‘Kosovo’s moves towards Israel are the price of aligning with US policy’

Kosovo’s decision to join a US-led Gaza force exposes the pull of its alliance with Washington, according to analysts.

Kosovar Albanian supporters of Israel hold a Kosovo and Israeli flag as they take part in a rally in support of Israel in Pristina on May 21, 2021 [Armend Nimani/AFP]

Kosovo, a small majority-Muslim country in the Balkans, has signed up to United States President Donald Trump’s controversial Board of Peace and the planned International Stabilization Force for Gaza, after Israel gave its approval.

The proposed force is, in theory, expected to help maintain security, support demilitarisation and train Palestinian police, though its mandate and composition remain unclear.

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For Kosovo, the decision has a particular resonance.

Its statehood and security depend on international support and NATO protection, as well as the right of a population under pressure from a stronger neighbour to decide its own future. It is now joining a Gaza framework whose legitimacy is contested by Palestinian actors and legal experts, and in which Israel retains decisive influence.

Kosovo was an autonomous province within Serbia in the former Yugoslavia until Slobodan Milosevic stripped it of much of its self-government in 1989. Repression and the political marginalisation of Kosovo Albanians culminated in the 1998-99 war, after the Kosovo Liberation Army launched a rebellion against Serbian and Yugoslav forces.

Serbian and Yugoslav forces responded with killings, expulsions and mass displacement; more than 10,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians were killed. The Hague tribunal later convicted senior Serbian and Yugoslav officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. After NATO’s 78-day 1999 air campaign, Serbian and Yugoslav forces withdrew.

NATO’s KFOR force, Kosovo’s principal external security guarantor, arrived that June.

Kosovar Albanian supporters of Israel hold placards as a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas came into force on May 21, 2021, after 11 days of fighting that pounded the Strip and killed more than 250 Palestinians and 13 Israelis [Armend Nimani/AFP]

Nexhmedin Spahiu, a university professor and political analyst in Pristina, says Kosovo’s approach to Israel reflects a perceived obligation to Washington and, in his view, to the pro-Israel lobby in the US.

NATO and US intervention, Kosovo’s recognition, and the assistance received from the United States are consequences of the lobby’s “influence”, he said. “People in Kosovo feel they have a moral debt … and that is the reason for Kosovo’s approach to Israel.”

For many Kosovo Albanians, the US is associated with the end of repression, the return of refugees and the conditions that made independence possible.

With Serbia still refusing to recognise Kosovo and periodic tensions continuing, US backing and NATO deterrence remain central to Pristina’s security.

“Kosovo’s moves towards Israel are the price of aligning with American policy,” Spahiu said. “It is about repaying old debts.”

From recognition to partnership

Relations with Israel developed within this US-centred logic. Under the Washington agreement of September 2020, Kosovo committed to opening an embassy in Jerusalem. Israel formally recognised Kosovo in February 2021, and Pristina opened its embassy there the following month, becoming the first majority-Muslim country to do so.

Donika Emini, a research fellow at the University of Graz’s Centre for Southeast European Studies, said recognition was “unquestionably a major diplomatic and political achievement” for Kosovo.

Kosovo Albanians shout slogans and hold banners against violence in Gaza and in support for Palestine during a march in Pristina, Kosovo May 14, 2021 [Laura Hasani/Reuters]

Israel’s recognition carried strategic value beyond the bilateral relationship. For Pristina, she added, it helped counter the argument used by states with their own territorial disputes that they could not recognise Kosovo, showing that domestic sovereignty concerns need not prevent such a political decision.

“The relationship has, therefore, been moving beyond recognition towards a broader strategic partnership,” she said, citing Kosovo’s interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.

For Kosovo’s leadership, Israel’s recognition was a concrete victory, while the Jerusalem embassy formed part of a package linked to the first Trump administration. Emini said the calculation was also about strengthening its relationship with Washington.

Artan Muhaxhiri, a Kosovo political analyst, describes this as “proxy politics”: a relationship shaped by, and contingent on, Pristina’s ties with the US rather than an autonomous bilateral policy.

From security consumer to provider

Pristina presents the Gaza role as an opportunity to give back. In March, Prime Minister Albin Kurti said Kosovo was ready to help Gaza because it had benefitted from international forces since 1999.

Emini said Kosovo has long desired to contribute to peace and security, but its lack of UN membership narrows its options.

“Joining a US-led international initiative offers Kosovo something it has been seeking for years: international visibility and an opportunity to demonstrate that it can contribute to international security,” she said. “There is also a degree of reciprocity here.”

She cautioned against a simple comparison with Gaza, where the political and security environment is fundamentally different.

Muhaxhiri expects a symbolic payoff.

“A significant military role is not a realistic expectation,” he said. Still, participation in high-profile initiatives can help consolidate Kosovo’s state identity, build relationships and advance its wider international integration, he added.

An unresolved contradiction

Kosovo’s national story rests on international protection for civilians exposed to state violence and on self-determination.

Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, launched after the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians. Israel faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice; the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

For Emini, Pristina has not resolved the tension between its language on Serbia and its position on Gaza.

“The question in Pristina has been less about whether the two positions can be reconciled in purely legal terms, and more about where the United States stands, what Kosovo’s strategic interests are – and what alliances Kosovo can build,” she said.

分析人士认为，科索沃决定加入美国领导的加沙部队，暴露了其与华盛顿结盟的吸引力。

2021年5月21日，在普里什蒂纳，科索沃阿尔巴尼亚族以色列支持者手持科索沃和以色列国旗参加支持以色列的集会。[Armend Nimani/AFP]

科索沃是巴尔干半岛上一个穆斯林占多数的小国，在以色列批准后，它加入了美国总统唐纳德·特朗普备受争议的和平委员会和计划中的加沙国际稳定部队。

理论上，这支拟议中的部队有望帮助维护安全、支持非军事化并训练巴勒斯坦警察，但其任务授权和组成仍不清楚。

科索沃在乱葬坑中发现23具遗骸（共4条，第1条）

科索沃加入美国领导的加沙国际稳定部队（共4条记录，此为第2条）

科索沃在经历了数月的政治僵局后批准了新政府（共4条，此为第3条）

列出科索沃前总统犯下战争罪行的4人名单

对科索沃而言，这项决定具有特殊的意义。

加沙的建国地位和安全依赖于国际支持和北约的保护，以及在强大邻国压力下，加沙人民决定自身未来的权利。如今，加沙正加入一个合法性受到巴勒斯坦各方和法律专家质疑的框架，而以色列在该框架内仍然拥有决定性的影响力。

科索沃曾是前南斯拉夫塞尔维亚境内的一个自治省，直到 1989 年斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇剥夺了它的大部分自治权。科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人的镇压和政治边缘化最终导致了 1998-99 年的战争，科索沃解放军发动了反对塞尔维亚和南斯拉夫军队的叛乱。

塞尔维亚和南斯拉夫军队以杀戮、驱逐和大规模流离失所作为回应；超过1万名科索沃阿尔巴尼亚族平民丧生。海牙法庭后来判定塞尔维亚和南斯拉夫高级官员犯有战争罪和反人类罪。在北约1999年为期78天的空袭行动之后，塞尔维亚和南斯拉夫军队撤离。

北约驻科索沃部队（KFOR）是科索沃的主要外部安全保障力量，于当年六月抵达。

2021年5月21日，以色列和哈马斯之间的停火协议生效，科索沃阿尔巴尼亚族以色列支持者举着标语牌。此前，双方进行了11天的战斗，造成加沙地带遭受重创，超过250名巴勒斯坦人和13名以色列人丧生。[Armend Nimani/AFP]

普里什蒂纳大学教授兼政治分析家内克什梅丁·斯帕希乌表示，科索沃对以色列的态度反映了其对华盛顿的义务，在他看来，也反映了其对美国亲以色列游说集团的义务。

他说，北约和美国的干预、科索沃的独立以及美国提供的援助都是游说集团“影响力”的结果。“科索沃人民感到他们负有道义上的义务……这就是科索沃与以色列接触的原因。”

对于许多科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人来说，美国与镇压的结束、难民的返回以及使独立成为可能的条件联系在一起。

由于塞尔维亚仍然拒绝承认科索沃，并且双方不时发生紧张局势，美国的支持和北约的威慑对于普里什蒂纳的安全仍然至关重要。

斯帕希乌说：“科索沃向以色列靠拢是其顺从美国政策的代价。这关乎偿还旧债。”

从认可到合作

科索沃与以色列的关系正是在这种以美国为中心的逻辑下发展起来的。根据2020年9月华盛顿达成的协议，科索沃承诺在耶路撒冷开设大使馆。以色列于2021年2月正式承认科索沃，普里什蒂纳于次月在以色列开设了大使馆，成为第一个向以色列派遣大使馆的穆斯林占多数的国家。

格拉茨大学东南欧研究中心的研究员多尼卡·埃米尼表示，获得承认对科索沃来说“无疑是一项重大的外交和政治成就”。

2021年5月14日，科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人在科索沃普里什蒂纳举行游行，高喊口号，举着横幅，反对加沙的暴力行为，支持巴勒斯坦。[劳拉·哈萨尼/路透社]

以色列的承认具有超越双边关系的战略价值。她补充说，对普里什蒂纳而言，这有助于反驳那些与科索沃存在领土争端的国家提出的“不能承认科索沃”的论点，表明国内主权问题并非阻碍此类政治决定的因素。

“因此，两国关系已经超越了简单的承认，朝着更广泛的战略伙伴关系发展，”她说道，并提到了科索沃对与以色列加强安全合作的兴趣。

对科索沃领导层而言，以色列的承认是一项实实在在的胜利，而以色列驻耶路撒冷大使馆则是与特朗普第一任期相关的政策方案的一部分。埃米尼表示，此举也是为了加强与华盛顿的关系。

科索沃政治分析家阿尔坦·穆哈吉里将此描述为“代理政治”：这种关系是由普里什蒂纳与美国的关系塑造的，并且取决于普里什蒂纳与美国的关系，而不是自主的双边政策。

从安全消费者到安全提供商

普里什蒂纳将加沙问题视为回馈国际社会的契机。今年3月，总理阿尔宾·库尔蒂表示，科索沃愿意帮助加沙，因为自1999年以来，科索沃一直受益于国际部队的援助。

埃米尼表示，科索沃一直渴望为和平与安全做出贡献，但由于它不是联合国成员国，其选择受到限制。

她表示：“加入美国主导的国际倡议，能为科索沃提供它多年来一直寻求的东西：国际知名度，以及向外界展示其对国际安全贡献能力的机会。而且，这其中也存在一定程度的互惠。”

她告诫人们不要简单地将这里与加沙进行比较，因为那里的政治和安全环境与这里截然不同。

穆哈吉里希望获得象征性的回报。

他说：“指望科索沃发挥重要的军事作用并不现实。”但他补充说，参与一些备受瞩目的活动有助于巩固科索沃的国家认同，建立国际关系，并促进其更广泛的国际融合。

未解决的矛盾

科索沃的民族故事建立在国际社会对遭受国家暴力侵害的平民的保护和民族自决之上。

以色列在2023年10月7日哈马斯领导的袭击事件后对加沙发动种族灭绝战争，已造成数万巴勒斯坦人死亡。以色列面临国际法院的种族灭绝指控；国际刑事法院已对以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡和前国防部长约阿夫·加兰特发出逮捕令，指控他们犯有战争罪和反人类罪。

对埃米尼而言，普里什蒂纳并没有解决其在塞尔维亚问题上的措辞和在加沙问题上的立场之间的矛盾。

她说：“普里什蒂纳的问题与其说是双方立场能否在纯粹的法律层面上得到调和，不如说是美国的立场是什么，科索沃的战略利益是什么，以及科索沃可以建立什么样的联盟。”