Israel is holding its most important election in years. Here’s what’s at stake以色列即将举行多年来最重要的选举。以下是此次选举的关键所在。
When Israelis go the polls on October 27, they will face a familiar question: Should Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s longest-serving prime minister, stay in power?

When Israelis go the polls on October 27, they will face a familiar question: Should Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s longest-serving prime minister, stay in power?
Nearly every recent election has been a referendum on Netanyahu. This time, many Israelis say the choice is more consequential than ever: not only about who will lead the country, but about where it is heading.
It is the first national vote since the Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023, the deadliest security failure in Israel’s history, and the wars that followed in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, which have mobilized much of the country and subsequently deepened Israel’s international isolation.
For many voters, this is the first chance to pass judgment on the leadership that presided over October 7 failures, to decide who should lead the country in conflict and who should carry the burden of increased military service.
Netanyahu’s outgoing government – the first in decades to conclude a full four-year term – relied on far-right and ultra-Orthodox partners, who pushed Israel in a more nationalist and religious direction than ever before. He became the first sitting Israeli prime minister to stand trial on corruption charges as his government pursued a judicial overhaul aimed at weakening the supreme court and other checks on power. The overhaul effort sparked massive protests in 2023.
At stake in Tuesday’s election is whether Israel keeps moving in the nationalistic, conservative and religious direction – or changes course. The answer might not be clear for weeks, because of the way Israeli coalitions are built. Polls suggest neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor the opposition is likely to win a majority alone, meaning the vote may launch Israel’s next political crisis rather than settle it.
Israelis vote for party lists, not individual candidates. In a society divided by nationality, religion, ethnicity and ideology, that produces a crowded field.
Dozens of lists register each cycle – 37 this time around – but only those that pass a 3.25% vote threshold win seats and enter the 120-seat Knesset, Israel’s parliament. Polls suggest 11 to 13 parties will meet the bar; seats are allocated through a proportional representation system.
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The two largest parties are Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud and Yashar, a new centrist party led by Gadi Eisenkot, a former military chief of staff who has emerged as his principal challenger.
The latest Channel 12 opinion poll puts Eisenkot first with 23 seats, ahead of the Likud with 21, though other pollsters differ. On the pro-Netanyahu Channel 14, Likud is projected to take 30 seats and Eisenkot about 20. In head-to-head matchups about who is better suited to be prime minister, Eisenkot has led Netanyahu by a steady margin.
But coming out as the largest party is not enough to win. A prime minister needs 61 seats to form a government, and no party has ever won that majority alone. So, election night usually settles very little. The real contest is the coalition calculus that follows, which can take days, weeks, and even months.
Most polls put Netanyahu’s bloc, made up of Likud, two far-right parties led by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, and two ultra-Orthodox parties, at 49 to 55 seats, short of the 61-seat majority.
The opposition, which looks strong on paper, is deeply fragmented: Eisenkot has parties led by former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and former Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman to his right, and the Democrats party led by Yair Golan on his left. Bennett and Liberman have not endorsed Eisenkot and both have their own premiership aspirations.
According to the opinion polls, any alternative government would probably need the support or the abstention of the Arab parties, and several opposition leaders have ruled out any cooperation.
With no side holding a clear majority, a deadlock, a minority government, a unity government – or another election – are all plausible outcomes.
With neither bloc projected to win comfortably, the outcome may hinge on the margins: which small parties clear the 3.25% threshold and how many votes go to parties that miss it, effectively sending them down the drain.
Turnout matters, since a few thousand votes can determine whether a party disappears entirely or enters parliament, or even becomes the kingmaker that breaks the deadlock between the blocs and reshapes the political map.
Arab voter turnout could be pivotal. Palestinian citizens of Israel – who make up roughly 20% of the Israeli population – have traditionally voted at lower rates than the national average. In the 2022 election, the Arab turnout was 53.2%, while the general turnout was 70.6%. This time, pollsters expect it to exceed 60%. That would raise the threshold and make it harder for small parties to survive.
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Netanyahu’s coalition has several small parties at potential risk, including Smotrich’s Religious Zionism and a new right- wing party led by Ofer Winter, a prominent retired military general.
While most opposition parties sit safely above the line, another new, uncommitted small party, connecting a reservist and economic agenda, is polling close to the 3.25% threshold.
Another factor drawing attention is Israelis living abroad. Israel does not allow overseas voting, except for diplomatic staff, and official data suggests more than 11% of the 7.3 million eligible voters, about 810,000 people, live outside the country. Thousands plan to fly to Israel to vote in person, a number that could potentially impact the election.
In a country that has been through years of war, security and accountability are powerful electoral forces. But opinion polls suggest the cost of living is also a leading concern for many voters – particularly for younger ones.
According to the latest Channel 12 poll, 21% of Israelis rank the economy and the cost of living as their top priority in the coming election – ahead of the ultra-Orthodox conscription with 17%, the October 7 failure at 14% and the war with Iran at 10%.
The picture differs sharply by political bloc: among voters of Netanyahu’s coalition – the war with Iran ranks first at 21%, while among opposition voters, the October 7 failure leads at 28%.
A September survey by the Achord research center at Hebrew University found that 58% of voters aged 22-34 year olds said cost of living and housing prices would drive their vote, while 36% cited security issues.
Despite these figures, the economy has not been a central theme in the campaign topic – until this weekend, when Netanyahu moved it to the top of the agenda. In an interview to Channel 10 focused on the economy, Netanyahu addressed the wave of international condemnation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and said Israel should prepare for possible international banking sanctions by developing “an economy that can circumvent them.” He said crypto currency and blockchain are being considered, and he had requested a plan to deal with it.
The interview sparked harsh criticism of Netanyahu by economists, including a rare rebuke from the Bank of Israel, who publicly rejected the idea, which said that “cryptocurrencies cannot serve as a means of circumventing sanctions.”
Netanyahu’s main rivals portrayed his proposal as evidence he expects Israel to become more isolated. Gadi Eisenkot, Netanyahu’s main challenger, mocked the idea as “BibiCoin” and called it a “threat to national security,” accusing Netanyahu of planning to “dismantle the Israeli economy for generations ahead.”
Netanyahu built his political career as a security hawk, yet he was prime minister on October 7, when Hamas infiltrated the Israeli border, killing more than 1,200 Israelis and taking 251 hostages into Gaza.
He has resisted taking personal responsibility and has rejected demands to establish a state commission of inquiry to investigate the security failures. His opponents have made that lack of accountability a central campaign theme.
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The war has also shaped Eisenkot’s personal story. His son Gal, 25, was killed fighting in Gaza in December 2023, a loss that reinforces his appeal to voters focused on security. Other party lists have recruited bereaved families and relatives of former Israeli hostages as candidates. Opposition parties have also added new reservist candidates, fresh from fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, pushing the issue of military service to the top of the election agenda.
Most Jewish Israelis over 18 are subject to conscription, but ultra-Orthodox men have long enjoyed a blanket exemption for religious study. Netanyahu’s ultra-Orthodox coalition partners have sought to preserve and expand the exemption, even as the Israeli military says it is missing more than 12,000 personnel while being stretched by multi-front fighting. Reservists fill the gap, serving up to hundreds of days a year on repeated deployments.
All the opposition parties have made universal service a central campaign pledge.
The outgoing government was among the most hardline on Palestinian issues in Israel’s history, driven largely by two far-right nationalist party leaders.
Smotrich, the finance minister, who also oversees civil administration in the occupied West Bank, pushed to expand settlements dramatically, while withholding tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which critics say could bring its economic collapse.
Ben-Gvir, the national security minister, championed a death penalty law in the Knesset, toughened conditions for Palestinian prisoners, and weakened police enforcement against Israeli settler violence in the West Bank. Both opposed ending the Gaza war, both are advocating for Israeli settlements in Gaza, and both envision full annexation of and Jewish control over the West Bank.
If Netanyahu returns to power with his current partners, that approach is likely to continue and intensify. Smotrich wants to cancel the Oslo Accords, dismantle the Palestinian Authority, and go to war in the West Bank. Ben-Gvir, who has said he will demand the defense ministry in a new government, has called for Palestinian emigration from Gaza and the West Bank.
An opposition government would probably not represent a radical ideological reversal, and would change the tone more than the substance. Eisenkot, like Netanyahu, has rejected Palestinian statehood, and any opposition coalition would include right-wing parties resistant to any concession.
Still, a government not dependent on Ben- Gvir and Smotrich would likely act more forcefully against settler violence, drop open advocacy of emigration and PA collapse, and be more responsive and receptive to US and regional initiatives in Gaza and elsewhere.
But it would inherit the same unresolved questions: how to disarm Hamas, who rebuilds Gaza, and who restores law and order in the West Bank.
The wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the conflict with Iran and the surge in settler violence have left Israel’s diplomatic standing at its weakest point in decades. Netanyahu faces an International Criminal Court warrant alleging war crimes in Gaza, and he avoids traveling to most European countries because of the risk of being arrested. US President Donald Trump endorsed him ahead of the vote, but the picture in the wider American public is much less friendly.
A March 2026 Pew Research Center poll found 60% of US adults surveyed held an unfavorable view of Israel, and 59% had little or no confidence in Netanyahu to do the right thing regarding global affairs. Pew’s Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey pointed the same way, with majorities in most of the 36 countries it covered holding unfavorable views of Israel and its prime minister.
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The shift has been sharpest in Western Europe, where several countries – including the United Kingdom, France and Canada – have recognized a Palestinian state and imposed sanctions and trade restrictions on Israeli settlements and individuals and entities linked to settler violence. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich have been personally sanctioned and are facing travel bans from multiple Western countries.
If Netanyahu’s government is re-elected, that international pressure will likely grow. A government led by Eisenkot or another opposition figure might see some easing of tensions, at least at first. Firmer action on settler violence could open a window to restore warmer ties with some European governments and the US Democratic party.
But it is not likely to reverse the broader trend. The main opposition contenders are not expected to overhaul Israel’s security and foreign policy, so a new government would regain some diplomatic breathing room, but not a clean slate.
10 月 27 日,以色列人将前往投票站,届时他们将面临一个熟悉的问题:该国任期最长的总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡是否应该继续执政?
近几届大选几乎都变成了对内塔尼亚胡的一次全民公投。这一次,许多以色列人表示,这次的选择比以往任何时候都更加重要:不仅关乎谁将领导国家,更关乎国家的未来走向。
这是自 2023 年 10 月 7 日哈马斯领导的袭击事件(以色列历史上最致命的安全失败)以及随后在加沙、黎巴嫩和伊朗爆发的战争以来的首次全国选举。这些战争动员了该国大部分地区,并随后加深了以色列的国际孤立。
对于许多选民来说,这是他们第一次有机会对导致 10 月 7 日失败的领导层进行评判,决定谁应该在冲突中领导国家,谁应该承担增加兵役的重担。
内塔尼亚胡即将卸任的政府——几十年来首个完整完成四年任期的政府——依靠极右翼和极端正统派盟友,将以色列推向了前所未有的民族主义和宗教化方向。他本人也成为首位因腐败指控受审的在任以色列总理,因为他的政府推行了旨在削弱最高法院和其他权力制衡机制的司法改革。这项改革在2023年引发了大规模抗议活动。
周二的选举关乎以色列是否会继续朝着民族主义、保守主义和宗教化的方向发展,还是会改变路线。由于以色列的执政联盟结构复杂,答案可能要几周后才能明朗。民调显示,内塔尼亚胡的联盟和反对派都不太可能单独赢得多数席位,这意味着此次选举或许会引发以色列的下一场政治危机,而不是解决危机。
以色列选民投票给政党名单,而不是单个候选人。在一个因民族、宗教、种族和意识形态而分裂的社会里,这导致候选人众多。
每届选举都有数十个政党名单登记——这次有37个——但只有得票率超过3.25%的政党才能赢得席位,进入拥有120个席位的以色列议会(克内塞特)。民调显示,将有11到13个政党达到门槛;议席采用比例代表制分配。
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两大政党分别是内塔尼亚胡的右翼利库德集团和由前军事总参谋长加迪·艾森科特领导的新兴中间派政党亚沙尔党,艾森科特已成为内塔尼亚胡的主要挑战者。
最新一期第12频道民调显示,艾森科特以23个席位领先,利库德集团以21个席位位居第二,但其他民调机构的预测有所不同。在支持内塔尼亚胡的第14频道,利库德集团预计将获得30个席位,艾森科特则有望获得约20个席位。在关于谁更适合担任总理的直接对决中,艾森科特一直以稳定的优势领先于内塔尼亚胡。
但仅仅成为最大党并不足以赢得大选。总理需要61个席位才能组建政府,而历史上没有任何一个政党能够单独赢得如此多数席位。因此,选举之夜通常能解决的问题非常有限。真正的竞争在于随后的组阁策略,这可能需要数天、数周甚至数月的时间。
大多数民调显示,内塔尼亚胡的联盟(由利库德集团、贝扎莱尔·斯莫特里奇和伊塔马尔·本-格维尔领导的两个极右翼政党以及两个极端正统派政党组成)将获得 49 至 55 个席位,距离 61 个席位的多数席位还差 49 至 55 个席位。
反对派表面上看起来很强大,但实际上却四分五裂:艾森科特右翼是前总理纳夫塔利·贝内特和前国防部长阿维格多·利伯曼领导的政党,左翼则是亚伊尔·戈兰领导的民主党。贝内特和利伯曼都没有公开支持艾森科特,而且两人都有各自的总理职位。
根据民意调查,任何替代政府都可能需要阿拉伯政党的支持或弃权,而几位反对派领导人已经排除了任何合作的可能性。
由于没有一方获得绝对多数席位,因此出现僵局、少数派政府、联合政府,或者再次举行选举,都是可能的结果。
由于预计两大阵营都无法轻松获胜,最终结果可能取决于得票差距:哪些小党能够跨越 3.25% 的门槛,以及有多少选票流向未能达到门槛的小党,导致它们最终落败。
投票率很重要,因为几千张选票就能决定一个政党是彻底消失还是进入议会,甚至成为打破各阵营僵局、重塑政治版图的“造王者”。
阿拉伯选民的投票率可能至关重要。以色列巴勒斯坦公民约占以色列总人口的20%,他们的投票率历来低于全国平均水平。在2022年的选举中,阿拉伯选民的投票率为53.2%,而总体投票率为70.6%。此次民调机构预计阿拉伯选民的投票率将超过60%。这将提高当选门槛,使小党派更难生存。
艾哈迈德·加拉布利/法新社/盖蒂图片社
内塔尼亚胡的联合政府中有几个小党派面临潜在风险,其中包括斯莫特里奇的宗教犹太复国主义党和由著名退役将军奥弗·温特领导的新右翼政党。
虽然大多数反对党都稳居支持率之上,但另一个新的、立场不明的小党,将预备役和经济议程结合起来,民调支持率接近 3.25% 的门槛。
另一个引人关注的因素是居住在海外的以色列人。以色列不允许海外选民投票,外交人员除外。官方数据显示,在730万符合投票资格的选民中,超过11%的人(约81万人)居住在国外。数千人计划飞往以色列亲自投票,这一数字可能会对选举结果产生影响。
在一个饱受多年战乱的国家,安全和问责制是强大的选举动力。但民意调查显示,生活成本也是许多选民——尤其是年轻选民——最为关注的问题。
根据第 12 频道的最新民意调查,21% 的以色列人将经济和生活成本列为即将到来的选举中的首要任务——其次是极端正统派征兵(17%)、10 月 7 日的失败(14%)和与伊朗的战争(10%)。
不同政治集团的看法截然不同:在内塔尼亚胡执政联盟的选民中,对伊朗的战争以 21% 的支持率位居榜首;而在反对派选民中,10 月 7 日的失败则以 28% 的支持率领先。
希伯来大学 Achord 研究中心 9 月份的一项调查发现,58% 的 22-34 岁选民表示,生活成本和住房价格将影响他们的投票,而 36% 的人则提到了安全问题。
尽管有这些数据,经济问题在竞选活动中一直并非核心议题——直到本周末,内塔尼亚胡才将其置于首要位置。在接受以色列第十频道关于经济问题的采访时,内塔尼亚胡谈到了国际社会对以色列在西岸定居点建设的谴责浪潮,并表示以色列应该通过发展“能够规避制裁的经济体系”来应对可能出现的国际银行制裁。他表示,以色列正在考虑加密货币和区块链技术,并已要求制定相关计划。
这次采访引发了经济学家对内塔尼亚胡的严厉批评,其中包括以色列银行罕见的公开谴责,该银行公开驳斥了这一想法,称“加密货币不能作为规避制裁的手段”。
内塔尼亚胡的主要竞争对手将他的提议解读为他预期以色列将变得更加孤立的证据。内塔尼亚胡的主要挑战者加迪·艾森科特嘲讽这一想法为“内塔尼亚胡币”,并称其“威胁国家安全”,指责内塔尼亚胡计划“摧毁以色列未来几代人的经济”。
内塔尼亚胡以安全鹰派的形象建立起自己的政治生涯,然而,10 月 7 日,哈马斯渗透到以色列边境,造成 1200 多名以色列人死亡,并将 251 名人质劫持到加沙地带,当时他正是以色列总理。
他一直拒绝承担个人责任,也拒绝成立国家调查委员会调查安全失职事件的要求。他的对手将这种缺乏问责制作为竞选的核心议题。
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战争也影响了艾森科特的个人经历。他25岁的儿子加尔于2023年12月在加沙阵亡,这一悲剧更加凸显了他对关注安全问题的选民的吸引力。其他政党也招募了阵亡将士家属和前以色列人质的亲属作为候选人。反对党还增加了刚从加沙和黎巴嫩战场归来的预备役军人候选人,将兵役问题推到了选举议程的首位。
大多数18岁以上的以色列犹太人都必须服兵役,但极端正统派男性长期以来享有因宗教学习而免服兵役的特权。内塔尼亚胡的极端正统派执政联盟伙伴一直试图保留并扩大这项豁免权,尽管以色列军方表示,由于多线作战而兵力捉襟见肘,目前缺兵超过12000人。预备役人员填补了这一空缺,他们每年多次部署,服役时间长达数百天。
所有反对党都将普及公共服务作为竞选的核心承诺。
即将卸任的以色列政府是历史上对巴勒斯坦问题立场最强硬的政府之一,这主要归因于两位极右翼民族主义政党领导人。
财政部长斯莫特里奇同时还负责被占领的西岸地区的民政管理,他大力推动定居点的扩张,同时扣留巴勒斯坦权力机构(PA)的税收收入,批评人士称这可能导致巴勒斯坦权力机构的经济崩溃。
国家安全部长本-格维尔在以色列议会力推死刑法案,加重了巴勒斯坦囚犯的待遇,并削弱了警方对西岸以色列定居者暴力行为的执法力度。两人都反对结束加沙战争,都支持在加沙建立以色列定居点,并且都设想完全吞并西岸并由犹太人控制。
如果内塔尼亚胡及其现有盟友再次掌权,这种做法很可能会延续并加剧。斯莫特里奇希望废除奥斯陆协议,解散巴勒斯坦权力机构,并在西岸发动战争。本-格维尔曾表示,他将在新政府中要求获得国防部长一职,并呼吁巴勒斯坦人从加沙和西岸地区迁出。
反对派政府不太可能代表意识形态的彻底转变,其改变的更多是基调而非实质。艾森科特和内塔尼亚胡一样,拒绝承认巴勒斯坦建国,任何反对派联盟都将包含不愿做出任何让步的右翼政党。
不过,一个不依赖本·格维尔和斯莫特里奇的政府可能会更强烈地打击定居者暴力,放弃公开鼓吹移民和巴勒斯坦权力机构崩溃,并对美国和地区在加沙及其他地区的倡议做出更积极的回应和接受。
但它也将继承同样的未决问题:如何解除哈马斯的武装,谁来重建加沙,以及谁来恢复西岸的法律和秩序。
加沙和黎巴嫩的战争、与伊朗的冲突以及定居者暴力事件的激增,使以色列的外交地位跌至数十年来的最低点。内塔尼亚胡面临国际刑事法院对其在加沙犯下战争罪行的逮捕令,由于担心被捕,他避免前往大多数欧洲国家。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普在选举前公开支持他,但美国民众对他的看法远没有那么友好。
2026年3月皮尤研究中心的一项民意调查发现,60%的受访美国成年人对以色列持负面看法,59%的人对内塔尼亚胡在国际事务中能否做出正确决策缺乏信心或完全没有信心。皮尤研究中心2026年春季的全球态度调查也指向了同样的结果,在其调查的36个国家中,大多数国家的大多数受访者都对以色列及其总理持负面看法。
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这一转变在西欧最为显著,包括英国、法国和加拿大在内的多个国家承认巴勒斯坦国,并对以色列定居点以及与定居者暴力活动有关的个人和实体实施制裁和贸易限制。本-格维尔和斯莫特里奇已受到个人制裁,并面临多个西方国家的旅行禁令。
如果内塔尼亚胡政府连任,国际压力可能会增加。由艾森科特或其他反对派人士领导的政府或许能缓解一些紧张局势,至少在初期如此。对定居者暴力采取更强硬的措施,可能有助于恢复与部分欧洲国家政府和美国民主党的友好关系。
但这不太可能扭转大趋势。主要反对派候选人预计不会彻底改革以色列的安全和外交政策,因此新政府虽然能重新获得一些外交回旋余地,但并非一切从零开始。