Russia is gearing up for a long war. Will the West follow suit?

Russian President Vladimir Putin may have expected a quick victory when launching his invasion of Ukraine , now almost two years ago. But with as many as 300,000 Russian troops killed or wounded and thousands of Russian weapons expended on the battlefield, Russia is now gearing up for a long war.

The Russian government proposed a new budget that shows the Kremlin is mobilizing its economy for a long war of attrition. Defense spending in the new budget will account for 29.4%, or nearly one-third , of Russia’s total budget expenditure in 2024.

“The budget’s structure shows that the main emphasis is on ensuring our victory — the Army, defense capability, armed forces, fighters. Everything needed for the front, everything needed for victory, is in the budget,” explained Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov.

But there are questions not only about whether the Kremlin can find the cash to fund such spending but also whether Russia’s defense-industrial base will be able to deliver.

The Kremlin started the war with a formidable arsenal, greatly outnumbering Ukraine’s air, land and naval capabilities, which initially led many Western observers to believe that Ukraine would be quickly overpowered by the Russian military. Yet Russian losses in the war — both in terms of human casualties and materiel — have also been staggering, forcing Russia to pull aging equipment from its warehouses. The first several months of the invasion demonstrated that significant numbers of Russian-stockpiled equipment used in Ukraine were older and of lesser quality .

Furthermore, replacing equipment is challenging because higher-end Russian weapons systems , including main battle tanks, aircraft and missiles, have traditionally depended on critical components imported from the West, such as optical systems, bearings, machine tools, engines and microchips. The allied sanctions and export controls have constrained Russia’s access to these items, thus impacting the Kremlin’s ability to manufacture advanced weapons and equipment to supply its armed forces.

However, committed adversaries adapt. Russia has demonstrated a remarkable degree of adaptability to Western sanctions . It has established sanction-evading supply chains spanning several regions and continents, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. It has found alternative suppliers such as China , which has sold millions of dollars’ worth of semiconductors, drones and other types of dual-use goods to Russia since 2022.

Russia is also pressing ahead with efforts to increase the domestic production of military hardware, including tanks, rocket launchers, artillery and missiles by more than twofold and, in certain cases, by tenfold — at least according to representatives of Russia’s state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec.

Military vehicles are seen at a plant of Russian missile manufacturer Almaz-Antey in Saint Petersburg on Jan. 18, 2023. (Ilya Pitalev/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)

The Kremlin’s efforts also have limitations and potential pitfalls, ultimately impacting the quality of what Russia can produce. The United States and its allies are continuing to actively target Russia’s sanction-evading efforts by constantly expanding the sanctioned individuals and entities lists.

Moscow’s pivot to Beijing as an alternative supplier, while undeniably concerning, has its own challenges. According to U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo, China does not yet produce the advanced semiconductors Russia’s defense-industrial base requires, and about 40% of the less advanced microchips China sold to Russia have been defective.

Furthermore, the shift toward a war economy creates domestic risks to Putin’s government. While increases in state spending on defense have stimulated the economy, that has come at a cost to the budget. The weakening of the ruble makes importing critical components, whether through China or the black market, more expensive. Inflation is rising , stoked by high-priced imports, a pronounced labor shortage and a dramatic increase in government spending on the war.

In addition, Russian arms sales are declining significantly. Russia’s military-industrial base has refocused inward by prioritizing supplies for its troops in Ukraine. But this means the defense sector is now bringing in much less revenue and is a major drain on the Kremlin’s stretched budget. The Kremlin has started drawing down its rainy day fund to keep factories running. Thus, Russian spending will be all guns and little butter.

These limitations could create internal vulnerabilities on the Russian home front that Moscow will closely watch. The Kremlin put off another round of mobilization to boost manpower for the war, despite being stretched by Ukraine’s counteroffensive because of concerns of public backlash. The Russian government will be wary that a sluggish economy paired with high casualties could cause public support for a war of choice.

Ukraine’s ability to strike Crimea and Russian cities through its indigenous production of drones is another cause for concern. While the Kremlin’s strong autocratic rule may insulate Russian leadership from the whims of public opinion, it can never take its own stability for granted, as demonstrated by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny and the march toward Moscow this summer by his mercenary group Wagner.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin will be able to mass produce weapons, especially low-cost yet tactically effective weapons, such as explosive drones and gliding aerial bombs. This may give Russia an advantage as the war enters 2024, given Western defense production has not ramped up anywhere near the same degree.

With Moscow’s commitment to its war effort, the only way Kyiv will be able to maintain its defenses and retake captured territory from Russia will be through the uninterrupted delivery of Western military aid to Ukraine in 2024. Putin remains focused on reorienting Russia’s economy to support its defense-industrial base.

The onus is now on Ukraine’s international partners to do the same.

Max Bergmann is the director of the Stuart Center and the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. He previously served as a senior adviser at the U.S. State Department. Tina Dolbaia is a research associate with the CSIS program.

俄罗斯总统普京在近两年前发动入侵乌克兰时，或许曾期望速战速决。但如今，多达30万俄军士兵伤亡，数以千计的俄制武器被投入战场，俄罗斯已做好打持久战的准备。

俄罗斯政府提出的新预算表明，克里姆林宫正在调动经济力量，为一场持久战做准备。新预算中，国防开支将占俄罗斯2024年预算总支出的29.4%，接近三分之一。

俄罗斯财政部长安东·西卢阿诺夫解释说：“预算结构表明，重点在于确保我们的胜利——军队、国防能力、武装部队、战斗人员。前线所需的一切，胜利所需的一切，都在预算之中。”

但问题不仅在于克里姆林宫能否找到资金来支付此类开支，还在于俄罗斯的国防工业基础能否胜任。

克里姆林宫在战争伊始便拥有强大的武器库，其空军、陆军和海军实力远超乌克兰，这最初让许多西方观察家认为乌克兰很快就会被俄罗斯军队击败。然而，俄罗斯在战争中的损失——无论是人员伤亡还是物资损失——也同样惊人，迫使俄罗斯不得不从仓库中调出老旧装备。入侵乌克兰的最初几个月表明，俄罗斯在乌克兰使用的大量库存装备都比较老旧，质量也较差。

此外，更换装备也面临挑战，因为包括主战坦克、飞机和导弹在内的俄罗斯高端武器系统历来依赖从西方进口的关键部件，例如光学系统、轴承、机床、发动机和微芯片。盟国的制裁和出口管制限制了俄罗斯获取这些部件的途径，从而影响了克里姆林宫为其武装部队生产先进武器装备的能力。

然而，顽固的对手总会做出调整。俄罗斯展现出了惊人的适应西方制裁的能力。它建立了跨越多个地区和大陆（从欧洲到印太地区）的规避制裁的供应链。它还找到了替代供应商，例如中国。自2022年以来，中国已向俄罗斯出售了价值数百万美元的半导体、无人机和其他两用物项。

俄罗斯也在加紧努力，将包括坦克、火箭发射器、火炮和导弹在内的军事装备的国内产量提高两倍以上，在某些情况下甚至提高十倍——至少俄罗斯国有国防集团Rostec的代表是这么说的。

2023年1月18日，在俄罗斯圣彼得堡的阿尔马兹-安泰导弹制造厂，可以看到军用车辆。（伊利亚·皮塔列夫/卫星通讯社/法新社，图片来自盖蒂图片社）

克里姆林宫的努力也存在局限性和潜在风险，最终会影响俄罗斯的产品质量。美国及其盟友正持续扩大制裁名单，积极打击俄罗斯规避制裁的行为。

莫斯科转向北京寻求替代供应商固然令人担忧，但也面临着自身的挑战。据美国财政部副部长沃利·阿德耶莫称，中国目前尚无法生产俄罗斯国防工业所需的高级半导体，而且中国向俄罗斯出售的低端微芯片中约有40%存在缺陷。

此外，向战时经济的转型也给普京政府带来了国内风险。虽然国防开支的增加刺激了经济，但也给财政预算带来了沉重负担。卢布贬值使得进口关键零部件（无论是通过中国还是黑市）的成本更高。高价进口商品、严重的劳动力短缺以及政府在战争方面的巨额支出，都加剧了通货膨胀。

此外，俄罗斯的武器销售额正在大幅下降。俄罗斯的军工产业已将重心转向国内，优先保障驻乌克兰军队的物资供应。但这同时也意味着国防工业的收入大幅减少，严重消耗了克里姆林宫本已捉襟见肘的预算。克里姆林宫已经开始动用应急储备金来维持工厂运转。因此，俄罗斯的支出将主要集中在军火上，而其他方面则相对较少。

这些限制可能会在俄罗斯国内造成内部脆弱性，莫斯科将密切关注。尽管乌克兰的反攻已使俄罗斯兵力捉襟见肘，但由于担心民众的强烈反对，克里姆林宫推迟了新一轮动员以增强战争兵力的计划。俄罗斯政府担心，经济低迷加上高伤亡率可能会导致民众支持这场“选择战争”。

乌克兰能够利用其自主生产的无人机打击克里米亚和俄罗斯城市，这令人担忧。虽然克里姆林宫强有力的专制统治或许能使俄罗斯领导层免受民意波动的影响，但它永远不能想当然地认为自身会永远稳定，叶甫根尼·普里戈任的兵变以及今年夏天他率领的瓦格纳雇佣兵集团向莫斯科进军就证明了这一点。

然而，克里姆林宫将能够大规模生产武器，尤其是低成本但战术上有效的武器，例如爆炸性无人机和滑翔式航空炸弹。鉴于西方国防生产的提升幅度远不及俄罗斯，这或许会让俄罗斯在2024年战争爆发时占据优势。

鉴于莫斯科对战争的投入，基辅要想维持防御并从俄罗斯手中夺回被占领土，唯一的途径就是西方在2024年持续不断地向乌克兰提供军事援助。普京仍然专注于调整俄罗斯经济结构，以支持其国防工业基础。

现在，乌克兰的国际伙伴也应该这样做。

马克斯·伯格曼是战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）斯图尔特中心主任兼欧洲、俄罗斯和欧亚项目主任。他曾任美国国务院高级顾问。蒂娜·多尔拜亚是CSIS项目的研究员。