Morocco’s pro-Palestine protests challenge Rabat’s deepening Israel ties

Protests across Morocco highlight gap between public opposition to normalisation and Rabat’s closer ties with Israel.

People wave Palestinian flags during a pro-Palestinian march in Rabat, Morocco, amid opposition to Israel’s Israel's genocidal war on Gaza [File: Abdel Majid Bziout/AFP]

Pro-Palestine protests have spread across several Moroccan cities, with demonstrators demanding an end to diplomatic normalisation with Israel as Rabat deepens ties with Tel Aviv.

The latest mobilisation took place on September 27, at the end of three days of action called by the Moroccan Front for Supporting Palestine and Against Normalisation.

They followed a September 16 announcement that Morocco and Israel would elevate their diplomatic missions to full embassies and appoint ambassadors.

On September 25, the Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes said it had organised 76 events in 45 cities under the slogan “Friday for Al-Aqsa and against normalisation”.

Moroccan media reported gatherings in cities including Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Tangier, Fez, Agadir, Oujda, Tetouan, Kenitra and Sale. The 76-event figure was the committee’s own count, with no independent national tally of participants.

In Rabat, protesters gathered outside Parliament, while a demonstration in Marrakesh developed into a march through several main streets, according to Lakome. Moroccan media also reported restrictions and arrests in some cities.

Restrictions and arrests

The mobilisation faced restrictions in some cities.

In Tangier, local authorities issued a decision banning a planned demonstration on September 27. Achkayen later reported that security forces dispersed hundreds of participants and that more than 12 people were detained, citing its own sources.

Lakome reported that authorities also prevented demonstrations in M’diq, while security forces surrounded a gathering in Agadir to prevent it from becoming a march.

Pro-Palestine protesters take part in a demonstration against Morocco’s diplomatic ties with Israel [File: Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

The Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes subsequently condemned what it described as bans, restrictions and arrests.

The response underscored another dimension of the dispute: Opposition to the relationship with Israel has remained visible on the streets, even as the government has continued to develop official ties.

A relationship under public pressure

Morocco restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2020 as part of the US-brokered Abraham Accords framework, alongside Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

On September 16, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz.

The three countries confirmed plans to elevate the Moroccan and Israeli diplomatic missions to full embassies and exchange ambassadors.

Morocco and Israel also agreed to conclude agreements on investment protection and avoiding double taxation, expand direct flights and organise high-level reciprocal visits.

The move therefore goes beyond maintaining diplomatic relations established in 2020. It sets out a broader programme of institutional, economic and transport links between the two countries.

For opponents of the relationship, the embassy agreement represents another step in a policy they have rejected since 2020.

Public opinion and state policy

Morocco has maintained diplomatic relations with Israel while continuing to publicly support the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

For opponents of normalisation, however, the two positions are incompatible, particularly amid Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

“What has changed is the political context: Normalisation is being consolidated at a time when the war in Gaza has generated unprecedented public anger and intense images of Palestinian suffering,” Kathya K Berrada, senior programmes manager at the Arab Center for Research, told Al Jazeera.

“What we are seeing in Morocco is a growing disconnect between official diplomacy and public sentiment,” Moroccan activist Mouna Rahiani said, citing the latest Arab Opinion Index, which found that 89 percent of Moroccans surveyed opposed their country recognising Israel, while six percent supported it.

“While the state is moving towards deeper and more formal relations with Israel, Moroccans are still taking to the streets to say that Palestine cannot be treated as separate from our political and moral responsibilities,” she said.

The September agreement has brought an existing tension into sharper focus: public mobilisation against normalisation continues while the state pursues closer institutional ties with Israel.

Berrada said there was an important distinction between official policy and popular opinion, arguing that there is not enough reliable public data to establish how many Moroccans support or oppose normalisation.

Western Sahara adds another layer

The timing also matters for Morocco’s Western Sahara policy. The United Nations Security Council is due to consider the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in October. Its current mandate runs until October 31, 2026.

The September 16 trilateral statement came against the backdrop of US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Israel’s support for Morocco’s position on the territory.

For Rabat, the relationship with Israel sits within a wider foreign-policy framework in which ties with Washington and international support for its position on Western Sahara remain important.

For opponents of normalisation, however, that strategic calculation does not resolve their objection to closer ties with Israel, particularly while the Palestinian issue remains highly salient.

Ahmed, a Moroccan sociologist who asked to be identified by one name, said the September 16 move was “a continuation of the trilateral agreement of December 10, 2020”, but that Morocco should make the relationship “comprehensive, not selective or partial”.

The election changes the political backdrop

The protests came days after Morocco held parliamentary elections on September 23.

The final results gave the Authenticity and Modernity Party 97 of the 395 seats, followed by the National Rally of Independents with 66, the Istiqlal Party with 65 and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) with 54.

The PJD had won 13 seats in 2021. Turnout was 38.08 percent, compared with 50.86 percent in 2021 and 42.27 percent in 2016, according to Morocco’s Ministry of Interior.

It was the PJD in power when Morocco restored relations with Israel in 2020. Then-Prime Minister Saadeddine el-Othmani signed the Morocco-US-Israel joint declaration that December.

The PJD has maintained that opposition to normalisation was a longstanding party position. The party subsequently reaffirmed its rejection of normalisation and relations with Israel, while el-Othmani defended the 2020 decision as a state-level decision.

On September 17, following the announcement of the planned diplomatic upgrade, the PJD’s general secretariat reiterated its opposition to normalisation and to relations and agreements with Israel.

After the election, the PJD’s national council unanimously decided to remain in parliamentary opposition and not participate in the next government.

Pro-Palestine protesters demonstrate against normalisation with Israel, as Morocco moves to deepen diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv [File: Mosa’ab Elshamy/AP]

The PJD’s position has illustrated the limits of using party politics to measure the effect of opposition to normalisation. The party opposed the policy while in government, yet its prime minister signed the 2020 declaration.

Its larger parliamentary presence in 2026 gives the issue a stronger political platform, but does not by itself alter Morocco’s foreign policy.

It has not been established that the Palestine issue or opposition to normalisation was a decisive factor in voting, and neither do the PJD’s gains demonstrate that its position on Israel directly drove its increased representation.

From the streets to politics?

The September demonstrations show that organisations opposed to normalisation retain the ability to mobilise across a wide geographic area. But their effect on government policy is less clear.

“There is an important distinction between state policy and popular opinion. Normalisation is an official state decision, but there is limited reliable public data allowing us to measure the level of popular support for it,” Berrada said.

Moroccan protesters display signs supporting Palestinians during a mobilisation against diplomatic ties with Israel [File: Abdel Majid Bziout/AFP]

“It would therefore be difficult to claim that either a majority or a minority of Moroccans endorse the policy.”

That distinction is important when assessing the significance of the protests. Demonstrations can show the strength and persistence of organised opposition, but they do not by themselves establish the views of the wider population or show that government policy will change.

The PJD now has a larger parliamentary presence than it did after the 2021 election, but it remains in opposition. It will be able to voice its opposition to normalisation in Parliament, but will not have a place in government.

At the same time, the September 16 agreement remains part of a broader Moroccan foreign-policy framework involving the United States, Israel and Western Sahara. The Security Council’s consideration of MINURSO in October will provide another diplomatic setting in which Morocco’s position on the territory is under discussion.

For now, the protests demonstrate that opposition to normalisation remains capable of sustained mobilisation, while the government continues to deepen the relationship. Whether that public opposition translates into sustained political pressure remains less clear.

摩洛哥各地爆发的抗议活动凸显了公众对关系正常化的反对与拉巴特与以色列更紧密联系之间的差距。

在摩洛哥拉巴特，人们挥舞着巴勒斯坦国旗，参加支持巴勒斯坦的游行，抗议以色列对加沙发动的种族灭绝战争。[图片：Abdel Majid Bziout/AFP]

支持巴勒斯坦的抗议活动已蔓延至摩洛哥多个城市，示威者要求结束与以色列的外交关系正常化，因为拉巴特正在加深与特拉维夫的关系。

最近一次动员发生在 9 月 27 日，这是摩洛哥支持巴勒斯坦和反对关系正常化阵线发起的为期三天的行动的结束。

此前，摩洛哥和以色列于 9 月 16 日宣布，将把两国的外交使团提升为正式大使馆，并任命大使。

9月25日，摩洛哥支持国家事业委员会表示，已在45个城市组织了76场活动，口号是“星期五为了阿克萨清真寺，反对正常化”。

摩洛哥媒体报道称，拉巴特、卡萨布兰卡、马拉喀什、丹吉尔、非斯、阿加迪尔、乌季达、得土安、凯尼特拉和萨勒等城市均有集会活动。76场活动的数字是组委会自行统计的，没有独立的全国性统计数据。

据拉科姆通讯社报道，在拉巴特，抗议者聚集在议会大厦外；而在马拉喀什，示威活动演变成一场穿越几条主要街道的游行。摩洛哥媒体还报道了一些城市实施的限制措施和逮捕行动。

限制和逮捕

在一些城市，动员活动受到限制。

在丹吉尔，地方当局发布决定，禁止原定于 9 月 27 日举行的示威活动。Achkayen 随后援引其消息来源报道称，安全部队驱散了数百名参与者，并拘留了 12 多人。

Lakome报道称，当局还阻止了姆迪克的示威活动，同时安全部队包围了阿加迪尔的一次集会，以防止集会演变成游行。

支持巴勒斯坦的抗议者参加了反对摩洛哥与以色列建立外交关系的示威活动。[图片：Abdel Majid Bziouat/AFP]

摩洛哥支持国家事业委员会随后谴责了它所称的禁令、限制和逮捕行为。

这一回应凸显了这场争端的另一个层面：尽管政府一直在发展与以色列的官方关系，但街头仍然可见到反对与以色列关系的呼声。

在公众压力下的关系

2020 年 12 月，摩洛哥在美国斡旋下，根据《亚伯拉罕协议》框架恢复了与以色列的外交关系，同时华盛顿也承认摩洛哥对西撒哈拉的主权。

9月16日，摩洛哥外交大臣纳赛尔·布里塔和以色列外交大臣吉迪恩·萨尔在纽约举行三方峰会，峰会由美国驻联合国大使迈克·沃尔兹主持。

三国确认了将摩洛哥和以色列外交使团提升为正式大使馆并互派大使的计划。

摩洛哥和以色列还同意缔结有关投资保护和避免双重征税的协议，扩大直航，并组织高层互访。

因此，此举不仅限于维持2020年建立的外交关系，还制定了两国之间更广泛的体制、经济和交通联系计划。

对于反对两国关系的人来说，大使馆协议代表着他们自 2020 年以来一直拒绝的政策的又一步。

公众舆论和国家政策

摩洛哥在与以色列保持外交关系的同时，继续公开支持巴勒斯坦事业和建立巴勒斯坦国。

然而，对于反对关系正常化的人来说，这两种立场是不相容的，尤其是在以色列对加沙发动种族灭绝战争的背景下。

“改变的是政治背景：在加沙战争引发前所未有的公众愤怒和巴勒斯坦人遭受苦难的强烈画面之际，正常化进程正在巩固，”阿拉伯研究中心高级项目经理卡蒂亚·K·贝拉达告诉半岛电视台。

摩洛哥活动家穆娜·拉希亚尼表示：“我们在摩洛哥看到的是官方外交与公众情绪之间日益加剧的脱节。”她援引最新的阿拉伯民意指数称，89%的受访摩洛哥人反对摩洛哥承认以色列，而只有6%的人支持。

“尽管摩洛哥正朝着与以色列建立更深入、更正式的关系迈进，但摩洛哥人仍然走上街头，表示巴勒斯坦问题不能与我们的政治和道德责任割裂开来，”她说。

9 月的协议使现有的紧张局势更加凸显：公众反对关系正常化的动员仍在继续，而该国却在寻求与以色列建立更紧密的制度联系。

贝拉达表示，官方政策和民意之间存在重要区别，他认为目前没有足够的可靠公共数据来确定有多少摩洛哥人支持或反对关系正常化。

西撒哈拉又增添了一层含义。

时机对摩洛哥的西撒哈拉政策也至关重要。联合国安理会将于10月审议联合国西撒哈拉全民公投特派团（西撒特派团）的任务授权。该特派团目前的任务授权将于2026年10月31日到期。

9 月 16 日的三方声明是在美国承认摩洛哥对西撒哈拉的主权以及以色列支持摩洛哥在该领土上的立场之后发表的。

对拉巴特而言，与以色列的关系处于更广泛的外交政策框架之内，在这个框架内，与华盛顿的关系以及国际社会对其在西撒哈拉问题上的立场的支持仍然非常重要。

然而，对于反对关系正常化的人来说，这种战略考量并不能解决他们反对与以色列建立更紧密关系的问题，尤其是在巴勒斯坦问题仍然非常突出的情况下。

一位名叫艾哈迈德的摩洛哥社会学家（他要求只透露一个名字）表示，9 月 16 日的举动是“2020 年 12 月 10 日三方协议的延续”，但摩洛哥应该使这种关系“全面、而非选择性或片面”。

选举改变了政治格局。

抗议活动发生在摩洛哥9月23日举行议会选举几天后。

最终结果显示，真实性和现代性党获得 395 个席位中的 97 个，其次是独立人士全国联盟，获得 66 个席位，独立党获得 65 个席位，正义与发展党 (PJD) 获得 54 个席位。

据摩洛哥内政部统计，正义与发展党 (PJD) 在 2021 年赢得了 13 个席位。投票率为 38.08%，而 2021 年为 50.86%，2016 年为 42.27%。

2020 年摩洛哥与以色列恢复外交关系时，执政的是正义与发展党 (PJD)。时任首相萨阿德丁·奥斯曼尼于当年 12 月签署了摩洛哥、美国和以色列联合声明。

正义与发展党（PJD）一直坚持反对与以色列关系正常化是其一贯立场。该党随后重申拒绝与以色列关系正常化及建立关系，而奥斯曼尼则辩称2020年的决定是国家层面的决定。

9 月 17 日，在宣布计划提升外交关系之后，正义与发展党总秘书处重申了其反对与以色列关系正常化以及与以色列建立关系和签署协议的立场。

选举结束后，正义与发展党全国委员会一致决定继续留在议会担任反对党，不参与下一届政府的组建。

支持巴勒斯坦的抗议者举行示威，反对与以色列关系正常化，与此同时，摩洛哥正努力深化与特拉维夫的外交关系。[图片：Mosa'ab Elshamy/AP]

正义与发展党（PJD）的立场表明，用党派政治来衡量反对正常化的影响是有限的。该党在执政期间反对这项政策，但其总理却签署了2020年宣言。

摩洛哥在 2026 年议会中拥有更大的席位，这为该问题提供了更强大的政治平台，但这本身并不会改变摩洛哥的外交政策。

目前尚无证据表明巴勒斯坦问题或反对关系正常化是投票的决定性因素，正义与发展党的得票增加也并未表明其在以色列问题上的立场直接推动了其代表人数的增加。

从街头到政坛？

9月份的示威活动表明，反对正常化的组织仍然能够在广阔的地域范围内动员起来。但它们对政府政策的影响尚不明朗。

贝拉达表示：“国家政策和民意之间存在着重要的区别。正常化是官方的国家决定，但可靠的公共数据有限，无法让我们衡量民众对此的支持程度。”

摩洛哥抗议者在反对与以色列建立外交关系的集会上展示支持巴勒斯坦人的标语。[图片：Abdel Majid Bziout/AFP]

“因此，很难断言大多数摩洛哥人或少数摩洛哥人支持这项政策。”

在评估抗议活动的意义时，这种区别至关重要。示威游行可以展现有组织的反对力量和坚持不懈的精神，但它们本身并不能代表广大民众的观点，也不能表明政府政策将会改变。

正义与发展党（PJD）在议会中的席位比2021年大选后有所增加，但它仍然是反对党。该党可以在议会中表达其反对关系正常化的立场，但无权参与政府。

与此同时，9月16日达成的协议仍然是摩洛哥更广泛的外交政策框架的一部分，该框架涉及美国、以色列和西撒哈拉。安理会10月份审议西撒特派团（MINURSO）将提供另一个外交平台，届时摩洛哥在该领土问题上的立场也将成为讨论的焦点。

目前来看，这些抗议活动表明，反对关系正常化的呼声依然能够持续动员起来，而政府却仍在不断深化与俄罗斯的关系。然而，这种公众反对能否转化为持续的政治压力，目前尚不明朗。