[COLUMN] Seoul should consider joining UK-France-led Hormuz mission

Korea should consider joining a U.K.-France-led mission in the Strait of Hormuz rather than automatically answering a U.S. request for a warship. The column says the mission should be defensive, multinational and separate from U.S. combat operations against Iran. It argues that any Korean deployment should wait until hostilities end, stay limited and receive National Assembly oversight. The Strait matters to Korea because 61 percent of its crude oil imports passed through it last year.

The column says 61 percent of Korea’s crude oil imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz last year.

The proposed mission is described as defensive, with merchant-vessel escorts, mine clearance, maritime surveillance and aerial surveillance.

The author says Korea should not deploy alone or place its forces directly under the command structure of U.S. operations against Iran.

Any Korean contribution should be limited and any substantial expansion should require renewed approval by the National Assembly.

The article says Korea has previously deployed more than 320,000 personnel on a cumulative basis during the Vietnam War and later sent support forces to the Gulf War, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Published Sep 7, 2026 11:36 am KST

Updated Sep 7, 2026 5:38 pm KST

Korea faces a dilemma over whether to deploy military assets to the Strait of Hormuz. The alliance with the United States is too important for Seoul to simply disregard Washington’s request for a military contribution. At the same time, dispatching a warship would carry serious consequences. Such a deployment could be interpreted as Korea joining U.S. military action against Iran, unnecessarily turning Tehran into an adversary.

The multinational maritime mission being developed by the United Kingdom and France deserves close attention. Early reports indicated that roughly 15 countries were involved in operational planning, while a considerably larger number later joined diplomatic consultations and expressed political support. Korea has also endorsed an international statement calling for freedom of navigation in the Strait and has discussed possible contributions with the United States, Britain and France. Seoul’s choice, therefore, need not be reduced to a simple question of accepting or rejecting a U.S. request.

The most important feature of the U.K.-France initiative is its stated effort to distinguish itself from U.S. military operations against Iran. Its purpose is not to attack or retaliate against Iran, but to ensure the safe passage of civilian vessels and remove mines and other threats to navigation. The proposed mission would focus on defensive activities such as merchant-vessel escorts, mine clearance and maritime and aerial surveillance. It is also intended to begin only after a ceasefire, consent by the relevant parties and other conditions necessary for a sufficiently permissive operational environment are in place.

That distinction is crucial for Korea. Sending a Korean warship to support U.S. operations against Iran would carry a fundamentally different political and military meaning from joining a multinational effort to restore an international sea lane. The former would expose Seoul to accusations that it had effectively become a party to America’s war. The latter could be justified as international cooperation to protect a global public good vital to the world economy.

The Strait of Hormuz is not a distant issue for Korea. Last year, 61 percent of the country’s crude oil imports passed through the waterway. Prolonged instability would raise not only oil and liquefied natural gas prices but also shipping, logistics and manufacturing costs. The resulting shock could spread to consumer prices and weaken the competitiveness of Korean exports. Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is therefore not merely an American interest. It is directly connected to Korea’s economic and national security.

Rather than responding to Washington’s request with an immediate deployment, Seoul should pursue a phased approach based on four principles.

First, hostilities must have effectively ended. If fighting continues or is likely to resume, the dispatch of a Korean warship could be interpreted not as protection of a sea lane but as military support for one of the belligerents. Korea should not place its ships and service members at unacceptable risk merely in the name of alliance solidarity.

Second, the mission must have a genuinely multinational framework and a clearly neutral character. Korea should not deploy alone or place its forces directly within the command structure of U.S. operations against Iran. A broader international framework involving nonbelligerent states such as Britain and France, with clearly defined missions and command relationships, would be preferable.

The label “multinational,” however, is not sufficient by itself. Seoul must determine whether the mission is truly separate from U.S. combat operations in terms of intelligence, command and logistics. It must also verify whether Iran, Oman and other coastal states have agreed to, or at least acquiesced in, the mission. If Iran rejects the presence of foreign forces altogether, a multinational deployment could itself become the source of another confrontation.

Third, Korea’s role must be strictly limited. Any Korean contribution should be confined to defensive missions such as escorting merchant vessels, detecting and clearing mines, maritime surveillance, search and rescue, and logistical support. The deployment authorization should clearly specify the mission and rules of engagement to prevent its expansion into attacks on Iranian territory or military facilities, a naval blockade or support for offensive operations. Any substantial enlargement of the mission should require renewed approval by the National Assembly.

Fourth, the deployment must be subject to democratic oversight. Sending troops abroad is a grave decision involving the lives of service members and Korea’s relations with other countries. The government should not seek to create the effect of a new deployment simply by expanding the operational area of the existing Cheonghae anti-piracy unit. Instead, it should explain the mission’s purpose, duration, size, command relationships, rules of engagement and withdrawal conditions to the public and obtain the consent of the National Assembly.

This process should not be viewed merely as an obstacle that delays action. Parliamentary approval could strengthen the government’s negotiating position by allowing Seoul to insist on clearly defined limits and an equitable sharing of risks before committing its forces.

The Washington-Seoul alliance remains the central pillar of Korea’s security. Korea has never taken its alliance responsibilities lightly. It deployed more than 320,000 personnel on a cumulative basis during the Vietnam War. During the Gulf War, it sent a medical support unit and an airlift unit. It dispatched engineering, medical and reconstruction forces to Iraq and provided reconstruction, medical and security support in Afghanistan. Korea has shouldered considerable responsibilities and sacrifices as a U.S. ally and a participant in multinational security operations.

A mature alliance, however, does not require one ally to automatically follow every military action taken by the other. It should be a partnership in which both countries respect each other’s national interests and domestic constraints, consult in advance and share responsibilities where a clearly defined common threat or interest exists.

The current military campaign against Iran was not undertaken on the basis of prior strategic consultations or joint planning with Korea. Nor were both allies subjected to a common armed attack. Pressuring Seoul to join such a war without adequate consultation could fuel anti-American sentiment and alliance fatigue within Korea, ultimately weakening the long-term foundation of the alliance.

A U.K.-France-led multinational mission could offer a practical way out of this dilemma. It would allow Seoul to demonstrate to Washington that it is not ignoring either an ally’s concerns or the threat to navigation through Hormuz. At the same time, Korea could explain to Iran that it is not joining a war against Tehran but contributing to a neutral, defensive mission intended to restore the safety of an international sea lane.

Washington should also respect Seoul’s previous contributions and current constraints. It should not treat a Korean deployment as an automatic alliance obligation. Before requesting military participation, the United States should carefully consult Korea on the common objective, legal basis, scope of the mission, command arrangements and distribution of risk. Drawing an ally into a war it did not choose and was not adequately consulted about does not strengthen an alliance. It erodes trust.

The appropriate course for Seoul is clear: Korea should remain cautious about joining U.S. combat operations against Iran while contributing responsibly to an international effort to restore a vital maritime route. If four conditions are met — an effective cessation of hostilities, a genuinely multinational and neutral framework, a limited defensive mission and democratic oversight by the National Assembly — a UK-France-led mission could protect Korea’s national interests without undermining its alliance with the United States.

The essential question in Hormuz is not simply whether Korea should deploy. What matters more is with whom it goes, when it goes, for what purpose and under what conditions.

Retired Navy Captain Moon Keun-sik is an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy of Hanyang University in Seoul.

韩国应考虑加入由英法领导的霍尔木兹海峡维和行动，而不是盲目响应美国的军舰派遣请求。该专栏文章指出，此次维和行动应为防御性、多国参与，并与美国针对伊朗的作战行动相互独立。文章认为，任何韩国的部署都应等到敌对行动结束后再进行，规模应保持有限，并接受国会的监督。霍尔木兹海峡对韩国至关重要，因为去年韩国61%的原油进口都经由此海峡。

专栏文章称，去年韩国 61% 的原油进口都经过霍尔木兹海峡。

拟议的任务被描述为防御性的，包括商船护航、扫雷、海上监视和空中监视。

作者认为，韩国不应单独部署军队，也不应将其部队直接置于美国对伊朗作战的指挥体系之下。

韩国的任何贡献都应受到限制，任何实质性的扩张都应需要国会重新批准。

文章称，韩国此前在越南战争期间累计部署了超过32万名人员，后来又向海湾战争、伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争派遣了支援部队。

发布于2026年9月7日上午11:36（韩国标准时间）

更新于2026年9月7日下午5:38（韩国标准时间）

韩国在是否向霍尔木兹海峡部署军事力量的问题上面临两难境地。韩美同盟对首尔而言至关重要，首尔不能无视华盛顿提出的军事支援请求。但与此同时，派遣军舰也会带来严重的后果。这样的部署可能被解读为韩国加入美国对伊朗的军事行动，从而不必要地将德黑兰变成敌人。

由英国和法国共同制定的多国海上行动值得密切关注。早期报告显示，约有15个国家参与了行动规划，随后更多国家加入外交磋商并表示政治支持。韩国也签署了一份呼吁维护霍尔木兹海峡航行自由的国际声明，并与美国、英国和法国探讨了可能的贡献。因此，首尔的选择并非仅仅是接受或拒绝美国的请求。

英法联合倡议最重要的特点在于其明确表示将自身与美国针对伊朗的军事行动区分开来。其目的并非攻击或报复伊朗，而是确保民用船只安全通行，并清除水雷和其他航行威胁。拟议的任务将侧重于防御性活动，例如为商船护航、扫雷以及海上和空中监视。此外，该行动计划在停火、相关各方同意以及其他必要的条件都已具备，以确保行动环境足够宽松之后才会启动。

对韩国而言，这种区别至关重要。派遣韩国军舰支援美国对伊朗的军事行动，与参与恢复国际海上航道的多国合作，在政治和军事上有着本质的不同。前者会使首尔面临被指责为实际上已成为美国战争一方的困境。而后者则可以被视为为保护对世界经济至关重要的全球公共利益而进行的国际合作。

霍尔木兹海峡对韩国而言并非遥远的问题。去年，韩国61%的原油进口都经由该海峡。长期的不稳定不仅会推高石油和液化天然气的价格，还会推高航运、物流和制造成本。由此产生的冲击可能会蔓延至消费价格，削弱韩国出口的竞争力。因此，霍尔木兹海峡的航行自由并非仅仅关乎美国的利益，而是与韩国的经济和国家安全息息相关。

首尔不应立即响应华盛顿的要求进行部署，而应采取基于四项原则的分阶段方法。

首先，敌对行动必须已经实际结束。如果战斗仍在继续或可能再次爆发，那么派遣韩国军舰可能被解读为并非保护海上航道，而是向交战一方提供军事支持。韩国不应仅仅为了维护联盟团结而将其舰艇和官兵置于不可接受的风险之中。

其次，此次行动必须真正具有多国合作框架和明确的中立性。韩国不应单独部署，也不应将其部队直接置于美国对伊朗军事行动的指挥体系内。更可取的做法是建立一个更广泛的国际框架，纳入英国和法国等非交战国，并明确界定行动任务和指挥关系。

然而，“多国”这一标签本身并不足以说明问题。首尔必须确定此次任务在情报、指挥和后勤方面是否真正独立于美国的作战行动。它还必须核实伊朗、阿曼和其他沿海国家是否同意或至少默许了这项任务。如果伊朗完全拒绝外国军队的存在，那么多国部署本身就可能成为另一场冲突的根源。

第三，韩国的作用必须受到严格限制。韩国的任何贡献都应仅限于防御性任务，例如护送商船、探测和清除水雷、海上监视、搜救和后勤支援。部署授权应明确规定任务和交战规则，以防止其扩大到攻击伊朗领土或军事设施、实施海上封锁或支援进攻行动。任何任务的实质性扩大都应重新获得国会批准。

第四，此次部署必须接受民主监督。向海外派遣军队是一项重大决定，关系到军人的生命安全以及韩国与其他国家的关系。政府不应仅仅通过扩大现有清海反海盗部队的行动范围来制造新的部署效果。相反，政府应当向公众解释此次任务的目的、持续时间、规模、指挥关系、交战规则和撤军条件，并获得国会的批准。

不应将此程序仅仅视为拖延行动的障碍。国会的批准可以增强政府的谈判地位，使首尔能够在投入兵力之前，坚持明确的限制和风险的公平分担。

华盛顿-首尔同盟仍然是韩国安全的核心支柱。韩国从未轻视其同盟责任。在越南战争期间，韩国累计向美方部署了超过32万名人员。在海湾战争期间，韩国派遣了医疗支援部队和空运部队。韩国还向伊拉克派遣了工程、医疗和重建部队，并在阿富汗提供了重建、医疗和安全支持。作为美国的盟友和多国安全行动的参与者，韩国承担了巨大的责任和牺牲。

然而，成熟的联盟并不意味着盟友必须自动跟随另一方的每一项军事行动。它应该是一种伙伴关系，在这种伙伴关系中，双方尊重彼此的国家利益和国内制约因素，事先进行磋商，并在存在明确的共同威胁或利益时分担责任。

当前对伊朗的军事行动并非基于与韩国事先的战略磋商或联合计划。美韩两国也未遭受共同的武装攻击。在未进行充分磋商的情况下，强迫首尔加入这场战争，可能会加剧韩国国内的反美情绪和联盟疲劳，最终削弱美韩同盟的长期基础。

由英国和法国牵头的多国特派团或许能为解决这一困境提供切实可行的方案。这将使首尔能够向华盛顿表明，它既没有忽视盟友的关切，也没有忽视霍尔木兹海峡航行所面临的威胁。同时，韩国也可以向伊朗解释，它并非参与对德黑兰的战争，而是参与一项旨在恢复国际海上航道安全的、中立的防御性行动。

华盛顿也应尊重首尔以往的贡献和当前的限制。不应将韩国的军事部署视为自动的联盟义务。在要求韩国参与军事行动之前，美国应就共同目标、法律依据、任务范围、指挥安排和风险分担等问题与韩国进行充分磋商。将盟友卷入一场它并未选择且未被充分征询意见的战争，并不会加强联盟关系，反而会削弱互信。

对首尔而言，正确的做法很明确：韩国应谨慎参与美国针对伊朗的军事行动，同时负责任地为恢复一条至关重要的海上航线做出贡献。如果满足四个条件——有效停止敌对行动、建立真正多国且中立的框架、开展有限的防御性行动以及接受国会的民主监督——那么由英国和法国主导的行动既能保护韩国的国家利益，又不会损害其与美国的联盟关系。

霍尔木兹岛战役的关键问题并非韩国是否应该部署军队，更重要的是它应该与哪些军队一同部署，何时部署，出于何种目的，以及在何种条件下部署。

退役海军上校文根植是首尔汉阳大学公共政策研究生院的兼职教授。