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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2026

RU officials effectively rejected the proposed limited energy ceasefire, reiterating an unwillingness to engage in meaningful negotiations.

ISWFiona Noonan查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年9月23日

High-ranking Kremlin officials effectively rejected the US-Ukrainian-proposed limited energy ceasefire and continued reiterating Russia’s unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on September 22 that the war in Ukraine will have to end through a “negotiated settlement” rather than a “military victory” on either side.[1] Rubio met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on September 23 and stated, following the meeting, that both Russia and Ukraine have “expressed interest” in a limited ceasefire involving grain and energy supplies but noted that the agreement would not “solve the war” and could serve as a baseline for a broader deal.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated “absolutely” in response to a question on whether Western energy ceasefire proposals are a rhetorical exercise, however , effectively rejecting US President Donald Trump’s proposal for a ceasefire of long-range strikes on energy infrastructure.[3] Peskov noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready for a bilateral meeting with Trump but emphasized that high-level peace negotiations between Russia and the United States require prior preparations at the “expert level.”[4] Peskov added that there are currently no “preconditions” to enter peace negotiations with Ukraine and reiterated that Putin will only meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Moscow City.[5] Putin separately expressed confidence on September 23 in Russian forces’ ability to achieve all of Russia’s war goals on the battlefield — goals that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation.[6] Peskov and Putin’s statements demonstrate the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to accept any diplomatic ceasefire and peace proposals on any terms that fall short of fulfilling Russia’s maximalist demands of Ukraine’s complete capitulation and surrender to Russia’s demands.[7] The Kremlin has continuously refused to adjust its negotiating positions based on the lack of Russian military successes, remaining committed to continue the war in Ukraine.[8]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers are simultaneously doubling down on baseless claims that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in various sectors of the frontline, likely as part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare campaign to portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing. The Russian MoD claimed on September 23 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Krasnyi Yar and Potykhonove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[9] Russian milbloggers claimed that the seizure of Krasnyi Yar threatens the claimed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Riznykove (southeast of Krasnyi Yar) and that the seizure of Potykhonove completed the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Rublene (east of Potykhonove).[10] One milblogger claimed that the claimed Russian encirclement between the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk directions surrounded around 1,500 Ukrainian servicemembers across 460 square kilometers.[11] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger also provided additional details regarding the baseless Russian MoD claim of an encirclement around Dobropillya on September 22.[12] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Virivka (west of Dobropillya) and are infiltrating toward Bilozerke, Vodyane, and Novotroitske (north, just south, and northeast of Dobropillya respectively).[13] The milblogger added that Russian forces achieved tactical gains along the Matyasheve-Vasylivka line (south of Dobropillya) and are advancing toward Shylivka and Novofedorivka (both southwest of Dobropillya). The milblogger notably did not claim that Russian forces have consolidated ground control over these settlements and did not expand map claims to show a claimed encirclement. ISW has observed no evidence to support the Russian MoD’s encirclement claims both in the northern Kharkiv Oblast and around Dobropillya, and recent Ukrainian statements continue to refute Russian false claims. These intensified claims of encirclement come as Ukrainian forces have made significant advances in priority sectors of the frontline and likely aim to distract from these Ukrainian successes.[14]

Ukrainian and Russian sources continue to refute Russia’s baseless claims of encirclements. Ukraine’s 1st Azov Corps reported on September 23 that Ukrainian forces prevented Russian forces’ attempts to physically interdict Ukrainian logistics routes in an effort to operationally encircle Druzhkivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and attack toward Dobropillya.[15] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated on September 23 that Russian forces are shelling settlements within the alleged encirclement between Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions that Russian sources claimed to have seized, indicating that Russian forces do not maintain positions in the settlements despite Russian claims.[16] One Russian milblogger defined the alleged Russian encirclement of Dobropillya as fire control over Ukrainian logistics including of the roads west of Dobropillya and toward Svyatohorivka (west of Dobropillya) rather than a continuous infantry presence.[17] Another milblogger claimed on September 23 that reports of encirclements in various sectors of the frontline overstate Russian successes and noted that the current battlefield situation more accurately describes fire control over Ukrainian logistics rather than physical encirclements.[18] The milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces retain sufficient combat capability for counterattacks and that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces currently possess the forces required to execute encirclement operations and that the creation, sustainment, and exploitation of true encirclements requires significant forces and resources.

A Russian Mi-8 helicopter violated Polish airspace in Braniewo (near Kaliningrad) — a marked escalation in Russia’s aggressive behavior toward NATO states. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on September 23 that a Russian Mi-8 helicopter entered Polish airspace north of Braniewo from Kaliningrad Oblast on the morning of September 23 and violated Polish airspace at a maximum depth of around 300 meters for 42 seconds.[19] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command added that the nature of the incident indicates Russia is “testing” the readiness of Polish air defenses. Russian drones first violated Polish airspace on August 26, 2024, and Russian forces significantly escalated drone incursions into Poland since September 2025. Two Belarusian helicopters previously violated Polish airspace in August 2023, and a Russian Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft violated Polish airspace over the Gulf of Gdansk for over a minute in February 2025.[20] ISW assesses that Russia’s escalating pattern of violations of Polish and other NATO states’ airspace are part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future aggression against NATO.[21] This recent Russian escalation with a manned aircraft violating Polish airspace is notably just over one year after Russia’s mass drone incursion into Poland in September 2025.[22]

High-ranking Kremlin officials effectively rejected the US-Ukrainian-proposed limited energy ceasefire and continued reiterating Russia’s unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers are simultaneously doubling down on baseless claims that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in various sectors of the frontline, likely as part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare campaign to portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.

Ukrainian and Russian sources continue to refute Russia’s baseless claims of encirclements.

A Russian Mi-8 helicopter violated Polish airspace in Braniewo (near Kaliningrad) — a marked escalation in Russia’s aggressive behavior toward NATO states.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction, in the Chasiv Yar tactical area, and in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces recently advanced near Kostyantynivka and south of Dobropillya.

Russian forces launched 161 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 23 that Russian forces advanced south of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[24]

Russian forces are facing increasingly high casualties, as they continue to rely on infiltration tactics in northern Sumy Oblast. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on September 23 that Russian forces in the Sumy area continue to rely on infiltration tactics to advance, never conduct frontal assaults, and are suffering increasingly heavy casualties.[25] The deputy commander noted that Russian forces often use the same infiltration routes repeatedly, even through areas where they have suffered heavy casualties. The deputy commander added that Russian drone operators must continually supply wounded Russian infiltrators with food, water, and medicine. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on September 22 that the density of Ukrainian drones is making a Russian advance north of Sumy City “virtually impossible.”[26]

Russian forces conducted a series of glide bomb strikes against Sumy City, as Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian frontline cities. Sumy City Military Administration Head Serhiy Kryvosheyenko reported on September 23 that Russian forces conducted several glide bomb strikes against Sumy City injuring 7 people.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and a Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) on September 23 with the claimed seizure of Krasnyi Yar and elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD] reportedly operating under the Northern Grouping of Forces) with the claimed seizure of Potykhonove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[29]

Russian and Ukrainian positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast are heavily intermixed, blurring discernable control of terrain. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on September 23 that Russian and Ukrainian positions in the area are heavily intermixed and do not form a clear frontline.[30] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces have recently pushed their drone operators further into this “gray zone,” which often makes these drone control points more vulnerable to Ukrainian forces.

See topline text for baseless Russian claims of encirclement in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk on September 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances. [31] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ivashkyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 23 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Rybalkyne (northwest of Velykyi Burluk).[33]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Kalynove (north of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 22.[34] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 23 that Ukrainian forces are operating near Kalynove and north of Kindrashivka (southwest of Kupyansk), thus improving positions on the flanks of Kupyansk.[35]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations toward Borova on September 22 and 23 but did not advance.[36]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure and energy assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Kundryuche (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline) on September 22 or overnight September 22 to 23.[37] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 23 that Ukrainian forces have conducted 13 strikes against Russian power stations in occupied Luhansk Oblast in September 2026.[38]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Ukrainian military officials continue to provide additional details about Ukrainian tactics north and northwest of Lyman during Operation Vivaldi. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian forces operating in three groups first created a bridgehead and liberated Serednie (northwest of Lyman) before launching subsequent counterattacks against Shandryholove (south of Serednie).[39] The commander noted that Ukrainian forces encountered exhausted and starving Russian servicemembers during clearing operations.

Ukrainian forces reportedly continue counterattacks in the Lyman direction, including southeast of Lyman. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking toward Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and the Zherebets River.[40] The source’s claims indicate that Ukrainian forces are likely counterattacking from the area along the T-05-13 Lyman-Siversk road southwest of Yampil. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are regularly counterattacking from Ozerne (southeast of Lyman) toward Kryva Luka (south of Ozerne).[41] Kryva Luka is notably across the Siversky Donets River from Ozerne. The milblogger accused other Russian sources of misrepresenting the severity of the situation for Russian forces in the area.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continue to attack in the Slovyansk direction but are struggling to make gains. A servicemember of a Ukrainian army corps operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on September 23 that Russian forces have increased infiltration attempts on foot, as Ukrainian forces regularly strike cars and motorcycles.[42] The servicemember stated that Russian forces continue to heavily strike Ukrainian logistics with drones (including Shahed-type strike drones), artillery, and glide bombs. The servicemember added that Russian forces may be attempting to recreate Ukrainian successes with unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver logistics and reduce casualties.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar tactical area as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions. Ukrainian forces advanced in eastern and central Molocharka (southwest of Chasiv Yar and north of Kostyantynivka) according to geolocated footage published on September 1.[43] Ukrainian forces advanced east of Stinky (northeast of Kostyantynivka) according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[44] Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in southern Izhevka, southwest of Popasne, west of Podilske, and in eastern Chervone (all west of Chasiv Yar), according to geolocated footage published on September 21, after what ISW assesses were all Russian infiltration missions.[45]

Russian forces continue to strike religious infrastructure in Ukraine.[46] A Russian strike destroyed the Church of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist in Kramatorsk, according to geolocated imagery published on September 22.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka. Russian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka based on geolocated footage published on August 31 and September 10.[48] Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in central, western, and northwestern Kostyantynivka; north of Illinivka (just southwest of Kostyantynivka); and in eastern Rozkishne (west of Kostyantynivka), according to geolocated footage published on September 13, 17, 18, and 20, after what ISW assesses were all Russian infiltration missions.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently advanced south of Dobropillya. Russian forces recently advanced north of Vasylivka and northeast of Novooleksandrivka (both south of Dobropillya) according to geolocated footage published on September 18.[50]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southwest of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position south of Myrne (southwest of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on September 22, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[51]

See topline text for baseless Russian claims of the Dobropillya encirclement.

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south and southeast of Novopavlivka as Russian forces advanced or maintained positions southeast of Novopavlivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 23 that Ukrainian forces reached western outskirts of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka) and northern outskirts of Perebudova (south of Novopavlivka) beyond the Mokri Yaly River and advanced along the southern bank of the Vovcha River toward Dachne (southwest of Horikhove).[52] Mashovets reported that Russian forces maintain positions in Filiya (south of Novopavlivka). Mashovets stated that Ukrainian advances in the confluence of the Vovcha and Mokri Yaly rivers significantly inhibited the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) ability to maintain positions in the area. Mashovets reported that intense fighting continues south of the H-15 Havrylivka-Kurakhove highway as Russian forces are trying to retain positions along the right bank of the Mali Yaly River along the Perebudova–Dniproenerhiya line. A Russian milblogger also claimed on September 23 that Russian forces are attempting to gain a foothold on the left bank of the Mokri Yaly River and that Perebudova is in the contested gray zone.[53]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Oleksandrivka, as Russian forces maintained positions in the area. Mashovets reported on September 23 that Ukrainian forces liberated Shevchenko (southeast of Oleksandrivka), penetrated two-and-a-half kilometers toward Burlatske (east of Shevchenko), and advanced north of Vilne Pole (south of Shevchenko), having liberated roughly eight kilometers roughly since early August 2026.[54] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces also reached northern Pavlivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) on the eastern bank of the Yanchur River.[55] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 36th CAA (EMD) maintain positions in Kalynivske occasionally attack toward Verbove and Stepove (both southeast of Oleksandrivka). Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate their positions southwest of Komyshuvakha (southwest of Shevchenko) near Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizke (both southwest of Komyshuvakha).

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 22 and 23 but did not advance.[56]

Russian forces recently conducted a mechanized assault in the Hulyaipole direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on September 23 that Russian forces attempted a mechanized assault using two BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) with a total of 20 servicemembers in the Hulyaipole direction.[57] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces identified and destroyed the vehicles before Russian forces were able to reach the line of contact.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in southern Orikhiv, as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Orikhiv. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in southern Orikhiv, an area where Russian forces previously claimed that Russian forces maintain positions, according to geolocated footage published on September 22.[58] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember in central Yehorivka after what ISW assesses was likely a Russian infiltration mission based on geolocated footage published on September 23.[59]

Ukrainian forces continued interdicting Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Hornet drones struck Russian trucks along the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk highway northeast of Osypenko, east of Prymorsk, and northeast of Azovske (all roughly between 90 and 95 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 22 and 23.[60]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 23.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck and killed the commander of the Russian 8th Artillery Regiment (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD])) Colonel Oleksandr Isaev in occupied Kherson Oblast on September 19. The Ukrainian state-affiliated website “Book of Executioners” reported on September 22 that Ukrainian forces killed Isaev with a first-person view (FPV) drone strike in occupied Kherson Oblast on September 19.[61] The source reported that Isaev previously served in the Ukrainian Armed Forces until 2014 and defected to the Russian Armed Forces in 2022 to fight against Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 23 that Ukrainian forces struck 10 gas distribution stations in occupied Crimea since September 1, 2026, and 412 power nodes across occupied Ukraine and Russia since roughly July 2026.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11. [63]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 23 that Russian forces launched 161 Shahed-type (including 82 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 119 drones and 3 Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions; that unspecified number of drones struck 18 locations; and that drone debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck agricultural, logistical, civilian, energy, critical, railway, communication, and commercial infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[65] Ukraine’s railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia Head Oleksandr Pertsovskyi stated on September 23 that Russian forces continue targeting railway infrastructure in Kyiv City.[66]

Russian forces struck and damaged two Ukrainian internet providers’ data centers, causing widespread internet disruptions in Kyiv City. Ukrainian internet service providers UTELS and Pavutyna reported on September 23 that Russian strikes damaged their data centers in Kyiv City, causing widespread internet disruptions.[67] The Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Affairs reported on September 23 that approximately 100,000 households in Kyiv City experienced internet disruptions following Russian strikes.[68] The Russian MoD claimed on September 23 that Russian forces struck New-Telco and United DC data processing centers in Kyiv City, which provide internet service for the Ukrainian MoD and the Ukrainian special services.[69]

Russian forces continue to strike civilian vessels in the Black Sea basin. Ukrainian officials reported on September 23 that Russian forces struck an Antigua- and Barbuda-flagged civilian cargo ship in the Black Sea on the night of September 22 to 23, causing a fire and killing the ship’s captain.[70]

Russian forces continued their strike campaign targeting gas stations in Kyiv City. Ukrainian officials reported on September 23 that Russian forces struck several gas stations across Kyiv City on the night of September 22 to 23.[71] Geolocated footage published on September 23 shows the aftermath of Russian strikes against two gas stations in Kyiv City.[72] Ukrainian oil company Ukrnafta Board Chairman Bohdan Kukura stated on September 23 that Russian strikes destroyed the company’s gas station in Kyiv City and noted that this is the sixth Russian strike against Ukrnafta infrastructure in recent weeks.[73] Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian gas stations since roughly June 2026.[74]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://wabcradio.com/2026/09/22/marco-rubio-joins-sid-rosenberg/?utm ; https://suspilne dot media/1410012-vijna-v-ukraini-mae-zaversitisa-peregovorami-rubio-nazvav-mozlivij-scenarij/

[2] https://news.sky dot com/story/un-latest-general-assembly-braced-for-iran-showdown-as-donald-trump-says-hes-ready-to-meet-iranian-president-pezeshkian-13590343?postid=12500045#liveblog-body; https://suspilne dot media/1410724-ssa-zaprosili-putina-na-grudnevij-samit-g20-u-maami-rubio/; https://t.me/tass_agency/396977; https://t.me/tass_agency/396973; https://t.me/tass_agency/396962 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/396964 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/396978

[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/28142607; https://tass dot ru/politika/28142801; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117270009579288120

[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/28142623

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/28142801

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80824

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/67571

[10] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47919; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22139; https://t.me/voin_dv/21248 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/29190; https://t.me/sashakots/64614

[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47920

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/

[13] https://t.me/rybar/83381

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/

[15] https://t.me/azov_media/8809l; https://x.com/azov_media/status/2102670724221534292; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/nakopychuvalysya-dlya-otochennya-druzhkivky-%c2%abazov%c2%bb-zachystyv-syly-protyvnyka-na-dobropilli/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/azov-zirvav-sprobu-rosiyan-otochyty-druzhkivku/

[16] https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/odna-z-desyaty-mozhe-projty-rosiyany-kydayut-grupy-v-siru-zonu-ta-shukayut-slabki-misczya-bilya-vovchanska/

[17] https://t.me/sashakots/64599

[18] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75418

[19] https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2102723364439679215?s=20

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-16/ ; https://www.aerotime dot aero/articles/russian-su24-airspace-violation-poland

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2025/; https://x.com/EtatMajorFR/status/2050245590693363985?s=20; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42335; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42337; https://t.me/wargonzo/37128 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9408

[24] https://t.me/divgen/84138

[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/jdut-po-odnomu-ta-zhyvut-ne-bilshe-nizh-dobu-vorog-u-krytychnij-sytuacziyi-na-pivnichno-slobozhanskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w

[26] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56139

[27] https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2331

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42337; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42335; https://t.me/severnnyi/9408; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47922; https://t.me/wargonzo/37128;

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47919; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22139;

[30] https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/odna-z-desyaty-mozhe-projty-rosiyany-kydayut-grupy-v-siru-zonu-ta-shukayut-slabki-misczya-bilya-vovchanska/

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42335 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42337 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9408

[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/9408

[33] https://t.me/divgen/84138

[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38472; https://t.me/rug_international/540 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13027

[35] https://t.me/grvZapad/19860

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42335 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42337

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42340

[38] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2841

[39] https://youtu.be/jsSJHRjQkmo?t=662; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/zajshly-troma-grupamy-j-zakripylysya-nad-selom-yak-onuky-adolfivny-zvilnyly-shandrygolove/

[40] https://t.me/grvZapad/19860

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56178

[42] https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM;p ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/shturmuyut-shhodnya-ale-stoyat-na-misczi-rosiyany-ne-mozhut-prosunutysya-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku/

[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102699477358309532; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102699454059180107; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102699435180347665; https://t.me/c/2110161421/21295

[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730461394997494; https://t.me/dva_majors/99139

[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102783992915427740?s=20; https://t.me/official24ombr/2691; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102783996706857274?s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102784004118524371?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102783992915427740?s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102729786594304333?s=20; https://t.me/official24ombr/2658; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102729798980145176?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102729809017057464?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102783992915427740?s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102784008085975391?s=20;

[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-10-20/

[47] https://x.com/CrimeanVoyager/status/2102635351500071254?s=20 ; https://x.com/CrimeanVoyager/status/2102465524571713795?s=20 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2102660553869234617?s=20

[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102677656928166020?s=20; https://t.me/ombr_28/3272; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102677782069416392?s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102728300401672340; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/880

[49] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730249876467815?s=20; https://t.me/OMBR156/3718; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730263050551636?s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730063200366643?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1046639055037831; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730082204725580?s=20 https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730082204725580?s=20 ; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/2361; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730850127278247 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102728893715173642; https://t.me/Volyn100obrTrO/4033 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730440633364955; https://www.instagram.com/striletskiy_police_batt/reel/DdZHephojRv/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730351110156515

[50]https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730436652720605s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/210273045034932500 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730463588602095 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2102730474632417434

[51] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2102449192874713397; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2102414259577831742 ; https://t.me/ombr_155/1837

[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3607

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47940

[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3608

[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3609

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42335; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42337; https://t.me/voin_dv/21245 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37128

[57] https://youtu.be/jsSJHRjQkmo?t=1523; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/vony-maly-proyihaty-yakomoga-dali-chym-zakinchyvsya-rankovyj-proryv-rosiyan-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku/

[58] https://t.me/UVO58/2037 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2102383727427121166?s=20 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2102588584197038164 ; https://t.me/UVO58/2036 ; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2102699622892175591

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13030 ; https://t.me/stepova_61/2318

[60]https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2102569192172159289s=20 ; https://x.com/HpwWJVafCv83954/status/2102563755074916421s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2102755085612949515s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2102569192172159289?s=20 ; https://x.com/HpwWJVafCv83954/status/2102563755074916421s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2102755085612949515?s=20

[61] https://russian-torturers dot org/news/sili-oboroni-likviduvali-polkovnika-zs-rf-yakij-u-2014-roci-zradiv-ukrayinu-i-perejshov-na-bik-voroga

[62] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2841

[63] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/79650

[65] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31917; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21002; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2954; https://www.facebook.com/bogdan.kukura.page/posts/pfbid0F8bB3P3uC9bUYckx5QU2KZx8PQkWwGQn3SXtb9sXZLeJNmonjeAAvm7cw41NDmd6l?locale=ru_RU; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75482; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7584; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7583; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7595; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7586 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7588 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7589 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7579 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7580; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7590 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7591; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7582; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7596; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10165325291220631&id=729535630&hpir=1; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34771; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1548171584016318&id=100064704725226&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=IFnT1q8L02gOqXwP#; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75454 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67798; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67803; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48818;

[66] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10165325291220631&id=729535630&hpir=1

[67] https://t.me/utels/1131 ; https://t.me/pavutynaua/1104

[68] https://t.me/mintsyfra/8476

[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/67578

[70] https://t.me/ampu_uspa/610 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1410064-rosia-atakuvala-vantazne-sudno-v-cornomu-mori-ekipaz-evakuuvali-kapitan-zaginuv/ ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1574056760490639

[71] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75482; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7584; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7582 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21002;

[72] https://t.me/kievinfo_kyiv/99354; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2102630182112612728; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2102641221495841277;

[73] https://www.facebook.com/bogdan.kukura.page/posts/pfbid0F8bB3P3uC9bUYckx5QU2KZx8PQkWwGQn3SXtb9sXZLeJNmonjeAAvm7cw41NDmd6l?locale=ru_RU

[74] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2026/

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