Iran-backed Houthis seize strategic Mayun Island: Can they hold it?伊朗支持的胡塞武装占领了具有战略意义的马云岛:他们能守住它吗?
The takeover solidifies the group’s position in the Bab al-Mandeb, but holding it long-term could be difficult.
![A satellite view of Mayun Island, Yemen, on September 11 [Pleiades Neo © Airbus DS 2026 /Handout via Reuters]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/reuters_6aa544d8-1789215960.jpg?resize=770%2C513&quality=80)
The takeover solidifies the group’s position in the Bab al-Mandeb, but holding it long-term could be difficult.
A satellite view of Mayun Island, Yemen, on September 11 [Pleiades Neo © Airbus DS 2026 /Handout via Reuters]
Houthi forces have taken control of the island of Mayun – also known as Perim – tightening their grip on the eastern coast of the Red Sea and giving the group a strategic foothold in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
The takeover was confirmed on Friday by a senior military official of Yemen’s internationally recognised government and a Houthi official, according to The Associated Press news agency.
list 1 of 3 Houthi advance in Yemen is about more than just the Red Sea
list 2 of 3 Houthis celebrate seizing control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast
list 3 of 3 Yemen government forces say Houthi ‘members, vehicles’ targeted in Mocha
Analysts say the seizure represents a significant military advance that, if the Houthis can consolidate, could reshape their conflict with Saudi-backed forces in Yemen while benefiting their backer Iran in its broader regional struggle.
Here is what we know about the island’s seizure, whether the Houthis can consolidate control and what it means for Yemen and beyond.
Why is Mayun Island important?
Mayun Island is a 13sq km (five square mile) volcanic island in the heart of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the narrow southern corridor at the entrance to the Red Sea.
In 2021, the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis said it had a presence on the island, after reports emerged of a UAE-linked airbase being built there. The UAE ended its involvement in the Yemen conflict at the end of last year and withdrew troops, but the status of the airbase on Mayun Island is unclear.
By controlling the island, which splits Bab al-Mandeb into two channels, the Houthis now have a physical outpost in the strait.
The Bab al-Mandeb Strait is crucial to global shipping as it is the southern entrance to the Red Sea with the Suez Canal at its northern end. The strait has become even more important to shipping since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula by the US-Israel war on Iran in March.
The Houthis also control the areas surrounding the strait, including the island of Hanish and the entire Red Sea coastline of Yemen, reported Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Yemen, Yousef Mawry, on Saturday. Houthi forces seized the port city of Mocha on Thursday.
Wolfgang Pusztai, a security, policy and defence analyst, said the Houthis’ advance and seizure of the whole of Yemen’s Red Sea coast means the group now “has the real capability to shut down any maritime traffic through Bab al-Mandeb if they want to”.
That gives the rebel group a major advantage in its battle in Yemen against Saudi-backed government forces, their primary target. It also benefits the Houthis’ ally, Iran, in its conflict with the US by giving Tehran new leverage over another global chokepoint and making its own blockade of the Strait of Hormuz “even more efficient”, Pusztai told Al Jazeera.
Farea Al-Muslimi, a research fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa programme, said the development serves both the Houthis’ “domestic” aims as well as Iran’s negotiating position with the US and the world “on other files, not just Yemen”.
What does it mean for shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait?
The Houthis have said that general shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb is safe from attacks, except for vessels linked to Saudi Arabia, which they will blockade.
Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the group would continue what his statement called a “siege for siege” and “escalation for escalation” strategy against Saudi Arabia, which has blockaded Houthi-held areas of Yemen.
However, the Houthis have previously targeted vessels with no links to Saudi Arabia in regional waters.
Between November 2023 and mid-2025, the Houthis attacked more than 100 commercial ships in the Red Sea. The Houthis said the attacks were against vessels linked to Israel or its allies, in a campaign of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. However, some attacks targeted vessels that appeared to have no such links, according to shipping sources cited by Reuters and BBC Verify, the BBC’s fact-checking team.
If the Houthis again expand their targets beyond Saudi vessels, their new positions could make it easier for them to strike passing ships.
The Houthis would “be able to use shorter-range missiles rather than long-range artillery to attack the ships,” said Pusztai. “This makes it a very risky endeavour to pass through the strait if the Houthis don’t allow it.”
Any further disruption on Red Sea shipping would have immense repercussions on an already strained global energy market, said economist Javed Hassan.
“War-risk insurance and charter rates can rise before cargoes are formally interrupted, and the resulting pressure extends beyond oil into container shipping, dry bulk and the wider cost of traded goods,” Hassan told Al Jazeera. “The technical supply shock from Houthi attacks therefore becomes an inflationary shock through several commodities at once.”
Can the Houthis hold on to the island?
That will depend on how much effort Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces, which reportedly quickly withdrew as the Houthis advanced on it, put into recapturing the island, said Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London.
The Houthis are in a strong position to hold the island in the short term due to their control of surrounding areas, Krieg told Al Jazeera. However, “the island itself is difficult to defend against an amphibious assault in the long run” though such an assault “would be a high-risk operation as well”.
“The key will be to hold the coastal areas of the mainland and its hinterland,” added Krieg.
Farea Al-Muslimi, a research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House, said the Houthis’ rapid push across the Red Sea coast and onto Perim Island was not surprising.
He cited poor coordination and weak armament among government forces, despite a yearlong Saudi-backed effort to consolidate them into an effective fighting force and an effective years-long military build-up by the Houthis.
Speaking to reporters during his visit to Ireland, US President Donald Trump said the Houthis had asked the US not to intervene in the conflict against Yemen’s internationally recognised government.
He said the Houthis “called us”. “They don’t want to fight us, they let us know,” Trump said.
“They would much prefer not having us involved and they’re letting most ships go through. There’s just one country that they’re not too happy with and we’ll get that straightened out.”
Trump added that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is a “good friend” and “everything will work out fine”.
此次收购巩固了该集团在曼德海峡地区的地位,但长期保持这一地位可能很困难。
9月11日,也门马云岛的卫星图像 [Pleiades Neo © Airbus DS 2026 /路透社提供]
胡塞武装控制了马云岛(又称佩里姆岛),加强了对红海东岸的控制,使该组织在曼德海峡获得了战略立足点。
据美联社报道,也门国际公认政府的一名高级军事官员和一名胡塞武装官员于周五证实了此次政变。
也门胡塞武装的推进不仅仅关乎红海,这共有三条记录(列表 1)。
(共3条记录,此为第2条)胡塞武装庆祝夺取也门红海沿岸控制权
也门政府军称,胡塞武装“成员和车辆”在摩卡遭到袭击,这是3起袭击事件中的第3起。
分析人士表示,此次占领行动代表着一次重大的军事进展,如果胡塞武装能够巩固这一成果,可能会重塑其与沙特支持的也门武装之间的冲突格局,同时也有利于其支持者伊朗在更广泛的地区斗争中发挥作用。
以下是我们对该岛占领事件的了解,胡塞武装能否巩固控制权,以及这对也门及其他地区意味着什么。
马云岛为何如此重要?
马云岛是位于曼德海峡中心的一座面积为 13 平方公里(5 平方英里)的火山岛,曼德海峡是红海入口处狭窄的南部通道。
2021年,在有报道称阿联酋正在马云岛上修建一座与其相关的空军基地后,沙特领导的打击胡塞武装的联军声称其在该岛拥有军事存在。阿联酋于去年年底结束了在也门冲突中的军事行动并撤出了军队,但马云岛上空军基地的现状尚不明朗。
通过控制该岛(该岛将曼德海峡一分为二),胡塞武装现在在该海峡拥有了一个实体前哨。
曼德海峡对全球航运至关重要,它是红海的南入口,苏伊士运河位于其北端。自今年3月美国和以色列对伊朗发动战争,导致位于阿拉伯半岛另一侧的霍尔木兹海峡关闭以来,曼德海峡对航运的重要性更加凸显。
据半岛电视台驻也门记者优素福·马乌里周六报道,胡塞武装还控制着海峡周边地区,包括哈尼什岛和也门整个红海沿岸地区。胡塞武装于周四占领了港口城市摩卡。
安全、政策和国防分析师沃尔夫冈·普斯泰表示,胡塞武装推进并占领了也门整个红海沿岸,这意味着该组织现在“如果他们愿意,就真的有能力关闭任何通过曼德海峡的海上交通”。
这使得胡塞武装在也门与沙特支持的政府军(其主要目标)的战斗中占据了重大优势。普斯泰告诉半岛电视台,这也有利于胡塞武装的盟友伊朗在与美国的冲突中,因为这使德黑兰在另一个全球咽喉要道上获得了新的影响力,并使其对霍尔木兹海峡的封锁“更加有效”。
查塔姆研究所中东和北非项目研究员法雷亚·穆斯利米表示,这一事态发展既符合胡塞武装的“国内”目标,也有利于伊朗在与美国和世界就“其他问题(不仅仅是也门问题)”进行谈判时的地位。
这对曼德海峡的航运意味着什么?
胡塞武装表示,红海和曼德海峡的普通航运不会受到袭击,但与沙特阿拉伯有关的船只除外,他们将封锁这些船只。
胡塞武装发言人叶海亚·萨里表示,该组织将继续对沙特阿拉伯采取他所谓的“以围攻还以围攻”和“以升级还升级”的战略,沙特阿拉伯封锁了胡塞武装控制的也门地区。
然而,胡塞武装此前也曾在区域水域袭击过与沙特阿拉伯没有任何关联的船只。
2023年11月至2025年年中,胡塞武装在红海袭击了100多艘商船。胡塞武装声称,这些袭击的目标是与以色列或其盟友有关联的船只,旨在声援加沙的巴勒斯坦人。然而,据路透社和BBC事实核查团队BBC Verify援引航运消息人士的话称,部分袭击的目标船只似乎与以色列或其盟友并无关联。
如果胡塞武装再次将袭击目标扩大到沙特阿拉伯船只以外,他们的新部署可能会使他们更容易袭击过往船只。
普斯泰说,胡塞武装“可以使用短程导弹而不是远程火炮来攻击船只”。“如果胡塞武装不允许,那么通过海峡将是一项非常冒险的行动。”
经济学家贾韦德·哈桑表示,红海航运若进一步中断,将对本已紧张的全球能源市场产生巨大影响。
哈桑告诉半岛电视台:“战争风险保险和租船费率可能在货物运输正式中断之前就上涨,由此产生的压力不仅限于石油,还会波及集装箱运输、干散货以及更广泛的贸易商品成本。因此,胡塞武装袭击造成的供应技术性冲击会同时通过多种商品引发通胀冲击。”
胡塞武装能守住这座岛屿吗?
伦敦国王学院副教授安德烈亚斯·克里格表示,这将取决于沙特支持的也门政府军为夺回该岛付出了多少努力。据报道,随着胡塞武装的推进,沙特支持的也门政府军迅速撤离。
克里格告诉半岛电视台,胡塞武装由于控制着周边地区,短期内有能力守住该岛。然而,“从长远来看,该岛本身很难抵御两栖登陆作战”,尽管这样的进攻“本身也是一次高风险行动”。
克里格补充说:“关键在于守住大陆沿海地区及其内陆地区。”
查塔姆研究所中东和北非项目研究员法雷亚·穆斯利米表示,胡塞武装迅速越过红海沿岸并进军佩里姆岛并不令人意外。
他指出,尽管沙特阿拉伯支持政府军进行了长达一年的努力,将其整合为一支有效的战斗力量,而胡塞武装也进行了多年的有效军事集结,但政府军内部的协调性差,武器装备薄弱。
美国总统唐纳德·特朗普在访问爱尔兰期间对记者表示,胡塞武装已要求美国不要干预针对也门国际公认政府的冲突。
他说胡塞武装“给我们打了电话”。特朗普说:“他们不想和我们打仗,他们已经明确告诉我们了。”
“他们其实更希望我们不要参与进来,而且他们也允许大多数船只通过。只有有一个国家让他们不太满意,我们会解决这个问题。”
特朗普还表示,沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼是他的“好朋友”,“一切都会好起来的”。