Cameras disabled, inspectors blocked: Nuclear watchdog asks for help with Iran摄像头被关闭,检查人员被阻拦:核监督机构请求协助处理伊朗核问题
The UN’s nuclear watchdog agency is asking the body to hold Iran accountable for failing to stick with safeguards meant to prevent the development of nuclear weapons, diplomatic officials announced Wednesday.

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The UN’s nuclear watchdog agency is asking the body to hold Iran accountable for failing to stick with safeguards meant to prevent the development of nuclear weapons, diplomatic officials announced Wednesday.
It’s the latest chapter in a more than decade-long effort to keep an eye on Iran that has seen the country descend from compliance to sabotaging inspection efforts – such as disabling monitoring cameras and “excessively invasive physical searches” of inspectors – according to multiple former officials, diplomats and more than a decade of UN documents reviewed by CNN.
Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with the US and other countries established the world’s most invasive nuclear inspection regime, overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency. And for years, Tehran’s nuclear program complied with the agency’s inspectors.
But during the years after President Donald Trump withdrew from that deal, Iran gradually and systematically defied its nuclear safeguards, according to contemporaneous IAEA reporting, and the agency later concluded that Iran failed to disclose nuclear material-related sites.
“The Iranians were really playing rope-a-dope and consistently making it hard for the IAEA to get access, presenting information that was laughably not true or plausible,” said a former US diplomat whom CNN granted anonymity to freely discuss the sensitive topic.
The UN nuclear watchdog sometimes downplayed issues for political reasons, including efforts to be less confrontational with Iran, a former IAEA official and a former US diplomat told CNN.
The saga demonstrates the limitations of monitoring and verification in the face of concerted noncompliance, leading top experts to argue that even a full diplomatic solution to the war that includes a new nuclear deal won’t be enough to stop Iran from getting a nuclear bomb.
“I think for both technical and political reasons … if Iran wants to get the bomb at this point, it’s going to get it,” said James Acton , a physicist who heads the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s nuclear policy division.
Acton told CNN he believes “there’s a 50-50 chance that Iran gets the bomb” within the next three years.
23 governors sitting on the International Atomic Energy Agency voted Wednesday to report Tehran to the Security Council, with Russia, China and Niger voting against the action, which stems from a June 2025 resolution declaring Iran non-compliant with nuclear safeguards.
Lisa Leutner/Reuters
That resolution came seven months before the current war with Iran, and days before US strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in Operation Midnight Hammer.
Tehran was last reported to the Security Council in early 2006, and the UN body responded with a cascade of actions including sanctions against the regime. It’s unclear whether the Security Council will respond similarly to Wednesday’s report; Russia and China are permanent members of the body who may unilaterally veto proposed actions.
Iran’s diplomatic mission to the IAEA decried the resolution as “political” and “nonconsensually adopted” in a statement on social media.
The 2015 deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA, followed 20 months of intense negotiations. The JCPOA placed strict limits on the country’s nuclear program — especially around uranium enrichment activity — that would be independently verified by the IAEA.
The JCPOA placed strict limits lasting a decade or more on Iran’s enriched uranium stocks and resulted in the country shipping most of its excess uranium to Russia for destruction. The agreement restricted enrichment centrifuge manufacturing, plutonium reprocessing, nuclear weapons design and other related areas.
The deal also permitted the IAEA to enact the most intrusive monitoring scheme on the planet: seals, cameras, sensors, daily in-person inspections, and a mechanism to investigate suspected covert nuclear facilities.
When the deal went into force in January 2016, the IAEA certified that the Iranians were following its terms. And until mid-2019, Iran remained in compliance with the deal’s access requirements and safeguards on its enrichment centrifuges and declared uranium stockpile despite Trump pulling out of the JCPOA in May 2018.
But Iranian compliance began to unravel in 2019, according to the IAEA’s reports, which were issued on a roughly quarterly basis.
In July 2019, inspectors reported that Iran had accumulated enough low enriched uranium to break the JCOPA’s cap on nuclear material. That fall, Tehran resumed enrichment using advanced centrifuges in facilities where the agreement had banned such work.
AFP/Getty Images/File
Then in 2020, Iran blocked IAEA inspectors from accessing two locations suspected of being used for nuclear-related activities before the JCPOA was signed.
IAEA access was curtailed further after Iran’s parliament passed a law in December 2020 that slashed cooperation with the watchdog agency on enhanced monitoring and verification provisions. The law, passed in the wake of Israel killing a top Iranian scientist, also directed the acceleration of Tehran’s nuclear program — to include enriching uranium to 60% purity — unless the US reduced sanctions. 60% is a key threshold that enables rapid further processing into weapons-grade material.
Iran initially agreed to keep IAEA monitoring equipment installed and store the data locally, but that agreement collapsed in mid-2021 — that summer, the Iranians disabled monitoring cameras, destroying one, in a centrifuge workshop in Karaj before demanding the agency remove all its JCPOA monitoring equipment about a year later in June 2022.
Members of Iran’s security forces also intimidated IAEA inspectors through “excessively invasive physical searches” in 2021, the agency said.
The IAEA discovered an undeclared set of centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility in January 2023 that were enriching uranium up to 83.7% purity, a level nearing weapons grade (about 90%).
The discovery came when an experienced Russian inspector spotted a subtle change to centrifuge piping, the former US diplomat said. Months later, Iran kicked that inspector and several other IAEA uranium enrichment experts out of the country.
Rafael Grossi, the IAEA’s chief, described the booting of the inspectors as a “very serious blow” to the agency’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program.
Elisabeth Mandl/Reuters
The relationship deteriorated further in subsequent years, with Iran and the IAEA trading allegations of espionage.
The interference, continued enrichment and lack of candor regarding undeclared nuclear sites led the agency to pass a resolution declaring Iran in violation of its nonproliferation promises in June 2025. Israel launched strikes against Iran the day after the resolution passed, and the US bombed three key nuclear sites at Fordow , Natanz and Isfahan less than two weeks later.
Iran’s representatives have disputed the IAEA claims in the past and sharply criticized Wednesday’s referral resolution that built upon the June 2025 finding. In their statement before the vote, the Iranians argued that the agency never “verified the diversion of nuclear materials.”
Tehran’s diplomats claimed that the US and other Western states sponsoring the Security Council referral “shed crocodile tears over proliferation while hypocritically evading even a simple verbal condemnation of unprecedented massive aggressions against peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities, brutal war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”
Since February 2026, when the US and Israel launched their air campaign against Iran, the IAEA has been unable to visit any Iranian nuclear facility other than the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Inspectors have not visited the nuclear facilities previously bombed by the US and Israel in June 2025, either. The lack of access compounds the early 2021 lapse of IAEA monitoring of centrifuge production, movement and installation.
Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images
IAEA officials have stressed that the inspection blackout broke the agency’s “continuity of knowledge” on Iran’s uranium, enrichment centrifuges and related items under the watchdog’s monitoring. That means it cannot vouch for the status, amount or location of those items.
Reestablishing that monitoring baseline poses a monumental task for the agency, according to experts who spoke with CNN.
Eric Brewer, a former National Security Council counterproliferation director who now researches nonproliferation at the Nuclear Threat Initiative nonprofit, told CNN that “the IAEA is starting from a pretty massive deficit when it comes to understanding the picture on the ground in Iran.”
“They would need to have much stronger monitoring and a much longer time to go back in and establish a new monitoring baseline to try to put the pieces of the puzzle back together,” Brewer said.
The Security Council will ultimately determine whether Iran will face new international consequences for its alleged violation of the non-proliferation treaty.
After the last such report in 2006, the body passed a series of resolutions that enabled crushing economic sanctions on Tehran.
But with the US currently taking military and economic action against Iran, it’s unclear what impact additional actions would have, and it’s unclear whether any Security Council resolutions on the matter would make it past the veto powers that Russia and China hold.
Davis Winkie’s work at CNN is supported by a partnership between Outrider Foundation and Journalism Funding Partners (JFP). CNN retains full editorial control of the reporting.
CNN’s Arpita Dasika contributed research to this story.
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联合国核监督机构要求联合国追究伊朗的责任,因为伊朗未能遵守旨在防止发展核武器的保障措施。外交官员周三宣布了这一消息。
这是十多年来密切关注伊朗的最新进展。据 CNN 查阅的多位前官员、外交官和十多年来的联合国文件显示,伊朗已经从遵守检查工作转变为破坏检查工作,例如关闭监控摄像头和对检查人员进行“过度侵入性的身体搜查”。
伊朗与美国和其他国家于2015年达成的核协议建立了世界上监管最严格的核查机制,由国际原子能机构负责监督。多年来,德黑兰的核计划一直配合该机构的核查工作。
但据国际原子能机构当时的报告显示,在唐纳德·特朗普总统退出该协议后的几年里,伊朗逐渐且有系统地违反了其核保障措施,该机构后来得出结论,伊朗未能披露与核材料相关的场所。
一位不愿透露姓名的美国前外交官表示:“伊朗人一直在玩弄诡计,不断阻挠国际原子能机构的调查,提供的信息既荒谬又不合情理。” CNN 允许这位外交官匿名讨论这一敏感话题。
一位前国际原子能机构官员和一位前美国外交官告诉 CNN,联合国核监督机构有时会出于政治原因淡化一些问题,包括努力减少与伊朗的对抗。
这一事件表明,面对有组织的不遵守行为,监测和核查存在局限性,导致顶级专家认为,即使通过全面的外交途径解决战争,包括达成新的核协议,也无法阻止伊朗获得核武器。
“我认为,无论从技术上还是政治上来说……如果伊朗现在想要获得核弹,它就能得到,”卡内基国际和平基金会核政策部门负责人、物理学家詹姆斯·阿克顿说。
阿克顿告诉 CNN,他认为伊朗在未来三年内“有 50% 的可能性获得核武器”。
国际原子能机构的 23 位理事周三投票决定向安理会报告伊朗,俄罗斯、中国和尼日尔投了反对票。此举源于 2025 年 6 月的一项决议,该决议宣布伊朗不遵守核保障措施。
丽莎·洛伊特纳/路透社
该决议是在与伊朗的当前战争爆发前七个月,以及美国发动“午夜铁锤行动”打击伊朗核设施前几天通过的。
德黑兰上一次被提交至安理会是在2006年初,当时安理会采取了一系列行动,包括对德黑兰政权实施制裁。目前尚不清楚安理会是否会对周三的报告做出类似反应;俄罗斯和中国是安理会常任理事国,它们可以单方面否决任何提议的行动。
伊朗驻国际原子能机构外交使团在社交媒体上发表声明,谴责该决议是“政治性的”和“未经协商一致通过的”。
2015年达成的协议,即《联合全面行动计划》(JCPOA),是在历经20个月的密集谈判后达成的。JCPOA对该国的核计划,特别是铀浓缩活动,施加了严格的限制,这些限制将由国际原子能机构进行独立核查。
伊核协议对伊朗的浓缩铀库存施加了长达十年或更久的严格限制,导致伊朗将其大部分过剩铀运往俄罗斯销毁。该协议限制了浓缩离心机的制造、钚的后处理、核武器的设计以及其他相关领域。
该协议还允许国际原子能机构实施地球上最具侵入性的监控方案:封条、摄像头、传感器、每日现场检查以及调查疑似秘密核设施的机制。
该协议于2016年1月生效时,国际原子能机构认证伊朗遵守了协议条款。尽管特朗普于2018年5月退出了伊核协议,但直到2019年中期,伊朗仍遵守了协议中关于其浓缩铀离心机和已申报铀库存的准入要求和保障措施。
但根据国际原子能机构大约每季度发布的报告,伊朗的遵守情况从 2019 年开始出现问题。
2019年7月,核查人员报告称,伊朗已积累了足够多的低浓缩铀,突破了《伊核协议》对核材料数量的上限。同年秋季,德黑兰在协议禁止的设施中,使用先进离心机恢复了铀浓缩活动。
法新社/盖蒂图片社/档案照片
2020 年,伊朗阻止国际原子能机构核查人员进入两个被怀疑在伊核协议签署前用于核相关活动的地点。
2020年12月,伊朗议会通过一项法律,大幅削减了与国际原子能机构在加强监测和核查条款方面的合作,导致伊朗与国际原子能机构的合作进一步受限。这项法律是在以色列杀害一名伊朗高级科学家后通过的,它还指示伊朗加快推进其核计划,包括将铀浓缩至60%纯度,除非美国放松制裁。60%的纯度是快速进一步加工成武器级材料的关键门槛。
伊朗最初同意保留国际原子能机构的监测设备并在当地存储数据,但该协议在 2021 年年中破裂——那年夏天,伊朗人在卡拉季的一个离心机车间里破坏了监测摄像头,摧毁了其中一个,然后在大约一年后的 2022 年 6 月要求该机构移除其所有根据《联合全面行动计划》(JCPOA) 设立的监测设备。
国际原子能机构表示,2021年,伊朗安全部队成员还通过“过度侵入性的身体搜查”恐吓国际原子能机构的核查人员。
国际原子能机构于 2023 年 1 月在福尔多核设施发现了一组未申报的离心机,这些离心机将铀浓缩至纯度高达 83.7%,接近武器级(约 90%)。
这位前美国外交官表示,这一发现源于一位经验丰富的俄罗斯核查员注意到离心机管道的一处细微改动。几个月后,伊朗将这位核查员以及其他几位国际原子能机构的铀浓缩专家驱逐出境。
国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·格罗西将驱逐核查人员描述为对该机构监督伊朗核计划能力的“非常严重的打击”。
Elisabeth Mandl/路透社
此后几年,两国关系进一步恶化,伊朗和国际原子能机构互相指责对方从事间谍活动。
伊朗的干预、持续的铀浓缩活动以及对未申报核设施缺乏坦诚,导致该机构于 2025 年 6 月通过一项决议,宣布伊朗违反了其不扩散承诺。决议通过的第二天,以色列就对伊朗发动了袭击;不到两周后,美国轰炸了福尔多、纳坦兹和伊斯法罕的三个重要核设施。
伊朗代表过去曾对国际原子能机构的指控提出异议,并强烈批评了周三通过的、以2025年6月调查结果为基础的决议。在投票前的声明中,伊朗方面辩称,该机构从未“核实过核材料转移的情况”。
德黑兰的外交官声称,美国和其他西方国家在安理会提出这项动议时“对核扩散问题流下鳄鱼的眼泪,却虚伪地回避对前所未有的大规模侵略、针对和平利用的受保护核设施的暴行、残酷的战争罪行和反人类罪行进行哪怕是最简单的口头谴责”。
自 2026 年 2 月美国和以色列对伊朗发动空袭以来,国际原子能机构除了布什尔核电站外,一直无法访问伊朗的任何核设施。
检查人员也未曾前往此前于2025年6月遭到美国和以色列轰炸的核设施进行视察。由于无法进入这些设施,国际原子能机构在2021年初停止对离心机生产、运输和安装的监测工作,这一情况更加恶化。
Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images
国际原子能机构官员强调,此次核查中断破坏了该机构对伊朗铀、浓缩离心机及其他相关受其监测物品的“持续信息”。这意味着该机构无法保证这些物品的状态、数量或位置。
据接受 CNN 采访的专家称,重新建立这一监测基线对该机构来说是一项艰巨的任务。
曾任美国国家安全委员会反扩散主任、现任核威胁倡议非营利组织防扩散研究员的埃里克·布鲁尔告诉 CNN,“国际原子能机构在了解伊朗的实际情况方面存在相当大的不足。”
“他们需要更强有力的监测,以及更长的时间来重新建立新的监测基线,以便尝试将拼图碎片重新拼凑起来,”布鲁尔说。
安理会最终将决定伊朗是否会因其涉嫌违反不扩散条约而面临新的国际后果。
在 2006 年发布上一份此类报告之后,该机构通过了一系列决议,从而得以对德黑兰实施严厉的经济制裁。
但由于美国目前正在对伊朗采取军事和经济行动,尚不清楚采取进一步行动会产生什么影响,也不清楚安理会就此事通过的任何决议能否克服俄罗斯和中国所拥有的否决权。
戴维斯·温基在CNN的工作得到了Outrider基金会和新闻资助伙伴(JFP)的合作支持。CNN对报道拥有完全的编辑控制权。
CNN的Arpita Dasika为本文的研究工作做出了贡献。