Russia Is Integrating AI Models into Its Cognitive Warfare Campaign Against Ukraine

Russian sources are increasingly relying on AI-generated and AI-altered videos to assert territorial control over areas of Ukraine that Russian forces have not, in fact, seized. Russian sources are intentionally exaggerating territorial gains to portray Russian forces as advancing and having the initiative along the frontline and to falsely portray the Ukrainian line as collapsing across the theater.[1] The generation of AI-altered footage appears to be a grassroots effort by several Russian milbloggers and a subset of Russian units rather than a widespread, centralized, or standardized military practice. Certain Russian units may be publishing AI-altered material in order to claim to the Russian military leadership that they have met Kremlin-issued deadlines, or they may be using AI-altered footage to try to make exaggerated claims aimed at public audiences more credible. AI-manipulated footage is very likely here to stay, and Russian sources will continue to evolve their methodology to overcome commercially available AI detection software.

Russian sources began posting flag raising videos altered with artificial intelligence at scale in June 2026 to assert territorial control over areas of Ukraine that Russian forces had not seized.

Russian officials, units, and milbloggers have repeatedly amplified footage purportedly showing Russian forces holding flags and presented such footage as evidence of Russian forces’ seizure of settlements. Russian soldiers had been attempting to exploit OSINT mapping methodologies by having soldiers actually infiltrate areas and ostentatiously raise flags since at least September 2025.[2] The Russian sources are now evolving this information tactic by leveraging AI-altered footage to insert Russian soldiers with flags into geolocated videos to make such claims in places into which soldiers have not infiltrated. Russian sources combine authentic and AI-altered flag raising footage in video montages in an effort to pass off AI-generated videos as authentic.[3] ISW observed at least 35 videos suspected of AI alteration from June 1, 2026, to August 30, 2026. Commercially available AI detection software assessed with high confidence that at least 10 videos were altered with AI models. The total number of AI-altered videos is likely higher given the limitations of available AI detection tools, which do not always successfully identify AI alterations that are clearly visible to the trained observer. ISW first observed AI-altered flag waving videos on June 11, 2026, and Russian sources posted at least eight suspected AI-altered videos in June 2026.[4] ISW observed that Russian sources posted no fewer than 13 and 14 videos with AI-altered footage in July and August 2026 respectively.

Visual anomalies persist in suspected AI-altered videos despite efforts by Russian milbloggers to portray the footage as authentic.

Russian milblogger Divgen posted footage on July 27 showing a Russian servicemember raising a flag on the eastern outskirts of Bilyi Kolodyaz, Kharkiv Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that the video was AI-altered given the improbable physical proportions of the Russian servicemember and their sudden disappearance from the scene.[5] A Russian milblogger who frequently publishes footage from the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, Voin DV, posted footage on August 24 showing similarly misproportioned Russian servicemembers raising flags in Dolynka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] Russian milblogger Southern Republic posted footage on August 20 that showed a Russian flag disappearing or melting into a roof in Mykolaipillya, Donetsk Oblast.[7]

Russian sources use camera panning and zooming in their videos to reduce the length of time in which AI-generated or altered Russian servicemembers are visible to make it harder to detect anomalies. Suspected AI-altered videos contain jump-cuts, sporadic zooming or panning of the camera, and inconsistent shadows near the observed Russian servicemembers and flags.[8] Video cuts are used to make two scenes — a close-up shot of a Russian soldier waving a flag and an overview scene of the claimed settlement — appear connected. The observed anomalies indicate that AI models continue to struggle in generating persuasive images of Russian servicemembers or animating complex scenes.

Georeferencing footage manipulated in this way is not a viable practice for determining the authenticity of the scene. Geolocations derived from both suspected and assessed AI-altered videos are accurate because footage often actually does show parts of the claimed settlement.[9] Russian sources likely record videos of frontline settlements specifically to use as reference material for AI models. Several Russian milbloggers have included maps or reference points with their AI-altered videos to show the location of the flag raising events to support georeferencing.[10] Detection of AI manipulation in such videos requires closer scrutiny of the servicemembers or flags depicted, rather than closer interrogation of the geolocations.

Specific Russian military units appear to be producing or amplifying AI-altered footage to compensate for poor performance and their failures to secure military objectives on time. The use of AI-altered footage does not appear to be a widespread phenomenon across the Russian military for now. ISW has observed at least 10 regiments and brigades featured in assessed and suspected AI footage.[11]

A Russian milblogger repeatedly posted AI-altered footage of the 36 th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29 th CAA), likely to compensate for the brigade’s inability to make actual advances. Russian milblogger Voin DV has mentioned the 36 th Motorized Rifle Brigade in multiple assessed and suspected AI-altered videos since June 1, 2026.[12] Voin DV credited the 36 th Motorized Rifle Brigade with seizing seven settlements in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts over 10 kilometers ahead of the Russian forward line of own troops (FLOT). The 36 th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been operating in the Oleksandrivka Direction since November 2025.[13] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 4, 2026, that the command of the Russian 29th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) investigated the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and found that the unit had exaggerated previous control-of-terrain (CoT) reports in the Oleksandrivka direction.[14] The 36 th Motorized Rifle Brigade likely relied on exaggerated control-of-terrain (CoT) reports to offset high casualty rates and territorial losses to Ukrainian counterattacks since January 2026.[15] Voin DV’s repeated attribution of battlefield successes to the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade is likely furthering the brigade’s own efforts to conceal its failures.

Russian commanders have punished subordinates for leveraging AI-altered footage to offset poor performance. Russian milblogger Divgen credited the claimed seizure of Bilyi Kolodyaz to the 127 th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71 st Motorized Rifle Division, 14 th Army Corps [AC]).[16] A source reporting on the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 30, 2026, that Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov dismissed the commander of the 127 th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the commander of the regiment’s 1st battalion following the unit’s publication of AI-altered footage in Bilyi Kolodyazi, Kharkiv Oblast.[17] Russian milblogger Anatoliy Radov suggested that the original video was taken from a private chat used by the unit’s commander prior to modification.[18] The reported dismissal of the regiment’s commanders highlights the pressure placed upon Russian forces to make territorial gains. The Ukrainian 16 th Army Corps reported on January 30 that Nikiforov appointed a commission to evaluate the lack of progress in the Vovchansk direction.[19] The Ukrainian 16 th Army Corps reported on April 25 th that the 127 th Motorized Rifle Regiment conducted an unsuccessful motorized assault toward Vovchanski Khutory, Kharkiv Oblast.[20] Russian sources claimed on May 29 that the 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment seized Karaichne, Kharkiv Oblast.[21] ISW does not assess Russian forces to control Karaichne as of August 31, 2026.

Russian sources are publishing AI-generated and AI-altered footage to support claims about Russian advances in the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast — the Kremlin’s priority operational objective. The Russian Ministry of Defense, Kremlin newswire TASS, official unit Telegram channels, and milbloggers mentioned eight Russian regiments and brigades operating in the Fortress Belt in suspected and assessed AI-altered footage. The Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and subordinate elements of the 123 rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 88 th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 7 th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) were mentioned in four assessed and suspected AI-altered videos since June 1, 2026.[22] The official Telegram channel of the 3rd Combined Arms Army posted at least two suspected AI-altered videos. Commercially available AI detection software assessed with high confidence that at least two videos mentioning the 3rd CAA and subordinate elements were altered with AI models.[23] The 3 rd CAA’s combat effectiveness has degraded since June, and the formation can only conduct small-group infiltration efforts in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions at this time.[24] Ukrainian 19th Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Alexander Bakulin reported on June 15 th that elements of the 3 rd CAA had personnel shortages and fear their commanders.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense, the official Telegram channel of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and Russian milblogger Southern Republic mentioned the Russian 3rd Army Corps [AC] (Central Military District) and subordinate elements of the 1442 nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division) and 54 th Motorized Rifle Regiment in three assessed and suspected AI-altered videos. [26] Russian forces’ advances in the Fortress Belt have been slow and costly, and Russian forces are likely using this AI footage in order to advance a narrative that Russian forces are advancing more rapidly than they really are.[27]

Russian sources use AI-altered footage as part of a deliberate cognitive warfare campaign to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable.

Russian sources claimed territory ahead of the actual Russian forward line of their own troops to give the impression of territorial advances where they do not exist. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 27 that Russian forces made gains in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction and seized Pyskunivka, Donetsk Oblast (east of Slovyansk).[28] Commercially available AI detection software assessed with high confidence that several scenes purportedly showing Russian servicemembers in Pyskunivka were altered with AI models.[29] Gerasimov and other military commanders have exaggerated Russian gains in multiple public addresses since January 2026.[30] Russian President Vladimir Putin used a staged meeting with several Russian commanders on July 3 to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances in Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, that do not match battlefield realities.[31] Russian sources posted at least four suspected or assessed AI-altered videos on July 3 and 4 purportedly showing Russian servicemembers waving flags in Kostyantynivka.[32] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely uses these meetings as part of a cognitive warfare campaign to present Russia’s offensive as achieving its operational and strategic objectives.[33] Kremlin used the informational effect of the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka to shape the United States administration’s perceptions and the Western information space. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on July 4 that Putin used a call with US President Donald Trump that day to emphasize the seizure of Kostyantynivka and claimed that Ukraine’s European partners have a false perception of the state of the frontline.[34] Putin remains committed to his theory of victory, which rests on the premise that Russia can win a war of attrition by having Russian forces maintain the initiative and advance across the entire theater indefinitely, thereby outlasting both Ukraine’s ability to defend and Western support for Ukraine.[35] The use of AI-altered footage to show fictitious gains supports this theory of victory and advances Russian efforts to persuade the US and the West to accept Russian claims of territory Russian forces have not seized. Most of the settlements claimed by Russian sources using assessed or suspected AI-altered footage remain under Ukrainian control as of August 31, 2026.

Russian sources used what is assessed and suspected to be AI-altered footage to deny demonstrated Ukrainian territorial gains in the Oleksandrivka direction. President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 12 that Ukrainian forces had concluded counteroffensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction and liberated 26 settlements.[36] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces liberated roughly 626.69 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction and the northern part of the Hulyaipole direction (where Ukrainian forces also counterattacked) between January 29 and August 12, 2026.[37] Successful Ukrainian counteroffensives undermine Russia’s cognitive warfare campaign by demonstrating that Russian forces are unable to maintain the initiative and hold all territory they take. A Russian source posted suspected footage posted on August 14 purportedly showing Russian servicemembers maintaining positions in several settlements liberated by Ukrainian forces. [38] Commercially available AI detection software assessed with high confidence that scenes purportedly showing Russian soldiers in Novomykolaivka and Zlahoda, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, as well as northern Pryvilne, Rybne, Krasnohirske, and Novohryhorivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, were altered with AI models. Geolocations of the suspected footage purportedly showed Russian servicemembers in five other settlements liberated by Ukrainian forces.[39]

Russian sources are leveraging publicly available video generation models to produce AI-altered videos.

Russian sources will likely continue to scale up their use of AI-altered footage given the ready accessibility of text-to-video generative AI models. Commercially available AI detection software indicates that assessed AI-altered footage was derived from Sora and Seedance AI models. Sora and Seedance are text-to-video generative AI models that develop videos from input text or reference material. Sora was published by American artificial intelligence company OpenAI in 2024.[40] Seedance was published by Chinese artificial intelligence and social media company ByteDance in 2025.[41] OpenAI discontinued the Sora web and app experiences on April 26, 2026, and reportedly intends to discontinue the application programming interface (API) on September 24, 2026.[42] OpenAI’s decision to discontinue Sora will force Russian sources to produce AI-altered footage with Seedance, or other AI models, including proprietary models the Russian government may develop for its own use.

Conclusion: Russian sources likely will continue to mature their use of AI-augmented footage to support cognitive warfare campaigns. ISW continues to assess that Russian sources are engaging in a sophisticated cognitive warfare effort that uses — among other means — AI-altered or generated footage of flag raisings to substantiate fabricated claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain positions.[43] This footage is designed to have geolocatable elements in order to imbue the videos with a veneer of legitimacy. Russian sources will continue to update their AI narratives and models to pass off fabricated gains as authentic. Text-to-video AI models provide Russian sources an inexpensive avenue to exaggerate Russian gains or deny the success of Ukrainian counteroffensives. Suspected AI-altered footage is increasingly able to bypass pixel content verification in commercially available AI detection software. Visual anomalies remain pervasive within AI-altered footage, however.

Russian sources may expand their cognitive warfare campaign to include AI-altered or generated satellite imagery. Google Earth’s Nano Banana AI tool allows users to generate AI-altered satellite imagery by text prompt.[44] Posts purportedly showing Nano Banana AI-altered or generated imagery indicate that users were able to bypass Google Earth’s terms of use by generating deepfakes of military sites. Russian sources will likely exploit similar AI models with limited guardrails to further their cognitive warfare campaigns. Open source researchers will need to develop and continuously refine responsible tradecraft to distinguish AI-altered footage or imagery from legitimate footage.

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https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/ [44] https://www.digitaldigging.org/p/how-to-plant-a-nuclear-plant-in-iran; https://www.digitaldigging.org/p/nano-banana-2-removed-from-google; https://x.com/henkvaness/status/2082912544394498228?s=20; https://blog.google/products-and-platforms/products/earth/nano-banana-google-earth-image-generation/; https://blog.google/products-and-platforms/products/earth/nano-banana-google-earth-image-generation/; https://www.npr.org/2026/07/31/nx-s1-5914652/google-adds-ai-to-satellite-images-raising-fears-of-deepfakes-in-the-sky

俄罗斯方面越来越多地依赖人工智能生成和篡改的视频来宣称对乌克兰部分地区拥有控制权，而事实上俄军并未占领这些地区。俄罗斯方面故意夸大领土扩张，以描绘俄军在前线推进并占据主动，并错误地将乌克兰防线描绘成在整个战区崩溃。[1] 生成人工智能篡改的视频似乎是一些俄罗斯军事博客作者和部分俄罗斯部队的草根行为，而非普遍、集中或标准化的军事做法。某些俄罗斯部队可能发布人工智能篡改的视频，是为了向俄罗斯军方领导层声称他们已达到克里姆林宫设定的最后期限，或者他们可能使用人工智能篡改的视频来试图使针对公众的夸大声明更具可信度。人工智能操纵的视频很可能会长期存在，俄罗斯方面也将继续改进其方法，以绕过市面上现有的人工智能检测软件。

2026年6月，俄罗斯方面开始大规模发布利用人工智能技术篡改的升旗视频，以宣示对俄罗斯军队尚未占领的乌克兰地区的领土控制权。

俄罗斯官员、部队和军事博客作者反复放大据称显示俄军举旗的视频，并将其作为俄军占领定居点的证据。至少从2025年9月起，俄罗斯士兵就试图利用开源情报（OSINT）测绘方法，派遣士兵实际渗透到特定区域并高调升旗。[2] 俄罗斯方面正在改进这种信息策略，利用人工智能（AI）篡改的视频，将手持旗帜的俄罗斯士兵插入到带有地理位置信息的视频中，从而在士兵并未渗透到的地区做出此类声明。俄罗斯方面将真实的升旗视频和AI篡改的视频剪辑在一起，试图将AI生成的视频伪装成真实的视频。[3] 情报与安全局（ISW）观察到，从2026年6月1日至2026年8月30日，至少有35个视频疑似经过AI篡改。市面上可用的AI检测软件以高度置信度评估，至少有10个视频是使用AI模型篡改的。鉴于现有人工智能检测工具的局限性，实际被人工智能篡改的视频总数可能更高。这些工具并非总能成功识别出训练有素的观察者能够明显识别的人工智能篡改痕迹。ISW于2026年6月11日首次发现人工智能篡改的挥旗视频，俄罗斯方面在2026年6月至少发布了8个疑似人工智能篡改的视频。[4] ISW还观察到，俄罗斯方面在2026年7月和8月分别发布了不少于13个和14个包含人工智能篡改画面的视频。

尽管俄罗斯军事博主努力将这些视频描绘成真实的，但疑似人工智能篡改的视频中仍然存在视觉异常。

俄罗斯军事博主Divgen于7月27日发布了一段视频，显示一名俄罗斯军人在哈尔科夫州比利科洛迪亚兹东郊升起国旗。俄罗斯和乌克兰方面报道称，鉴于视频中俄罗斯军人的身材比例异常，且突然消失，该视频疑似经过人工智能处理。[5] 另一位经常发布俄罗斯东部军区视频的俄罗斯军事博主Voin DV于8月24日发布了一段视频，显示身材比例同样不协调的俄罗斯军人在扎波罗热州多林卡升起国旗。[6] 俄罗斯军事博主Southern Republic于8月20日发布了一段视频，显示一面俄罗斯国旗在顿涅茨克州尼古拉皮利亚消失或融入屋顶。[7]

俄罗斯方面利用视频中的镜头平移和缩放来缩短人工智能生成或篡改的俄罗斯军人形象的可见时间，从而增加检测异常的难度。疑似人工智能篡改的视频包含跳切、镜头不规律的缩放或平移，以及在出现的俄罗斯军人和旗帜附近出现不一致的阴影。[8] 视频剪辑被用来将两个场景——一名俄罗斯士兵挥舞旗帜的特写镜头和所声称的定居点的全景镜头——连接起来。观察到的异常表明，人工智能模型在生成具有说服力的俄罗斯军人图像或制作复杂场景动画方面仍然存在困难。

以这种方式对篡改过的视频进行地理定位并非确定场景真实性的可行方法。从疑似和已评估的AI篡改视频中提取的地理位置信息是准确的，因为视频通常确实显示了所声称的定居点的部分区域。[9] 俄罗斯方面很可能专门录制前线定居点的视频，用作AI模型的参考素材。一些俄罗斯军事博主在其AI篡改过的视频中添加了地图或参考点，以显示升旗事件的地点，从而支持地理定位。[10] 检测此类视频中的AI篡改需要更仔细地审查视频中出现的军人或旗帜，而不是更仔细地审查地理位置信息。

某些俄罗斯军事单位似乎正在制作或放大人工智能篡改的视频，以弥补其表现不佳以及未能按时完成军事目标。目前看来，使用人工智能篡改的视频在俄罗斯军队中并不普遍。ISW观察到至少有10个团和旅出现在已评估和疑似使用人工智能篡改的视频中。[11]

一位俄罗斯军事博主多次发布经人工智能修改的俄罗斯第36摩托化步兵旅（第29民防航空兵团）的视频，这很可能是为了弥补该旅实际战果的不足。自2026年6月1日起，俄罗斯军事博主Voin DV在多段经鉴定和疑似经人工智能修改的视频中提及了第36摩托化步兵旅。[12] Voin DV声称，第36摩托化步兵旅在第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州和扎波罗热州夺取了七个定居点，其推进距离超过俄军前沿阵地（FLOT）10公里。第36摩托化步兵旅自2025年11月起一直在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向作战。[13]乌克兰军事观察员科斯蒂安廷·马绍韦茨于2026年3月4日报告称，俄罗斯第29民防军（东部军区）指挥部对第36摩托化步兵旅进行了调查，发现该部队夸大了此前在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向的地形控制报告。[14] 自2026年1月以来，第36摩托化步兵旅很可能依靠夸大的地形控制报告来掩盖其在乌克兰反击中遭受的高伤亡率和领土损失。[15] 沃因·DV反复将战场上的胜利归功于第36摩托化步兵旅，这很可能是在进一步掩盖该旅的失败。

俄罗斯指挥官惩罚了利用人工智能篡改视频掩盖战绩不佳的下属。俄罗斯军事博主Divgen声称，第127摩托化步兵团（隶属第71摩托化步兵师，第14军）攻占了比利科洛迪亚兹。[16] 2026年7月30日，北方集团军消息人士称，俄罗斯北方集团军司令叶夫根尼·尼基福罗夫上将解除了第127摩托化步兵团团长和该团第1营营长的职务，原因是该部队在哈尔科夫州比利科洛迪亚兹发布了人工智能篡改的视频。[17] 俄罗斯军事博主阿纳托利·拉多夫则认为，原始视频是从该部队指挥官在修改前的私人聊天记录中截取的。[18]据报道，该团指挥官被解职凸显了俄军在领土扩张方面面临的压力。乌克兰第16军于1月30日报告称，尼基福罗夫任命了一个委员会，评估沃夫昌斯克方向缺乏进展的情况。[19] 乌克兰第16军于4月25日报告称，第127摩托化步兵团对哈尔科夫州沃夫昌斯基胡托里发动了一次摩托化进攻，但未能成功。[20] 俄罗斯方面于5月29日声称，第127摩托化步兵团占领了哈尔科夫州卡拉伊奇内。[21] 截至2026年8月31日，ISW评估认为俄军尚未控制卡拉伊奇内。

俄罗斯方面发布人工智能生成和篡改的视频，以佐证其在顿涅茨克州要塞带取得进展的说法——这是克里姆林宫的首要作战目标。俄罗斯国防部、克里姆林宫通讯社塔斯社、官方部队Telegram频道以及军事博客都提到，在疑似和经鉴定为人工智能篡改的视频中，有八个俄罗斯团和旅在要塞带作战。自2026年6月1日起，在四段经评估并被怀疑由人工智能篡改的视频中，提及了俄罗斯第三合成集团军（原卢甘斯克人民共和国第二军，隶属南部军区）及其下属的第123独立摩托化步兵旅、第88独立摩托化步兵旅、第7独立摩托化步兵旅和第1465摩托化步兵团（第4独立摩托化步兵旅）。[22] 第三合成集团军的官方Telegram频道至少发布了两段疑似由人工智能篡改的视频。市售人工智能检测软件以高度置信度评估认为，至少有两段提及第三合成集团军及其下属部队的视频是由人工智能模型篡改的。[23]自6月以来，第3集团军的战斗力有所下降，目前该部队只能在斯拉维扬斯克和克拉马托尔斯克方向进行小规模渗透行动。[24] 乌克兰第19军军长亚历山大·巴库林准将于6月15日报告称，第3集团军部分部队人员短缺，且惧怕其指挥官。[25] 俄罗斯国防部、第1442摩托化步兵团的官方Telegram频道以及俄罗斯军事博客“南方共和国”在三段经评估并疑似经人工智能篡改的视频中提到了俄罗斯第3集团军（中央军区）以及第1442摩托化步兵团（第6摩托化步兵师）和第54摩托化步兵团的下属部队。 [26] 俄军在堡垒带的推进缓慢且代价高昂，俄军很可能利用这段人工智能拍摄的视频来宣传俄军推进速度比实际情况要快得多的说法。[27]

俄罗斯方面利用人工智能篡改的视频素材，作为蓄意认知战的一部分，旨在将俄罗斯在乌克兰的胜利描绘成不可避免的。

俄罗斯方面声称在实际俄军前线前方占领了领土，以营造领土推进的假象，而实际上并不存在这样的推进。俄罗斯总参谋长瓦列里·格拉西莫夫陆军上将8月27日声称，俄军在斯拉维扬斯克-克拉马托尔斯克方向取得进展，并占领了顿涅茨克州皮斯库尼夫卡（位于斯拉维扬斯克以东）。[28] 商用人工智能检测软件高度确信地评估认为，一些据称显示俄军在皮斯库尼夫卡的场景经过了人工智能模型的修改。[29] 自2026年1月以来，格拉西莫夫和其他军事指挥官在多次公开讲话中夸大了俄军的战果。[30] 7月3日，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京与几位俄军指挥官举行了一次事先安排好的会晤，会上他大肆夸大了俄军在顿涅茨克州科斯佳蒂尼夫卡的进展，这与战场实际情况不符。[31] 7月3日和4日，俄罗斯方面发布了至少四段疑似或经评估为人工智能篡改的视频，据称视频显示俄罗斯军人在科斯佳蒂尼夫卡挥舞旗帜。[32] 情报与安全局（ISW）继续评估认为，克里姆林宫很可能利用这些会面作为认知战的一部分，旨在将俄罗斯的攻势描绘成实现了其作战和战略目标。[33] 克里姆林宫利用科斯佳蒂尼夫卡占领事件的信息效应，影响美国政府的认知和西方的信息空间。俄罗斯总统助理尤里·乌沙科夫7月4日声称，普京当天与美国总统唐纳德·特朗普通话时，强调了科斯佳蒂尼夫卡的占领，并声称乌克兰的欧洲伙伴对前线局势存在错误认知。[34]普京依然坚持他的胜利理论，该理论基于这样的前提：俄罗斯可以通过让俄军保持主动权并无限期地推进整个战区，从而赢得消耗战，最终耗尽乌克兰的防御能力和西方对乌克兰的支持。[35] 利用人工智能篡改的视频来展示虚假的战果，既支持了这一胜利理论，也推进了俄罗斯说服美国和西方接受其对尚未占领领土的主张的努力。截至2026年8月31日，俄罗斯方面利用经评估或疑似人工智能篡改的视频所宣称的大部分定居点仍处于乌克兰的控制之下。

俄罗斯方面利用疑似经人工智能篡改的视频，否认乌克兰在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向取得的领土进展。8月12日，泽连斯基总统报告称，乌克兰军队已结束在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向的反攻行动，解放了26个定居点。[36] 情报与安全研究所（ISW）评估，2026年1月29日至8月12日期间，乌克兰军队在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向和胡利亚伊波列方向北部（乌克兰军队也曾在此方向发动反攻）解放了约626.69平方公里的土地。[37] 乌克兰反攻的成功削弱了俄罗斯的认知战策略，表明俄军无法保持主动权并守住所有占领的领土。8月14日，一名俄罗斯方面发布了一段疑似视频，声称视频显示俄罗斯军人在乌克兰军队解放的几个定居点维持阵地。 [38] 市售人工智能检测软件以高度置信度评估认为，据称显示俄罗斯士兵出现在第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州新米科拉伊夫卡和兹拉霍达，以及扎波罗热州北部普里维尔内、雷布内、克拉斯诺希尔斯克和新戈里霍里夫卡的画面，均已使用人工智能模型进行篡改。疑似篡改视频的地理位置显示，俄罗斯军人出现在乌克兰军队解放的其他五个定居点。[39]

俄罗斯方面正在利用公开的视频生成模型来制作人工智能篡改的视频。

鉴于文本转视频生成式人工智能模型的易用性，俄罗斯方面很可能会继续扩大其对人工智能篡改视频的使用。市售人工智能检测软件显示，经评估的人工智能篡改视频源自Sora和Seedance人工智能模型。Sora和Seedance是文本转视频生成式人工智能模型，可根据输入的文本或参考资料生成视频。Sora由美国人工智能公司OpenAI于2024年发布。[40] Seedance由中国人工智能和社交媒体公司字节跳动于2025年发布。[41] OpenAI已于2026年4月26日停止Sora网页版和应用程序的运营，据报道，该公司计划于2026年9月24日停止其应用程序编程接口（API）的运营。[42] OpenAI停止Sora运营的决定将迫使俄罗斯方面使用Seedance或其他人工智能模型（包括俄罗斯政府可能为其自身开发的专有模型）来制作人工智能篡改视频。

结论：俄罗斯方面可能会继续完善其利用人工智能增强视频来支持认知战行动的技巧。ISW持续评估认为，俄罗斯方面正在开展一项复杂的认知战行动，该行动利用人工智能篡改或生成的升旗视频等手段，来佐证其在俄军未驻守地区取得战术胜利的虚假说法。[43] 这些视频旨在包含可定位的元素，从而赋予视频以合法性。俄罗斯方面将继续更新其人工智能叙事和模型，以将捏造的战果伪装成真实的战果。文本转视频的人工智能模型为俄罗斯方面提供了一种低成本的途径，使其能够夸大俄军的战果或否认乌克兰反攻的成功。疑似经人工智能篡改的视频越来越能够绕过市售人工智能检测软件的像素内容验证。然而，经人工智能篡改的视频中仍然普遍存在视觉异常。

俄罗斯方面可能会扩大其认知战行动，将人工智能篡改或生成的卫星图像纳入其中。谷歌地球的Nano Banana人工智能工具允许用户通过文本提示生成人工智能篡改的卫星图像。[44] 据称展示Nano Banana人工智能篡改或生成图像的帖子表明，用户能够通过生成军事网站的深度伪造图像来绕过谷歌地球的使用条款。俄罗斯方面很可能会利用类似的、缺乏安全保障的人工智能模型来推进其认知战行动。开源研究人员需要开发并不断完善负责任的技术，以区分人工智能篡改的视频或图像与真实视频。

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