DRC-Rwanda: Can Geneva talks break the cycle of war in eastern Congo?刚果民主共和国-卢旺达:日内瓦会谈能否打破刚果东部的战争循环?
M23 controls large parts of eastern DRC as Kinshasa and Kigali remain divided over security and sovereignty.
![The Washington peace deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will face a key test in Geneva on September 16-17, as the two sides return to talks on its implementation [Mandel Ngan/AFP]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/AFP__20250627__643Q944__v1__HighRes__UsDrcRwandaPoliticsDiplomacyConflictPeace-1751046001.jpg?resize=770%2C513&quality=80)
M23 controls large parts of eastern DRC as Kinshasa and Kigali remain divided over security and sovereignty.
The Washington peace deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will face a key test in Geneva on September 16-17, as the two sides return to talks on its implementation [Mandel Ngan/AFP]
Goma, DR Congo – More than a year after the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed an agreement intended to end their confrontation, the two countries are back at the negotiating table in Geneva. In eastern Congo, however, the guns have not gone quiet.
The dispute over the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Rwanda’s military presence in Congolese territory and M23’s control of large parts of the east is now difficult to separate. While the DRC and Rwanda negotiate in Geneva, Kinshasa is pursuing a separate dialogue with the political alliance backing M23.
The talks are separate, but the conflicts they are trying to contain are not.
In Goma, where M23 fighters captured the city in January 2025, the latest round of diplomacy is being judged against what has happened since.
For Josue Akuzwe Walayi, a pro-democracy activist speaking from Kinshasa, another round of talks will mean little unless people begin to see a change in their daily lives.
“People are still waiting for the real benefits of peace that have been trumpeted for over a year. Fields continue to be ravaged in the east, and further displacement is still being reported,” he told Al Jazeera.
Why are Kinshasa and Kigali still divided?
At the heart of the dispute is the FDLR.
The armed group emerged from the aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, when members of the former Rwandan army and fighter groups involved in the killings fled into what is now eastern DRC. Kigali has long regarded the group’s presence near Rwanda’s border as a security threat.
Under the Washington framework, Kinshasa agreed to a process aimed at neutralising the FDLR. The Congolese government says that process, including demobilisation measures, is under way.
But Rwandan President Paul Kagame described the agreement on the FDLR as “insufficient” in remarks at the end of last month.
Patrick Muyaya, the Congolese minister of information and government spokesperson, rejected that assessment, saying Kinshasa is meeting its commitments while accusing Kigali of maintaining “expansionist ambitions” in eastern DRC.
“The work of neutralising the FDLR through demobilisation is being carried out in accordance with the Washington agreements,” Muyaya told Al Jazeera.
The disagreement is not simply over whether the FDLR process is sufficient. It reflects a deeper dispute over security and sovereignty.
Rwanda wants credible assurances that armed groups hostile to it will not operate from Congolese territory. Kinshasa argues that Rwanda’s security concerns cannot justify the presence of foreign forces on Congolese soil.
What Rwanda sees as a necessary security measure, Kinshasa sees as a threat to its sovereignty.
That mistrust is now at the centre of the Geneva talks.
Where does M23 fit into the peace process?
M23 is not a party to the Washington agreement, but it is central to the conflict that the agreement is supposed to help contain.
The group captured Goma in January 2025 and later took Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, dramatically altering the balance of power in eastern DRC.
M23 operates under the political umbrella of the Congo River Alliance (AFC), which has been involved in a separate Qatar-led dialogue with Kinshasa.
The Geneva process is focused on the confrontation between the DRC and Rwanda, while the Qatar process addresses the Congolese government’s dispute with the AFC-M23 alliance.
Yet on the ground, those conflicts cannot easily be separated.
M23’s territorial control shapes Kinshasa’s calculations, while the Congolese military response affects the security environment along Rwanda’s border. Rwanda’s concerns about armed groups in eastern DRC are also bound up with its position towards M23, while Kinshasa continues to demand the withdrawal of Rwandan forces.
A settlement between Kinshasa and Kigali could reduce regional tensions, but it would not necessarily end the fighting inside eastern DRC.
The talks may be taking place on separate tracks, but what happens on one can affect the others.
What does the diplomacy look like from Goma?
In Goma, where residents have lived through repeated cycles of fighting and displacement, diplomacy is ultimately being measured against what happens outside the conference rooms.
Sadiki Bitha, a resident who experienced the city’s capture in January 2025, is following the Geneva talks and wants the parties and their mediators to ensure that their commitments are honoured.
For Walayi, the continued violence has made it difficult to view another round of diplomacy with confidence.
He accuses Rwanda of supporting violence in eastern DRC and of invoking the FDLR threat to justify its military actions.
“Rwanda prefers to attack us in order to secure its borders within our country, something we cannot accept,” he said.
“The threat posed by the FDLR cannot justify a Rwandan military presence on Congolese territory. Rwanda’s security must not, under any circumstances, be built at the expense of our country’s sovereignty.”
Rwanda rejects accusations that it is pursuing territorial expansion.
The dispute is difficult to resolve because Kinshasa and Kigali disagree over both the threat and how it should be addressed. Neither side appears ready to change its military posture without guarantees from the other.
For people in eastern DRC, however, those arguments are measured in more immediate terms: Displacement, violence and the loss of access to land and livelihoods.
Can the ceasefire hold while the accusations continue?
While the talks continue, fighting persists in North and South Kivu between the DRC army and allied armed groups and M23 fighters.
AFC-M23 has accused Kinshasa of attacking populated areas and violating the ceasefire.
“The AFC-M23 calls on the Congolese people and the international community to bear witness to these serious attacks against the civilian population, which violate the ceasefire,” Lawrence Kanyuka, spokesperson for AFC-M23, told Al Jazeera.
“The AFC-M23 will take all necessary measures to establish a security perimeter to protect these people.”
The allegations could not be independently verified.
On August 27, AFC-M23 also said an aircraft carrying humanitarian aid and essential supplies had been shot down by the DRC army and described it as a civilian aircraft.
When contacted by Al Jazeera, Mak Hazukay, acting spokesperson for the DRC army, declined to comment on the allegation.
The incident also shows how quickly a disputed event can become part of the conflict itself. Without a trusted mechanism for establishing what happened, disputed incidents can quickly become another source of confrontation.
That makes verification central to whether any ceasefire can survive.
What can Geneva realistically achieve?
Herve Amani, a civil society activist, believes the meeting should not be dismissed simply because previous diplomatic efforts have failed.
For him, the priority is to reduce tensions and begin rebuilding trust between the two countries.
“This meeting in Switzerland should be seen as an opportunity rather than yet another diplomatic exercise,” he told Al Jazeera.
“We must not underestimate the difficulties, but we must also recognise that dialogue remains preferable to escalation.”
Geneva will not resolve decades of mistrust between Kinshasa and Kigali. Nor will it settle M23’s position or, on its own, end the wider conflict in eastern DRC.
But it can still matter if it produces commitments that are concrete, implementable and verifiable.
For Rwanda, that means credible progress towards neutralising the FDLR and addressing its security concerns.
For the DRC, it means respect for its territorial sovereignty and progress towards the withdrawal of Rwandan forces.
And for the wider peace effort, progress on one track cannot come at the expense of the other.
For civilians caught between armed groups and national armies, however, the test is simpler: Whether the guns finally fall silent.
Bitha, who lived through the capture of Goma, says he still believes the Geneva meeting can offer a way forward.
“We have high hopes for this meeting. Every 21 September marks the International Day of Peace. We believe this is an opportunity for the people of Congo and Rwanda to speak with one voice and silence the guns by mutual agreement,” he told Al Jazeera.
M23控制着刚果民主共和国东部的大片地区,金沙萨和基加利在安全和主权问题上仍然存在分歧。
卢旺达和刚果民主共和国在华盛顿达成的和平协议将于9月16日至17日在日内瓦接受关键考验,届时双方将重返谈判桌,商讨协议的执行情况。[Mandel Ngan/AFP]
刚果民主共和国戈马——刚果民主共和国(简称刚果(金))和卢旺达签署旨在结束冲突的协议一年多后,两国重返日内瓦谈判桌。然而,在刚果(金)东部,枪声并未停止。
围绕卢旺达解放民主力量(FDLR)、卢旺达在刚果(金)领土上的军事存在以及M23对东部大片地区的控制等问题的争端,如今已难以区分。在刚果(金)和卢旺达在日内瓦进行谈判的同时,金沙萨方面正与支持M23的政治联盟进行单独对话。
会谈是分开进行的,但它们试图遏制的冲突却是一体的。
在戈马,M23 武装分子于 2025 年 1 月占领了这座城市,最新一轮外交努力正根据此后发生的事情来评判。
来自金沙萨的亲民主活动家约书亚·阿库兹韦·瓦拉伊表示,除非人们开始看到日常生活发生改变,否则新一轮的谈判意义不大。
“人们仍在等待一年多来一直被大肆宣扬的和平带来的真正好处。东部的农田仍在遭受破坏,而且不断有民众流离失所的报道,”他告诉半岛电视台。
金沙萨和基加利为何至今仍处于分裂状态?
这场争端的核心是FDLR。
这个武装组织是在1994年卢旺达针对图西族的种族灭绝事件后出现的,当时参与屠杀的卢旺达前军队成员和武装团体逃往如今的刚果民主共和国东部地区。基加利长期以来一直将该组织在卢旺达边境附近的活动视为安全威胁。
在华盛顿框架下,金沙萨同意开展旨在瓦解卢旺达解放民主力量(FDLR)的进程。刚果政府表示,包括复员措施在内的这一进程正在进行中。
但卢旺达总统保罗·卡加梅在上月底的讲话中称,关于卢旺达解放民主力量的协议“不够充分”。
刚果(金)新闻部长兼政府发言人帕特里克·穆亚亚驳斥了这一评估,称金沙萨正在履行其承诺,同时指责基加利在刚果(金)东部地区抱有“扩张野心”。
“通过解除武装来瓦解卢旺达解放民主力量的工作正在按照华盛顿协议进行,”穆亚亚告诉半岛电视台。
分歧不仅仅在于FDLR进程是否充分,它反映了更深层次的安全和主权争议。
卢旺达希望获得可信的保证,确保敌对卢旺达的武装团体不会在刚果(金)境内活动。金沙萨方面则认为,卢旺达的安全顾虑不足以成为外国军队驻扎在刚果(金)领土上的理由。
卢旺达认为这是必要的安全措施,而金沙萨则认为这是对其主权的威胁。
这种不信任如今已成为日内瓦和谈的核心。
M23在和平进程中扮演什么角色?
M23 不是华盛顿协议的缔约方,但它是该协议旨在遏制的冲突的核心。
该组织于 2025 年 1 月占领了戈马,后来又占领了南基伍省首府布卡武,极大地改变了刚果民主共和国东部的权力平衡。
M23 在刚果河联盟 (AFC) 的政治框架下运作,该联盟参与了由卡塔尔主导的与金沙萨的另一场对话。
日内瓦进程的重点是刚果民主共和国和卢旺达之间的对抗,而卡塔尔进程则着眼于刚果政府与非洲金融共同体-M23联盟之间的争端。
然而在实际情况中,这些冲突很难被轻易区分开来。
M23的领土控制影响着金沙萨的考量,而刚果(金)的军事反应则影响着卢旺达边境沿线的安全环境。卢旺达对刚果(金)东部武装团体的担忧也与其对M23的立场密切相关,与此同时,金沙萨继续要求卢旺达军队撤出。
金沙萨和基加利之间的和解可能会缓解地区紧张局势,但未必能结束刚果民主共和国东部的战斗。
虽然谈判是在不同的轨道上进行的,但其中一个轨道上发生的事情可能会影响其他轨道。
从戈马的角度来看,外交形势如何?
在戈马,居民们经历了反复的战斗和流离失所,外交最终是根据会议室外发生的事情来衡量的。
萨迪基·比塔 (Sadiki Bitha) 是这座城市在 2025 年 1 月被占领的居民,她一直关注着日内瓦的谈判,并希望各方及其调解人确保他们的承诺得到履行。
对于瓦拉伊来说,持续不断的暴力事件让他难以对新一轮外交谈判抱有信心。
他指责卢旺达支持刚果(金)东部的暴力活动,并援引卢旺达解放民主力量(FDLR)的威胁来为其军事行动辩护。
他说:“卢旺达宁愿攻击我们来确保其在我们国家境内的边界安全,这是我们无法接受的。”
“卢旺达解放民主力量构成的威胁不能成为卢旺达军队驻扎在刚果领土上的理由。在任何情况下,卢旺达的安全都绝不能以牺牲国家主权为代价。”
卢旺达否认其正在寻求领土扩张的指控。
这场争端难以解决,因为金沙萨和基加利在威胁的性质和应对方式上都存在分歧。双方似乎都不愿在没有对方保证的情况下改变军事姿态。
然而,对于刚果民主共和国东部的人们来说,这些论点可以用更直接的方式来衡量:流离失所、暴力以及失去土地和生计。
在相互指责持续的情况下,停火协议能否维持下去?
尽管谈判仍在继续,但刚果(金)军队及其盟友武装团体与M23武装分子在北基伍省和南基伍省的战斗仍在继续。
AFC-M23 指责金沙萨袭击人口稠密地区并违反停火协议。
“AFC-M23呼吁刚果人民和国际社会见证这些针对平民的严重袭击,这些袭击违反了停火协议,”AFC-M23发言人劳伦斯·卡纽卡告诉半岛电视台。
“AFC-M23 将采取一切必要措施,建立安全警戒线,以保护这些人。”
这些指控无法得到独立核实。
8月27日,AFC-M23还表示,一架载有人道主义援助和基本物资的飞机被刚果(金)军队击落,并称这是一架民用飞机。
半岛电视台联系刚果民主共和国军队代理发言人马克·哈祖凯时,他拒绝就此指控发表评论。
这一事件也表明,争议事件很容易演变成冲突本身的一部分。如果没有可信的机制来查明真相,争议事件很快就会成为新的对抗根源。
因此,核查对于任何停火协议能否维持都至关重要。
日内瓦实际能够取得哪些成就?
公民社会活动家埃尔韦·阿马尼认为,不应仅仅因为之前的外交努力失败就否定这次会议。
对他而言,当务之急是缓和紧张局势,重建两国之间的信任。
“这次在瑞士举行的会晤应该被视为一次机会,而不是又一次外交活动,”他告诉半岛电视台。
“我们绝不能低估困难,但我们也必须认识到,对话仍然比局势升级更可取。”
日内瓦会议无法解决金沙萨和基加利之间长达数十年的不信任,也无法解决M23的立场,更无法独自结束刚果(金)东部更广泛的冲突。
但如果能够产生具体、可执行和可验证的承诺,那么它仍然很重要。
对卢旺达而言,这意味着在消除卢旺达解放民主力量(FDLR)及其安全问题方面取得切实进展。
对刚果民主共和国而言,这意味着对其领土主权的尊重以及卢旺达军队撤离进程的推进。
而对于更广泛的和平努力而言,在一条道路上取得进展不能以牺牲另一条道路为代价。
然而,对于夹在武装团体和国家军队之间的平民来说,考验就简单多了:枪声最终是否会停止。
经历过戈马陷落的比塔表示,他仍然相信日内瓦会议能够提供前进的方向。
“我们对这次会晤寄予厚望。每年的9月21日是国际和平日。我们相信,这将是刚果和卢旺达人民发出共同声音、通过相互协商实现和平的良机。”他告诉半岛电视台。