America needs a robust, resilient supply chain for semiconductors

U.S. economic and military competition with China is the defining condition of this decade and, likely, of decades to follow. The outcome of today’s competition with China rests on who will assume technology leadership for advanced and emerging technologies.

Semiconductors feed the defense, medical, industrial control and transportation sectors, to name just a few. America is confronted with a rising China that is committed to becoming the dominant technology power and increasingly poses an existential threat. We must quickly address critical supply chain security and resiliency issues. Both American soft and hard power are girded by our innovative technology and ability to apply it with agility to market demands and national security requirements.

Today, the U.S. commercial sector is America’s innovation engine, and private corporations are developing the intellectual property for our most advanced capabilities such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, space communications and sensing. And these dramatic leaps in technology are enabled by advancements in semiconductors. While semiconductors are the building blocks for the U.S. economy, so much of this industry has migrated overseas, and the resulting imbalance is a significant U.S. economic and national security threat.

The United States is at a precarious juncture where private and public sector missteps could erode our technological superiority, underscoring the urgency of addressing the semiconductor sector.

The People’s Republic of China understands the correlation between technology leadership, the economy and the military, which is why semiconductors are high on the PRC’s list of industries to develop for self-sufficiency and global leadership. Chips and semiconductor capabilities have received consistent and significant investment by the Chinese government. This internal emphasis has been matched by aggressive licit and illicit efforts to gain access to U.S. and other nations’ intellectual property.

Other foreign governments also have prioritized their semiconductor industries and heavily subsidized their chipmakers, contributing to the erosion of America’s semiconductor technology leadership position and the broader competitive environment. Moreover, the concentration of advanced semiconductor development and manufacturing carries not only considerable geopolitical risks but also resource constraints such as an interruption in water or power supplies. A one-hour power outage in a small area of Taiwan impacted 10% of the global DRAM — or dynamic random access memory — supply.

Complicating U.S. policy options is the highly specialized, fragmented and time-consuming semiconductor production process. Furthermore, the supply chain for the raw materials needed to produce semiconductors is vast and complex, containing hidden chokepoints.

What is indisputable is that the U.S. needs a robust and resilient supply chain for semiconductors. U.S. government leaders should consider ways to promote greater robustness and resilience. They also should focus on the criticality of continuous innovation in microelectronics. We need our most essential IP to be developed, owned and protected here in the U.S. while perhaps leveraging the National Technology and Industrial Base partners.

Increasing manufacturing capacity does not itself contribute to U.S. technology leadership. This production capacity needs to be fed by capabilities derived from American developed, owned and protected IP. Widespread licensing from foreign companies creates not only an undesirable dependency, but over the long run it hinders technology leadership.

American leaps in innovation — e.g., the iPhone, the 787 Dreamliner, the reusable Falcon 9 rocket — were not created with IP licensed from abroad. The United States cannot be the world’s semiconductor leader or engine of advanced products if it merely builds domestic manufacturing capacity but relies on IP developed and owned overseas.

This importance of owning IP is why foreign companies base their IP — especially for advanced products — largely in their home countries, creating a virtuous cycle that sustains their competitive edge. That is also why foreign direct investment in the U.S. semiconductor industry makes a limited contribution in the long run to U.S. technology leadership. China, recognizing this, has developed an IP strategy meant to boost the number of patents held by Chinese companies in China.

What this means for the U.S. government is that it is not sufficient to subsidize chip manufacturing capacity; subsidies can be an accelerant supporting private sector investment but are not alone a solution. Subsidies as well as regulatory and tax policies should be designed to work together across the entire semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem — from process technology know-how through production and packaging.

We need to consider the requirements of U.S. semiconductor equipment manufacturers as well. Adding factory space, without the output of continuous innovation, risks that space being empty sometime in the future due to a lack of demand from a changing global market.

The competition with China will not be measured by leadership in square footage, but by intellectual leadership. We cannot expect to have the world’s leading economy without technological superiority — nor can we expect to have the world’s strongest military absent global economic leadership .

Both our allies and our adversaries have invested and continue to invest substantially in semiconductors. The U.S. is vulnerable, and this vulnerability is unacceptable. Upon funding of the CHIPS Act — otherwise known as the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America Act — the U.S. government should prioritize U.S. industry for focused financial support as well as consider the impact of proposed tax and regulatory measures on the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem.

Finally, the U.S. should establish clear lines of accountability and metrics to measure impact.

While the U.S. semiconductor industry’s global position has eroded, we have an opportunity to capitalize on the bipartisan consensus between Congress and the Biden administration. The challenge is to support this sector smartly and swiftly to ensure U.S. technological overmatch now and in the future.

Ellen Lord served as the first undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. Prior to that, she was president and CEO of Textron Systems. She is currently a senior adviser of The Chertoff Group, where Mira Ricardel is a principal. Ricardel served as assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser. Prior to that, she was undersecretary of commerce for the Bureau of Industry and Security. The Chertoff Group has technology clients who may have an interest in this topic.

美国与中国的经济和军事竞争是本十年乃至未来几十年的决定性特征。当今与中国的竞争结果取决于谁将主导先进和新兴技术领域。

半导体为国防、医疗、工业控制和交通运输等众多行业提供技术支持。美国正面临着崛起中的中国，中国致力于成为全球科技霸主，并日益构成生存威胁。我们必须迅速解决关键供应链安全和韧性问题。美国的软实力和硬实力都建立在我们创新技术以及灵活运用这些技术满足市场需求和国家安全要求的能力之上。

如今，美国商业领域是美国的创新引擎，私营企业正在开发人工智能、机器学习、量子计算、空间通信和传感等尖端技术的知识产权。而这些技术的飞速发展得益于半导体技术的进步。尽管半导体是美国经济的基石，但该产业的大部分已经转移到海外，由此造成的不平衡对美国经济和国家安全构成了重大威胁。

美国正处于一个岌岌可危的十字路口，私营和公共部门的失误都可能削弱我们的技术优势，这凸显了解决半导体行业的紧迫性。

中华人民共和国深知科技领先地位、经济和军事之间的关联，因此半导体产业在中国实现自给自足和全球领先地位的重点发展产业中占据重要地位。中国政府持续对芯片和半导体技术进行大量投资。与此同时，中国也积极采取合法或非法手段，获取美国和其他国家的知识产权。

其他国家政府也优先发展本国半导体产业，并大力补贴芯片制造商，这削弱了美国在半导体技术领域的领先地位，并恶化了整体竞争环境。此外，先进半导体研发和制造的集中不仅带来巨大的地缘政治风险，也存在资源限制，例如水或电力供应中断。台湾一小片区域一小时的停电就影响了全球10%的DRAM（动态随机存取存储器）供应。

半导体生产过程高度专业化、分散且耗时，这使得美国的政策选择更加复杂。此外，半导体生产所需原材料的供应链庞大而复杂，存在诸多隐蔽的瓶颈。

毋庸置疑，美国需要一个强大且具有韧性的半导体供应链。美国政府领导人应考虑如何增强供应链的稳健性和韧性。他们还应重视微电子领域持续创新的重要性。我们需要确保最重要的知识产权在美国本土研发、拥有和保护，同时或许可以借助国家技术和工业基础合作伙伴的力量。

提高制造能力本身并不能提升美国的科技领先地位。这种生产能力需要以美国自主研发、拥有和保护的知识产权为基础。广泛依赖外国公司的技术许可不仅会造成不必要的依赖，而且从长远来看，还会阻碍美国的科技领先地位。

美国在创新领域取得的飞跃——例如iPhone、787梦想客机、可重复使用的猎鹰9号火箭——并非源于从国外获得授权的知识产权。如果美国仅仅依靠发展国内制造能力，而依赖海外开发和拥有的知识产权，就无法成为世界半导体领域的领导者或先进产品的引擎。

知识产权的重要性正是外国公司将其知识产权（尤其是先进产品的知识产权）主要集中在本国的原因，从而形成良性循环，维持其竞争优势。这也解释了为什么外国直接投资对美国半导体行业的长期贡献有限，难以巩固美国的科技领先地位。中国认识到这一点，制定了一项知识产权战略，旨在提高中国企业在中国的专利持有量。

对美国政府而言，这意味着仅仅补贴芯片制造能力是不够的；补贴可以促进私营部门投资，但并非唯一的解决方案。补贴、监管和税收政策的设计应协调一致，贯穿整个半导体制造生态系统——从工艺技术诀窍到生产和封装。

我们还需要考虑美国半导体设备制造商的需求。如果缺乏持续的创新产出，仅仅增加厂房面积，未来可能会因为全球市场需求的变化而导致厂房空置。

与中国的竞争，衡量标准并非领土面积上的领先地位，而是智力上的领先地位。没有技术优势，我们无法拥有世界领先的经济体；同样，没有全球经济领导地位，我们也无法拥有世界最强大的军队。

我们的盟友和对手都已在半导体领域投入巨资，并且仍在继续投入。美国自身也因此变得脆弱，这种脆弱性是不可接受的。在《芯片法案》（CHIPS Act，又称《为美国半导体生产创造有益激励法案》）获得拨款后，美国政府应优先考虑为美国本土产业提供专项财政支持，同时也要考虑拟议的税收和监管措施对美国半导体生态系统的影响。

最后，美国应该建立明确的问责机制和衡量影响的指标。

尽管美国半导体产业的全球地位有所削弱，但我们有机会利用国会和拜登政府之间的两党共识。挑战在于如何明智而迅速地支持该行业，以确保美国在现在和未来都保持技术优势。

艾伦·洛德曾担任美国国防部负责采购和保障的首任副部长。此前，她曾任德事隆系统公司总裁兼首席执行官。她目前是切尔托夫集团的高级顾问，米拉·里卡德尔是该集团的负责人。里卡德尔曾任总统助理兼国家安全副顾问。此前，她曾任商务部工业与安全局副部长。切尔托夫集团拥有一些可能对本主题感兴趣的科技客户。