Why Pakistan overhauled its military command structure after five decades

New legislation gives Pakistan’s military chief sweeping command powers, raising questions about oversight.

Asim Munir was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal last year in May after Pakistan's four-day conflict with India [Handout via Inter-Services Public Relations]

Islamabad, Pakistan — Pakistan’s parliament in late August passed legislation that, for the first time, spells out in statute the powers of the country’s most senior military office, continuing a restructuring of the military’s command structure that began with last November’s 27th constitutional amendment.

The National Assembly on August 20 approved the Defence Forces of Pakistan Act, 2026, and an amendment to the National Command Authority Act, 2010. Together, the two laws give legal shape to the office of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), created through that amendment last year .

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The bills were not on the National Assembly’s original agenda; the cabinet cleared them that morning, and they passed within hours. The 27th amendment moved through parliament in a similarly compressed timeframe last November.

The changes come just over a year after Pakistan’s four-day conflict with India in May 2025.

Analysts say the changes mark the most significant restructuring of Pakistan’s higher military command since 1976, when the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) was created to coordinate, in a limited way, between the army, navy and air force.

That post has now been abolished. In its place is a Defence Forces Headquarters (DFHQ), headed by the CDF, currently Field Marshal Asim Munir, who also serves as army chief.

Al Jazeera sent questions to the military’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations, about the rationale behind the changes and how the navy and air force will be represented at the new headquarters. It received no response.

Pakistan’s military, and the army in particular, has dominated the country’s political life since independence in 1947, staging four coups and ruling directly for more than three decades.

No elected prime minister has ever completed a full five-year term. The new legislation formalises a degree of authority the army chief has often held informally.

So what exactly do the new laws change, and what could they mean for the balance of power between Pakistan’s civilian government and its military? Al Jazeera examines the key questions.

How is the CDF role different from the old CJCSC?

The CJCSC was designed as a coordinator, not a commander. It had no authority to act on the navy or air force, and each service largely ran its own affairs.

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir looks on prior to a quadrilateral meeting between the United States, Iran, Pakistan and Qatar in Switzerland on June 21, 2026 [Fabrice Coffrini/Pool via Reuters]

The new law changes that. It gives the CDF “operational command and control of the Armed Forces”, making him responsible to the federal government for military operations across all three services, not just the army.

A Rawalpindi-based retired three-star general, speaking on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the subject, described the new arrangement as a genuine, codified chain of command for the first time: the prime minister, then the CDF and his new headquarters, then the individual service chiefs, and finally formations on the ground.

“The CJCSC never had that kind of codified, statutory operational grip,” he told Al Jazeera.

That authority means little, other officers argue, unless it comes with the power to enforce it.

“Any command is ineffective if the commander cannot incentivise or disincentivise,” said Naeem Khalid Lodhi, a retired three-star general and former defence secretary. “The Commander of the Defence Forces is now a real commander, and that has been properly formalised through this legislation.”

Under the earlier arrangement, “there were no arrangements whereby the office holder could take any action with respect to the air force or the navy”, Lodhi told Al Jazeera. “He could act within the army, but now it is all-encompassing.”

Abdul Moiz Jaferii, a Karachi-based lawyer, said the old coordinating post had, in practice, become largely symbolic well before it was formally abolished.

“In practice, this became a ceremonial position with little more than post office authority due to the hegemony of the army within the hierarchy,” Jaferii told Al Jazeera.

Is Pakistan’s military command becoming too army-centric?

Whether the new authority upsets the balance between the three services is the question dividing Pakistan’s defence establishment.

Under the new law, the Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), the post overseeing the country’s nuclear-capable forces, must come from the army and is appointed on the CDF’s recommendation.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meeting General Syed Aamer Raza at the Prime Minister’s Office in July after his appointment as CNSC [Handout/Pakistan Prime Minister’s Office]

General Syed Aamer Raza was appointed the first CNSC in July 2026, promoted from lieutenant general to fill the post, having previously served as Chief of General Staff.

The navy and air force are excluded from the post altogether.

“Since the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was a rotational post, its abolition also means the Commander of the National Strategic Command will remain a four-star appointment, but will now come exclusively from the army,” said Majid Nizami, a Lahore-based strategic analyst. “A four-star officer from the navy or the air force reaching that post has been formally closed off.”

The CJCSC could, in theory, be filled by an officer from any of the three services. In practice, the last non-army officer to hold the post was Air Chief Marshal Farooq Feroze Khan, who left the role in 1997.

The Rawalpindi-based retired three-star general was more blunt about where that leaves the balance of power.

“The institutional centre of gravity of the new system is unmistakably army-centric,” he said.

A former senior military official who served in a strategic planning role, speaking anonymously because he was not authorised to comment publicly, said the shift could affect careers across the navy and air force.

“Since all senior positions in the three services would now be approved by the CDF, it may eventually erode the individual identity of the other two services,” the Islamabad-based official told Al Jazeera. Promotions decided “by someone else who is not from their service” risked breeding resentment, he added.

The risk, said Ahmed Saeed, a retired vice admiral, is most acute for the navy.

Pakistan’s sea-based deterrent depends on sound technical judgement, communications at sea, and the demands of submerged, surface and air platforms that the navy institutionally understands and the army does not, according to Saeed, who is also a former president of the National Institute of Maritime Affairs, an Islamabad-based think tank.

This point is more related to two aspects, which are how proportionately the services will be interlaced into the CDF HQ decision-making loop and how much operational leverage services chiefs will enjoy at the top level, he said.

“The risk isn’t dilution of control,” he said. “It’s that assurance and survivability arguments get subordinated to a land-centric concept of deterrence.”

Lodhi acknowledged the concern but said it was not new.

He said he had in the past suggested that the position overseeing strategic forces rotate between the three services, rather than remain fixed with the army, and that senior officers from each service be designated as potential successors to the CDF.

“That, too, may come later,” he said, adding that the rules of business still to be finalised could require the CDF to act only on the recommendation of the respective air or naval chief.

Where does this leave nuclear command?

The new law also indirectly touches Pakistan’s nuclear command structure.

An Islamabad-based defence analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity around Pakistan’s nuclear programme, said the CDF is now expected to serve as deputy chairman of the National Command Authority (NCA), the body that oversees Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and is chaired by the prime minister.

The army also set up a separate command last year, the Army Rocket Force Command, to handle conventional missile strikes that fall outside the nuclear chain of command.

“This creates a clear separation between strategic deterrence and conventional missile operations that previously sat in an ambiguous space,” the analyst said.

The military official who has served in a strategic planning role said the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is expected to retain that role, working “under the new appointment of CNSC” rather than being absorbed by it.

The SPD is the military department that has run Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes for more than two decades.

Formal control over nuclear forces is likely to remain with the prime minister, he added, “but in practice, the CDF may have a major say in nuclear decision-making”.

Does this weaken civilian oversight of the military?

The clearest disagreement is over what the changes mean for civilian control of the military.

Colonel Inam Raheim, a former army officer who is now a lawyer, said the new law shifts significant power away from elected civilians.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif offers prayers at the funeral of the late supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in Tehran in July [Handout/Pakistan Prime Minister’s Office]

Previously, dismissing or retiring an officer required a summary to be sent to the prime minister and cabinet, he said. That authority now rests with the CDF alone.

“He no longer needs to send a summary anywhere,” Raheim told Al Jazeera. “He will simply issue a letter, and that officer will be dismissed, retired or have his service reduced.”

The Islamabad-based defence analyst went further, arguing that the new law sits uneasily with Article 243 of the constitution, which states that “the federal government shall have control and command of the armed forces”, wording that last year’s amendment left untouched.

“By granting operational command and control to the CDF over the armed forces, the political government is also violating Article 243,” he said.

Jaferii pressed the point further, arguing that the new arrangement goes beyond what the constitution actually allows.

Service chiefs, he said, are formally equal and structurally subordinate to civilian authority, whatever the practical reality on the ground.

“If we still had an independent judiciary, and if an air force or navy chief wanted to challenge suddenly becoming subordinate to an arm of service they were supposed to be equal to, it would make for an interesting challenge in court,” Jaferii said. “Luckily for this regime, we do not have any forum independent enough to consider this question.”

The retired three-star general took a more measured view.

The new law, he said, is “not obviously ultra vires” the constitution. In plain terms, it does not obviously exceed what the constitution allows.

Not everyone agrees the changes are cause for concern.

Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar, an advocate of the Supreme Court, described the legislation as the ordinary legal follow-through required after a constitutional amendment, comparing it to how Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia have each legislated the powers of their own top defence officers.

“Parliament has therefore not created an authority independently of the Constitution,” Khokhar told Al Jazeera. “Rather, it has given legislative effect to a constitutional structure already established” by last year’s amendment.

The comparison only goes so far, however.

In the UK and Australia, the officer equivalent to Pakistan’s CDF is a separate post, historically rotated between the navy, army and air force, and is not held by the sitting head of any one service.

Pakistan’s CDF, by contrast, is permanently and concurrently the army chief.

巴基斯坦新立法赋予军方首脑广泛的指挥权力，引发了人们对监督机制的质疑。

阿西姆·穆尼尔在去年五月巴基斯坦与印度发生四天冲突后晋升为陆军元帅。[巴基斯坦三军公共关系部供稿]

巴基斯坦伊斯兰堡——巴基斯坦议会于 8 月下旬通过了一项立法，首次以法律形式明确规定了该国最高军事官员的权力，延续了自去年 11 月第 27 次宪法修正案开始的军队指挥结构重组。

8 月 20 日，国民议会批准了《2026 年巴基斯坦国防军法案》和《2010 年国家指挥机构法案》的修正案。这两项法律共同赋予了国防军总司令（CDF）办公室法律形式，该办公室是通过去年的修正案设立的。

列表 1/4：巴基斯坦的阿西姆·穆尼尔如何成为特朗普“最喜欢的元帅”

列表 2/4 从印度到伊朗：两场战争如何塑造了巴基斯坦阿西姆·穆尼尔的崛起

列表 3/4：巴基斯坦的国防改革会加强还是破坏其军事平衡？

列表 4（共 4 题）：巴基斯坦第 27 号宪法修正案将如何重塑其军队和法院？

这些法案原本不在国民议会的议程上；内阁当天上午批准了这些法案，它们在数小时内就获得了通过。去年11月，第27次宪法修正案也在类似的短时间内获得了议会通过。

这些变化发生在巴基斯坦与印度于 2025 年 5 月发生为期四天的冲突一年多之后。

分析人士表示，这些变化标志着巴基斯坦高级军事指挥部自 1976 年以来最重大的重组。1976 年，巴基斯坦设立了参谋长联席会议主席 (CJCSC) 一职，旨在有限地协调陆军、海军和空军之间的行动。

该职位现已撤销。取而代之的是国防军总部（DFHQ），由国防军司令领导，现任国防军司令是阿西姆·穆尼尔元帅，他同时也是陆军总司令。

半岛电视台就此次人事变动的理由以及海军和空军在新总部将如何代表军方等问题，向军方媒体部门——三军公共关系部——发送了询问，但未收到回复。

自 1947 年独立以来，巴基斯坦军方，特别是陆军，一直主导着该国的政治生活，发动了四次政变，并直接统治了三十多年。

历史上没有任何一位民选总理能够完成完整的五年任期。新法案将陆军总司令长期以来非正式拥有的某种程度的权力正式化。

那么，新法律究竟改变了什么？它们又会对巴基斯坦文官政府和军方之间的权力平衡产生怎样的影响？半岛电视台将探讨这些关键问题。

CDF 的角色与之前的 CJCSC 有何不同？

参谋长联席会议（CJCSC）的设计初衷是作为协调机构，而非指挥机构。它无权对海军或空军采取行动，各军种基本上各自独立运作。

2026年6月21日，巴基斯坦陆军参谋长阿西姆·穆尼尔元帅在瑞士出席美国、伊朗、巴基斯坦和卡塔尔四方会谈前发表讲话。[Fabrice Coffrini/Pool via Reuters]

新法律改变了这一点。它赋予国防军司令“武装部队的作战指挥权和控制权”，使他不仅对陆军负责，还要对所有三个军种的军事行动向联邦政府负责。

一位驻扎在拉瓦尔品第的退役三星将军，由于该话题的敏感性，要求匿名。他将新的安排描述为首次真正意义上的、成文的指挥链：总理，然后是国防军司令及其新总部，然后是各个军种的司令，最后是地面部队。

“联合参谋长委员会从来没有过那种成文的、法定的操作权力，”他告诉半岛电视台。

其他警官则认为，除非拥有强制执行的权力，否则这种权力意义不大。

“如果指挥官不能起到激励或惩罚作用，任何命令都是无效的，”退役三星将军、前国防部长纳伊姆·哈立德·洛迪说。“国防军司令现在是一位真正的指挥官，这一点已通过这项立法正式确立。”

洛迪告诉半岛电视台，根据之前的安排，“没有任何规定允许该官员对空军或海军采取任何行动”。“他只能在陆军内部行事，但现在范围扩大了。”

卡拉奇律师阿卜杜勒·莫伊兹·贾费里表示，旧的协调职位在正式废除之前，实际上已经很大程度上变成了象征性的。

“实际上，由于军队在等级制度中的统治地位，这变成了一个只有邮局权力的礼仪性职位，”贾菲里告诉半岛电视台。

巴基斯坦的军事指挥是否变得过于以陆军为中心？

新机构是否会打破三军之间的平衡，是巴基斯坦国防机构内部争论的焦点。

根据新法律，负责监督国家核力量的国家战略司令部司令（CNSC）必须来自军队，并由国防军司令推荐任命。

巴基斯坦总理谢赫巴兹·谢里夫于7月在总理办公室会见了赛义德·阿米尔·拉扎将军，此前他被任命为国家安全委员会主席。[图片由巴基斯坦总理办公室提供]

赛义德·阿米尔·拉扎将军于 2026 年 7 月被任命为首任国家安全委员会主席，他此前曾担任总参谋长，后晋升为中将。

海军和空军完全被排除在该职位之外。

“由于参谋长联席会议主席一职是轮值职位，其废除也意味着国家战略司令部司令仍将由四星上将担任，但该职位将全部由陆军人员担任，”拉合尔战略分析师马吉德·尼扎米表示。“海军或空军的四星上将晋升该职位的途径已被正式关闭。”

理论上，参谋长联席会议主席可以由三军中的任何一位军官担任。但实际上，最后一位担任此职的非陆军军官是空军上将法鲁克·费罗兹·汗，他于1997年卸任。

这位驻扎在拉瓦尔品第的退役三星将军对权力平衡的走向则直言不讳。

他说：“新体制的制度重心无疑是以军队为中心的。”

一位曾在战略规划部门担任高级军事官员的前官员（因未获授权公开评论而要求匿名）表示，这一变化可能会影响海军和空军的职业生涯。

这位驻伊斯兰堡的官员告诉半岛电视台：“由于现在三军所有高级职位都需由国防军司令批准，这最终可能会削弱其他两军的独立性。”他还补充说，由“非本军种人员”决定的晋升可能会引发不满。

退役海军中将艾哈迈德·赛义德表示，海军面临的风险最为严重。

巴基斯坦的海上威慑力量依赖于可靠的技术判断、海上通信以及海军在体制上理解而陆军不理解的水下、水面和空中平台的需求。赛义德（Saeed）也是位于伊斯兰堡的智库——国家海事事务研究所的前任所长。

他表示，这一点更多地与两个方面有关，即各军种将以多大的比例融入国防军司令部的决策流程，以及各军种司令将在最高层享有多大的作战影响力。

他说：“风险不在于控制力的削弱，而在于保障和生存能力方面的考量会被置于以陆地为中心的威慑概念之下。”

洛迪承认存在这种担忧，但表示这并非什么新鲜事。

他说，他过去曾建议，负责战略部队的职位应该在三个军种之间轮换，而不是固定在陆军，并且应该指定每个军种的高级军官作为国防军司令的潜在继任者。

“那也可能稍后才会发生，”他说道，并补充说，尚未最终确定的业务规则可能要求国防军司令只能根据相应的空军或海军司令的建议采取行动。

那么，核指挥系统该何去何从？

新法律也间接影响到巴基斯坦的核指挥结构。

一位驻伊斯兰堡的国防分析人士匿名表示，鉴于巴基斯坦核计划的敏感性，他表示，国防军司令现在有望担任国家指挥机构（NCA）的副主席，该机构负责监督巴基斯坦的核武器，由总理担任主席。

去年，陆军还设立了一个独立的指挥机构——陆军火箭部队司令部，负责处理不属于核武器指挥链的常规导弹袭击。

“这明确划分了战略威慑和常规导弹作战，而此前两者之间的界限一直模糊不清，”这位分析人士说。

一位曾在战略规划部门任职的军方官员表示，战略规划司 (SPD) 预计将保留该职位，在“新任命的 CNSC 领导下”运作，而不是被 CNSC 吸收。

巴基斯坦国防部（SPD）是负责巴基斯坦核武器和导弹计划二十多年的军事部门。

他补充说，对核力量的正式控制权可能仍归总理所有，“但实际上，国防军司令可能在核决策中拥有很大的发言权”。

这是否会削弱文职人员对军队的监督？

最明显的分歧在于这些变化对文官控制军队意味着什么。

曾是陆军军官、现为律师的伊纳姆·拉海姆上校表示，新法律将大量权力从民选官员手中转移出去。

7月，巴基斯坦总理谢赫巴兹·谢里夫在德黑兰为已故伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊的葬礼祈祷。[图片由巴基斯坦总理办公室提供]

他表示，此前，解雇或退休一名军官需要向总理和内阁提交一份简报。现在，这项权力完全归国防军司令所有。

拉希姆告诉半岛电视台：“他不再需要向任何地方发送总结报告了。他只需出具一封信函，涉事警官就会被解雇、退休或降级。”

这位常驻伊斯兰堡的国防分析人士更进一步指出，新法律与宪法第 243 条存在冲突，该条款规定“联邦政府对武装部队拥有控制和指挥权”，而去年修正案并未触及这一措辞。

他说：“通过授予国防军对武装部队的作战指挥权和控制权，政治政府也违反了第243条。”

贾费里进一步强调，新的安排超出了宪法实际允许的范围。

他说，无论实际情况如何，各军种首长在形式上与文职当局平等，但在结构上隶属于文职当局。

贾费里说：“如果我们仍然拥有独立的司法体系，如果空军或海军司令想要质疑自己突然被降级到原本应该与其平等的军种之下，那将会是一场有趣的法庭挑战。幸运的是，对于这个政权而言，我们没有任何足够独立的机构来审理这个问题。”

这位退役的三星将军则持更为谨慎的态度。

他说，这项新法律“并非明显越权”。简而言之，它并没有明显超出宪法允许的范围。

并非所有人都认为这些变化令人担忧。

最高法院律师哈菲兹·阿赫桑·艾哈迈德·霍克哈尔将这项立法描述为宪法修正案后所需的普通法律后续行动，并将其与加拿大、英国和澳大利亚各自立法规定其最高国防官员权力的方式进行了比较。

“因此，议会并没有建立独立于宪法之外的权力，”霍哈尔告诉半岛电视台。“相反，它只是通过去年的修正案，赋予了已经确立的宪法结构以立法效力。”

然而，这种比较也仅限于此。

在英国和澳大利亚，相当于巴基斯坦国防军司令的军官是一个单独的职位，历史上由海军、陆军和空军轮流担任，并非由任何一个军种的现任首脑兼任。

相比之下，巴基斯坦的国防军司令（CDF）是永久且兼任陆军参谋长的职务。