会更容易朝着这个方向前进。