Houthi advance in Yemen is about more than just the Red Sea

Houthis were already able to disrupt shipping – their advance consolidates that power, and exposes Yemeni government weakness.

Yemen's Houthi rebels march during a mobilisation campaign in Sanaa, Yemen, Thursday, September 10, 2026 [AP Photo]

The rapid Houthi advance down Yemen’s Red Sea coast this week is an astonishing military victory, but not quite the game-changer it is being portrayed as.

The group has been able to threaten the vitally important shipping route , but they have been doing so since 2023. This new victory consolidates that control, proving that Yemen’s government is not currently in a position to defeat them.

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The prior Houthi control over the northern section of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the major port city of Hodeidah, has allowed the Iran-allied rebel group, for years, to first attack shipping linked to Israel and the United States – and then, in recent months, Saudi Arabian-linked vessels .

That control also damaged the global economy. Long before the US war with Iran and the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a tool to throttle international trade, Houthi attacks around Yemen had turned Bab al-Mandeb into a similar weapon, and led to bombing campaigns against the Houthis by the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Houthi officials themselves have emphasised this, with one leading official, Abdulqader al-Murtada, saying earlier this week that the group did “not need control over Bab al-Mandeb, for the blockade [on Saudi ships] is already in place”. Al-Murtada could point Saudi ships that have avoided Bab al-Mandeb since the Houthis began attacking them in July, even before their latest progress.

However, the Houthi lightning advance makes it even easier for the group to disrupt shipping. They now have access to the Red Sea’s narrow entry point and several islands in it, allowing them to use shorter-range weapons and more easily reach vessels they want to attack and board, as well as potentially using sea mines to further restrict shipping.

The increase in the Houthi ability to target shipping – even with the caveats outlined above – does have an impact on market sentiment. Oil prices have increased as traders price in the ability for Iran and its allies to disrupt shipping in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, the two maritime chokepoints of the southern Arabian Peninsula.

However, the consequences of this advance are not limited to the increased ability of the Houthis to attack shipping, but to the increasing reality that the Houthi problem on the Red Sea is not going away.

For months, after Saudi Arabia backed a Yemeni government campaign against southern Yemeni separatist forces earlier this year, the mood had shifted in the country’s anti-Houthi camp.

The perception was that the Yemeni government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council, had finally gotten its act together. President Rashad al-Alimi repeatedly spoke of a unified military chain of command, allowing the military to overcome the divisions blamed for its inability to defeat the Houthis.

Yemeni and Saudi officials had hinted at an anti-Houthi campaign all year. The Red Sea coastline was a possible location: the largely flat geography suited the government, allowing Saudi Arabia to effectively use its air power; much of the population is not made up of the Houthis’ traditional support base; and prior Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping meant that there would likely be international buy-in for such a campaign.

The seizure of the Red Sea coastline has broken all of those narratives.

The momentum the Yemeni government thought it had, even at the start of this week when it claimed advances in al-Jawf, to the east of the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa, is now gone.

After months of projecting unity, Yemen’s anti-Houthi camp is once again turning on itself, trading accusations of blame for the defeat.

The message the Houthis have for Saudi Arabia is clear: ‘Your partners in Yemen can’t defeat us.’

Therefore, the potential Houthi argument is that Saudi Arabia has to make a deal with them and agree to their terms, including Riyadh funding public sector salaries, access to income from Yemen’s oil and gas reserves, and no restrictions on flights and shipping to Houthi-controlled ports.

The Houthis have an incentive to lock in their gains and raise the cost of escalation before Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reorganise.

Their attacks on Saudi Arabia, escalating in the past week, have been damaging, and the group is promising more if Riyadh increases its military support for the Yemeni government.

The risk of any such intervention is clearly there for Saudi Arabia. But so is the risk of inaction. The Houthis have repeatedly demanded more concessions when they were in positions of strength.

With the Yemen war unresolved, the Houthis may decide to escalate again in the future, even if a deal is agreed now.

And so, policymakers in Riyadh could determine that it makes more sense to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem head-on now, rather than allow it to fester into the future.

胡塞武装此前已经能够扰乱航运——他们的推进巩固了这种力量，并暴露了也门政府的弱点。

2026年9月10日星期四，也门胡塞武装在也门首都萨那举行动员活动。[美联社照片]

本周胡塞武装沿也门红海沿岸的迅速推进是一场惊人的军事胜利，但并没有像人们所描述的那样彻底改变战局。

该组织一直能够威胁这条至关重要的航运路线，但他们从 2023 年开始这样做。这次新的胜利巩固了他们的控制，证明也门政府目前没有能力击败他们。

问题 1/3：胡塞武装占领也门海岸后能否封锁红海？

巴基斯坦为何在胡塞武装与沙特冲突升级之际与伊朗展开对话（共3条，此为第2条）

胡塞武装在也门红海沿岸取得进展后，控制了一条关键航运路线（共3条记录，此为第3条）。

胡塞武装此前控制了也门红海沿岸北部地区，包括主要港口城市荷台达，多年来，这个与伊朗结盟的叛乱组织先是袭击与以色列和美国有关的船只，然后在最近几个月，又袭击了与沙特阿拉伯有关的船只。

这种控制也损害了全球经济。早在美伊战争爆发、霍尔木兹海峡被用作扼杀国际贸易的工具之前，胡塞武装在也门周边的袭击就已经将曼德海峡变成了类似的武器，并导致美国、英国和以色列对胡塞武装发动空袭。

胡塞武装官员自己也强调了这一点，其中一位高级官员阿卜杜勒卡德尔·穆尔塔达本周早些时候表示，该组织“不需要控制曼德海峡，因为（对沙特船只的）封锁已经到位”。穆尔塔达可以指出，自胡塞武装7月开始袭击沙特船只以来，甚至在他们取得最新进展之前，沙特船只就一直避开曼德海峡。

然而，胡塞武装的闪电式推进使他们更容易扰乱航运。他们现在能够进入红海狭窄的入口及其中的几个岛屿，这使他们可以使用近程武器，更容易接近并登船攻击目标，并且可能还会使用水雷进一步限制航运。

即使考虑到上述种种限制，胡塞武装袭击航运能力的提升确实对市场情绪产生了影响。由于交易员将伊朗及其盟友扰乱霍尔木兹海峡和曼德海峡（阿拉伯半岛南部两大海上咽喉要道）航运的能力纳入考量，油价应声上涨。

然而，这一进展的后果不仅限于胡塞武装袭击航运的能力增强，而且还日益凸显了红海胡塞武装问题不会消失的现实。

今年早些时候，沙特阿拉伯支持也门政府对也门南部分离主义势力发动军事行动，此后数月，也门反胡塞阵营的情绪发生了转变。

人们普遍认为，由总统领导委员会领导的也门政府终于步入正轨。总统拉沙德·阿利米多次谈到建立统一的军事指挥系统，使军队能够克服此前导致其无法击败胡塞武装的分裂局面。

也门和沙特官员全年都在暗示将发起反胡塞武装的军事行动。红海沿岸地区是一个可能的地点：地势平坦，有利于也门政府的战略部署，使沙特阿拉伯能够有效地运用其空中力量；该地区的大部分人口并非胡塞武装的传统支持者；此外，胡塞武装此前曾袭击红海航运，这意味着此次军事行动很可能获得国际社会的支持。

红海沿岸地区的占领打破了所有这些说法。

也门政府原本以为本周初在胡塞武装控制的首都萨那以东的焦夫省取得了进展，但这种势头现在已经消失了。

在展现了数月的团结之后，也门反胡塞阵营再次内讧，互相指责对方应为战败负责。

胡塞武装向沙特阿拉伯传达的信息很明确：“你们在也门的盟友无法打败我们。”

因此，胡塞武装可能会提出这样的论点：沙特阿拉伯必须与他们达成协议，并同意他们的条款，包括利雅得资助公共部门工资、获得也门石油和天然气储备的收入，以及不对飞往胡塞武装控制港口的航班和航运施加任何限制。

胡塞武装有动机巩固战果，并在沙特支持的也门军队重组之前提高局势升级的成本。

过去一周，他们对沙特阿拉伯的袭击不断升级，造成了破坏。该组织威胁称，如果利雅得加大对也门政府的军事支持，他们将采取更多行动。

对沙特阿拉伯而言，采取此类干预措施的风险显而易见。但同样存在不作为的风险。胡塞武装在占据优势地位时，曾多次要求沙特做出更多让步。

由于也门战争尚未解决，即使现在达成协议，胡塞武装将来也可能再次升级冲突。

因此，利雅得的决策者可能会认为，与其让问题在未来恶化，不如现在齐心协力正面解决这个问题，这样更有意义。