Hegseth orders cyber, intelligence agencies to prioritize election defense

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks during the department's 2026 National POW/MIA Recognition Day Ceremony on the Pentagon on Sept. 18, 2026. Andrew Harnik / Getty Images

The directive comes as the administration has dismantled or reorganized offices that tracked foreign influence and reduced civilian election security support.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directed U.S. Cyber Command and military intelligence agencies to prioritize countering foreign threats to the upcoming elections, ordering intelligence collection and coordination with the Department of Homeland Security.

The Sept. 22 memorandum was released publicly Monday and instructs the defense intelligence enterprise to gather and analyze information on foreign election threats. It separately directs Cyber Command to use its existing authorities and capabilities to counter potential cyberattacks by foreign actors targeting the elections.

“I am therefore directing the entire [Defense Intelligence Enterprise] to mobilize every authorized asset, capability, and partnership under your command to defend our election infrastructure from foreign malign influence,” Hegseth wrote.

The memo is addressed to the leaders of Cyber Command, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. It calls protecting elections a “no-fail mission,” but does not identify particular adversaries or operations, specify additional staffing or funding, or set implementation deadlines.

The directive notably comes amid a broader retreat from dedicated federal efforts to track foreign influence and disinformation. The second Trump administration has dismantled the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force, reorganized the intelligence community’s coordination of that work and reduced election security support at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

At the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, an overhaul shifted many responsibilities of the Foreign Malign Influence Center to other offices. ODNI has subsequently assigned two officials to coordinate election threat intelligence.

Foreign election threats can range from attacks on voting-related computer systems to campaigns intended to manipulate public opinion.

The NSA collects foreign signals intelligence, including intercepted communications, to understand adversaries’ plans and capabilities, while also helping protect sensitive U.S. systems. Cyber Command conducts military cyber operations, including missions to disrupt foreign hackers and the infrastructure they use.

The organizations have previously combined those capabilities through a joint Election Security Group. In a description of its work during the 2022 midterms , NSA explained that intelligence about an attack originating abroad could be shared with domestic agencies to help them defend against it, while Cyber Command could use offensive operations to disrupt the foreign attacker.

Hegseth’s memo does not specify whether the same organizational model will be used this year. It directs intelligence work to comply with applicable laws and policies and tells Cyber Command to operate under its existing authorities.

The directive also emphasizes cooperation with DHS as that agency’s civilian cyberdefense agency outlines how it will assist election officials following staffing and program reductions.

Two days after Hegseth signed the memo, CISA—housed within DHS— released an election security plan identifying its 10 regional directors as election security advisers and describing a free threat-sharing platform connecting election officials, state intelligence hubs and federal partners. That plan followed warnings from state officials that earlier cuts had weakened their access to federal security expertise.

The 2026 elections come as rapid advances in AI allow foreign influence operators to automate more of their work . Such capabilities could let adversaries run larger campaigns with fewer people, adding to the challenge of identifying coordinated manipulation ahead of the midterms.

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2026年9月18日，美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯在五角大楼举行的国防部2026年全国战俘/失踪人员纪念日仪式上发表讲话。（图片来源：Andrew Harnik / Getty Images）

这项指令出台之际，正值政府解散或重组追踪外国影响的机构，并减少对平民选举安全的支持。

国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯指示美国网络司令部和军事情报机构优先应对即将到来的选举中面临的外国威胁，并下令与国土安全部进行情报收集和协调。

9月22日发布的备忘录于周一公开，指示国防情报机构收集和分析有关外国选举威胁的信息。备忘录还单独指示网络司令部利用其现有权限和能力，应对外国势力针对选举发起的潜在网络攻击。

“因此，我指示整个[国防情报机构]调动你们指挥下的所有授权资产、能力和合作伙伴关系，以保护我们的选举基础设施免受外国恶意影响，”赫格塞斯写道。

这份备忘录发给了网络司令部、国家安全局、国防情报局和国家地理空间情报局的领导人。备忘录称保护选举是一项“不容有失的任务”，但没有指明具体的对手或行动，也没有具体说明需要增加哪些人员或资金，更没有设定实施期限。

值得注意的是，这项指令出台之际，联邦政府正大幅削减追踪外国影响和虚假信息的专项工作。特朗普第二任期政府已解散了联邦调查局的外国影响工作组，重组了情报界对这项工作的协调，并削减了网络安全和基础设施安全局对选举安全的支持。

国家情报总监办公室进行了一次改革，将外国恶意影响中心的多项职责转移到了其他部门。此后，国家情报总监办公室指派了两名官员负责协调选举威胁情报工作。

外国对选举的威胁包括攻击与投票相关的计算机系统，以及旨在操纵舆论的活动。

美国国家安全局（NSA）收集外国信号情报，包括截获的通信信息，以了解对手的计划和能力，同时帮助保护美国的敏感系统。网络司令部负责开展军事网络行动，包括打击外国黑客及其所用基础设施的任务。

这些机构此前曾通过联合选举安全小组整合过这些能力。美国国家安全局在描述其在2022年中期选举期间的工作时解释说，有关源自境外的攻击情报可以与国内机构共享，以帮助它们进行防御，而网络司令部则可以采取进攻性行动来干扰外国攻击者。

赫格塞斯的备忘录并未明确说明今年是否会沿用同样的组织模式。备忘录指示情报工作必须遵守适用的法律和政策，并要求网络司令部在其现有权限范围内运作。

该指令还强调与国土安全部合作，因为该机构的民事网络防御机构概述了在人员和项目缩减后将如何协助选举官员。

在赫格塞斯签署备忘录两天后，隶属于国土安全部的网络安全和基础设施安全局（CISA）发布了一项选举安全计划，指定其10名区域主管担任选举安全顾问，并介绍了一个连接选举官员、州情报中心和联邦合作伙伴的免费威胁信息共享平台。此前，各州官员曾警告称，早期的预算削减削弱了他们获取联邦安全专业知识的渠道。

2026年大选之际，人工智能的飞速发展使得外国影响力操纵者能够实现更多工作的自动化。这种能力可能让对手用更少的人手开展更大规模的行动，从而加大了在中期选举前识别协同操纵行为的难度。

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