How F-16s for Ukraine could harm Russia without taking a single shot

With F-16 fighter jets expected to be provided to Ukraine over the coming months, opinions of their usefulness spans from a gamechanger in the war with Russia to a total waste of resources. But there is one way that these aircraft will harm Russia even if they never shoot down a missile, fighter jet or helicopter: They will cost the Russian Aerospace Forces precious aircraft life.

The Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, possessed roughly 900 tactical aircraft before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine . These included fighter, attack and fighter-bomber aircraft. Since the invasion, it has lost between 84 and 130 of those to air defenses, fighter aircraft and crashes . That’s only a portion of total losses, however. Overuse of these aircraft is also costing Russia as the war drags on.

In a conflict’s early stages, what matters is total combat power from all active platforms; that represents the maximum firepower that can be directed at the opposition from the onset. In a protracted war, where one force tries to exhaust the other, it’s the total longevity of the military force that matters. And that’s where the VKS finds itself now.

By my calculations, the extra hours that it’s pressed its aircraft into service since February 2022 have effectively cost it an additional 27 to 57 aircraft in imputed losses.

Aircraft have a life span. They are designed with a total number of expected flight hours, which are used roughly evenly over the life of the aircraft and segmented with periodic maintenance and inspection. For example, if an aircraft is designed for 3,000 flight hours with an expected use of 30 years, the aircraft will fly roughly 100 hours per year. If, during an inspection, wear on the plane is found to be more or less than expected, the projected remaining hours are adjusted accordingly. These numbers dictate all sorts of planning, from fuel procurement to ground maintenance to pilot training.

Imputed losses mean that the Russians have burned through more of the expected life span of their aircraft more quickly than anticipated. To make up for it, they’ll have to procure more aircraft, increase maintenance, reduce operations, or accept a smaller force — or some combination of those.

The VKS is still in the process of transitioning from Soviet-era aircraft to more modern platforms, and an estimated 18 to 36 of these newer tactical aircraft join the force every year. Almost half of the VKS force is still upgraded Soviet-era airframes.

While newer Russian aircraft are designed for between 3,500 and 4,500 flight hours, with some as high as 6,000 , those Soviet-era aircraft were designed to be in the air only 2,000 to 3,500 hours. Although several platforms, such as the MiG-31 , have been upgraded to extend their service life, many of these older planes (Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, MiG-29) are nearing the end of their service lives. These have, at best, 500 to 1,000 hours remaining.

In the first few months of the war in Ukraine, the VKS was flying as many as 150 to 300 sorties per day — compared with the peacetime rate of roughly 60 per day . Even dropping to 100 sorties a day since, the VKS has basically flown double its normal annual hours since the beginning of the war.

This extra use is, by commonly used measures, equivalent to losing roughly 34 aircraft since the start of the invasion. However, this only captures the losses relative to the life span of newer airframes. Because the older airframes have so few remaining hours, it’s actually equivalent to losing about 57 VKS airframes.

To be clear, the exact composition of the VKS force and the precise age and historical usage of all its airframes are not precisely known. Further, some VKS tactical aircraft aren’t operating in Ukraine; they are either harassing NATO aircraft or being used for training. These sorties are in addition to previously mentioned Ukraine-related sorties and are in excess of the usage calculated above. They are being conservatively excluded from the usage being applied to the total force. These factors likely mean that my estimate of 57 imputed losses is an undercount.

A U.S. Air Force F-16 flies during a 2019 drill at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. (Senior Airman Daniel Snider/U.S. Air Force)

This results in total true losses closer to 187 VKS airframes. Extrapolating this, the VKS will continue to lose 30 to 60 airframes a year from combat, accident and imputed losses.

There are some ways the Russians could mitigate such losses: Conduct more frequent and detailed inspections; increase maintenance; modify flight profiles and how aircraft are rotated; and reduce the hours of training. All those might pare back imputed losses to more like 34 airframes. But these actions are expensive in terms of manpower, time and resources — all of which are likely strained from ongoing conflict.

By the summer of 2024, combat losses and imputed flight hour losses may put the VKS below 75% of its prewar strength. To make up for that, the VKS will need to either increase production, reduce usage or reduce force structure for the next 30 years. Overall, though, that’s not a horrible position to be in.

However, the VKS soon will be facing a very different Ukrainian threat: F-16 fighter jets, more air defenses and cruise missiles.

As the VKS devotes a greater share of its dwindling force to countering those, it will have fewer aircraft left to support Russian ground operations. VKS fighters in the sky will also be less capable, stemming from two years of overuse. This happens even if F-16s fail to score a single air-to-air kill, and an upgraded Ukrainian fighter and air defense threat will score many.

Michael Bohnert is a licensed engineer at the think tank Rand. He previously worked as an engineer at a naval nuclear laboratory.

预计未来几个月乌克兰将接收F-16战斗机，对于其作用的看法褒贬不一，有人认为它们将改变对俄战争的格局，也有人认为它们完全是资源浪费。但即便这些战机从未击落过导弹、战斗机或直升机，它们也会以某种方式损害俄罗斯：它们将使俄罗斯空天军损失宝贵的飞机生命。

在2022年入侵乌克兰之前，俄罗斯空天军（VKS）拥有约900架战术飞机，包括战斗机、攻击机和战斗轰炸机。自入侵以来，俄罗斯空天军已损失其中84至130架，损失原因包括防空系统、敌方战斗机以及飞机坠毁。但这仅仅是总损失的一部分。随着战争的持续，过度使用这些飞机也给俄罗斯带来了沉重的代价。

在冲突初期，重要的是所有现役平台的总战斗力；这代表着从一开始就能对敌方施加的最大火力。而在持久战中，一方试图耗尽另一方的体力，关键在于军队的整体生存能力。而这正是俄罗斯空天军目前所处的境地。

据我计算，自 2022 年 2 月以来，该公司增加的飞机使用小时数实际上使其损失了 27 至 57 架飞机。

飞机都有使用寿命。它们的设计都基于预期的总飞行小时数，这些飞行小时数大致均匀地分布在飞机的整个使用寿命期间，并通过定期维护和检查进行分段。例如，如果一架飞机的设计飞行小时数为3000小时，预期使用寿命为30年，那么这架飞机每年大约飞行100小时。如果在检查过程中发现飞机的磨损程度高于或低于预期，则需要相应地调整预计剩余飞行小时数。这些数据决定了从燃油采购到地面维护再到飞行员培训等各种规划。

估算损失意味着俄罗斯飞机的预期使用寿命已提前耗尽，且消耗速度超出预期。为了弥补损失，他们将不得不采购更多飞机、增加维护成本、减少作战行动或缩减兵力——或者采取上述几种措施的组合。

俄罗斯空天军仍在从苏联时代的飞机过渡到更现代化的平台，每年约有18至36架新型战术飞机加入部队。目前，俄罗斯空天军仍有近一半的飞机是经过升级改造的苏联时代机型。

虽然新型俄罗斯飞机的设计飞行时间在3500到4500小时之间，有些甚至高达6000小时，但苏联时代的飞机设计飞行时间仅为2000到3500小时。尽管一些机型，例如米格-31，已经过升级改造以延长使用寿命，但许多老式飞机（苏-24、苏-25、苏-27、米格-29）已接近使用寿命的终点。这些飞机最多只剩下500到1000小时的剩余飞行时间。

在乌克兰战争爆发的最初几个月里，苏联空军每天的飞行架次高达150至300架次，而和平时期每天的飞行架次约为60架次。即使战后飞行架次降至每天100架次，苏联空军自战争开始以来的飞行小时数也基本达到了其正常年飞行小时数的两倍。

按常用标准衡量，这种额外的使用相当于自入侵开始以来损失了大约34架飞机。然而，这仅仅反映了相对于较新机型使用寿命的损失。由于老旧机型的剩余飞行小时数很少，实际上相当于损失了大约57架VKS飞机。

需要说明的是，俄罗斯空天军部队的确切组成以及所有飞机的具体机龄和历史使用情况尚不完全清楚。此外，部分俄罗斯空天军战术飞机并未在乌克兰境内执行任务；它们要么在骚扰北约飞机，要么用于训练。这些出动次数是在之前提到的与乌克兰相关的出动次数之外的，并且超过了上述计算的使用量。出于保守考虑，这些出动次数已从总出动次数中排除。这些因素可能意味着我估计的57架飞机损失被低估了。

2019年，一架美国空军F-16战斗机在阿拉斯加州艾尔森空军基地进行演习。（美国空军高级飞行员丹尼尔·斯奈德/美国空军）

这导致实际损失总数接近187架俄罗斯空军飞机。据此推算，俄罗斯空军每年仍将因战斗、事故和推定损失而损失30至60架飞机。

俄罗斯可以通过一些方法来减轻此类损失：进行更频繁、更细致的检查；加强维护；调整飞行计划和飞机轮换方式；以及减少训练时间。所有这些措施或许能将估计损失减少到34架左右。但这些措施需要耗费大量的人力、时间和资源——而这些资源很可能都因持续不断的冲突而捉襟见肘。

到2024年夏季，战斗损失和预计飞行小时损失可能使苏联空军的实力降至战前水平的75%以下。为了弥补这一损失，苏联空军需要在未来30年内提高产量、减少使用量或缩减部队规模。不过总的来说，这并非一个糟糕的局面。

然而，俄罗斯空天军很快将面临截然不同的乌克兰威胁：F-16战斗机、更多的防空系统和巡航导弹。

随着俄罗斯空天军将日益减少的兵力投入更多用于应对这些威胁，其用于支援俄罗斯地面作战的飞机数量将会减少。由于两年来的过度使用，空天军战斗机的作战能力也会下降。即便F-16战机未能取得一次空战战果，升级后的乌克兰战斗机和防空系统仍将取得多次空战胜利，这种情况依然会发生。

迈克尔·博纳特是兰德公司（Rand）的注册工程师。他之前曾在海军核实验室担任工程师。