To deter Iran, US must rethink military basing in the Middle East

Geography is destiny, but when it comes to U.S. bases in the Middle East, it needn’t be. Our current basing structure detracts from our ability to deter Iran — the core threat — because it reduces our ability to fight effectively in a high-intensity scenario. We need to overcome the tyranny of geography.

In a full-blown war with Iran, these existing bases will be rendered unusable by sustained Iranian attack. The Iranians can see this and have created a large and very capable missile and drone force in part to exploit this situation.

Therefore, we need to reexamine where we are based in the region, both on a day-to-day and contingency basis.

Our presence at existing bases provides an important assurance mission to host countries. Thus, we are unlikely to permanently leave bases like Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates and Al Udeid in Qatar .

We should, however, work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Egypt to identify bases as far to the west as possible where we can deploy aircraft, maintenance capabilities, refueling capabilities and weapons.

We have already done some of this work. The “Western Basing Network” was a joint U.S.-Saudi decision to evaluate bases near the Red Sea for use in times of war. Not as far advanced but still under consideration were basing concepts that included Oman, Egypt and Jordan. The U.S. Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid has also shifted some of its responsibilities to locations in the United States, significantly reducing air command and control vulnerabilities.

How does this approach, known as “agile combat employment,” work? Based on warnings and indications of war, land-based air assets would relocate to the western bases from their locations along the Arabian Gulf. The number of Iranian weapons that could reach them would be significantly reduced, warning times would be increased and the Iranians would have a targeting problem in ascertaining from which bases U.S. aircraft operated.

In the event of hostilities, these aircraft would launch from the distant bases, be refueled en route and conduct combat operations over Iran. Depending on how the fight was going, they could land and refuel/rearm at the existing forward bases on the Arabian Gulf, minimizing their time on the ground, and increasing their “cycle rate.” Regardless, they would return to the western bases to “bed down.”

However, access to these installations is not guaranteed. The necessary political decisions are not necessarily made quickly in this region. The facilities themselves range from “bare bones” bases to fully equipped ones. Nonetheless, this is something that is squarely in the best interest of all concerned.

There is a second component to this new basing construct, and it is the opportunity made possible by Israel’s 2021 entry into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is now possible to consider basing in Israel in the event of a war with Iran. It has the same geographic advantages as basing in western Saudi Arabia or other Arab states. Additionally, Israel has a powerful, proven air and missile defense capability . The fact that Israel is now in CENTCOM also facilitates training, interoperability, and even maintenance. Israel should certainly be at the forefront of possible basing alternatives.

The third component to the basing solution also involves Israel, and it is the growing normalization of ties with Arab states. This was made diplomatically possible by the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020. It was made operationally feasible by Israel’s move into the CENTCOM AOR. It was further underwritten by Iranian malign behavior which has finally convinced the Gulf States that a collective approach to air and missile defense is necessary, practicable and achievable without sacrificing sovereignty. It is largely a matter of sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures and agreeing what sensor information to share, and how to share it, with the U.S. acting as the honest broker.

We have a clear-cut example of this concept at work. The Iranians’ large, complex attack against Nevatim Airfield in Israel on April 13, 2024, failed because of Israeli competence, U.S. and allied assistance and the cooperation and assistance of Arab neighbors. Information was shared; airspace was shared. In every measurable way, this was a remarkable success story.

Deterrence must be continuous; in the Middle East, it can have a very short half-life unless it is refreshed systematically. The events of the past two months clearly show that Iran can be deterred from undertaking irresponsible and deadly attacks in the region, but this requires resources, careful messaging and the demonstrated ability to fight and win if necessary.

We now need to move aggressively to develop basing alternatives that demonstrate that we are prepared to fight and prevail in a sustained, high-intensity war with Iran. Geography is destiny for some, but not for all. Being obviously ready to rebase rapidly, and frequently exercising the capability, will increase the chances of peace in the region, because Iran will be watching.

Gen. McKenzie, a retired U.S. Marine general, served as commander of U.S. Central Command from 2019 to 2022. He is the Hertog Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and author of “The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century.”

地理位置决定命运，但就美国在中东的军事基地而言，情况并非如此。我们目前的基地布局削弱了我们威慑伊朗（核心威胁）的能力，因为它降低了我们在高强度冲突环境下有效作战的能力。我们需要克服地理位置的限制。

在与伊朗的全面战争中，这些现有基地将因伊朗的持续攻击而无法使用。伊朗人深知这一点，并已建立起一支规模庞大、能力卓越的导弹和无人机部队，部分原因正是为了利用这种情况。

因此，我们需要重新审视我们在该地区的基地位置，无论是日常运营还是应急情况。

我们在现有基地的存在对驻在国具有重要的安全保障作用。因此，我们不太可能永久撤离像阿联酋的达夫拉基地和卡塔尔的乌代德基地这样的基地。

但是，我们应该与沙特阿拉伯王国、约旦、阿曼和埃及合作，尽可能向西寻找基地，以便部署飞机、维护能力、加油能力和武器。

我们已经完成了一部分工作。“西部基地网络”是美国和沙特阿拉伯共同决定的一项计划，旨在评估红海附近基地在战时的可用性。其他一些基地方案，例如包括阿曼、埃及和约旦在内的方案，虽然进展尚不成熟，但仍在考虑之中。位于乌代德空军基地的美国联合空中作战中心也已将其部分职责转移到美国境内的其他地点，从而显著降低了空中指挥和控制方面的脆弱性。

这种被称为“敏捷作战运用”的策略是如何运作的呢？根据预警和战争迹象，陆基空中力量将从阿拉伯湾沿岸的基地转移到西部基地。这样一来，能够打到这些基地的伊朗武器数量将大幅减少，预警时间将延长，而伊朗方面也将面临定位难题，难以确定美军飞机是从哪些基地起飞的。

一旦发生敌对行动，这些飞机将从远距离基地起飞，途中加油，然后飞越伊朗上空执行作战任务。根据战况，它们可以在阿拉伯湾现有的前沿基地降落并进行加油/重新装弹，从而最大限度地减少地面停留时间，提高作战循环率。无论如何，它们最终都会返回西部基地休整。

然而，能否使用这些设施并不能得到保证。在该地区，必要的政治决策未必能迅速做出。这些设施本身的条件也各不相同，从简陋的基地到设备齐全的都有。尽管如此，这完全符合所有相关方的最佳利益。

这一新的基地布局方案还有第二个组成部分，那就是以色列于2021年加入美国中央司令部（CENTCOM）责任区所带来的机遇。如今，一旦与伊朗发生战争，就可以考虑在以色列设立基地。以色列拥有与沙特阿拉伯西部或其他阿拉伯国家相同的地理优势。此外，以色列还拥有强大且久经考验的防空和导弹防御能力。以色列加入中央司令部也有利于训练、互操作性乃至维护。以色列无疑应该成为可能的基地备选方案的首选。

基地解决方案的第三个组成部分也与以色列有关，即与阿拉伯国家关系的日益正常化。2020年签署的《亚伯拉罕协议》在外交上促成了这一进程。以色列进驻美国中央司令部责任区则使其在作战上成为可能。伊朗的恶意行为进一步强化了这一进程，最终使海湾国家确信，采取集体防空和导弹防御策略是必要、可行且可行的，且不会损害主权。这主要涉及战术、技术和程序的共享，以及就共享哪些传感器信息以及如何共享达成一致，而美国则扮演着公正调解人的角色。

我们有一个清晰的例子可以证明这一概念的有效性。2024年4月13日，伊朗对以色列内瓦蒂姆机场发动了大规模、复杂的袭击，最终失败，这得益于以色列的专业能力、美国及其盟国的援助以及阿拉伯邻国的合作与支持。信息共享，领空共享。从各个方面来看，这都是一次卓越的成功案例。

威慑必须持续不断；在中东，除非系统性地加以巩固，否则威慑作用很快就会消退。过去两个月的事件清楚地表明，伊朗可以被威慑，从而避免在该地区发动不负责任的致命袭击，但这需要资源、谨慎的信息传递以及在必要时展现出的战斗和取胜能力。

现在，我们需要积极发展替代基地方案，以表明我们已做好准备，在与伊朗的持久高强度战争中取得胜利。地理位置对某些人来说决定命运，但并非对所有人如此。显然，我们必须做好快速转移基地的准备，并经常演练这种能力，这将增加该地区实现和平的可能性，因为伊朗会密切关注。

麦肯齐将军是一位退役的美国海军陆战队将军，曾于 2019 年至 2022 年担任美国中央司令部司令。他是美国犹太国家安全研究所的赫托格杰出研究员，也是《熔点：21 世纪的高级指挥与战争》一书的作者。