Trump's Iran war is not S. Korea's war

Trump’s war with Iran is putting pressure on South Korea to consider support for securing the Strait of Hormuz, while Seoul says no decision has been made on troop deployment. The column argues that South Korea’s energy interests do not make the war its own, and that any military move would require parliamentary approval. It also says Trump tied a reduction in major South Korea-U.S. exercises to Seoul’s reluctance, even as those drills are central to deterrence against North Korea.

Brent crude recently climbed above $107 a barrel as fighting and attacks on regional energy infrastructure intensified.

In August, Trump ordered a reduction in major South Korea-U.S. military exercises and linked it to Seoul’s reluctance to assist Washington’s war effort against Iran.

Trump launched major military operations against Iran on Feb. 28 without first obtaining specific congressional authorization for war.

The article says North Korea remains a nuclear-armed state and continues to develop missiles and other military capabilities.

Iran has warned that South Korean military participation in the Gulf would carry consequences.

Published Sep 14, 2026 1:15 pm KST

Updated Sep 14, 2026 6:37 pm KST

Trump's unfair demand draws criticism

South Korea faces an uncomfortable question: How much should an ally sacrifice for a war it did not choose?

U.S. President Donald Trump increasingly appears to expect Seoul to answer: more.

As the U.S. war with Iran enters its seventh month, Washington is pressing Seoul to contribute to efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz. Seoul has sent an inspection team to the United Arab Emirates and is considering possible contributions to maritime security, but says no decision has been made to deploy troops. Any military deployment would require parliamentary approval.

South Korea has legitimate reasons to care deeply about Hormuz. The strait is critical to its energy security, and disruptions have contributed to rising oil prices. Brent crude recently climbed above $107 a barrel as fighting and attacks on regional energy infrastructure intensified.

But an economic interest in keeping the waterway open is not the same as an obligation to join a U.S. war.

That distinction has been blurred by Trump’s increasingly unilateral approach to alliances.

The most troubling aspect of Washington’s pressure on Seoul is not that a U.S. president is asking an ally for assistance. Allies ask one another for help during crises. The problem is the apparent assumption that refusing can carry a price.

In August, Trump ordered a reduction in major South Korea-U.S. military exercises, explicitly linking the decision to Seoul’s reluctance to assist Washington's war effort against Iran. The move alarmed officials and analysts because those drills are not simply diplomatic favors to the U.S.; they are central to deterrence against North Korea.

The message is difficult to miss: cooperate with Washington’s war, or risk paying a price for the alliance.

That is not how a durable alliance should work.

South Korea has stood beside the United States for more than seven decades. American forces remain stationed on the peninsula, while South Korea maintains a sophisticated military and bears substantial costs for the alliance. The purpose of this partnership is to deter North Korean aggression — not to give Washington leverage whenever it wants Seoul to participate in conflicts elsewhere.

The timing is particularly troubling. North Korea remains a nuclear-armed state and continues to develop missiles and other military capabilities. Pyongyang has already seized on the reduction in U.S.-South Korean exercises, while regional officials warn that weakening the alliance could create opportunities for North Korea and China.

Washington should therefore ask whether its pressure on Seoul is strengthening the alliance or consuming its strategic capital.

There is also a fundamental question about the legitimacy of the war itself.

Trump launched major military operations against Iran on Feb. 28 without first obtaining specific congressional authorization for war. His administration has offered its own interpretation of the War Powers Resolution, arguing that subsequent developments and a temporary ceasefire affected the statutory timeline. But legal scholars have challenged that reasoning, while Congress has repeatedly sought to assert its constitutional authority over the use of force.

That matters to South Korea.

A U.S. president who has not secured congressional authorization for an open-ended war has limited moral and political grounds for demanding that another democracy send its soldiers into the conflict. Seoul’s decision should not be made simply because the U.S. leader wants greater allied participation.

Nor is this merely a constitutional dispute. The war is becoming increasingly difficult to define and end. Trump has suggested that the United States might remain in Iran and benefit from its oil, while indicating that the conflict could continue until later this year.

That is very different from a limited military operation with a clearly defined objective.

South Korea should be particularly cautious about entering a conflict whose end state Washington itself has not clearly articulated.

There are, however, ways for Seoul to protect its interests without becoming a combatant. It can support freedom of navigation, provide maritime information, protect Korean commercial shipping and cooperate with international efforts to keep the sea lanes open. Seoul can also work with European and other partners on a multilateral framework rather than simply responding to demands from Washington.

That would demonstrate alliance solidarity without requiring automatic military alignment.

The risks are real. Iran has warned that South Korean military participation in the Gulf would carry consequences. Seoul would therefore be assuming potential risks to its personnel, ships, businesses and diplomatic interests. South Korean public opinion also deserves consideration. A government cannot casually send troops into a distant war when its citizens are divided over whether such a deployment serves the national interest.

Trump’s approach risks turning a difficult strategic calculation into a loyalty test.

That would be a mistake.

America needs South Korea to remain a reliable partner on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul needs the United States to remain a credible deterrent against North Korea. Both countries therefore have a profound interest in preserving the alliance beyond the tenure of any one president.

An alliance is not a protection racket. Nor is it a subscription service in which benefits can be withdrawn whenever one partner refuses an unrelated demand.

South Korea should stand with the U.S. when its own security interests and international responsibilities justify doing so. But it should not send its soldiers into Iran merely to demonstrate loyalty to a U.S. president.

The better course is principled cooperation: protect freedom of navigation, defend Korean economic interests and coordinate closely with Washington — but insist that any military deployment be based on South Korea’s own national interests, domestic law and democratic consent.

Trump may regard that caution as insufficiently loyal. In fact, it is what a mature ally should do.

The U.S. did not build its alliances through presidential demands alone. It built them through treaties, institutions, consultation and mutual confidence. If Trump wants South Korea to share the U.S.’ burdens, Washington must first demonstrate that it is prepared to share decisions with its allies. Otherwise, the greatest casualty of the Iran war may not be another ship in the Gulf. It may be trust in the alliance itself.

Shim Jae-yun is chief editorial writer of The Korea Times.

特朗普对伊朗的战争给韩国施加了压力，迫使其考虑支持维护霍尔木兹海峡的安全，而首尔方面则表示尚未就部署军队做出任何决定。该专栏文章认为，韩国的能源利益并不使其卷入这场战争，任何军事行动都需要国会批准。文章还指出，特朗普将减少韩美联合军演与首尔的犹豫不决联系起来，而这些军演对于威慑朝鲜至关重要。

由于战斗和对地区能源基础设施的袭击加剧，布伦特原油价格最近攀升至每桶 107 美元以上。

8 月，特朗普下令减少韩美之间的大规模联合军事演习，并将其与首尔不愿协助华盛顿对伊朗的战争行动联系起来。

2月28日，特朗普在没有事先获得国会明确授权的情况下，对伊朗发动了大规模军事行动。

文章称，朝鲜仍然是一个拥有核武器的国家，并继续发展导弹和其他军事能力。

伊朗警告称，韩国参与海湾军事行动将会带来后果。

发布于2026年9月14日下午1:15（韩国标准时间）

更新于2026年9月14日 下午6:37（韩国标准时间）

特朗普的不公平要求招致批评

韩国面临着一个棘手的问题：盟友应该为一场自己并未选择的战争做出多大的牺牲？

美国总统唐纳德·特朗普似乎越来越希望首尔方面做出回应：更多。

随着美伊战争进入第七个月，华盛顿方面正敦促首尔为维护霍尔木兹海峡安全做出贡献。首尔已向阿联酋派遣了一支核查小组，并正在考虑可能为海上安全做出的贡献，但表示尚未决定部署军队。任何军事部署都需要获得国会批准。

韩国有充分理由高度关注霍尔木兹海峡。该海峡对其能源安全至关重要，任何中断都加剧了油价上涨。随着冲突和对区域能源基础设施的袭击升级，布伦特原油价格近期已攀升至每桶107美元以上。

但出于经济利益而保持航道畅通，并不等同于有义务加入美国的战争。

特朗普日益单边主义的结盟方式模糊了这种区别。

华盛顿对首尔施压最令人担忧的并非美国总统向盟友寻求援助。盟友在危机时刻互相帮助是常有的事。问题在于，这种施压似乎预设了拒绝援助会付出代价。

8月，特朗普下令减少韩美之间的大型联合军演，并明确将此决定与首尔不愿协助华盛顿对抗伊朗的行动联系起来。此举令官员和分析人士感到震惊，因为这些军演不仅仅是韩国对美国的外交恩惠，它们对威慑朝鲜至关重要。

这个信息不言而喻：要么与华盛顿的战争合作，要么冒着为联盟付出代价的风险。

持久的联盟不应如此运作。

七十多年来，韩国一直与美国并肩作战。美军至今仍驻扎在朝鲜半岛，而韩国则维持着一支精良的军队，并为美韩同盟承担着巨大的开支。这种伙伴关系的目的是为了遏制朝鲜的侵略，而不是为了让华盛顿在需要首尔介入其他地区的冲突时拥有筹码。

时机尤其令人担忧。朝鲜仍然是一个拥有核武器的国家，并且仍在继续发展导弹和其他军事能力。平壤已经抓住美韩联合军演减少的机会，而地区官员警告说，削弱美韩同盟可能会为朝鲜和中国创造机会。

因此，华盛顿应该扪心自问，它对首尔施加的压力究竟是在加强同盟关系，还是在消耗其战略资本。

还有一个关于战争本身合法性的根本性问题。

2月28日，特朗普在未事先获得国会明确授权的情况下，对伊朗发动了大规模军事行动。他的政府对《战争权力决议》提出了自己的解读，声称后续事态发展和临时停火影响了法定的时间节点。但法学学者对这种说法提出了质疑，而国会也一再试图维护其在武力使用方面的宪法权力。

这对韩国来说很重要。

一位尚未获得国会授权发动无休止战争的美国总统，在道德和政治上都缺乏足够的理由要求另一个民主国家派遣军队参战。首尔的决定不应仅仅因为美国领导人希望盟军更多地参与其中而做出。

这不仅仅是一场宪法纠纷。这场战争的界限越来越模糊，结束也变得越来越困难。特朗普暗示美国可能会继续留在伊朗并从中获取石油利益，同时表示冲突可能会持续到今年晚些时候。

这与目标明确的有限军事行动截然不同。

韩国尤其应该谨慎对待卷入一场华盛顿方面尚未明确阐明其最终结果的冲突。

然而，首尔并非没有办法在不卷入冲突的情况下维护自身利益。它可以支持航行自由，提供海上信息，保护韩国商船，并与国际社会合作，确保海上航道畅通。首尔还可以与欧洲和其他伙伴在多边框架下开展合作，而不是仅仅回应华盛顿的要求。

这既能展现联盟的团结，又无需自动采取军事行动。

风险真实存在。伊朗已警告，韩国若参与海湾地区的军事行动，必将承担后果。因此，首尔方面将面临人员、舰船、企业和外交利益方面的潜在风险。韩国公众舆论也应予以考虑。当民众对此类部署是否符合国家利益存在分歧时，政府不能草率地将军队派往遥远的战场。

特朗普的做法有可能将一项复杂的战略考量变成一场忠诚度测试。

那将是一个错误。

美国需要韩国继续作为朝鲜半岛上可靠的伙伴。首尔则需要美国继续对朝鲜构成可信的威慑。因此，两国都深切关注如何使美韩同盟在任何一位总统任期结束后继续保持下去。

联盟并非保护费勒索，也不是订阅服务，一方拒绝其他无关要求即可取消另一方的权益。

当韩国自身的安全利益和国际责任需要时，韩国应该与美国站在一起。但韩国不应仅仅为了向美国总统示好而向伊朗派遣军队。

更好的做法是秉持原则开展合作：保护航行自由，捍卫韩国的经济利益，并与华盛顿密切协调——但坚持任何军事部署都必须基于韩国自身的国家利益、国内法律和民主同意。

特朗普或许会认为这种谨慎不够忠诚。但事实上，这才是成熟盟友应有的做法。

美国并非仅靠总统的命令来建立联盟，而是通过条约、机制、磋商和互信来构建联盟。如果特朗普希望韩国分担美国的负担，华盛顿首先必须证明自己愿意与盟友共同决策。否则，伊朗战争最大的受害者或许并非海湾地区又多了一艘军舰，而是对联盟本身的信任。

沈在允是《韩国时报》的首席社论撰稿人。