The Sahel and the UN: a smaller footprint, a different role

As UNGA 81 begins, the UN faces a changing Sahel demanding greater sovereignty.

Mali’s Assimi Goita, Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tchiani and Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traore are united by a push for greater sovereignty and strategic autonomy [Mahamadou Hamidou/Reuters] (Reuters)

For a decade, the United Nations’s most visible role in the Sahel was its peacekeeping mission in Mali.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by the Security Council in 2013. Its mandate was terminated in June 2023 at the request of Mali’s transitional government, and the mission completed its withdrawal by the end of that year.

But the end of MINUSMA did not end the UN’s engagement with the region.

Its political work continues through the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), while the wider UN system remains involved in humanitarian and development work.

What has changed is the space in which that engagement takes place.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formally left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 29, 2025. The three countries have also deepened cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), putting sovereignty and strategic autonomy at the centre of their political message.

The humanitarian pressures, meanwhile, have not eased.

Displacement, insecurity, food insecurity and other pressures continue to cross borders, even as governments increasingly insist on handling their security and political affairs on their own terms.

The question is what influence the UN can exercise after the departure of the peacekeeping force that once represented its most substantial presence in the region.

What does the UN’s presence look like now?

The UN’s role today is less about troops and more about diplomacy, mediation, humanitarian assistance and development.

UNOWAS is a special political mission rather than a peacekeeping operation. Its work includes preventive diplomacy, good offices, political mediation, conflict prevention and support for political dialogue.

“The influence the UN can actually exercise is narrow. The AES states have stripped away the mechanisms that once gave outside institutions leverage, leaving ECOWAS and the Rome Statute, and building their own confederation and joint force instead,” said Mubarak Aliyu, a political and security analyst in Nigeria.

In February 2026, the Security Council extended UNOWAS’s mandate until January 31, 2029, while requesting an independent strategic review of its mandate and activities, to be finalised by September 30, 2026.

The review comes as West Africa’s political landscape is being reshaped by military governments, new regional alliances and a stronger emphasis on sovereignty.

Russia has also become an important part of that changing security picture.

“What has actually shaped events this year is Russia’s Africa Corps, which helped Mali’s and Niger’s military governments survive shocks the UN was never positioned to influence, functioning mainly as regime protection rather than counterinsurgency,” Aliyu said.

UN continues its engagement in a Sahel where governments are placing greater emphasis on sovereignty and strategic autonomy [File: Timothy A Clary/AFP]

“Moscow’s leverage extends into the Security Council chamber too, since its veto shapes what collective action the Council can attempt on Mali in the first place.”

Kabir Adamu, founder and managing director of Beacon Security and Innovations Limited, an Abuja-based firm that provides security solutions in Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, said the UN should shift its approach away from large deployments of UN troops to diplomatic and towards diplomatic and development solutions.

“Looking ahead, the UN’s priorities in the Sahel should promote effective security sector governance and security sector reform. This will mean pivoting from traditional, large-scale peacekeeping to deep-rooted and core preventive strategies and diplomacy that addresses the root causes of fragility, conflict and violence, as well as instability,” Adamu said.

For the United Nations, diplomacy has become more important as governments turn to other security partnerships and regional arrangements.

How has sovereignty changed the political space?

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have made sovereignty and strategic autonomy central to their political outlook and built the AES as a framework for closer cooperation.

Their departure from ECOWAS has changed the regional architecture through which West African governments have traditionally dealt with political and security crises.

The UN still works with regional organisations, including ECOWAS and the African Union, but governments no longer share one political framework or the same approach to external engagement.

Consequently, for the UN, maintaining vital political channels has become potentially more difficult.

Adamu said the fragmented security architecture means the UN should seek to work with and through regional organisations and groups, rather than establishing its own large-scale forces.

“As national security structures remain weak and extractive, and regional security architecture fragments, marked by the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States and shifting ECOWAS dynamics, the UN should prioritise pragmatic, inclusive mediation to bridge divides between Sahelian and coastal states, while actively bolstering alternative, functioning frameworks like MNJTF [Multinational Joint Task] and the Accra Initiative,” he said.

Have the problems in the Sahel gone away?

The retreat of peacekeepers has not removed the pressures that brought international organisations into the region in the first place.

Displacement, armed violence, organised crime, food insecurity and climate pressures continue to overlap across the Sahel.

Climate change is perhaps not the root cause of the instability, but environmental and economic pressures can add to existing vulnerabilities, particularly where state institutions are weak and communities are already dealing with conflict and displacement.

For the UN, humanitarian work remains one of the areas where engagement can continue, even when governments reject large-scale military intervention.

Humanitarian work also places greater emphasis on local and regional capacity.

“Crucially, the UN must double down on the core UNISS pillars of governance, resilience, and security by integrating climate-peace initiatives and empowering local capacities, ensuring that international engagement remains flexible, locally owned, and focused on sustainable, multidimensional stability rather than solely militarised responses,” Adamu said.

While the UN cannot determine the security partnerships of sovereign governments or force political processes on authorities that reject them, it can still facilitate dialogue, support humanitarian operations and raise regional crises before the wider international community.

What does UNGA 81 mean for the Sahel?

The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on September 8, 2026, with its General Debate due to begin on September 22.

The UNGA meets with no UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger outside ECOWAS, while the AES has become a separate framework for their political and security cooperation.

“That leaves the UN closer to an advocate and service provider than a shaper of outcomes,” Aliyu said. “It can report, brief, fund aid operations and press for access, but it cannot compel it or offer the regime security that has made Russia indispensable to the military governments.”

Yet for the Sahel, insecurity, displacement, humanitarian needs and economic and climate pressures remain.

In the changed regional environment, the UN’s influence is more likely to come through diplomacy than force, through access rather than authority, and through regional relationships rather than a large international security presence.

联合国大会第 81 届会议开幕之际，联合国面临着萨赫勒地区不断变化的需求，该地区要求更大的主权。

马里总统阿西米·戈伊塔、尼日尔将军阿卜杜拉哈曼·奇亚尼和布基纳法索上尉易卜拉欣·特拉奥雷因争取更大的主权和战略自主权而团结一致。[马哈马杜·哈米杜/路透社]（路透社）

十年来，联合国在萨赫勒地区最引人注目的角色是其在马里的维和行动。

联合国马里多层面综合稳定特派团（马里稳定团）由安全理事会于2013年设立。应马里过渡政府的要求，其任务于2023年6月终止，该特派团于当年年底完成撤离。

但联合国马里多层面综合稳定特派团（MINUSMA）的结束并没有终止联合国与该地区的联系。

其政治工作通过联合国西非和萨赫勒办事处（西非和萨赫勒办事处）继续进行，而更广泛的联合国系统则继续参与人道主义和发展工作。

改变的是参与活动发生的空间。

布基纳法索、马里和尼日尔于2025年1月29日正式退出西非国家经济共同体（西非经共体）。这三个国家还通过萨赫勒国家联盟（萨赫勒联盟）深化了合作，将主权和战略自主置于其政治信息的核心。

与此同时，人道主义压力并未缓解。

尽管各国政府越来越坚持按照自己的方式处理安全和政治事务，但流离失所、不安全、粮食不安全和其他压力仍在跨越国界。

问题是，在曾经代表联合国在该地区最重要存在的维和部队撤离后，联合国还能发挥多大的影响力。

联合国目前在联合国的影响力如何？

如今联合国的作用不再是派遣军队，而是更多地体现在外交、调解、人道主义援助和发展方面。

联合国西非特派团（UNOWAS）是一项特殊的政治任务，而非维和行动。其工作包括预防性外交、斡旋、政治调解、冲突预防和支持政治对话。

尼日利亚政治和安全分析师穆巴拉克·阿利尤表示：“联合国实际能够发挥的影响力很有限。非洲、中东欧国家已经剥夺了曾经赋予外部机构影响力的机制，放弃了西非国家经济共同体和《罗马规约》，转而建立自己的邦联和联合部队。”

2026 年 2 月，安全理事会将联合国西非办事处的任务期限延长至 2029 年 1 月 31 日，同时要求对其任务和活动进行独立战略审查，审查应于 2026 年 9 月 30 日前完成。

此次审查正值西非政治格局因军政府、新的区域联盟以及对主权的日益重视而发生重塑之际。

俄罗斯也已成为这种不断变化的安全格局的重要组成部分。

阿利尤说：“真正左右今年局势的是俄罗斯非洲军团，它帮助马里和尼日尔的军政府度过了联合国从未有能力影响的冲击，其主要作用是保护政权，而不是打击叛乱。”

联合国继续在萨赫勒地区开展工作，该地区各国政府越来越重视主权和战略自主权。[图片：Timothy A Clary/法新社]

“莫斯科的影响力也延伸到了安理会，因为它的否决权决定了安理会最初可以对马里采取哪些集体行动。”

总部位于阿布贾的Beacon Security and Innovations Limited公司创始人兼总经理Kabir Adamu表示，联合国应该改变其策略，不再大规模部署联合国部队，而是转向外交和发展解决方案。该公司为尼日利亚、乍得湖盆地和萨赫勒地区提供安全解决方案。

阿达穆表示：“展望未来，联合国在萨赫勒地区的优先事项应是促进有效的安全部门治理和安全部门改革。这意味着要从传统的、大规模的维和行动转向根深蒂固的核心预防战略和外交手段，以解决脆弱性、冲突和暴力以及不稳定的根源问题。”

对于联合国而言，随着各国政府转向其他安全伙伴关系和区域安排，外交变得越来越重要。

主权如何改变了政治空间？

布基纳法索、马里和尼日尔将主权和战略自主作为其政治观点的核心，并建立了AES作为更紧密合作的框架。

它们退出西非国家经济共同体改变了西非各国政府传统上处理政治和安全危机的区域架构。

联合国仍然与包括西非国家经济共同体和非洲联盟在内的区域组织合作，但各国政府不再共享同一个政治框架或相同的对外交往方式。

因此，对于联合国而言，维持重要的政治渠道可能变得更加困难。

阿达穆表示，由于安全架构分散，联合国应该寻求与区域组织和团体合作，而不是建立自己的大规模部队。

“由于国家安全结构依然薄弱且具有掠夺性，区域安全架构也日益分裂，萨赫勒国家联盟的崛起和西非国家经济共同体（ECOWAS）动态的变化便是明证，联合国应优先考虑务实、包容的调解，以弥合萨赫勒国家和沿海国家之间的分歧，同时积极加强多国联合特遣部队（MNJTF）和阿克拉倡议等其他有效的框架，”他说道。

萨赫勒地区的问题解决了吗？

维和部队的撤离并没有消除当初促使国际组织进入该地区的压力。

流离失所、武装暴力、有组织犯罪、粮食不安全和气候压力等问题在萨赫勒地区持续交织出现。

气候变化或许不是造成不稳定的根本原因，但环境和经济压力会加剧现有的脆弱性，尤其是在国家机构薄弱、社区已经面临冲突和流离失所问题的地方。

对于联合国而言，即使各国政府拒绝大规模军事干预，人道主义工作仍然是联合国可以继续参与的领域之一。

人道主义工作也更加重视地方和区域能力。

阿达穆表示：“至关重要的是，联合国必须加倍重视联合国稳定战略的核心支柱——治理、韧性和安全，将气候和平倡议纳入其中，增强地方能力，确保国际参与保持灵活性，由当地主导，并专注于可持续的多维稳定，而不是仅仅采取军事应对措施。”

虽然联合国不能决定主权政府的安全伙伴关系，也不能强迫拒绝这些伙伴关系的当局接受政治进程，但它仍然可以促进对话，支持人道主义行动，并将区域危机提交给更广泛的国际社会。

第81届联合国大会对萨赫勒地区意味着什么？

2026年9月8日，联合国大会第81届会议开幕，一般性辩论将于9月22日开始。

联合国大会在马里没有联合国维和部队，布基纳法索、马里和尼日尔又不在西非国家经济共同体（ECOWAS）之内，而东盟安全框架（AES）已成为它们政治和安全合作的独立框架。

阿利尤说：“这使得联合国更像是倡导者和服务提供者，而不是结果的塑造者。它可以提交报告、提供简报、资助援助行动并争取准入，但它无法强制俄罗斯进入该地区，也无法为该地区提供俄罗斯对军政府不可或缺的安全保障。”

然而，萨赫勒地区仍然面临着不安全、流离失所、人道主义需求以及经济和气候压力等问题。

在区域环境发生变化的情况下，联合国的影响力更有可能通过外交手段而非武力，通过准入而非权威，通过区域关系而非大规模国际安全存在来实现。