Russia’s maxed-out arms makers face labor, tech shortages

MOSCOW — As Russian arms makers fulfill government orders at a record rate, they are bracing for a shortage in skilled labor and high-tech manufacturing components that belie the image of a defense-industrial juggernaut, according to analysts.

The projection comes amid a demographic crisis of an aging population, factors that run counter to the government’s trumpeting of expanded weapons production and construction of new plants while the war against Ukraine enters its third year.

According to the former deputy prime minister and head of Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov, the entire Russian defense industry will lack 400,000 workers in the near future.

Irina Sokolova, a specialist at a Moscow recruitment agency who asked that her employer not be revealed, said there are fewer incentives available to fill the ranks. “In 2022-23, the Russian defense industry attracted almost the entire possible personnel reserve by increasing salaries,” she told Defense News. “It is becoming more difficult to recruit specialists; unemployment in Russia is only about 3%. Defense companies are already enticing personnel from each other.”

Firms have tried to increase cooperation with universities and technical schools to prime the personnel pump, according to aerospace industry analyst Vasily Brevnov. But finding management staff adept at navigating the pressure of the Ukraine war is another story.

“With the beginning of a special military operation, many heads of defense industry enterprises were not ready to work in the new realities,” Brevnov told Defense News, using the government-prescribed parlance for the war. “In some cases, drastic personnel decisions were needed.”

For example, business leaders were unfamiliar with available subsidies and credit opportunities or were unable to find alternative suppliers in the wake of Western sanctions, he said.

Managers were also used to running their businesses without paying attention to the needs of their engineers, according to Sergey Smyslov, an independent defense industry analyst. In addition, according to Russian media, the courts are considering the cases of former heads of various defense companies who are accused of fraud, embezzlement and abuse of authority.

Finally, the government’s legislative and regulatory framework is slowing down many production processes, increasing time, costs and hindering technological solutions, analysts interviewed for this article said.

The sanctions squeeze has especially hit those industries in which Russia has long relied on Ukrainian products or established channels for obtaining Western components, according to Brevnov and Pavel Luzin of the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank. Affected industries include aviation, space, shipbuilding and machine tool construction.

Scrounging for parts

While high-end radar components may now be hard to source for Russian arms makers, there is a large market of old but hardy parts that is nearly impossible to regulate, according to Michael Jerdev, a Russian aviation expert.

“If you look at the database of electronic components found in Russian weapons by Ukrainians, you can see a great conservatism in the use of electronic components in military equipment,” he said. “The mass of electronic component samples is literally 25 years old, massive and saturated in the secondary market, which is almost impossible to control with sanctions.”

Crucial equipment has continued to make its way to Russia since the beginning of the war — or has been there all along. Kirill Sypalo, general director of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, said in November 2022 imported machine tools made up the vast majority of equipment in his organization, with producers hailing from Germany, Sweden and Israel.

In total, foreign manufacturers accounted for up to 50% of the electronic components used in rocket and space technology systems and up to 70% in satellite production, an engineer at the state-owned enterprise Russian Space Systems told Defense News, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal planning assumptions.

Vitaly Egorov, an independent expert on the Russian space industry, said “new sanctions in electronics led to the suspension or significant postponement of the launch dates of various spacecraft.”

“Roscosmos itself or the Russian industry is not able to create a full-fledged replacement, and all the hopes of Russian cosmonautics are connected either with China or with parallel imports, that is, essentially gray schemes to circumvent sanctions, but this leads to significant losses of time and money,” he added.

Heavily dependent on foreign parts, Russian naval shipbuilders are now looking to source components from manufacturers in China, India, or Iran through shadow import schemes, a leading researcher at the state-owned enterprise Kant, who asked that their name not be revealed, told Defense News.

Alexey Migalin, the chief executive of marine equipment seller NavMarin, said in an interview with Kommersant newspaper that radars, satellite-based navigation receivers and related devices are manufactured in Russia, but based on Chinese technology.

China to the rescue?

At the Neva 2023 International Exhibition and Conference in St. Petersburg, the head of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, Petr Vanyukov, said 60 of his employees are embedded all over China to scout equipment officials hope could replace the entire ecosystem of sanctioned Western technology.

In September 2023, at a meeting of the Council of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Konstantin Babkin, president of the Rosspetsmash Association, said there is practically no production of hydraulics components, needed for making tanks, in Russia. Similarly, local makers of bearings and electronic parts can only produce up to 25% of the required volume, he added.

At the same time, it is not profitable to produce those parts in Russia, Babkin said, adding that the tax burden in China is lower and loans are cheaper.

That explains why many experts interviewed for this article said the scheme of import substitution is still weak. The head of Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, stated in a June 2022 article for RBC “replacing everything is pointless, economically inexpedient and simply impossible.”

In a study by the Russian Higher School of Economics, more than 60% of executives polled said they are confident that within two to three years they will only partially be able to forego using foreign equipment, technologies and raw materials.

Machine tools play a crucial role in the production of numerous types of weapons and military equipment. Well before Russia’s invasion in 2022, the country’s machine tool industry had been in crisis.

Last year, the government approved a program to provide loans to machine tool builders at an interest rate of 1% per year. The government plans to inject 300 billion rubles (U.S. $3.2 billion) into the industry by 2030. Rostec aims to reduce the import of machine tools by half.

In an effort to obtain foreign components and technologies, Russian metalworking company Stankomashstroy plans to open a machine tool factory in China.

But Asian-made machines are considered to be of lesser quality. Mikhail Prokopyev, an expert on robotics at SofPol, speaking at the Russian Industrial Week event held in Moscow in October, said Chinese equipment is usually less durable and less precise than Japanese and European equipment.

Parallel imports and smuggling are also used by Russia. According to Russian independent investigative journalists from The Insider, there are examples of a private foreign company purchasing microchips from Analog Devices or Texas Instruments, both U.S. companies, and reselling them to a Russian private importing company.

Russian officials are hedging against the semiconductor flow drying out completely. Analysts have observed large-scale import activity of equipment from China, amounting to a future repository that could serve production needs for one to two years, said Luzin, the CEPA analyst.

All told, the Russian defense industry, while firing on all cylinders, is behind the technology curve as Chinese substitutions turn out to be lackluster. As a result, it is easier for Russian industry to reproduce old Soviet models of equipment, rather than create technically more complex Armata tanks and Su-57 aircraft, Luzin said.

Maxim Starchak is a Russia correspondent for Defense News. He previously worked as an editor for the Russian Defence Ministry and as an expert for the NATO Information Office in Moscow. He has covered Russian nuclear and defense issues for the Atlantic Council, the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Royal United Services Institute and more.

莫斯科——分析人士称，随着俄罗斯武器制造商以创纪录的速度完成政府订单，他们正面临熟练劳动力和高科技制造零部件短缺的问题，这与俄罗斯作为国防工业巨头的形象不符。

这项预测出台之际，正值人口老龄化危机时期，这与政府大肆宣扬扩大武器生产和建设新工厂的做法背道而驰，而此时对乌克兰的战争已经进入第三年。

据俄罗斯前副总理兼俄罗斯航天局局长尤里·鲍里索夫称，俄罗斯国防工业在不久的将来将面临40万工人的缺口。

莫斯科一家招聘机构的专家伊琳娜·索科洛娃（Irina Sokolova）要求不透露其雇主姓名。她表示，目前用于招募人才的激励措施有所减少。“2022-2023年，俄罗斯国防工业通过提高薪资几乎吸引了所有潜在的人才储备，”她告诉《防务新闻》。“现在招募专业人才变得越来越难；俄罗斯的失业率只有3%左右。国防企业之间已经开始互相挖角了。”

据航空航天业分析师瓦西里·布列夫诺夫称，各公司已尝试加强与大学和技术院校的合作，以储备人才。但要找到能够应对乌克兰战争压力的管理人员，则是另一回事。

“随着特种军事行动的开始，许多国防工业企业的负责人还没有做好适应新形势的准备，”布雷夫诺夫在接受《防务新闻》采访时说道，他使用的是政府规定的战争术语。“在某些情况下，需要做出重大的人事决定。”

他表示，例如，由于西方制裁，企业领导人不熟悉可用的补贴和信贷机会，或者无法找到替代供应商。

独立国防工业分析师谢尔盖·斯梅斯洛夫表示，管理者们习惯于在不关注工程师需求的情况下经营业务。此外，据俄罗斯媒体报道，法院正在审理几起前国防公司负责人被控欺诈、挪用公款和滥用职权的案件。

最后，接受本文采访的分析人士表示，政府的立法和监管框架正在减缓许多生产流程，增加时间、成本，并阻碍技术解决方案的实施。

据欧洲政策分析中心智库的布雷夫诺夫和帕维尔·卢津称，制裁带来的压力尤其打击了俄罗斯长期以来依赖乌克兰产品或拥有获取西方零部件既定渠道的行业。受影响的行业包括航空、航天、造船和机床制造。

四处搜寻零件

俄罗斯航空专家迈克尔·杰尔德夫表示，虽然俄罗斯武器制造商现在可能很难获得高端雷达组件，但旧式但耐用的零部件市场很大，几乎无法监管。

他说：“如果你查看乌克兰人在俄罗斯武器中发现的电子元件数据库，你会发现俄罗斯在军事装备中使用电子元件方面非常保守。这些电子元件样本的数量庞大，几乎都已有25年历史，它们充斥着二手市场，而制裁几乎无法控制这些市场。”

自战争爆发以来，关键设备一直源源不断地运往俄罗斯——或者说，它们一直都在那里。中央空气动力学研究所所长基里尔·西帕洛在2022年11月表示，进口机床占该机构设备总数的绝大部分，生产商来自德国、瑞典和以色列。

俄罗斯航天系统公司一名工程师在接受《防务新闻》采访时表示，外国制造商在火箭和航天技术系统中使用的电子元件中占比高达 50%，在卫星生产中占比高达 70%。该工程师要求匿名，以便讨论内部规划假设。

俄罗斯航天工业独立专家维塔利·叶戈罗夫表示，“针对电子产品的新制裁导致各种航天器的发射日期暂停或大幅推迟。”

“俄罗斯航天局自身或俄罗斯工业界都无法制造出完全替代的产品，俄罗斯航天事业的所有希望都寄托在中国或平行进口上，也就是本质上规避制裁的灰色地带，但这会导致时间和金钱的重大损失，”他补充道。

俄罗斯国营企业康德研究所的一位不愿透露姓名的首席研究员告诉《防务新闻》，由于严重依赖外国零部件，俄罗斯海军造船企业现在正寻求通过影子进口计划从中国、印度或伊朗的制造商那里采购零部件。

海洋设备销售商 NavMarin 的首席执行官 Alexey Migalin 在接受《生意人报》采访时表示，雷达、卫星导航接收器和相关设备是在俄罗斯制造的，但基于中国技术。

中国会出手相救吗？

在圣彼得堡举行的 2023 年涅瓦国际展览会暨会议上，俄罗斯海事船舶登记局局长彼得·瓦纽科夫表示，他的 60 名员工已派驻中国各地，寻找官员们希望能够取代整个受制裁的西方技术生态系统的设备。

2023年9月，在俄罗斯工商会理事会的一次会议上，俄罗斯特种机械制造协会主席康斯坦丁·巴布金表示，俄罗斯实际上几乎没有生产制造坦克所需的液压元件。他还补充说，同样，本土轴承和电子元件制造商的产能也只能达到所需产量的25%。

巴布金表示，与此同时，在俄罗斯生产这些零部件并不划算，而且中国的税收负担较低，贷款成本也更低。

这就解释了为什么本文采访的许多专家都认为进口替代方案仍然薄弱。俄罗斯国家技术集团公司总裁谢尔盖·切梅佐夫在2022年6月为RBC撰写的一篇文章中指出，“全部替换毫无意义，既不经济，也根本不可能。”

俄罗斯高等经济学院的一项研究显示，超过 60% 的受访高管表示，他们有信心在两到三年内，他们只能部分放弃使用外国设备、技术和原材料。

机床在多种武器和军事装备的生产中发挥着至关重要的作用。早在2022年俄罗斯入侵之前，该国的机床行业就已经陷入危机。

去年，政府批准了一项计划，以每年1%的利率向机床制造商提供贷款。政府计划到2030年向该行业注资3000亿卢布（约合32亿美元）。俄罗斯国家技术集团公司（Rostec）的目标是将机床进口量减少一半。

为了获取外国零部件和技术，俄罗斯金属加工企业斯坦科马什斯特罗伊计划在中国开设一家机床厂。

但亚洲制造的机器普遍被认为质量较差。SofPol公司的机器人专家米哈伊尔·普罗科皮耶夫在10月份于莫斯科举行的俄罗斯工业周活动上表示，中国制造的设备通常不如日本和欧洲的设备耐用和精确。

俄罗斯也使用平行进口和走私手段。据俄罗斯独立调查记者网站“内幕”（The Insider）报道，有案例表明，一些外国私营公司从美国公司Analog Devices或德州仪器（Texas Instruments）购买微芯片，然后转售给俄罗斯私营进口公司。

俄罗斯官员正在防范半导体供应完全枯竭的风险。CEPA分析师卢津表示，分析人士观察到，俄罗斯正大规模从中国进口设备，这相当于建立了一个未来储备库，足以满足未来一到两年的生产需求。

总的来说，俄罗斯国防工业虽然运转良好，但由于中国替代产品表现平平，其技术发展已落后于时代。卢津表示，因此，俄罗斯工业更容易复制苏联时期的老旧装备，而不是研发技术更为复杂的“阿玛塔”坦克和苏-57战斗机。

马克西姆·斯塔恰克是《防务新闻》的俄罗斯特派记者。他曾任俄罗斯国防部编辑，也曾担任北约驻莫斯科新闻办公室专家。他还曾为大西洋理事会、欧洲政策分析中心、皇家联合军种研究所等机构报道俄罗斯核问题和国防问题。