Concurrent attacks across multiple domains force rethinking of air-and-missile-defense

A U.S. Army air defense artilleryman inspects a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launcher in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. THAAD is an anti-ballistic missile system designed to intercept missiles in their terminal phase. (U.S. Army photo)

Air-and-missile-defense (AMD) systems have performed well in recent conflicts, defending against waves of cruise missiles and drone swarms with a high success rate. But interceptors are being burned through at an alarming rate, and that along with the loss of THAAD/TPY-2 radars have forced the US to scramble to ensure assets in the Middle East are protected.

Refilling current stockpiles is a challenge, and preparing for future needs is an even bigger challenge. Meeting both current and future needs means being able to quickly adapt to changing tactics by adversaries, said Rob Mitrevski, president, Golden Dome strategy and integration, L3Harris.

“As we’ve seen, Iran had a real capability in deploying and launching a multitude of well-stocked multi-domain threats, ranging from several classes of missiles through several classes of UAVs,” said Mitrevski. “We saw a significant number of them deployed concurrently and set to hit their targets within short time frames. The Iranian threat was unique in that it challenged the defender to defeat low-cost threats with low-cost defensive means, and defeat high-cost, more capable threats with more capable effectors.”

When it comes to establishing a roadmap for AMD going forward, there are three primary concerns: cost, effectiveness and industrial base capacity. Managing all three of those concerns will require a concentrated effort from both the Pentagon and industry to ensure AMD is up to the task.

AMD is, to put it simply, expensive. Radars, launchers and interceptors are all costly and time-consuming to produce, and those systems are often shooting down threats that are much cheaper, especially given the proliferation of low-cost drones that are launched in swarms.

But the sticker price isn’t the only thing that matters. What is being defended plays into the cost consideration, as well, said Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

“The value is what you defend,” Karako said. “The cost police are nevertheless correct, as well, and you can’t just hand wave away the cost problem by saying the defended asset is more expensive. Well, that’s true, but what cost do we put on defending the homeland? Does that mean we can spend a trillion dollars a year on missile defense of the homeland because, hey, the homeland is worth many trillions. No, you still have the affordability question.

“Then it comes down to can you afford to be a global superpower and can you afford to project power to the other side of the globe? The costs of the interceptors are meaningful. They are just one of many factors and they are one of many costs.”

The rise of unmanned aerial system (UAS) swarms – mostly Iran’s Shahed, which has a cost per drone measured in the tens of thousands – is quickly changing the calculations around the cost of interception. Combating drone swarms with traditional interceptors may be effective, but the cost imbalance matters. Karako pointed out that there are counter-drone systems that are less expensive and still effective, but the demand signal must change to make them a priority in order to implement them effectively.

“The thing that’s not appreciated is everybody keeps repeating the same tired cliche and headline about you shouldn’t kill a $40,000 drone with a $4,000,000 missile,” he said. “Well, then start buying more of the kind of UAS things that are already available, already fielded and already operational. Just go and turn up the volume dial on that. The drone dominant stuff talks about counter-UAS. Well, then, let’s go. Show me the money and start buying stuff.”

Iran’s Shahed drones can attack in swarms over distances measured in the hundreds or thousands of kilometers. (Graphic courtesy of CSIS Missile Defense Project.)

AMD Systems Are Effective, But Must Adapt

Overall, AMD systems have performed admirably in the Iran conflict. But the varied threats that Iran has launched have shown that traditional thinking about AMD – see target, hit target – must quickly adapt to respond to low-flying, highly maneuverable drone swarms, high-speed threats such as hypersonics and ballistic missiles that follow a fixed trajectory that can be predicted.

“Iran’s retaliatory actions have certainly given us real-world confirmation of what we knew about their capabilities,” said Mitrevski. “Regardless of the outcome of this specific conflict, the multi-domain, concurrent attack capability on a diverse set of targets with significant numbers of weapons is the type of scenario we’re going to have to get used to thinking about in the way we protect ourselves.”

The US has proven its AMD capabilities for decades, with one of the prime examples dating back to the first Persian Gulf War when the Patriot system was shooting down Scuds. But threats are changing rapidly, and now AMD systems must be able to combat multiple threats at the same time. To do that, both the Pentagon and industry need to ramp up their efforts to build and deploy the necessary systems to meet these threats.

“It’s not as if we haven’t seen this problem coming,” said Karako. “One of my complaints is that nobody seems to be aware in the popular circles of any air defense below a Patriot. But there’s these whole categories of things called short-range air defense, counter-UAS and all this stuff that has been reinvigorated since about 2017. But the actual funding has been a little anemic in recent years. Now you’re seeing people hit the panic button.”

Industrial Base Capacity

Inconsistent demand signals for AMD systems and components has led to less production over time. Components such as solid-rocket motors for interceptors require a complex manufacturing process. And building a THAAD/TPY-2 radar is an extended, multi-billion-dollar task. All of these factors combined have helped lead to dwindling stockpiles and a need for a rapid increase in industrial base capacity and production to help meet needs. Given not only the need to replenish munitions expended in Iran, but also the administration’s defense spending priorities, the necessary demand signals are in place to spur production and investment from the industrial base.

“When you read not only the NDS but all the executive orders, the reconciliation budget, acquisition reform initiatives and other policy pieces together, there are plenty of demand signals – including the Department of War’s priorities to defend the homeland with next-generation air and missile defense and supercharge the defense industrial base,” said Mitrevski.

Industry and the Pentagon are on the same page about what is needed for AMD, which is critical to ensuring consistency in demand signals that will allow the industrial base to increase production. Developing technologies that can not only meet needs but be produced at scale will be key, as the Iran conflict has shown that the future of AMD may well be defending against swarms of attackers that threaten to overwhelm systems.

Ultimately, both the problem and the solution are known. Now, the industrial base and the Pentagon need to invest in the necessary resources to quickly refill stockpiles and prepare for future threats.

“We needed to do a munitions ramp before we vaporized a couple trillion dollars of interceptors,” said Karako. “Now we need it even worse.”

一名美国陆军防空炮兵正在美国中央司令部责任区内检查末段高空区域防御系统（THAAD）发射器。THAAD是一种反弹道导弹系统，旨在拦截处于末段的导弹。（美国陆军照片）

在近期的冲突中，防空反导系统表现出色，能够以很高的成功率防御一波又一波的巡航导弹和无人机群。但拦截弹的损耗速度惊人，再加上THAAD/TPY-2雷达的损失，迫使美国紧急采取措施，确保其在中东的资产安全。

补充现有库存是一项挑战，而为未来需求做好准备则更具挑战性。L3Harris公司金穹战略与集成总裁罗伯·米特雷夫斯基表示，满足当前和未来的需求意味着能够快速适应对手不断变化的战术。

“正如我们所见，伊朗确实具备部署和发射大量储备充足的多域威胁的能力，涵盖多种类型的导弹和无人机，”米特雷夫斯基说。“我们看到大量此类威胁同时部署，并准备在短时间内打击目标。伊朗的威胁独特之处在于，它要求防御方既要用低成本的防御手段应对低成本的威胁，又要用更强大的武器应对高成本、更强大的威胁。”

在制定AMD未来发展路线图时，主要有三个方面需要考虑：成本、效率和产业基础产能。要兼顾这三个方面，需要五角大楼和业界共同努力，确保AMD能够胜任这项任务。

简而言之，AMD（主动防御和导弹防御）成本高昂。雷达、发射器和拦截器的生产都需要耗费大量成本和时间，而且这些系统经常拦截成本低得多的威胁，尤其是在低成本无人机集群发射激增的情况下。

但标价并不是唯一重要的因素。战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）导弹防御项目主任汤姆·卡拉科表示，防御对象也是成本考量因素之一。

“价值在于你所捍卫的东西，”卡拉科说道。“成本控们的观点也同样正确，你不能仅仅因为被防御的资产更昂贵就回避成本问题。没错，这确实如此，但我们究竟如何衡量保卫国土的成本？这是否意味着我们可以每年花费一万亿美元用于国土导弹防御，因为，嘿，国土价值数万亿美元？不，你仍然要考虑其可承受性问题。”

“那么问题就变成了：你是否负担得起成为全球超级大国的代价？你是否负担得起将力量投射到地球另一端的代价？拦截器的成本不容忽视。它们只是众多因素之一，也是众多成本之一。”

无人机群的兴起——尤其是伊朗的“沙赫德”无人机系统，每架无人机的成本高达数万美元——正在迅速改变拦截成本的计算方式。使用传统拦截器对抗无人机群或许有效，但成本失衡是一个重要因素。卡拉科指出，虽然存在一些成本更低且同样有效的反无人机系统，但必须改变市场需求，才能将其列为优先事项，从而有效实施。

“大家不理解的是，总是重复那句老生常谈的陈词滥调，说什么不应该用价值400万美元的导弹击落价值4万美元的无人机，”他说。“那为什么不多买些已经上市、已经部署、已经投入使用的无人机系统（UAS）呢？加大投入力度就行了。现在无人机主导的论调都在谈论反无人机系统。好，那就行动起来。拿出钱来，开始采购吧。”

伊朗的“沙赫德”无人机可以成群结队地发起攻击，攻击距离可达数百甚至数千公里。（图片由战略与国际研究中心导弹防御项目提供。）

AMD系统性能优异，但必须适应

总体而言，反导系统在伊朗冲突中表现出色。但伊朗发起的各种威胁表明，传统的反导思维——发现目标，击中目标——必须迅速调整，以应对低空飞行、高机动性的无人机群、高超音速飞行器以及弹道轨迹固定且可预测的弹道导弹等高速威胁。

米特雷夫斯基说：“伊朗的报复行动无疑在现实世界中证实了我们之前对其能力的了解。无论这场冲突的最终结果如何，伊朗能够使用大量武器对多种目标进行多域、同步攻击，这种作战场景是我们今后在自我防御方面必须考虑的。”

美国数十年来已证明了其在主动防御和多目标防御（AMD）方面的能力，其中一个典型例子可以追溯到第一次海湾战争，当时“爱国者”导弹系统成功击落了飞毛腿导弹。但威胁瞬息万变，如今的AMD系统必须能够同时应对多种威胁。为此，五角大楼和相关产业都需要加大力度，研发和部署必要的系统以应对这些威胁。

“我们并非没有预料到这个问题，”卡拉科说道。“我一直抱怨的是，在普通民众中，似乎没有人意识到‘爱国者’导弹系统之下的任何防空系统。但实际上，存在着一系列被称为短程防空、反无人机系统等等的防御体系，这些体系自2017年以来得到了重新重视。然而，近年来，实际的资金投入却一直不足。现在，人们开始感到恐慌了。”

工业基础产能

对反导系统及其组件的需求信号不稳定，导致产量逐渐下降。拦截器固体火箭发动机等组件的制造工艺复杂。而建造THAAD/TPY-2雷达则是一项耗时耗力、耗资数十亿美元的工程。所有这些因素共同导致库存减少，亟需迅速提升工业基础产能和产量以满足需求。鉴于不仅需要补充在伊朗消耗的弹药，而且考虑到政府的国防开支优先事项，必要的市场需求信号已经出现，足以刺激工业基础的生产和投资。

“当你把《国防战略》以及所有行政命令、预算协调、采购改革倡议和其他政策文件放在一起阅读时，你会发现很多需求信号——包括战争部优先考虑用下一代防空和导弹防御系统保卫国土，并大力发展国防工业基础，”米特雷夫斯基说。

工业界和五角大楼在AMD（自动目标防御）的需求方面达成共识，这对于确保需求信号的稳定性至关重要，而需求信号的稳定性又将使工业基础能够提高产量。开发不仅能够满足需求而且能够大规模生产的技术至关重要，因为伊朗冲突表明，AMD的未来很可能在于防御可能使系统瘫痪的大量攻击者。

最终，问题和解决方案都已明确。现在，工业基础和五角大楼需要投资必要的资源，以迅速补充库存，并为未来的威胁做好准备。

卡拉科说：“我们本来就需要提升弹药储备，以免浪费价值数万亿美元的拦截弹。现在我们更需要这样做了。”