Mind the gaps: Europe’s to-do list for defense without the US

PARIS — Europe can build up most of the critical defense enablers needed to deter or defeat Russia without U.S. support within five years, provided the political will to invest is there, according to security researchers and experts surveyed by Defense News.

European countries currently rely on the U.S. within the NATO alliance for a range of supporting capabilities and assets that allow combat forces to operate effectively. That dependency looks increasingly precarious as U.S. President Donald Trump signals willingness to abandon America’s long-time allies and align with Russia.

Without critical enablers now provided by the United States, such as battlefield command and control (C2), satellite intelligence and long-range strike, an alliance of European Union countries, the U.K. and Norway could still defeat Russia in a conventional conflict, but it would be a costlier and bloodier affair, according to several analysts.

“At a European level we’re actually not fully operational without those enablers,” said Sven Biscop, director of the Europe in the World program at the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels.

“That doesn’t mean you can’t do anything, but it would be much more improvised. Much bloodier, with more losses of people, of terrain also – so we have to solve that urgently.”

Military satellite communications is the area where Europe is closest to having sufficient capability, with unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) not far behind, based on the assessment of 17 experts from mostly Europe-based think tanks and institutions. Those capabilities are either in place or fewer than three years away, a majority said.

Defense News asked the experts how much time a European alliance will need to reach adequate capacity in nine defense enablers, in order to deter or successfully fight Russia without the U.S.

Battlefield command and control, long-range strike and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) are all areas where most analysts expect Europe can achieve self sufficiency within five years. Space-based ISR stood out as the capability for which the respondents were least optimistic, with a majority considering Europe will need five to 10 years to have sufficient capacity to stop relying on the U.S.

“We’re almost completely dependent on U.S. intelligence for satellite and everything that goes with it,” Biscop said. “That will take some time to develop, we will need a number of years.”

The experts were divided on aerial refueling and strategic airlift, with one group considering that Europe has enough tanker aircraft and transport aircraft as it is, and another set of analysts considering the continent still needs three to five years to achieve sufficient mass.

Airborne surveillance was another area of divided assessments, with around half of the analysts considering that Europe has the capability in place or can achieve critical ability within three years, and the other half expecting that to take anywhere between three and 10 years.

All the estimates are contingent on European governments being willing to cough up the money required to build up the enablers, with only a handful of NATO members in Europe spending more than 2.5% of their GDP on defense in 2024, and nearly a third not meeting the 2% target set by NATO in 2014.

“It’s difficult to forecast the number and size of capabilities we would need to be fully efficient against Russia,” said Héloïse Fayet, a researcher at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, where she’s in charge of deterrence and proliferation. “There are a lot of external variables, such as the political willingness to spend much more money on defense.”

Russia could be ready to attack a European Union country within three to ten years, researchers Alex Burilkov at Globsec GeoTech Center and Guntram Wolff at Bruegel wrote in a Feb. 21 analysis , citing assessments by NATO, Germany, Poland, Denmark and the Baltic states.

European NATO allies have time to prepare, but “this time must not be spent doing nothing, as Europe is used to doing,” said Léo Péria-Peigné, a researcher at IFRI who specializes in armament capacity, and who doesn’t expect Russia to be a threat to the EU for at least five years because of its losses of troops and equipment in Ukraine.

European solutions for enablers “are critically under-financed right now, and it would be foolish to say anything else, but they exist,” said Péria-Peigné. “So it can ramp up, and we have time to do so. How much time will Europe need to build up capacity? If everybody is actually doing instead of talking, in five years it will be pretty solid.”

Europe wouldn’t need to match the U.S. in enablers, as its ambition is territorial defense rather than global, Biscop said. “You may not want to have the same numbers, but it is still a major investment.”

“Ukraine held Russia at the gate without most of these enablers, and it took most of the might of Russia.” — Léo Péria-Peigné, IFRI

“Ukraine held Russia at the gate without most of these enablers, and it took most of the might of Russia.”

The example of Poland’s military expansion shows capabilities can be built up quickly when governments commit the finances, according to Péria-Peigné. And Europe may not need top notch capabilities to defeat a Russian attack, he said.

“Russia is not China,” Péria-Peigné said. “Ukraine held Russia at the gate without most of these enablers, and it took most of the might of Russia. I’m not saying it’s easy and we can do without, but we can fight Russia without all of the enablers, and we still have a lot of them.”

Some analysts mentioned enablers that were not in the survey, such as combat engineering and wet-gap crossing, airborne electronic attack and improved military mobility,

“Enhanced military mobility is a critical enabler to ensure deterrence,” said Mihai Sebastian Chihaia, an analyst at the European Policy Centre. “Currently, the state of infrastructure and regulatory issues are seriously impeding the movement of armed forces across Europe.”

Enablers provide supporting effects that boost the effectiveness of direct combat forces, and several analysts pointed out that Europe would also need to build up its troop numbers and add tanks, artillery and other equipment to compensate for the U.S. withdrawing from the continent.

“Land warfare is the most critical capacity to build up, because the worst case scenario is a Russian invasion of the EU proper, and scaling up land warfare capabilities rapidly would make a Russian breakthrough improbable, which after the lessons of 2022 would factor heavily in the Kremlin’s decision making,” Burilkov told Defense News.

A U.S. withdrawal, combined with a U.S.-Russia deal over Ukraine that would allow for a continued Russian military build-up, would require Europe to add capacities equivalent to the fighting force of 300,000 U.S. troops, with a focus on mechanized and armored forces, Burilkov and Wolff wrote in their report.

“We do have the people and the scale, we also have a much larger economy, so we would win a conventional war against Russia,” Biscop said. “What we need is to complete our European force package, so that you’re fully operational, which then works as a deterrent. To make the Russians think: `We’re not going to start this.’”

Below are the results of the survey asking the question how much time a European alliance would need to reach adequate capacity in nine enablers in order to deter or successfully fight Russia without the U.S. The results are based on 17 responses, except for satellite communications, airborne surveillance and strategic airlift, which received 16 responses, and SEAD with 15 responses.

Space-based ISR uses satellites to collect intelligence, conduct surveillance and perform reconnaissance. This provides critical information about enemy forces, terrain, and other factors to support decision-making and boost combat effectiveness.

The U.S. had 246 military satellites as of May 2023, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists, compared to 49 for European NATO members, led by France with 15 satellites.

“European efforts to expand space-based ISR capabilities are being hampered by the lack of an operational space port on the continent, limited launch capacity, and differing space-launch philosophies between the major European players. Without much improved space-based ISR capabilities, other European capability development efforts, such as the European Long-Range Strike Approach, will suffer from exceedingly long kill chains” — Rafael Loss, European Council on Foreign Relations

“European efforts to expand space-based ISR capabilities are being hampered by the lack of an operational space port on the continent, limited launch capacity, and differing space-launch philosophies between the major European players. Without much improved space-based ISR capabilities, other European capability development efforts, such as the European Long-Range Strike Approach, will suffer from exceedingly long kill chains”

Battlefield command & control

Battlefield command and control refers to the system and processes used by military commanders to direct and coordinate forces during operations.

“There will not be a convergence on one C2 network, but rather an emergence of C2 clusters around different coalitions/missions.” — Loss, ECFR

“There will not be a convergence on one C2 network, but rather an emergence of C2 clusters around different coalitions/missions.”

Long-range strike involves weapon systems to deliver a conventional payload at stand-off range and with high precision, in order to achieve strategic or operational goals such as destroying critical infrastructure or high-value targets.

“Europeans possess some number of air-launched long-range strike systems, but they lack arsenal depth and should be complemented with sea-based and land-based long-ranged strike.” — Loss, ECFR

“Europeans possess some number of air-launched long-range strike systems, but they lack arsenal depth and should be complemented with sea-based and land-based long-ranged strike.”

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)

SEAD involves actions to neutralize or degrade enemy air-defense systems to create a safer operating environment for friendly aircraft.

Aerial reconnaissance / aerial ISR

Aerial reconnaissance uses aircraft, including unmanned aerial systems, to gather visual or electronic intelligence about enemy forces, terrain, and other areas of interest.

Poland has developed unmanned ISR capability over the past 10 years in response to developments in Ukraine, according to Péria-Peigné. “Not everybody is well equipped, but it exists.”

Satellite communications

Provides secure and reliable communication links for military forces across large areas.

Europe has a number of communication satellites in space, and using them for military purposes is a political decision, several analysts said.

Airborne surveillance

Uses aircraft equipped with sensors and communication systems for a comprehensive view of a battle space, tracking aircraft, ships and other assets to enhance situational awareness for friendly forces.

“It depends. If you talk about U.S. armed forces getting out of Europe, it’s in place. If you talk about the U.S. switching off all European devices made in the U.S., it’s not in place.” — Péria-Peigné, IFRI

“It depends. If you talk about U.S. armed forces getting out of Europe, it’s in place. If you talk about the U.S. switching off all European devices made in the U.S., it’s not in place.”

One potential area of uncertainty is whether Europe would have access to the multinational fleet of 17 Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft operated by NATO.

“This is ... going to take a long time, to have all of that ourselves.” — Biscop, Egmont

“This is ... going to take a long time, to have all of that ourselves.”

Allows for fighter jets and other aircraft to receive fuel in flight, extending their range and loiter time, and allowing for long-duration missions such as keeping a persistent presence over an area.

European countries operate 34 Airbus A330 Multi Role Transport Tankers, including eight in a NATO pool, with another eight on order, according to Airbus numbers as of Jan. 31.

“Here we have quite a lot already” – Biscop, Egmont

“On the refueling tankers we have a very good Europe solution” – Péria-Peigné, IFRI

“The A330 MRTT is a proven success, but the numbers in the MRTT pool are too low.” — Dick Zandee, Clingendael

“The A330 MRTT is a proven success, but the numbers in the MRTT pool are too low.”

Transport aircraft / strategic airlift

Allows for rapid and large-scale deployment of military personnel, equipment and supplies over long distances, supporting operations far from home bases.

Germany, France, the U.K., Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg combined operate a total 115 Airbus A400M heavy transport aircraft, with another 45 on order, according to Airbus data.

“There is too little, but the platform is there” – Biscop, Egmont

“Thanks to the A400 it’s quite solid. The A400 is enough for the European theater” – Péria-Peigné, IFRI

“Hard to assess because if strategic airlift is for force project beyond Europe, Europeans might prioritize in-theater airlift given risk of U.S. disengagement.” — Loss, ECFR

“Hard to assess because if strategic airlift is for force project beyond Europe, Europeans might prioritize in-theater airlift given risk of U.S. disengagement.”

Rudy Ruitenberg is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. He started his career at Bloomberg News and has experience reporting on technology, commodity markets and politics.

巴黎——据《防务新闻》调查的安全研究人员和专家称，只要有足够的政治意愿进行投资，欧洲就可以在五年内建立起大部分必要的关键防御能力，以威慑或击败俄罗斯，而无需美国的支持。

欧洲国家目前在北约联盟框架内依赖美国提供一系列支持能力和资源，以确保其作战部队的有效运作。然而，随着美国总统唐纳德·特朗普释放出愿意放弃美国长期盟友、转而与俄罗斯结盟的信号，这种依赖关系正变得日益岌岌可危。

一些分析人士认为，如果没有美国目前提供的关键支持，例如战场指挥与控制（C2）、卫星情报和远程打击，欧盟国家、英国和挪威组成的联盟仍然可以在常规冲突中击败俄罗斯，但这将会是一场代价更高、更血腥的战争。

“在欧洲层面，如果没有这些推动因素，我们实际上无法完全运作，”布鲁塞尔埃格蒙特皇家国际关系研究所“世界欧洲”项目主任斯文·比斯科普说。

“这并不意味着你们什么都做不了，但只能采取更加临时的措施。会更加血腥，造成更多的人员伤亡和土地损失——所以我们必须尽快解决这个问题。”

根据17位主要来自欧洲智库和机构的专家的评估，军事卫星通信是欧洲最接近具备足够能力的领域，无人情报、监视和侦察（ISR）能力也紧随其后。大多数专家表示，这些能力要么已经具备，要么将在三年内实现。

《防务新闻》询问专家，欧洲联盟需要多少时间才能在九项防御能力方面达到足够的水平，以便在没有美国参与的情况下威慑或成功对抗俄罗斯。

战场指挥控制、远程打击和压制敌方防空系统（SEAD）都是大多数分析人士认为欧洲可以在五年内实现自主的领域。天基情报、监视与侦察（ISR）能力是受访者最不乐观的领域，大多数人认为欧洲需要五到十年的时间才能拥有足够的能力摆脱对美国的依赖。

“我们在卫星及其相关技术方面几乎完全依赖美国的情报，”比斯科普说。“这需要一些时间才能发展起来，我们需要好几年时间。”

专家们对空中加油和战略空运问题意见不一，一部分人认为欧洲目前拥有足够的加油机和运输机，而另一部分分析人士则认为欧洲大陆还需要三到五年时间才能达到足够的规模。

空中监视是另一个评估结果存在分歧的领域，大约一半的分析人士认为欧洲已经具备这种能力，或者可以在三年内达到关键能力，而另一半则预计这需要三到十年的时间。

所有这些估计都取决于欧洲各国政府是否愿意拿出必要的资金来建设必要的设施，而到 2024 年，欧洲只有少数几个北约成员国将超过其 GDP 的 2.5% 用于国防，近三分之一的成员国未能达到北约在 2014 年设定的 2% 的目标。

“要预测我们需要多少能力和多大规模的能力才能对俄罗斯起到全面有效的应对作用，这很难说，”法国国际关系研究所负责威慑和扩散研究的研究员埃洛伊丝·法耶特说，“有很多外部因素会影响最终结果，例如各国是否愿意在国防上投入更多资金。”

全球安全地球技术中心 (Globsec GeoTech Center) 的研究人员 Alex Burilkov 和布鲁盖尔研究所 (Bruegel) 的 Guntram Wolff 在 2 月 21 日的一份分析报告中写道，俄罗斯可能在三到十年内准备好攻击欧盟国家，他们引用了北约、德国、波兰、丹麦和波罗的海国家的评估。

欧洲北约盟国有时间做好准备，但“这段时间绝不能像欧洲以往那样无所事事，”IFRI 专门研究军备能力的研究员莱奥·佩里亚-佩涅 (Léo Péria-Peigné) 说。他认为，由于俄罗斯在乌克兰遭受了兵力和装备的损失，因此至少在五年内，俄罗斯不会对欧盟构成威胁。

佩里亚-佩涅表示：“目前欧洲的赋能解决方案资金严重不足，说其他说法都是愚蠢的，但这些方案确实存在。因此，我们可以逐步扩大规模，而且我们有时间这样做。欧洲需要多少时间来建立能力？如果每个人都能付诸行动而不是空谈，五年后就会相当稳固。”

比斯科普表示，欧洲无需在支援力量方面与美国匹敌，因为其目标是领土防御而非全球防御。“你或许不想拥有同样多的支援力量，但这仍然是一笔巨大的投资。”

“乌克兰在没有大多数这些助力的情况下，就将俄罗斯挡在了城门外，而且消耗了俄罗斯的大部分兵力。”——莱奥·佩里亚-佩涅，国际关系研究所

“乌克兰在没有大多数帮手的情况下，就将俄罗斯挡在了城门外，而且消耗了俄罗斯的大部分兵力。”

佩里亚-佩涅认为，波兰的军事扩张表明，只要政府投入资金，军事能力就能迅速提升。他还表示，欧洲或许并不需要顶尖的军事实力来抵御俄罗斯的进攻。

佩里亚-佩涅说：“俄罗斯不是中国。乌克兰在没有大多数盟友的情况下就将俄罗斯挡在了城门外，而且消耗了俄罗斯的大部分兵力。我不是说这很容易，也不是说我们可以不用这些盟友也能战胜俄罗斯，但我们即使没有所有盟友也能与俄罗斯抗衡，而我们仍然拥有很多这样的盟友。”

一些分析人士提到了调查中没有提到的促成因素，例如战斗工程和湿地穿越、空中电子攻击和提高军事机动性。

“增强军事机动性是确保威慑力的关键因素，”欧洲政策中心分析师米哈伊·塞巴斯蒂安·奇哈亚表示，“目前，基础设施状况和监管问题严重阻碍了武装部队在欧洲的调动。”

支援力量能够提供支持性效果，提高直接作战部队的效能。一些分析人士指出，欧洲还需要增加兵力，并增加坦克、大炮和其他装备，以弥补美国从欧洲大陆撤军造成的损失。

“陆战能力是最需要加强的，因为最糟糕的情况是俄罗斯入侵欧盟本土，而迅速提升陆战能力将使俄罗斯取得突破变得不太可能，这在吸取了 2022 年的教训之后，将成为克里姆林宫决策的重要因素，”布里尔科夫告诉《防务新闻》。

布里尔科夫和沃尔夫在他们的报告中写道，如果美国撤军，再加上美俄就乌克兰问题达成协议，允许俄罗斯继续扩充军备，欧洲将需要增加相当于 30 万美军作战能力的兵力，重点是机械化和装甲部队。

“我们拥有足够的人力和规模，我们的经济规模也远超俄罗斯，所以我们能够赢得与俄罗斯的常规战争，”比斯科普说。“我们需要的是完善我们的欧洲部队部署，使其全面投入作战，从而起到威慑作用。让俄罗斯人明白：‘我们不会挑起这场战争。’”

以下是调查结果，该调查询问欧洲联盟需要多少时间才能在九项赋能方面达到足够的能力，以便在没有美国的情况下威慑或成功对抗俄罗斯。结果基于 17 份回复，卫星通信、空中监视和战略空运收到 16 份回复，压制性防空系统 (SEAD) 收到 15 份回复。

天基情报、监视与侦察（ISR）利用卫星收集情报、进行监视和侦察。这提供了有关敌军兵力、地形和其他因素的关键信息，以支持决策并提高作战效能。

据忧思科学家联盟统计，截至 2023 年 5 月，美国拥有 246 颗军用卫星，而欧洲北约成员国拥有 49 颗，其中法国拥有 15 颗。

“欧洲拓展天基情报、监视与侦察（ISR）能力的努力正受到欧洲大陆缺乏可用航天发射场、发射能力有限以及主要欧洲国家之间航天发射理念差异的阻碍。如果天基ISR能力没有显著提升，其他欧洲能力发展项目，例如欧洲远程打击计划，将面临过长的打击链。”——拉斐尔·洛斯，欧洲对外关系委员会

“欧洲拓展天基情报、监视与侦察（ISR）能力的努力正受到欧洲大陆缺乏可用航天发射场、发射能力有限以及主要欧洲国家之间航天发射理念差异的阻碍。如果天基ISR能力没有显著提升，其他欧洲能力发展项目，例如欧洲远程打击计划，将面临过长的打击链。”

战场指挥与控制

战场指挥与控制是指军事指挥官在作战行动中指挥和协调部队的系统和流程。

“不会出现统一的指挥控制网络，而是围绕不同联盟/任务涌现出多个指挥控制集群。”——洛斯，欧洲对外关系委员会

“不会形成单一的C2网络，而是围绕不同的联盟/任务涌现出多个C2集群。”

远程打击是指利用武器系统在远距离以高精度投放常规有效载荷，以实现摧毁关键基础设施或高价值目标等战略或作战目标。

“欧洲拥有一定数量的空射远程打击系统，但其武器库深度不足，应辅以海基和陆基远程打击能力。”——洛斯，欧洲对外关系委员会

“欧洲拥有一些空射远程打击系统，但缺乏武器库深度，应该辅以海基和陆基远程打击能力。”

压制敌方防空系统（SEAD）

防空压制（SEAD）是指采取措施削弱或干扰敌方防空系统，从而为友军飞机创造更安全的作战环境。

空中侦察/空中情报、监视与侦察

空中侦察利用飞机（包括无人机系统）收集有关敌军、地形和其他感兴趣区域的视觉或电子情报。

佩里亚-佩涅表示，波兰在过去十年中，为了应对乌克兰局势的发展，发展了无人情报、监视和侦察（ISR）能力。“虽然并非所有国家都装备精良，但这种能力确实存在。”

卫星通信

为大范围地区的军事力量提供安全可靠的通信链路。

多位分析人士表示，欧洲在太空拥有多颗通信卫星，将其用于军事用途是一个政治决定。

空中监视

利用配备传感器和通信系统的飞机，对战场进行全面观察，跟踪飞机、舰船和其他资产，以增强友军的态势感知能力。

“这要看情况。如果你说的是美国军队撤出欧洲，那已经落实了。如果你说的是美国关闭所有在美国制造的欧洲设备，那还没有落实。”——佩里亚-佩涅，IFRI

“这要看情况。如果你说的是美国军队撤出欧洲，那已经落实了。如果你说的是美国关闭所有在美国制造的欧洲设备，那还没有落实。”

一个潜在的不确定因素是，欧洲是否能够获得北约运营的17架波音E-3A预警机组成的多国机队。

“这……需要很长时间，我们才能拥有这一切。”——比斯科普，埃格蒙特

“要完全实现这一切……需要很长时间。”

允许战斗机和其他飞机在飞行中加油，延长航程和滞空时间，从而执行长时间任务，例如在某一区域保持持续存在。

根据空客公司截至 1 月 31 日的数据，欧洲各国运营着 34 架空客 A330 多用途运输加油机，其中 8 架在北约机库中，另有 8 架已订购。

“我们这里已经有很多东西了”——比斯科普，埃格蒙特

“关于加油船，我们有一个非常好的欧洲解决方案”——佩里亚-佩涅，IFRI

“A330 MRTT 已被证明是成功的，但 MRTT 机型的数量太少了。”——迪克·赞迪，克林根达尔

“A330 MRTT 已被证明是成功的，但 MRTT 机型的数量太少了。”

运输机/战略空运

允许军事人员、装备和物资快速、大规模地远距离部署，以支持远离本土基地的作战行动。

根据空客公司的数据显示，德国、法国、英国、西班牙、比利时和卢森堡共运营着 115 架空客 A400M 重型运输机，另有 45 架已订购。

“资源太少，但平台已经存在”——比斯科普，埃格蒙特

“多亏了A400发动机，它非常可靠。A400发动机足以应对欧洲战场。”——佩里亚-佩涅，IFRI

“很难评估，因为如果战略空运是为了在欧洲以外地区投送兵力，考虑到美国可能撤出战场的风险，欧洲人可能会优先考虑战区内的空运。”——欧洲对外关系委员会（ECFR）洛斯

“很难评估，因为如果战略空运是为了向欧洲以外的地区投送兵力，考虑到美国可能撤出的风险，欧洲人可能会优先考虑战区内的空运。”

鲁迪·鲁伊滕贝格是《防务新闻》的欧洲记者。他的职业生涯始于彭博新闻社，拥有报道科技、大宗商品市场和政治方面的经验。