Why the world should care about the far right’s rise in Germany

The AfD has a far different vision on support for Ukraine, foreign aid and Russia than the governing coalition.

AfD co-leader Alice Weidel addresses reporters at a news conference after state elections at the Federal Press Conference building, in Berlin, Germany, September 21, 2026 [Axel Schmidt/Reuters]

The Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) party won 43.8 percent of the popular vote in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt on September 6, trouncing the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

That victory brought a party which follows in the historical footsteps of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party closer than it has ever come since World War II to ruling a German state.

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Two weeks later, the AfD took more than 38 percent of the vote in a regional election in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where the Christian Democrats failed to cross the 5 percent threshold to enter the regional parliament – “a disaster”, said Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

“What it’s doing is what the far right has done elsewhere, and that is essentially erode the consensus against a set of mainstream political parties… hollowing out of the centre,” Catherine Fieschi, a political scientist with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an expert on the European far right, told Al Jazeera.

The left-wing Die Linke party took 25.3 percent of the vote in a separate by-election in Berlin on Sunday, illustrating how German voters are being pulled by both ends of the political spectrum.

Here’s why the far right’s rise in Germany matters to the rest of the world:

Could the far right derail German foreign policy?

Fieschi expects immediate effects on German policy towards Ukraine, which relies heavily on German financial and military industrial might.

“This is bad news for Merz. It’s bad news for Germany, and it’s bad news for the Franco-German engine, and therefore for Ukraine,” Fieschi said.

Germany’s AfD wants dialogue with Russia.

On Tuesday, as Merz’s future looked uncertain, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov lauded the AfD as a popular political force talking about “establishing relations” with Russia. “This can’t fail to appeal to us,” he said.

Ronald Meinardus, research fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), explained how the AfD has adopted Russian positions.

“The AfD repeatedly says they want to stop all military and financial support to Ukraine, to refuse Ukraine entry into the EU and NATO, to restore relations with Russia and restart Nord Stream .”

Europe boycotted Russian oil in 2023 in retaliation for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and will stop importing Russian gas by the end of 2027.

On Monday, Moscow reinforced the argument that dependence on Russian gas is good for Germany.

“The decline in the competitiveness of the German economy is largely due to Germany’s decision to stop buying cheap Russian gas and instead purchase much more expensive gas from other countries, primarily the United States, at times paying several times more on the spot market,” Peskov said.

What about the economy?

There was unexpected good news for the German economy on the same day, when the country’s leading business newspaper, Handelsblatt, reported a growth forecast of 1.3 percent for 2026 – double what was previously expected.

The inward-looking AfD wants to prioritise spending for Germans, and is against foreign aid in any form.

Does the AfD have the power to set policy?

It will struggle to govern even the two states where it has a relative majority, since most other parties have ruled out working with it, and a national election is not due until early 2029.

Yet its victories put psychological pressure on the Merz government now, said Fieschi.

“Given that Merz has cancelled all his commitments, not gone to [the United Nations General Assembly in] New York, he’s going to go from crisis meeting to crisis meeting,” she said. “Merz is going to be a less effective chancellor.

“Germany is not going to stop supporting Ukraine, but I do think that it will do so even more by stealth,” said Fieschi. “I can’t see Merz getting on a train and going to Kyiv at this point.”

Oleksandr Danylyuk, an expert in Russian hybrid warfare, is even more pessimistic.

“[Moscow’s] task is to exhaust Ukraine, and to disrupt support from the West to Ukraine, and they have great progress in this regard,” Danylyuk told Al Jazeera.

“So that’s why they are confident that they can win. That’s why they’re not interested in any negotiations or ceasefire whatever, because actually, the political situation in Europe, in the US, is not optimistic at all,” said Danylyuk, who has served as a senior adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister, its foreign intelligence service and its commander-in-chief.

“Europe is going to be divided,” he predicted. “Most probably, it will not have any consensus or even keep financial support to Ukraine on the level it is right now, which is not actually enough anyhow.”

Merz came to power suggesting he might send Ukraine some of the powerful Taurus cruise missiles Germany possesses. That now seems highly unlikely.

Nor is Europe likely to resume discussion of lending Ukraine more than 200 billion euros ($230bn) in immobilised Russian money in the European financial system. That would be a game-changer, financing Ukraine’s war machine for years.

“There’s absolutely no appetite for it,” said Fieschi, citing objections from Belgium, whose depository Euroclear holds the bulk of the funds. “Loads of people are hiding behind the Belgian objection.”

Will the governing coalition hold out?

The mainstream has found ways to adapt to the rise of the AfD, which took 20.8 percent of the national vote in the last general election in February 2025, twice its 2021 showing.

The CDU formed a grand coalition with their traditional ideological opponents, the Social Democrats (SPD), to keep the AfD out of national power.

Fieschi now sees Merz as a wounded animal, limping to the next round of regional elections in April 2027.

“If those elections are as bad as these, then my sense is that we could be seeing a German election in the fall of 2027.”

Could the AfD win power at the national level?

The parliamentary system makes that unlikely, said Meinardus of ELIAMEP.

“It’s very difficult for AfD to take power in the German federal system because you have several states they would have to win, and objectively cannot because they are not equally popular everywhere, and because no one will work with them,” said Meinardus.

Germany also has a powerful judiciary, which would likely challenge any unconstitutional laws the AfD tried to enact.

Protest marches against the AfD across 20 German cities on September 12 served as a reminder that the far-right party remains deeply unpopular and divisive outside its former East German power base.

德国选择党在支持乌克兰、对外援助和俄罗斯等问题上与执政联盟有着截然不同的看法。

德国选择党联合主席艾丽斯·魏德尔在柏林联邦新闻发布会大楼举行的州选举新闻发布会上向记者发表讲话，2026年9月21日。[Axel Schmidt/路透社]

9月6日，德国另类选择党（AfD）在东部萨克森-安哈尔特州赢得了43.8%的普选票，击败了执政的基督教民主联盟（CDU）。

这场胜利使这个追随阿道夫·希特勒纳粹党历史脚步的政党，比二战以来任​​何时候都更接近统治一个德国国家。

列表 1/4：数万人在德​​国各地游行，抗议极右翼政党德国选择党（AfD）。

列表 2/4：德国从美国接收首架 F-35 战机，北约增加军费开支

名单 3/4：这位有土耳其血统的左翼领导人可能成为柏林下一任市长

列表 4/4：左翼赢得选举，德国选择党（AfD）节节胜利，柏林移民社区“希望”升起

两周后，德国选择党在梅克伦堡-前波美拉尼亚州的地方选举中获得了超过 38% 的选票，而基督教民主党未能跨越 5% 的门槛进入地方议会——“这是一场灾难”，总理弗里德里希·默茨说道。

“它所做的事情，正是极右翼在其他地方所做的事情，那就是从根本上削弱反对一系列主流政党的共识……掏空中间派，”卡内基国际和平基金会政治学家、欧洲极右翼专家凯瑟琳·菲斯基告诉半岛电视台。

周日，左翼政党“左翼党”（Die Linke）在柏林举行的另一场补选中获得了 25.3% 的选票，这表明德国选民正受到政治光谱两端的拉拢。

以下是德国极右势力崛起对世界其他地区的重要意义所在：

极右翼势力会破坏德国外交政策吗？

菲耶斯基预计这将立即对德国对乌克兰的政策产生影响，因为德国严重依赖德国的金融和军事工业实力。

“这对默茨来说是坏消息，对德国来说是坏消息，对法德关系来说也是坏消息，因此对乌克兰来说也是坏消息，”菲耶斯基说。

德国另类选择党（AfD）希望与俄罗斯对话。

周二，在梅尔茨前途未卜之际，克里姆林宫发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫称赞德国选择党是一支受欢迎的政治力量，并表示该党正在谈论与俄罗斯“建立关系”。他说：“这一定会吸引我们。”

希腊欧洲与外交政策基金会 (ELIAMEP) 的研究员罗纳德·梅纳德斯解释了德国选择党是如何采纳俄罗斯立场的。

“德国选择党一再表示，他们希望停止对乌克兰的一切军事和财政支持，拒绝乌克兰加入欧盟和北约，恢复与俄罗斯的关系，并重启北溪天然气管道项目。”

为报复俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，欧洲于 2023 年抵制俄罗斯石油，并将于 2027 年底停止进口俄罗斯天然气。

周一，莫斯科重申了德国依赖俄罗斯天然气有好处的论点。

佩斯科夫表示：“德国经济竞争力下降的主要原因是德国决定停止购买廉价的俄罗斯天然气，转而从其他国家（主要是美国）购买价格高得多的天然气，有时在现货市场上支付的价格是俄罗斯天然气价格的数倍。”

经济形势如何？

同一天，德国经济传来了一个意想不到的好消息：该国领先的商业报纸《商报》预测，2026 年德国经济将增长 1.3%，是此前预期的两倍。

奉行内向型政策的德国选择党希望优先考虑德国人的支出，反对任何形式的对外援助。

德国选择党（AfD）有权制定政策吗？

即使在它拥有相对多数席位的两个州，它也很难进行有效治理，因为大多数其他政党都已排除与其合作的可能性，而且全国大选要到 2029 年初才会举行。

菲耶斯基表示，然而，这场胜利现在给默茨政府带来了心理压力。

“鉴于默茨取消了所有行程安排，没有前往纽约参加联合国大会，他将疲于奔命地参加各种危机会议，”她说。“默茨的总理任期将会大大缩短。”

“德国不会停止支持乌克兰，但我认为它会以更隐蔽的方式加大支持力度，”菲耶斯基说。“我看不出梅尔茨现在会坐火车去基辅。”

俄罗斯混合战争专家奥列克桑德·丹尼柳克则更加悲观。

丹尼柳克告诉半岛电视台：“莫斯科的任务是耗尽乌克兰的资源，并破坏西方对乌克兰的支持，他们在这方面取得了巨大进展。”

“所以他们才自信能够获胜。所以他们对任何谈判或停火都不感兴趣，因为实际上，欧洲和美国的政治形势一点也不乐观，”丹尼柳克说道。他曾担任乌克兰国防部长、对外情报部门和总司令的高级顾问。

他预测说：“欧洲将会分裂。很可能，欧洲无法达成任何共识，甚至可能无法维持目前对乌克兰的财政支持水平，而目前的财政支持实际上本来就不够。”

默茨上台时曾表示，他可能会向乌克兰提供德国拥有的一些威力强大的金牛座巡航导弹。现在看来，这种可能性微乎其微。

欧洲也不太可能重启关于向乌克兰提供超过2000亿欧元（2300亿美元）俄罗斯资金的讨论，这些资金目前被冻结在欧洲金融体系中。这将彻底改变局势，为乌克兰的战争机器提供长达数年的资金支持。

菲耶斯基表示：“根本没人愿意接受这项提议。”他指出，比利时方面对此表示反对，因为比利时的托管机构欧洲清算银行持有大部分资金。“很多人都在借比利时的反对之名行事。”

执政联盟能否坚持到最后？

主流政党已经找到了适应德国选择党崛起的方法。德国选择党在2025年2月举行的上次大选中获得了20.8%的全国选票，是2021年得票率的两倍。

为了阻止德国选择党（AfD）获得国家政权，基民盟（CDU）与其传统的意识形态对手社会民主党（SPD）组成了大联盟。

菲耶斯基现在认为梅尔茨是一只受伤的动物，一瘸一拐地走向 2027 年 4 月的下一轮地方选举。

“如果那些选举也像这次一样糟糕，那么我的感觉是，我们可能会在2027年秋季看到德国大选。”

德国选择党能否在全国范​​围内赢得政权？

ELIAMEP 的 Meinardus 表示，议会制度使得这种情况不太可能发生。

“德国选择党很难在德国联邦体制下掌权，因为他们必须赢得多个州的选举，但客观上他们不可能做到，因为他们在各地并不同样受欢迎，而且没有人愿意与他们合作，”梅纳德斯说。

德国也拥有强大的司法机构，可能会对德国选择党试图颁布的任何违宪法律提出质疑。

9 月 12 日，德国 20 个城市爆发了反对德国选择党的抗议游行，这提醒人们，这个极右翼政党在其前东德权力基地之外仍然极不受欢迎，并且极具分裂性。