A wave is building for Democrats. Republicans are building a wall to stop it

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The 2026 election will be decided where the wave meets the wall.

Signs are accumulating that the blue wave of Democratic support this year may be even higher than in the 2018 election, when a backlash against President Donald Trump’s tumultuous first term carried the party back into control of the House of Representatives. But the defensive wall that Republicans are constructing against that Democratic tide also looks bigger than in 2018.

The height of the wave gives Democrats legitimate reasons to expect they can win races deep into previously reliably Republican territory. The depth of the wall gives Republicans plausible reasons to hope they can contain their losses to a modest level.

For Democrats, the wave is being powered primarily by turnout and Trump : clear signs that their partisans are more energized than Republicans about voting this year and that voters are now more negative on the president’s performance than not only in 2018, but also in other modern midterms that broke sharply against the party holding the White House, such as 2010 and 2006.

For Republicans, the central bricks in the wall are money and the map : a financial advantage magnified by crucial recent decisions from the Republican-appointed majority on the Supreme Court, and an electoral battlefield that is playing out almost entirely in places Trump carried in 2024.

“This election is home field advantage for Republicans, and they’ve got to exploit that,” says former Republican Rep. Tom Davis, who chaired the National Republican Congressional Committee. “On the other hand, this is a referendum on the president, and he’s had a confluence of very bad things coming together.”

A wide assortment of measures suggests the electoral environment this year is more perilous for Republicans than it was in 2018 — and during other recent midterms that produced significant losses for the party holding the White House.

Those warning lights begin with attitudes about the economy. Compared with 2018, Americans today are much more negative about current economic conditions and much more pessimistic about the future. Inflation has become an inescapable strain on daily life: AAA, for instance, reported that gas prices last week reached $4.28 per gallon , compared with $2.75 on Election Day in 2018 (that’s $3.65 in today’s dollars , factoring for inflation). In the latest CNBC poll this summer conducted by a bipartisan Democratic-Republican pollster team, just 27% of Americans described the economy as excellent or good, compared with 73% who viewed as fair or poor. In CNBC’s October 2018 poll, 58% described the economy in positive terms and only 40% in negative ones.

Micah Roberts, a Republican pollster who conducts the CNBC survey with a Democratic partner, says far more Democrats, independents and even Republicans are negative on the economy than in 2018. Just as striking, he says, the share who are not only down on today’s conditions but pessimistic about tomorrow’s is twice as large now as then. “That’s a radically different environment,” Roberts says. “Everybody everywhere is feeling an economic pinch.”

Today’s economic assessment is also gloomier than the results measured in CNBC polls before the midterm election that produced historic losses for Democrats in 2010, and in the exit polls when Republicans lost control of both chambers in 2006.

The Democrats’ 2006 gains were fueled as well by widespread disillusionment over the Iraq War that then President George W. Bush launched in 2003. In the 2006 exit poll , 59% of voters said the war had not improved American security — and over three-fourths of those skeptics supported Democrats for the House. Today, the Iran War is facing comparable public opposition in most polls .

Some of Trump’s other initiatives have been more popular, such as his efforts to regain control of the Southern border and the provisions in the “One Big Beautiful Bill” temporarily reducing taxes on tips and overtime. But to a much greater extent than before the 2018 election, Trump has pursued a wide range of other specific policy choices that have provoked opposition from a significant majority of Americans , including his tariffs and the Medicaid cuts in that reconciliation bill.

All of this — especially the economy and the war — has predictably eroded Trump’s support. The negative views of Trump’s economic management “didn’t really exist in 2018,” said Democratic pollster Nick Gourevitch. “2018 was like: ‘He’s a bad guy, crazy guy, but the economy is good.’ Now it’s: ‘He’s a bad guy, crazy guy, and the economy is bad.’”

The latest CNN poll of polls found just 35% of Americans approve of Trump’s performance, with 63% disapproving. If those levels hold among this November’s electorate, they’ll be much worse than Trump’s standing in the 2018 exit poll, when 45% of voters approved and 54% disapproved. Trump’s approval rating is also much weaker than that of other presidents in recent midterms when their party suffered losses, including Joe Biden in 2022, Obama in 2010, George W. Bush in 2006 and Bill Clinton in 1994.

Trump’s decline poses a clear and present danger for Republicans: During his first term, Democratic House candidates won 90% of voters who disapproved of him in 2018, and 93% in 2020, per the exit polls. Likewise, in Senate races over those elections, every Democratic incumbent or challenger except Maine Republican Sen. Susan Collins’ opponent in 2020 won at least 89% of voters who disapproved of Trump .

Probably the most worrisome sign for Democrats this year is that many of their candidates are not yet matching those benchmarks among Trump disapprovers. But so many voters now disapprove of Trump — not only in swing states but even such red-leaning places as North Carolina, Texas, Ohio and Georgia — that Democrats can reach 50% even with support from fewer of them.

Democratic pollster Anna Greenberg says that in her surveys and focus groups, red-state voters are often the most disenchanted with Trump’s return. They point above all, she says, to inflation, the Iran war and Trump’s focus on his own preoccupations — from making money to gilding the capital with his construction projects .

“In the red states… it feels like independent voters, Hispanic voters, White non-college women to some degree, are really, really angry at Trump,” Greenberg says. “And, in guilt by association, with Republicans. When you do focus groups … they feel betrayed and lied to.”

Whit Ayres, a veteran Republican pollster, says that Trump’s hold remains undiminished on voters who identify as part of his Make America Great Again movement. But he notes, about half of Republican voters don’t identify with MAGA. And among those non-MAGA Republican voters — a group that includes both traditional country-club Republicans and the new, mostly younger and nonwhite, voters Trump attracted in 2024 — Trump “has slipped a lot,” Ayres says.

Some of those disillusioned 2024 Trump voters (especially people of color) may cross over to vote for Democrats, Ayres and other strategists say. But as American politics have grown more polarized, fewer voters are willing to cross that line . Roberts says that in the CNBC polling, the share of non-MAGA Republicans who say they are still voting for Republicans this fall is about 20 points higher than the portion who approve of Trump’s performance.

“There are a lot of people who may think, ‘I don’t like Trump but … I don’t agree with the policies of the other party and where they would take us,’” Roberts says.

Most analysts agree the biggest risk for the GOP among disillusioned Trump supporters is that they will not vote at all. “That’s one of the major challenges for Republican candidates,” Ayres says. “Democratic enthusiasm is substantially higher than Republican enthusiasm at the moment.”

That potential turnout gap represents the other major component of the possible Democratic wave. Not only do polls consistently show that more Democrats say they are very motivated to vote than Republicans, but more Democrats are voting since 2024.

Political data analyst John Couvillon has calculated that through last week’s New Hampshire contest, 56% of all the votes in primaries nationwide this year have been cast in Democratic contests. That’s an even bigger share than their 54% in 2018. By contrast, Couvillon found that in 2014 and 2022 — when Republicans made midterm gains — they cast at least 53% of primary votes nationwide.

Similarly, Democrats are performing even better in special elections leading into this midterm than they did before 2018. The Downballot, a political website, calculates that in 110 state and federal special elections since 2024, Democratic candidates on average have run 12.5 points better than Kamala Harris did in the same jurisdiction; in 2017 and 2018, Democratic candidates ran 10.6 points better than Hillary Clinton did in 2016.

Two other factors could widen this year’s potential Democratic turnout advantage. One is that across almost all the key battleground states, racial minorities and/or White college graduates, two generally good groups for Democrats, have increased their share of eligible voters since 2018, while Whites without a four-year college degree, the core Trump constituency, have diminished, according to census figures analyzed by demographer William Frey. And while people of color usually make up a smaller share of the vote in midterms than presidential years, the opposite is true for college graduates. These shifts will likely matter only at the margin, but that could be enough to tip some very close races.

Amid all these forces churning against them, the Republican wall begins with the map of states and districts at play this year.

Heading into the 2018 election, House Republicans held 23 seats that voted for Clinton two years before and ultimately lost 20 of them. This time, before the redistricting wars, Republicans were defending just three seats that voted for Harris. Looking more broadly, Republicans this year must defend 30 seats that narrowly voted either for or against Trump in 2024, compared with 36 in 2018, according to calculations by the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics . And the GOP’s redistricting drive has left 13 House Democrats defending districts where Trump ran at least 5 points better than his share of the national vote , compared to just four in such districts in 2018. Moreover, fewer House seats overall than in 2018 remain competitive — which leaves Democrats, while still strongly favored to capture the majority, with less room to overcome idiosyncratic stumbles (such as scandals or otherwise vulnerable nominees).

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On paper, the Senate map is even more forbidding . Of the Republican-held seats Democrats are most seriously contesting, Maine is the only one in a state that supported Harris; North Carolina is the sole other state on the Senate map where Harris even came close. Trump prevailed by double digits in every other state whose Senate seat Democrats are targeting — Alaska, Ohio, Texas, Iowa, much less Kansas and Nebraska ( where Democrats are supporting an independent candidate. )

Even in these states, Trump’s approval has generally fallen into negative territory, which provides Democrats their opening. But to win on this stony soil, Democratic candidates must overcome years of alienation from their national party. In these red states, Democrats “have to establish yourself as a really unique candidate who is going to change the way things are,” says Democratic pollster Celinda Lake. “It isn’t going to be the party that wins; it is going to be a vote for change that wins.”

After the map, money is the next major component of the GOP wall. In 2018, Democratic House and Senate candidates significantly outraised their Republican opponents, according to OpenSecrets.org . And while Republican party committees and independent expenditure groups raised more than their Democratic counterparts that year, that advantage was dulled by federal election rules which limited their direct coordination with campaigns and allowed broadcasters to charge those groups more for ads than they charged candidates.

But two rulings by the Republican-appointed Supreme Court majority this year have swept away those constraints, which will allow Republicans to maximize the big financial advantage their party committees and outside groups have established over their Democratic rivals.

Also working for Republicans is the decline in the Democrats’ own image. In Pew Research polling, favorability ratings for the Democratic Party have hovered in the high 30s for the past three years, a downtick from 2018. But the GOP image is no better-and historically attitudes toward the president in the White House have shaped midterm results much more than views of the party outside it.

Trump’s efforts to tilt electoral rules toward the GOP represent the final section of the GOP wall — the spikes on the battlements. That effort began with his successful pressure on multiple red states to gerrymander their House districts. Still looming are his attempts to restrict mail voting and possible deployments of federal law enforcement at polling places in Democratic areas.

All of this could limit Democratic gains. But strategists in both parties agree that attitudes toward the incumbent president have become the most powerful force influencing midterm outcomes. No wall may be high enough to fully contain the wave of public disenchantment cresting through Trump’s storm-tossed second term.

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2026 年大选的胜负将取决于浪潮与壁垒的碰撞。

种种迹象表明，今年民主党的支持浪潮可能比2018年大选时还要强劲。当时，民众对特朗普总统动荡的第一任期的强烈不满，帮助民主党重新夺回了众议院的控制权。但共和党人为抵御这股民主党浪潮而构筑的防线，似乎也比2018年更加坚固。

这波浪潮的高度让民主党人有理由相信，他们能够在以往共和党稳固的票仓赢得选举。而共和党人坚守的防线也让他们有理由相信，他们能够将损失控制在合理的范围内。

对于民主党人来说，这股浪潮主要由投票率和特朗普推动：有明显的迹象表明，他们的支持者比共和党人更有热情参与今年的投票，而且选民现在对总统的表现更加负面，不仅比 2018 年，而且比 2010 年和 2006 年等其他现代中期选举中对执政党产生强烈不利影响的选举更加负面。

对于共和党人来说，构筑这堵墙的核心是金钱和地图：共和党任命的最高法院多数派最近做出的关键决定放大了他们的财政优势，而选举战场几乎完全在特朗普在 2024 年赢得的地区展开。

“这次选举对共和党来说是主场优势，他们必须利用这一点，”曾任共和党全国国会委员会主席的前共和党众议员汤姆·戴维斯说。“另一方面，这也是对总统的一次全民公投，而他正面临着一系列非常糟糕的局面。”

各种各样的指标表明，今年的选举环境对共和党人来说比 2018 年更加危险——也比最近几次中期选举对执政党造成重大损失的情况更加危险。

这些警示信号首先体现在人们对经济的态度上。与2018年相比，如今的美国人对当前的经济状况更加悲观，对未来也更加担忧。通货膨胀已成为日常生活中不可避免的压力：例如，美国汽车协会（AAA）报告称，上周汽油价格达到每加仑4.28美元，而2018年大选日的价格为每加仑2.75美元（考虑到通货膨胀因素，相当于今天的3.65美元）。今年夏天，由民主党和共和党两党民调团队进行的CNBC最新民调显示，仅有27%的美国人认为经济状况良好或优秀，而73%的人认为经济状况一般或糟糕。在CNBC 2018年10月的民调中，58%的人对经济状况持积极态度，只有40%的人持消极态度。

与一位民主党合作伙伴共同进行CNBC民调的共和党民调专家迈卡·罗伯茨表示，与2018年相比，如今对经济持悲观态度的民主党人、独立人士甚至共和党人的比例都大幅上升。他指出，同样引人注目的是，不仅对当前经济状况感到失望，而且对未来前景也持悲观态度的人数比例，是当时的两倍。“现在的经济环境截然不同，”罗伯茨说，“每个人都感受到了经济压力。”

今天的经济评估也比 2010 年中期选举前 CNBC 民调的结果更为悲观，当时民主党遭遇了历史性的惨败；也比 2006 年共和党失去参众两院控制权时的出口民调结果更为悲观。

2006年民主党的胜利也得益于民众对时任总统乔治·W·布什于2003年发动的伊拉克战争普遍感到失望。2006年的出口民调显示，59%的选民认为这场战争并未提升美国的安全——而超过四分之三的持怀疑态度者在众议院选举中支持了民主党候选人。如今，伊朗战争在大多数民调中也面临着类似的公众反对。

特朗普的其他一些举措更受欢迎，例如他试图重新控制南部边境的努力，以及“一项伟大的法案”中暂时降低小费和加班费税收的条款。但与2018年大选前相比，特朗普推行的一系列其他具体政策选择，包括关税和预算协调法案中削减医疗补助的条款，都引发了绝大多数美国民众的反对。

所有这些——尤其是经济和战争——不出所料地削弱了特朗普的支持率。民主党民调专家尼克·古雷维奇表示，对特朗普经济管理的负面看法“在2018年并不存在”。“2018年的情况是：‘他是个坏人，是个疯子，但经济形势不错。’现在变成了：‘他是个坏人，是个疯子，而且经济形势很糟糕。’”

CNN最新民调显示，仅有35%的美国人认可特朗普的表现，而63%的人表示不认可。如果这一比例在今年11月的选民中保持不变，那么特朗普的支持率将远低于2018年出口民调的结果，当时45%的选民认可他，54%的选民不认可他。特朗普的支持率也远低于近年来其他在各自政党遭遇中期选举失利的总统，例如2022年的乔·拜登、2010年的奥巴马、2006年的乔治·W·布什以及1994年的比尔·克林顿。

特朗普的衰落对共和党构成了迫在眉睫的威胁：根据出口民调，在他第一个任期内，民主党众议院候选人在2018年赢得了90%对他持否定态度的选民的支持，在2020年赢得了93%的支持。同样，在同期举行的参议院选举中，除了2020年缅因州共和党参议员苏珊·柯林斯的对手之外，所有民主党现任议员或挑战者都赢得了至少89%对特朗普持否定态度的选民的支持。

今年对民主党人来说，最令人担忧的迹象或许是，他们的许多候选人在反对特朗普的选民中尚未达到既定的支持率。但如今，反对特朗普的选民人数众多——不仅在摇摆州，甚至在北卡罗来纳州、德克萨斯州、俄亥俄州和佐治亚州等传统共和党州也是如此——因此，即使民主党候选人获得的反对者人数较少，他们也能达到50%的支持率。

民主党民调专家安娜·格林伯格表示，在她进行的调查和焦点小组访谈中，共和党传统票仓州的选民往往对特朗普的回归最为不满。她说，他们最主要的不满在于通货膨胀、伊朗战争以及特朗普只关注自身利益——从赚钱到用他的建设项目粉饰首都。

格林伯格说：“在那些红色州……感觉独立选民、拉丁裔选民，以及一定程度上白人非大学学历女性，都对特朗普非常非常愤怒。而且，他们也因为与共和党人有关联而感到内疚。当你做焦点小组访谈时……他们会觉得被背叛和欺骗了。”

资深共和党民调专家惠特·艾尔斯表示，特朗普在那些认同其“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）运动的选民中依然稳固。但他指出，大约一半的共和党选民并不认同MAGA运动。在这些非MAGA共和党选民中——其中包括传统的乡村俱乐部共和党人和特朗普在2024年吸引的新兴选民（他们大多更年轻、更多是非白人）——特朗普的支持率“大幅下滑”，艾尔斯说道。

艾尔斯和其他策略师表示，一些对特朗普感到失望的2024年选民（尤其是少数族裔）可能会转而投票给民主党。但随着美国政治日益两极分化，愿意跨越这条界限的选民越来越少。罗伯茨指出，CNBC的民调显示，非“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）支持者中，表​​示今年秋季仍将投票给共和党的选民比例，比认可特朗普表现的选民比例高出约20个百分点。

罗伯茨说：“很多人可能会想，‘我不喜欢特朗普，但是……我不同意对方政党的政策以及他们会把我们带向何方。’”

大多数分析人士都认为，共和党面临的最大风险在于，那些对特朗普感到失望的支持者很可能根本不会投票。“这是共和党候选人面临的主要挑战之一，”艾尔斯说，“目前民主党的热情远高于共和党。”

潜在的投票率差距是民主党可能掀起选举浪潮的另一个重要因素。民调不仅始终显示，表示投票积极性的民主党人比共和党人更多，而且自2024年以来，民主党人的投票率也有所提高。

政治数据分析师约翰·库维隆计算得出，截至上周新罕布什尔州初选，今年全国初选总投票数的56%都投给了民主党候选人。这一比例甚至高于2018年的54%。相比之下，库维隆发现，在2014年和2022年——共和党在中期选举中取得进展的那两次——共和党在全国初选中的得票率至少达到53%。

同样，民主党人在本次中期选举前的特别选举中表现甚至比2018年之前还要好。政治网站The Downballot计算得出，自2024年以来，在110场州和联邦特别选举中，民主党候选人的平均得票率比卡马拉·哈里斯在同一选区高出12.5个百分点；在20​​17年和2018年，民主党候选人的得票率比希拉里·克林顿在2016年高出10.6个百分点。

还有两个因素可能会扩大今年民主党潜在的投票率优势。首先，在几乎所有关键摇摆州，少数族裔和/或白人大学毕业生（这两个群体通常对民主党有利）的合格选民比例自2018年以来有所上升，而未获得四年制大学学位的白人（特朗普的核心支持者）的比例则有所下降。这是人口统计学家威廉·弗雷分析人口普查数据得出的结论。其次，虽然有色人种在中期选举中的投票比例通常低于总统选举年，但大学毕业生的情况恰恰相反。这些变化可能只会对最终结果产生微弱影响，但这足以左右一些势均力敌的选情。

在所有这些不利因素的影响下，共和党的防线始于今年各州和各选区的格局。

在2018年大选前，共和党在众议院拥有23个席位，这些席位在两年前都投票支持了希拉里·克林顿，但最终共和党失去了其中的20个。而这一次，在重新划分选区之前，共和党只需保住三个投票支持哈里斯的席位。更广泛地说，根据弗吉尼亚大学政治中心的计算，共和党今年必须保住30个在2024年大选中投票结果与特朗普势均力敌的席位，而2018年这一数字为36个。此外，共和党的选区重划行动导致13名民主党众议员需要在特朗普得票率比其全国得票率高出至少5个百分点的选区中捍卫自己的席位，而2018年只有4名民主党众议员面临这种情况。更重要的是，与2018年相比，众议院中竞争激烈的席位总数有所减少——这意味着，尽管民主党仍然很有可能赢得多数席位，但他们应对突发事件（例如丑闻或其他脆弱的候选人）的空间却更小了。

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从纸面上看，参议院的选情更加严峻。在民主党重点争夺的共和党把持席位中，缅因州是唯一一个支持哈里斯的州；北卡罗来纳州是参议院选情图上哈里斯支持率接近的另一个州。在民主党瞄准的其他所有参议院席位的州——阿拉斯加州、俄亥俄州、德克萨斯州、爱荷华州，更不用说堪萨斯州和内布拉斯加州（民主党支持一位独立候选人）——特朗普都以两位数的优势获胜。

即使在这些州，特朗普的支持率也普遍跌至负值，这为民主党人提供了机会。但要想在这些铁板一块的土地上获胜，民主党候选人必须克服多年来与党内高层的疏离感。民主党民调专家塞琳达·莱克表示，在这些共和党占优势的州，民主党人“必须把自己塑造成一个真正独特的候选人，一个能够改变现状的候选人”。“最终获胜的不是哪个党派，而是选民对变革的渴望。”

继地图之后，资金是共和党构筑“防线”的下一个重要组成部分。据OpenSecrets.org网站统计，2018年民主党众议院和参议院候选人的筹款额远超共和党对手。虽然共和党委员会和独立支出团体当年的筹款额也高于民主党，但联邦选举规则限制了他们与竞选团队的直接协调，并允许广播公司向这些团体收取比向候选人收取更高的广告费用，从而削弱了共和党的优势。

但今年由共和党任命的最高法院多数派做出的两项裁决已经扫除了这些限制，这将使共和党人能够最大限度地利用其党内委员会和外部团体相对于民主党对手所建立的巨大财政优势。

对共和党有利的还有民主党自身形象的下滑。皮尤研究中心的民调显示，过去三年民主党的支持率一直徘徊在30%以上，较2018年有所下降。但共和党的形象也好不到哪里去——而且从历史经验来看，民众对白宫现任总统的态度，比对党外人士的看法，更能左右中期选举的结果。

特朗普试图通过操纵选举规则来向共和党倾斜，这标志着共和党防线的最后一步——城墙上的尖刺——已经完成。他首先成功地向多个共和党占优势的州施压，要求他们重新划分众议院选区，以此作为其行动的开端。而他限制邮寄投票的企图，以及可能在民主党占优势的投票站部署联邦执法人员，这些都仍然令人担忧。

所有这些都可能限制民主党的胜利。但两党策略师都一致认为，民众对现任总统的态度已成为影响中期选举结果的最重要因素。任何防线都可能无法完全阻挡特朗普动荡不安的第二个任期内不断高涨的公众不满情绪。