Beyond sovereignty: Why OPCON transfer matters for South Korea's security

South Korea’s push to transfer wartime operational control from the United States is again contentious, as the Lee Jae Myung administration seeks to accelerate it and the Trump administration emphasizes agreed conditions. The postponement of the Security Consultative Meeting until next year indicates that the allies have not resolved their differences. Kim Jung-sup argues that developing South Korea’s ability to plan and conduct military operations is both a sovereignty issue and an urgent security priority. He says a Korean-led command could support a more sustainable alliance based on shared responsibility.

South Korea and the United States formally agreed to transfer wartime OPCON in 2007.

The article says the United States has described its security commitment to the Korean Peninsula as decisive but more limited.

The author says U.S. support in a Korean Peninsula crisis is more likely to center on air and naval forces than on a large-scale deployment of additional ground forces.

The author argues that a Korean-led operational command would help South Korea shape military strategy, force modernization and its future military structure.

Kim Jung-sup is president of the Sejong Institute.

Published Nov 4, 2026 9:30 am KST

The long-standing debate over the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) is once again emerging as a contentious issue in the ROK-U.S. alliance. The Lee Jae Myung administration has repeatedly expressed its determination to accelerate the transfer, while the Trump administration remains reluctant, emphasizing the need to meet the agreed conditions. The fact that the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), at which the two sides were expected to discuss and finalize a roadmap for the transfer, has been postponed until next year suggests that their differences remain unresolved. There is a real possibility that the OPCON issue could become a source of friction in the alliance.

The sensitivity and importance of this issue stem from its direct connection to two fundamental values: sovereignty and security. From the perspective of national sovereignty, the commander-in-chief should be able to exercise full command authority over the country's own armed forces. President Lee has also stressed that South Korea cannot continue to leave its military sovereignty in the hands of another country. From a security perspective, however, there are concerns that changing the command structure without adequate preparation could weaken deterrence. This is why meeting the conditions for the transfer has been given such strong emphasis. The tension between sovereignty and security has led to repeated delays over the years.

However, given the profound changes in the international order and the increasingly transactional nature of U.S. alliance policy, it is time to move beyond the conventional thinking that treats sovereignty and security as competing values. Excessive dependence on American support can no longer be regarded as an entirely reliable foundation for South Korea's security. The Trump administration has made it clear that its security commitment to the Korean Peninsula will take the form of support that is "decisive but more limited." For many years, analysts have pointed out that a large-scale deployment of additional U.S. ground forces in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely, and that support centered on air and naval forces is a more realistic scenario.

If this is the case, delaying the transfer of OPCON could actually increase structural vulnerabilities in South Korea's security. As U.S. security commitments to the Korean Peninsula evolve, maintaining a U.S.-led command structure could widen the gap between the actual level of American involvement and the current framework of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Developing the South Korean military's own capabilities to plan and conduct military operations must therefore be treated as an urgent security priority, not something that can be postponed indefinitely.

The transfer of OPCON is about much more than operational command. A military that does not plan its own wars will find it difficult to develop independent strategic thinking, no matter how large or powerful it becomes. Establishing a South Korean-led operational command structure is essential for the country to take the initiative in developing military strategies, determining the direction of force modernization, and designing its future military structure. You cannot improve your driving skills by remaining in the passenger seat; you have to take the wheel yourself.

Greater strategic autonomy resulting from the transfer would also have a positive impact on how North Korea and neighboring countries, including China, perceive and deal with South Korea. The ROK-U.S. alliance, in turn, could evolve into a healthier and more mutually beneficial partnership. Rather than viewing changes in the Trump administration's alliance policy solely as a weakening of American commitments, South Korea should seize this opportunity to make the alliance more sustainable by expanding its own capabilities and shouldering greater responsibility.

A sober look at our history reveals that since the establishment of the Republic of Korea there have been very few periods during which South Korea has exercised full military command authority over its own armed forces. This was largely due to the unavoidable security realities and historical circumstances. However, after living with these constraints on military sovereignty for so long, we have arguably become accustomed to what should be recognized as an abnormal situation that needs to be corrected.

Nearly two decades have passed since South Korea and the United States formally agreed in 2007 to transfer wartime OPCON. During this period, South Korea's national power and military capabilities have grown dramatically. However, the requirements have become increasingly demanding. New tasks and expectations continue to be added by the U.S. side. It is much like a high-jump competition in which the bar keeps being raised higher and higher.

It is time, therefore, to move beyond the recurring concerns about insufficient preparation and arguments that the transfer is premature, which have persisted for decades. South Korea's military capabilities have grown considerably, and the evolving nature of the ROK-U.S. alliance, as well as the changing division of responsibilities between the two countries, makes it increasingly difficult to maintain the status quo.

The transfer of wartime OPCON is necessary not only as a matter of principle and the restoration of military sovereignty, but also for the security of the Republic of Korea itself. Moreover, this should not be approached simply as an attempt to reclaim something the United States is reluctant to give up in the name of sovereignty. Instead, South Korea should engage Washington from the perspective of redesigning the alliance for the future and building a genuine partnership based on shared responsibilities and mutual respect.

韩国推动战时作战指挥权从美国移交的进程再次引发争议，李在明政府力图加快这一进程，而特朗普政府则强调必须满足双方已达成的条件。安全磋商会议推迟至明年，表明盟国之间的分歧尚未消除。金正燮认为，提升韩国规划和执行军事行动的能力既是主权问题，也是当务之急。他表示，由韩国主导的指挥体系有助于建立一个基于共同责任的更可持续的联盟。

2007年，韩国和美国正式同意移交战时作战指挥权。

文章称，美国已将其对朝鲜半岛的安全承诺描述为果断但更为有限。

作者认为，美国在朝鲜半岛危机中的支持更有可能集中在空军和海军力量上，而不是大规模部署额外的地面部队。

作者认为，由韩国领导的作战指挥部将有助于韩国制定军事战略、实现军队现代化并构建未来的军事结构。

金正燮是世宗研究所所长。

发布于2026年11月4日上午9:30（韩国标准时间）

关于战时作战指挥权（OPCON）移交的长期争论再次成为韩美同盟内部的棘手问题。李在明政府多次表示决心加快移交进程，而特朗普政府则态度犹豫，强调必须满足双方商定的条件。原定双方讨论并最终确定移交路线图的安全磋商会议（SCM）已被推迟至明年，这表明双方的分歧依然存在。战时作战指挥权问题极有可能成为韩美同盟内部摩擦的根源。

这一问题的敏感性和重要性源于其与主权和安全两大基本价值观的直接关联。从国家主权的角度来看，三军统帅应当能够对本国武装部队行使完全指挥权。李明博总统也曾强调，韩国不能继续将军事主权拱手让给他人。然而，从安全角度来看，人们担心在准备不足的情况下改变指挥结构可能会削弱威慑力。正因如此，满足移交条件才被如此重视。多年来，主权与安全之间的矛盾导致了移交工作的一再拖延。

然而，鉴于国际秩序的深刻变化以及美国联盟政策日益趋向交易性质，我们必须摒弃将主权与安全视为相互冲突价值的传统思维。过度依赖美国的支持已不再是韩国安全可靠的保障。特朗普政府已明确表示，其对朝鲜半岛的安全承诺将采取“果断但更为有限”的支持形式。多年来，分析人士一直指出，一旦朝鲜半岛发生危机，美国不太可能大规模增派地面部队，而以空军和海军力量为核心的支持才是更为现实的选择。

如果情况属实，推迟移交作战指挥权实际上可能会加剧韩国安全方面的结构性脆弱性。随着美国对朝鲜半岛安全承诺的演变，维持美国主导的指挥结构可能会扩大美国实际参与程度与当前韩美联合司令部框架之间的差距。因此，发展韩国军队自身规划和执行军事行动的能力必须被视为一项紧迫的安全优先事项，而不能无限期地推迟。

作战指挥权的移交远不止于作战指挥。一支军队如果不能自主规划战争，无论其规模多么庞大、实力多么强大，都难以发展出独立的战略思维。建立由韩国主导的作战指挥体系，对于韩国在制定军事战略、确定部队现代化方向以及设计未来军事结构方面掌握主动权至关重要。正如你坐在副驾驶座上无法提升驾驶技术一样，你必须亲自驾驶。

战略自主权的提升也将对朝鲜及包括中国在内的邻国如何看待和对待韩国产生积极影响。反过来，韩美同盟也可能发展成为更健康、更互利的伙伴关系。韩国不应仅仅将特朗普政府同盟政策的变化视为美国承诺的削弱，而应抓住这一契机，通过提升自身能力和承担更大责任，使同盟关系更具可持续性。

冷静地审视历史，我们会发现，自大韩民国建国以来，韩国极少拥有对其武装部队的完全军事指挥权。这主要是由于不可避免的安全现实和历史环境所致。然而，在长期忍受军事主权受限的局面之后，我们或许已经习惯了这种需要纠正的异常状况。

自2007年韩国和美国正式达成移交战时作战指挥权的协议以来，已近二十年。在此期间，韩国的国家实力和军事能力得到了显著提升。然而，随之而来的要求也越来越高。美方不断提出新的任务和期望，这就像一场跳高比赛，横杆不断升高。

因此，是时候摒弃那些持续数十年的、关于准备不足和移交为时尚早的反复担忧了。韩国的军事能力已显著提升，韩美同盟的性质也在不断演变，两国间的责任划分也在不断变化，这些都使得维持现状变得越来越困难。

战时作战指挥权的移交不仅是原则问题和恢复军事主权的必要之举，也关乎大韩民国自身的安全。此外，这不应被视为美国试图夺回其不愿以主权之名放弃的权力。相反，韩国应从重塑未来同盟、建立基于共同责任和相互尊重的真正伙伴关系的角度出发，与华盛顿展开对话。