[ED] Prepare for era of extreme aging

Korea is heading toward the world’s oldest population by 2060, and the editorial warns that aging will strain pensions, health care, labor and public finances. A U.S. Census Bureau report projects the share of people 65 and older will rise to 41 percent and the old-age dependency ratio to 81.6. The piece argues Korea needs structural reform in housing, education, labor, pensions and welfare, plus political consensus. It says delay would make the transition a national crisis rather than a manageable change.

The U.S. Census Bureau projected in 2025 that Koreans aged 65 and older will account for 41 percent of the population in 2060, up from 20.3 percent last year.

The share of people aged 80 and above is expected to rise from 4.8 percent to 18.3 percent.

Korea’s old-age dependency ratio is projected to climb from 29.5 elderly people per 100 working-age adults to 81.6.

Korea had the highest old-age poverty rate among OECD members at 40.5 percent in 2020.

The government estimates that more than one in 10 Koreans aged 65 or older could have dementia by 2040.

Published Sep 7, 2026 2:05 pm KST

Korea faces disaster unless rapid population aging is properly addressed

Older adults wait to receive free meals near Tapgol Park in Seoul's Jongno District, July 28. Yonhap

Korea is on course to have the world’s oldest population by 2060, overtaking Japan. The projection is more than a demographic curiosity. It is a warning that one of the world’s most advanced economies is approaching an unprecedented test of its pension, health care, labor and fiscal systems.

According to a 2025 report from the U.S. Census Bureau, the share of Korea’s population aged 65 and over is projected to rise from 20.3 percent last year to 41 percent in 2060, the highest in the world. The proportion aged 80 and above is expected to nearly quadruple, from 4.8 percent to 18.3 percent. Even more striking, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to jump from 29.5 elderly people for every 100 working-age adults to 81.6. In practical terms, fewer than two workers will be supporting each older person.

This is not simply a welfare challenge. It threatens economic growth itself. The era in which a large working-age population provided a demographic dividend is ending. Korea is entering an era of demographic drag, in which a shrinking labor force, rising dependency and growing demand for public services will weigh increasingly on productivity and public finances.

The country’s already-high elderly poverty rate makes the problem more acute. At 40.5 percent in 2020, Korea had the highest old-age poverty rate among OECD members. The late introduction of the national pension system, limited benefit coverage, inadequate replacement rates and a seniority-based wage structure that encourages early retirement have all contributed. Meanwhile, longer life expectancy is increasing demand for medical and long-term care. The government estimates that more than one in 10 Koreans aged 65 or older could have dementia by 2040, placing additional pressure on health and care budgets.

Successive governments have spent hundreds of trillions of won addressing low birthrates and population aging. Cash allowances, expanded parental leave and housing support for young couples have all grown. Yet these measures have done little to alter the structural conditions discouraging marriage and childbirth: prohibitively high housing costs, intense educational competition, expensive private tutoring and insecure employment.

The recent uptick in the total fertility rate is encouraging, but it should not invite complacency. Demographic trends have long lags. Even a sustained recovery in births would take decades to translate into a larger workforce. Korea therefore has to pursue two strategies simultaneously: remove the structural barriers to having children while preparing for an aging society that is already inevitable.

That means shifting from subsidies to structural reform. Young people need affordable housing, stable jobs and realistic ways to balance work and family life. Education policy must address the intense competition for university credentials and the enormous burden of private tutoring. Family policy should also recognize changing social realities by extending meaningful support to diverse family arrangements, including unmarried couples.

At the same time, Korea must make better use of the workers it will have. Raising the effective retirement age, expanding post-retirement employment, reforming seniority-based pay and increasing women’s labor force participation should be priorities. Carefully managed immigration will also become increasingly important.

Pension reform cannot be postponed. Nor can the redesign of health, long-term care and other social programs around the realities of a super-aged society. Raising the age threshold for some senior benefits may warrant consideration as life expectancy rises, but such changes must not become a pretext for shifting costs onto an already vulnerable elderly population. With elderly poverty so high, reform must balance fiscal sustainability with adequate protection.

Above all, demographic policy requires political courage and continuity. Population decline is a decadeslong challenge that cannot be managed within the electoral cycle. Korea’s failure to respond quickly enough when fertility first began to fall should serve as a lesson: delay is itself a policy choice, and an expensive one.

The country cannot stop demographic aging. It can, however, determine whether the transition becomes a national crisis or a manageable transformation. That will require coordinated reforms in pensions, taxation, education, housing, labor and welfare — and, above all, a political consensus strong enough to outlast individual governments.

到2060年，韩国将成为世界上人口老龄化程度最高的国家。社论警告称，人口老龄化将给养老金、医疗保健、劳动力和公共财政带来巨大压力。美国人口普查局的一份报告预测，65岁及以上人口的比例将上升至41%，老年抚养比将达到81.6%。文章认为，韩国需要在住房、教育、劳动力、养老金和福利等领域进行结构性改革，并达成政治共识。文章指出，拖延只会使人口转型演变成一场全国性危机，而非可控的变革。

美国人口普查局在 2025 年预测，到 2060 年，65 岁及以上的韩国人将占总人口的 41%，高于去年的 20.3%。

预计80岁及以上人口的比例将从4.8%上升至18.3%。

预计韩国老年抚养比将从每 100 名劳动年龄成年人对应 29.5 名老年人上升到 81.6。

2020年，韩国在经合组织成员国中老年贫困率最高，达到40.5%。

政府估计，到 2040 年，超过十分之一的 65 岁及以上韩国人可能会患有痴呆症。

发布于2026年9月7日下午2:05（韩国标准时间）

韩国若不妥善应对人口快速老龄化问题，将面临灾难。

7月28日，在首尔钟路区塔谷公园附近，老年人排队领取免费餐食。（韩联社）

到2060年，韩国有望超越日本，成为世界上老龄化程度最高的国家。这不仅仅是人口统计上的一个奇特现象，更是一个警示：作为世界上最发达的经济体之一，韩国的养老金、医疗保健、劳动力和财政体系正面临前所未有的考验。

根据美国人口普查局2025年的报告，韩国65岁及以上人口的比例预计将从去年的20.3%上升到2060年的41%，位居世界第一。80岁及以上人口的比例预计将增长近四倍，从4.8%增至18.3%。更令人震惊的是，老年抚养比预计将从每100名劳动年龄人口对应29.5名老年人跃升至81.6。这意味着，届时平均每位老年人需要不到两名劳动人口供养。

这不仅仅是福利方面的挑战，它还威胁到经济增长本身。庞大的劳动年龄人口带来人口红利的时代正在结束。韩国正步入人口拖累时代，劳动力萎缩、人口抚养比上升以及对公共服务需求的增长，将日益加剧生产力下降和公共财政压力。

韩国本已居高不下的老年贫困率使问题更加严峻。2020年，韩国老年贫困率高达40.5%，在经合组织成员国中位居榜首。造成这一问题的原因包括：国民养老金制度建立较晚、福利覆盖范围有限、养老金替代率不足以及鼓励提前退休的基于工龄的工资结构。与此同时，预期寿命的延长也增加了对医疗和长期护理的需求。政府估计，到2040年，超过十分之一的65岁及以上韩国人可能患有痴呆症，这将给医疗和护理预算带来更大的压力。

历届政府已投入数千万亿韩元用于应对低生育率和人口老龄化问题。现金补贴、延长育儿假以及为年轻夫妇提供的住房支持等措施均有所增加。然而，这些措施对阻碍结婚和生育的结构性因素收效甚微：高昂的住房成本、激烈的教育竞争、昂贵的课外辅导以及不稳定的就业状况。

近期总和生育率的回升令人鼓舞，但这不应成为自满的理由。人口趋势具有长期滞后性。即使出生率持续回升，也需要数十年才能转化为更大的劳动力。因此，韩国必须同时采取两项策略：一方面消除生育的结构性障碍，另一方面为不可避免的人口老龄化做好准备。

这意味着要从补贴转向结构性改革。年轻人需要负担得起的住房、稳定的工作以及切实可行的工作与家庭生活平衡方案。教育政策必须解决大学学历竞争激烈以及课外辅导负担过重的问题。家庭政策也应正视不断变化的社会现实，为包括未婚伴侣在内的各种家庭结构提供切实有效的支持。

与此同时，韩国必须更好地利用现有劳动力。提高实际退休年龄、扩大退休后就业、改革基于资历的薪酬制度以及提高女性劳动参与率应是优先事项。谨慎管理移民也将变得日益重要。

养老金改革刻不容缓。同样，围绕超老龄化社会的现实，对医疗、长期护理和其他社会项目进行重新设计也势在必行。随着预期寿命的延长，提高部分老年福利的年龄门槛或许值得考虑，但此类调整绝不能成为将成本转嫁给本已脆弱的老年群体的借口。鉴于老年贫困率居高不下，改革必须在财政可持续性和充分保障之间取得平衡。

人口政策首先需要政治勇气和持续性。人口下降是一个持续数十年的挑战，无法在选举周期内解决。韩国在生育率最初开始下降时未能迅速做出反应，这应该给我们敲响警钟：拖延本身就是一种政策选择，而且代价高昂。

国家无法阻止人口老龄化，但它可以决定这一转型是演变成一场国家危机，还是一次可控的变革。这需要养老金、税收、教育、住房、劳动力和福利等领域的协调改革，而最重要的是，需要达成足以超越历届政府的强大政治共识。