It’s time to reboot America’s counter-WMD strategy

As the world continues to press forward with technological advancements, weapons of mass destruction remain a threat to our national security and global stability. We have devolved into an era where the possession and use of WMDs is escalating, the penalties for their use is declining, and the risk of a catastrophic event is ever-increasing. But there is an opportunity to reverse the march toward increasing WMD threats.

One step is for the United States to reestablish its leadership role in the countering-WMD space . To do that, we need a clear strategy along with active implementation plans across each responsible department and agency. It is time to reboot our national CWMD strategy.

The events of Sept. 11, 2001, combined with the continued threat of WMDs across the globe led to the 2002 publication of the “ National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction .” This strategy established the tenants of nonproliferation, counterproliferation and consequence management, and they remain valid. Yet, the current era of great power competition, advances in technology and globalization necessitate a reboot that incorporates those lessons into an implementable whole-of-government approach.

What should a rebooted national CWMD strategy cover? I recommend the following: “The United States seeks to counter weapons of mass destruction through a whole-of-government effort. The U.S. government’s efforts will include work with partners and allies to achieve the goals of preventing the development, countering the proliferation and recovering from the use of WMDs enabled by comprehensive deterrence actions.”

How is this different from the previous “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”? The principles are the same, but these restated goals, in conjunction with an emphasis on comprehensive deterrence, build upon the 20 years of lessons learned from implementing programs and actions under these old tenants.

The first objective of the strategy should be to prevent the development and transfer (across borders and within) of WMD-related knowledge and technology while promoting and protecting technologies that benefit society. It includes the continued safeguarding of WMD-related materials along with the transparent and responsible elimination of declared stockpiles (chemical, biological and nuclear).

Our focus to achieve this end state is to strengthen regimes and international norms, and work with the global community to enact a new one. Our work will increase partnerships with likeminded nations to establish secure, viable environments that promote the use of advancing scientific capabilities for the benefit of humankind, and that dissuade nefarious development efforts and uses. We will use national and international fora to identify technology risks and install protective measures to mitigate those risks, while preserving beneficial innovation.

The second goal encompasses efforts to counter the potential use of WMDs by nonstate or state actors. Although we seek to prevent WMD threats from materializing, we are committed to stopping the potential use of these weapons by nonstate or state actors. We will use all applicable aspects of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement assets to prevent any use against the United States or its allies.

Our efforts will ensure that we can act to develop, transfer or use WMDs immediately. We will punish noncompliance as a measure of last resort, but seek to reward compliance.

The third goal focuses on developing and sustaining the ability to effectively and swiftly recover from the use of WMDs, including responding to their use, attributing responsibility for their use, restoring operations, mitigating residual hazards and promoting rapid recovery.

The ability to swiftly recover provides a hedge, should our efforts to preventing the development of WMDs or countering their use prove unsuccessful.

Should these efforts fail, we will respond swiftly to WMDs against the U.S. and our allies to mitigate their effects, preserve life, maintain order and recover the affected area to resume daily activities.

Accomplishing these three goals hinges upon deliberate and comprehensive deterrence, which includes maintaining a range of credible offensive and defensive capabilities to prevent use, along with coordinated and effective strategic messaging.

Our deterrence activities and capabilities will reinforce our efforts to reestablish international norms and promote compliance — and should be multilateral.

FORT BLISS, Texas - CRS-H's features will provide enhanced capability to detect, identify, access, render safe, exploit, and achieve final disposition of heavy explosive ordnance, including Improvised Explosive Devices, Vehicle Borne IEDs, and Weapons of Mass Destruction at safe standoff. (FLIR Systems)

These efforts rely upon deliberate and comprehensive deterrence. Comprehensive deterrence includes offensive capabilities such as maintaining responsive capabilities to prevent the use of WMDs as well as developing and deploying U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear response capabilities. These are complemented by defensive capabilities, which include demonstrating effective chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response capabilities, and maintaining a robust military and public health network. Evaluating and demonstrating these capabilities during regular training and exercises is part of establishing and delivering consistent strategic messaging that reinforces our readiness to counter, respond and recover from the use of WMDs.

Our deterrence activities and capabilities will reinforce our efforts to reestablish international norms and promote compliance. Our deterrence will also be multilateral. Through those international and regional partnerships that promote readiness and provide a unified response to threats and hazards, we can encourage prevention and promote compliance.

A useful national strategy must clearly state these goals and the desired outcomes from each. It should be short, direct and published within 90 days of initiation. In parallel, work should begin to develop implementing directives that assign responsibilities and tasks to departments and agencies, designate a lead, identify supporting activities and agencies, and solidify timelines to achieve each objective’s milestones. These implementing directives should be completed within 120 days of issuing the revised national strategy.

Once published, annual reviews should assess each department’s and agency’s progress toward accomplishing the goals as well as identify specific gaps and/or shortfalls. Reviews should result in modified implementing directives to sustain progress or revisions to account for the variables that impeded progress.

Within 180 days of the implementing directives’ issuance, departments and agencies should begin regular monitoring of progress. This affords valuable and necessary feedback to monitor progress between formal reviews. It also enables risk-based decisions when areas of limited progress need more attention and resources. This review process will ensure actions are progressing to achieve the strategy’s goals.

Retired U.S. Army Col. Ron Fizer is a fellow at LMI. He served in the force for 30 years in various command, staff and leadership positions across the Army, Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

随着世界科技的飞速发展，大规模杀伤性武器仍然威胁着我们的国家安全和全球稳定。我们已经步入一个大规模杀伤性武器拥有和使用不断升级、使用惩罚日益减轻、灾难性事件风险不断增加的时代。但我们仍有机会扭转大规模杀伤性武器威胁日益加剧的趋势。

其中一步是美国重新确立其在反大规模杀伤性武器领域的领导地位。为此，我们需要一个清晰的战略，以及各相关部门和机构积极落实的计划。现在是时候重启我们的国家反大规模杀伤性武器战略了。

2001年9月11日事件以及全球范围内大规模杀伤性武器持续存在的威胁，促成了2002年《国家打击大规模杀伤性武器战略》的发布。该战略确立了不扩散、反扩散和后果管理的基本原则，这些原则至今仍然有效。然而，当前大国竞争、技术进步和全球化的时代，要求对该战略进行重新调整，将这些经验教训融入到可实施的、全政府层面的方针中。

重启后的国家大规模杀伤性武器战略应该涵盖哪些内容？我建议如下：“美国寻求通过全政府的努力来应对大规模杀伤性武器。美国政府的努力将包括与伙伴和盟友合作，通过全面的威慑行动，实现防止大规模杀伤性武器的研发、遏制其扩散以及从其使用中恢复的目标。”

这与之前的“国家打击大规模杀伤性武器战略”有何不同？原则相同，但这些重申的目标，加上对全面威慑的强调，建立在过去20年根据这些旧原则实施各项计划和行动所汲取的经验教训之上。

该战略的首要目标应该是防止大规模杀伤性武器相关知识和技术的研发和转移（包括跨境和国内转移），同时促进和保护造福社会的技术。这包括继续对大规模杀伤性武器相关材料进行安全保护，以及以透明和负责任的方式销毁已申报的库存（化学、生物和核）。

为实现这一最终目标，我们的重点是加强现有机制和国际规范，并与国际社会合作制定新的规范。我们将加强与志同道合国家的伙伴关系，建立安全、可持续的环境，促进先进科学能力的运用，造福人类，并遏制不法开发活动和用途。我们将利用国家和国际论坛识别技术风险，并采取保护措施降低这些风险，同时保护有益的创新。

第二个目标涵盖应对非国家行为体或国家行为体可能使用大规模杀伤性武器的各项努力。尽管我们力求防止大规模杀伤性武器威胁成为现实，但我们也致力于阻止非国家行为体或国家行为体可能使用这些武器。我们将动用一切适用的外交、信息、军事、经济、金融、情报和执法资源，防止任何针对美国或其盟友的大规模杀伤性武器的使用。

我们的努力将确保我们能够立即采取行动，研发、转让或使用大规模杀伤性武器。我们将把惩罚不遵守规定的行为作为最后的手段，但会努力奖励遵守规定的行为。

第三个目标侧重于发展和维持有效、迅速地从大规模杀伤性武器的使用中恢复的能力，包括应对大规模杀伤性武器的使用、追究其使用责任、恢复行动、减轻残余危害和促进快速恢复。

快速恢复的能力提供了一种保障，以防我们阻止大规模杀伤性武器的研发或遏制其使用的努力失败。

如果这些努力失败，我们将迅速应对针对美国及其盟友的大规模杀伤性武器，以减轻其影响，保护生命，维护秩序，并恢复受影响地区，以恢复日常活动。

实现这三个目标的关键在于采取深思熟虑且全面的威慑措施，包括保持一系列可信的进攻和防御能力以防止其被使用，以及协调有效的战略宣传。

我们的威慑活动和能力将加强我们重建国际规范和促进遵守的努力——而且应该是多边的。

德克萨斯州布利斯堡——CRS-H 的各项功能将增强其在安全距离内探测、识别、接近、安全处置、利用和最终销毁重型爆炸物（包括简易爆炸装置、车载简易爆炸装置和大规模杀伤性武器）的能力。（FLIR Systems）

这些努力依赖于审慎而全面的威慑。全面威慑包括进攻性能力，例如保持应对大规模杀伤性武器使用的反应能力，以及发展和部署美国的核和非核应对能力。这些能力与防御性能力相辅相成，防御性能力包括展示有效的化学、生物、放射性和核应对能力，以及维持强大的军事和公共卫生网络。在常​​规训练和演习中评估和展示这些能力，是建立和传递一致战略信息的一部分，旨在强化我们应对、响应和从大规模杀伤性武器使用中恢复的准备状态。

我们的威慑活动和能力将加强我们重建国际规范和促进遵守的努力。我们的威慑也将是多边的。通过那些能够提升战备水平并对威胁和风险做出统一应对的国际和区域伙伴关系，我们可以鼓励预防并促进遵守。

一项有效的国家战略必须清晰阐明这些目标以及每个目标的预期成果。它应简明扼要，并在启动后90天内发布。与此同时，应着手制定实施细则，明确各部门和机构的职责和任务，指定牵头单位，确定支持活动和机构，并制定实现每个目标里程碑的时间表。这些实施细则应在修订后的国家战略发布后120天内完成。

年度评估报告发布后，应评估各部门和机构在实现目标方面取得的进展，并找出具体的差距和/或不足之处。评估结果应促使对实施细则进行修订，以维持进展，或根据阻碍进展的各种因素进行调整。

实施细则发布后180天内，各部门和机构应开始定期监测进展情况。这有助于在正式审查之间获得宝贵且必要的反馈，从而监测进展情况。同时，当进展缓慢的领域需要更多关注和资源时，也能基于风险做出决策。这一审查过程将确保各项行动朝着实现战略目标稳步推进。

美国陆军退役上校罗恩·菲泽是LMI的研究员。他曾在军队服役30年，担任过陆军、联合参谋部和国防部长办公室的各种指挥、参谋和领导职务。