Why dozens of Russian enterprises are bankrupt, or heading that way

MOSCOW — Russia’s economy has not shrunk to the point some Western governments and experts predicted following the country’s invasion of Ukraine.

Indeed, since Feb. 24, 2022, the more than 11,000 added restrictions aimed at pressuring the Russian government have “not delivered as much hell as originally expected,” according to a report released a year later by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

But despite the Kremlin’s ability to defy “apocalyptical forecasts,” as the think tank put it, and the government’s growing defense budget, dozens of Russian defense plants are undergoing bankruptcy proceedings or have claims for bankruptcy recognition. Some have received contracts to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and are still operating, while others have turned to selling their property.

“One of the main reasons for bankruptcies is the [inconsistency of] state defense orders,” according to Sergey Tolkachev, an economist at the Moscow-based Financial University. “Further, [there] is an irregular allocation of funds for the fulfilled state order.”

For example, imagine a defense plant buys metal to fulfill a state order, but the cost this year is 15% higher than last year. According to government regulations, the state would cover a bit less than half of that additional cost, while the company would have to use its own capital to pay for the remaining amount.

Even worse for the business, the Russian state might delay the delivery of funds, forcing the company to seek a loan to cover costs in real time. The bank providing the loan reviews the company’s application, assesses its financial situation and, finding it risky, sets a high interest rate.

Out of desperation, the defense company enters debt bondage, tightening the fiscal knot around an already struggling business.

‘Nothing here to save’

Russia’s national register of bankruptcy information lists data on dozens of domestic organizations and their debt. One of those is the Radiopribor plant, a producer of maritime electronics in Vladivostok that declared bankruptcy in 2018.

Radiopribor was in debt for 398.2 million rubles (U.S. $4.9 million). Its production capacity was then leased to Dubna Machine-Building Plant to complete work on a state defense order, which ended in 2021.

Ultimately, Radiopribor’s main property was sold in 2022 — 10 plots of land in total.

Another example is the Sibselmash plant, an artillery ammunition manufacturer in Novosibirsk, which declared bankruptcy in 2012 with a debt of more than 1 billion rubles. In 2021, the plant’s main complex was sold to the company Merkas. Despite the fact that Merkas pledged to maintain the defense production lines, it ended up demolishing its workshops and buildings throughout 2022.

Ukrainian air defenses intercept a Shahed drone midair in the third Russian aerial attack on the capital of Kyiv within 24 hours, on May 30, 2023. (Evgeniy Maloletka/AP)

And the Kalinin plant, which makes fuses as well as components for satellites in St. Petersburg, declared bankruptcy in 2021. The plant’s creditors claimed about 1.047 billion rubles. In May 2023, a plot of land once owned by the plant was sold for 300.3 million rubles.

Several bankruptcy procedures are also taking place, according to Russia’s national register of bankruptcy information. Examples include the Moscow-based Elektropribor plant, which produces navigation instruments and has a debt of 42 million rubles.

There is also the Podolsk Electromechanical Plant, which makes components for anti-aircraft and ballistic missile systems and has a debt of 1.3 billion rubles. And the Yekaterinburg-based Radio Equipment Plant, which makes radar components, has a debt of 741 million rubles.

Sergey Gebel, the chief executive of the Russia-based Gebel and Partners law firm, said some defense industry enterprises, following years of downtime and debt, are unable to build weapons.

For those organizations, “there is simply nothing here to save,” he told Defense News.

Survivors (somewhat)

Meanwhile, some enterprises are trying to solve their financial problems by selling all or part of their ownership shares. One example is the Kazan Synthetic Rubber Plant, whose products are used in the creation of sponge, which goes toward making aircraft parts.

In 2019, with a debt of 5.3 billion rubles, Kazan was declared bankrupt. However, it quickly found an investor in Industrial Technologies, which plans to invest 4.2 billion rubles in the plant by 2025. Production has already been restored.

United Shipbuilding Corp., which produces military vessels, has proposed that 51% of shares of the Baltic Plant, which constructs surface ships under its purview, be transferred to Rosatom State Corp. The Baltic Plant is experiencing economic problems and is under external management; 90% of its contracts come from Rosatom. United Shipbuilding Corp. hopes that, with Rosatom’s help, the plant will become profitable.

In 2021, the Sverdlov Plant, which produces explosives, sought to be declared bankrupt. At the end of 2022, an order was issued to transfer the plant from the Ministry of Industry and Trade under the control of the state-owned conglomerate Rostec and, accordingly, implement the plant’s corporatization, which can take up to five years.

In addition, 12 plants that repair vehicles and fall under the purview of the company Spetsremont have gone bankrupt. The parent organization has been bankrupt since February 2020. In total, Spetsremont oversees more than 30 repair plants.

In a response to a report on the financial situation at Spetsremont, Rostec noted that around the 2017-2018 time frame, when the process of transferring Spetsremont from the Russian Defence Ministry to Rostec took place, 90% of the holding’s repair plants were experiencing fiscal troubles.

Exhibitors stand next to rifles of Russia's Rostec enterprise at a 2018 defense exhibition on the outskirts of Chennai, India. (Arun Sankar/AFP via Getty Images)

Now the government is creating two new armored car factories in the Moscow and Rostov regions.

Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute think tank, said these investments can work out well for the state.

“New plants are a high investment, but in the end they are more effective producers and immediately able to outcompete the companies” that produce older equipment and are in debt, he told Defense News.

International pressure

Years of sanctions that precede Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022 may have contributed to the current state of Russia’s defense-industrial base.

“Sanctions — also those from before 2022 — may have made the situation worse, especially as they can lead to delays in delivery or the need to find more costly substitutes for the sanctioned parts. This increases costs for contracts where a fixed price was already agreed, or delays payment for contracted goods. Both cost increases need to be covered by the companies from their own pocket,” Wezeman said.

Members of the Committee on Economic Policy and Property within the Legislative Assembly of the Primorye Territory concluded the shipbuilder Vostochnaya Verf was a victim of sanctions. United Shipbuilding Corp. showed interest in buying the plant, but no decision has been made.

Then-Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, front, visits the country's Motovilikha Plants manufacturer in 2016. Currently, the Remdiesel plant — Russia’s newest manufacturer of special, purpose-built equipment — is applying to purchase the Motovilikha Plants holding. (Yekaterina Shtukina/AFP via Getty Images)

Tom Waldwyn, a research associate for defense procurement with the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, told Defense News any additional sanctions on Russian companies will negatively impact both defense and civilian sales in terms of product exports and the import of key subcomponents.

“As Russia also experiences high inflation and a brain drain, the Russian defense industry faces a difficult future despite massive increases in defense spending in 2022 and 2023,” he said.

From 2013 (the year before Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine) to 2022, Russia increased its defense budget by 15% , according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

And from 2021 to 2022, its military spending grew by 9.2% to $86.4 billion — the equivalent of 4.1% of Russia’s gross domestic product, the Swedish think tank reported.

In realizing the need to bolster the production and repair of equipment during the ongoing war, the Russian government has tried to simplify contractual procedures. It has shortened the terms of state orders and improved the process of agreeing to costs and contractual requirements. The state has also taken steps to provide advance payments to defense enterprises.

In addition, banks have started lowering interest rates and increasing the amount of a possible loan for defense companies. In July 2022, the preferential rate was reduced to 3%, and the maximum loan amount was increased to 3 billion rubles.

And on April 1, 2022, a moratorium on bankruptcy was introduced for six months to give businesses additional time to negotiate with creditors and adapt to new circumstances, such as sanctions and the disruption of supply chains. The moratorium was lifted six months later.

Since then, 10 more Russian shipbuilding and naval repair enterprises have received bankruptcy claims from creditors or filed for insolvency themselves. Among them are both small factories and large companies, including Vostochnaya Verf; the Khabarovsk Shipbuilding Plant; and the 10th Labor Ship Repair Plant, a subsidiary of United Shipbuilding Corp.

At the same time, six more shipyards were declared bankrupt and have moved into bankruptcy proceedings.

In September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin amended the criminal code so that the failure to fulfill obligations in defense contracts for the state would result in fines of 1 million rubles to 3 million rubles and/or imprisonment for up to 10 years.

“Under these conditions, declaring bankruptcy can be a way to reduce the risks of prosecution and punishment for [those managing] plants,” according to Pavel Luzin, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank.

“In addition, this is a signal to the government about the need for cash injections,” he told Defense News.

Indeed, government support and increased spending on the Army during the 2022-2023 time frame helped some bankrupt enterprises continue operating.

The Motovilikha Plants holding, part of NPO Splav, was declared bankrupt in 2018. This is the only full-cycle enterprise in Russia that produces multiple-launch rocket systems, and it has its own foundry. The company owes more than 17.6 billion rubles. Some of the holding’s enterprises have been sold off.

But in 2021, it received a defense order from the state worth 40 billion rubles that is to last until 2027. In 2022, the plant delivered to the Army combat vehicles with the Tornado-G and Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket systems. That same year, the plant’s mechanical and assembly production lines increased its shifts to three, and the plant began hiring.

Russian Tornado-S multiple rocket launchers are shown off during a parade through Red Square on May 9, 2022. (Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty Images)

In March 2023, the Perm region’s prosecutor’s office challenged the company’s bankruptcy status. Regional authorities have said they anticipate Rostec and the federal Ministry of Industry and Trade will invest 20 billion rubles to help modernize the plant.

Currently, the Remdiesel plant — Russia’s newest manufacturer of special, purpose-built equipment — is applying to purchase the Motovilikha Plants holding.

“The purchase of this plant is attractive because of the large state defense order,” Ivan Kostin, a former director of Motovilikha, told the Kommersant daily.

Another plant with a state order is the Miass Machine–Building Plant, which produces components for ballistic missiles as well as control equipment for missile systems. It has a debt of 2.38 billion rubles, and was declared bankrupt in 2022. The bankruptcy trustee, Anatoly Selishchev, was going to sell the property, but in May 2023 the creditors refused to sell. As the plant’s management reported, work will increase in 2023, the contracting rate will be 15% higher than in 2022 and the plant will hire new employees.

But the state defense order will not save the business, according to Alexander Abramov, an economist specializing in bankruptcy, who described such contracts as “an obligation” rather than “a lifeline.”

“It is impossible to refuse a defense order contract,” Abramov told Defense News.

Furthermore, if a company does not participate in the development of a product, but only produces it, the business typically won’t received the majority of funds allocated for the technology, according to Sergey Smyslov, an independent defense industry expert and an engineer by trade.

“This became possible due to the fact that, since the Soviet era, many enterprises have [duplicative] capacities. And when [the state had an option] to produce a product at a functioning plant, ‘A,’ or a half-empty plant, ‘B,’ a fully equipped plant was chosen,” Smyslov told Defense News.

After the bankruptcy moratorium ended in October 2022, State Duma Deputy Sergei Mironov petitioned Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and chief military prosecutor Valeri Petrov to help stop insolvency among defense enterprises.

As a result of the petition, Mironov told Defense News, “some of them [defense enterprises] were reorganized — restructured to prevent the closure and termination of production.”

Other deputies of the State Duma — the lower chamber of Russia’s legislature — proposed the assets of bankrupt companies be transferred to enterprises that successfully fulfill state defense orders during military mobilization and wartime.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, meets with Sergei Mironov, head of the political party A Just Russia — Patriots — For Truth, on Feb. 14, 2023. (Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)

“In the execution of [a] defense order, there is a large pyramid of cooperation. Even if small enterprises — or enterprises that are [in the third or fourth tier] of suppliers and only indirectly relate to the state defense order — fall under the bankruptcy procedure, then a huge risk is created for the disruption of the state budget,” Vladimir Gutenev, who leads the Duma Committee on Industry and Trade, warned in October 2022.

The Russian government created a plan to return state-owned enterprises to the private sector during the 2022-2024 time frame. None of the companies under consideration are undergoing bankruptcy proceedings, but most either had claims from creditors for bankruptcy or are financially unstable.

The effort includes more than a dozen defense plants. For example, 20% of shares of the Kartsev Research Institute of Computer Complexes, which develops hardware and software, including the Shershen drone, are for sale by the state.

Also on the list are the Simbirsk Cartridge Factory, the Scientific-Technical Center for Electronic Warfare, the Zvezda electromechanical plant, the Space Communications Co., and several ship repair plants.

Some have already tried selling themselves in whole or in part, but haven’t found buyers. That’s likely because only Russian organizations without foreign shareholders, that have permits to work with classified information and that have licenses to make weapons can purchase the property of defense enterprises. Often buyers need to commit to maintaining production and fulfilling existing state defense contracts.

The government’s plan may backfire, according to Wezeman, who warned any temporary support state-owned enterprises received from the government could help them outperform companies that have had to survive on their own.

“Those companies may in their turn fail,” he said. “However, a level of corruption may also play a role: Orders may go to companies that have ‘friends,’ and those without will have to solve their problems without much support.”

Maxim Starchak is a Russia correspondent for Defense News. He previously worked as an editor for the Russian Defence Ministry and as an expert for the NATO Information Office in Moscow. He has covered Russian nuclear and defense issues for the Atlantic Council, the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Royal United Services Institute and more.

莫斯科——俄罗斯经济并未像一些西方政府和专家预测的那样，在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后萎缩到如此程度。

事实上，根据战略与国际研究中心一年后发布的一份报告，自 2022 年 2 月 24 日以来，旨在向俄罗斯政府施压的 11000 多项新增限制措施“并没有像最初预期的那样造成严重破坏”。

但尽管克里姆林宫有能力无视智库所说的“世界末日预言”，而且政府的国防预算也在不断增长，数十家俄罗斯国防工厂仍在进行破产程序或申请破产保护。一些工厂获得了支持俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的合同，仍在运营，而另一些工厂则已开始出售资产。

莫斯科金融大学经济学家谢尔盖·托尔卡切夫表示：“破产的主要原因之一是国家国防订单的（不一致性）。此外，已完成的国家订单的资金分配也存在不规范的情况。”

例如，假设一家国防工厂为了完成政府订单而采购金属，但今年的成本比去年高出15%。根据政府规定，政府将承担略低于一半的额外成本，而该公司则必须用自有资金支付剩余部分。

对企业而言，更糟糕的是，俄罗斯政府可能会延迟拨款，迫使公司寻求贷款来实时支付成本。提供贷款的银行会审核公司的申请，评估其财务状况，如果认为风险较高，就会设定高利率。

绝望之下，这家国防公司陷入债务泥潭，使这家本已举步维艰的企业雪上加霜。

“这里没有什么可挽救的了。”

俄罗斯国家破产信息登记册列出了数十家国内企业及其债务数据。其中一家是位于符拉迪沃斯托克的海事电子产品生产商Radiopribor工厂，该厂于2018年宣布破产。

Radiopribor公司负债3.982亿卢布（490万美元）。随后，该公司将其生产能力租赁给杜布纳机械制造厂，以完成一项国家国防订单的工作，该订单于2021年结束。

最终，Radiopribor 的主要资产于 2022 年售出——总共 10 块土地。

另一个例子是位于新西伯利亚的西布塞尔马什工厂，这家炮弹生产商于2012年宣布破产，负债超过10亿卢布。2021年，该厂的主要厂房被出售给了梅尔卡斯公司。尽管梅尔卡斯公司承诺保留国防生产线，但最终却在2022年拆除了其车间和建筑物。

2023年5月30日，乌克兰防空部队在24小时内第三次对首都基辅发动的俄罗斯空袭中，拦截了一架“沙赫德”无人机。（Evgeniy Maloletka/AP）

位于圣彼得堡的卡利宁工厂生产保险丝和卫星部件，该工厂于2021年宣布破产。债权人索赔约10.47亿卢布。2023年5月，该工厂曾经拥有的一块土地以3.003亿卢布的价格售出。

根据俄罗斯国家破产信息登记册的数据，目前还有几起破产程序正在进行中。例如，位于莫斯科的Elektropribor工厂，该厂生产导航仪器，负债4200万卢布。

此外，还有波多利斯克机电厂，该厂生产防空和弹道导弹系统的零部件，负债13亿卢布。位于叶卡捷琳堡的无线电设备厂，生产雷达零部件，负债7.41亿卢布。

俄罗斯 Gebel and Partners 律师事务所首席执行官 Sergey Gebel 表示，一些国防工业企业由于多年的停工和债务，已经无法制造武器。

他对《防务新闻》表示，对于这些组织而言，“根本没有什么可以挽救的”。

幸存者（某种程度上）

与此同时，一些企业正试图通过出售全部或部分股权来解决财务困境。例如喀山合成橡胶厂，其产品用于制造海绵，而海绵又用于制造飞机零部件。

2019年，喀山工厂负债53亿卢布，被宣布破产。然而，它很快找到了投资者——工业技术公司，该公司计划到2025年向该工厂投资42亿卢布。目前，该工厂已恢复生产。

生产军舰的联合造船集团提议将其旗下建造水面舰艇的波罗的海造船厂51%的股份转让给俄罗斯国家原子能公司。波罗的海造船厂目前面临经济困境，由外部机构管理；其90%的合同来自俄罗斯国家原子能公司。联合造船集团希望在俄罗斯国家原子能公司的帮助下，该厂能够扭亏为盈。

2021年，生产炸药的斯维尔德洛夫工厂申请破产。2022年底，一项命令下达，将该工厂从工业和贸易部移交给国有企业集团俄罗斯国家技术集团（Rostec），并据此实施工厂的公司化改革，这一过程可能需要长达五年的时间。

此外，隶属于特种部队（Spetsremont）公司的12家车辆维修厂已经破产。其母公司自2020年2月起已处于破产状态。特种部队共管理着30多家维修厂。

针对有关俄罗斯特种部队（Spetsremont）财务状况的报告，俄罗斯国家技术集团（Rostec）指出，在 2017-2018 年期间，俄罗斯国防部将特种部队移交给俄罗斯国家技术集团时，该控股公司 90% 的维修厂都遇到了财务困难。

在印度钦奈郊区举行的2018年防务展上，参展商站在俄罗斯国家技术集团公司（Rostec）的步枪旁。（Arun Sankar/AFP via Getty Images）

现在，政府正在莫斯科州和罗斯托夫州新建两家装甲车工厂。

斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所智库的高级研究员西蒙·韦泽曼表示，这些投资对国家来说可能是有益的。

“新建工厂投资巨大，但最终它们会成为更高效的生产商，并能立即在竞争中胜过那些生产老旧设备且负债累累的公司，”他告诉《防务新闻》。

国际压力

在俄罗斯于 2022 年 2 月对乌克兰发动全面进攻之前，多年的制裁可能造成了俄罗斯国防工业基础目前的困境。

韦泽曼表示：“制裁——包括2022年之前的制裁——可能使情况更加恶化，尤其因为它们会导致交货延迟或需要寻找成本更高的替代品来取代受制裁的零部件。这会增加已约定固定价格的合同成本，或导致合同货物的付款延迟。这两方面的成本增加都需要企业自掏腰包来承担。”

滨海边疆区立法议会经济政策和财产委员会成员认定，东方造船厂是制裁的受害者。联合造船集团曾表示有意收购该厂，但尚未做出决定。

2016年，时任俄罗斯总理德米特里·梅德韦杰夫（前）视察了该国的摩托维利哈工厂。目前，俄罗斯最新的特种设备制造商雷姆柴油厂正在申请收购摩托维利哈工厂控股公司。（图片来源：叶卡捷琳娜·什图金娜/法新社/盖蒂图片社）

总部位于伦敦的国际战略研究所国防采购研究员汤姆·沃尔德温告诉《防务新闻》，对俄罗斯公司的任何额外制裁都将对国防和民用销售产生负面影响，包括产品出口和关键子部件的进口。

“由于俄罗斯也面临高通胀和人才流失，尽管2022年和2023年国防开支大幅增加，但俄罗斯国防工业仍面临着艰难的未来，”他说。

根据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的数据，从 2013 年（俄罗斯吞并乌克兰克里米亚的前一年）到 2022 年，俄罗斯的国防预算增加了 15%。

据瑞典智库报道，从 2021 年到 2022 年，俄罗斯的军费开支增长了 9.2%，达到 864 亿美元，相当于俄罗斯国内生产总值的 4.1%。

鉴于战争期间加强装备生产和维修的必要性，俄罗斯政府试图简化合同程序。它缩短了国家订单的期限，并改进了成本和合同要求的协商流程。此外，国家还采取措施向国防企业预付货款。

此外，银行已开始降低利率并提高国防企业的贷款额度。2022年7月，优惠利率降至3%，最高贷款额度增至30亿卢布。

2022年4月1日，政府实施了为期六个月的破产禁令，以便让企业有更多时间与债权人谈判并适应新的情况，例如制裁和供应链中断。该禁令在六个月后解除。

此后，又有10家俄罗斯造船和船舶修理企业收到债权人的破产索赔或自行申请破产。其中包括小型工厂和大型公司，例如东方造船厂、哈巴罗夫斯克造船厂以及联合造船集团旗下的第十劳动船舶修理厂。

与此同时，又有六家造船厂宣布破产，并已进入破产程序。

2022 年 9 月，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京修改了刑法，规定未能履行国家国防合同义务将处以 100 万卢布至 300 万卢布的罚款和/或最高 10 年的监禁。

“在这种情况下，宣布破产可以降低工厂管理者被起诉和处罚的风险，”欧洲政策分析中心智库高级研究员帕维尔·卢津表示。

“此外，这也向政府发出了一个信号，表明需要注入资金，”他告诉《防务新闻》。

事实上，2022-2023 年期间政府对军队的支持和增加的支出帮助一些破产企业继续运营。

隶属于“斯普拉夫”科研生产联合体（NPO Splav）的“莫托维利哈工厂”控股公司于2018年宣布破产。该公司是俄罗斯唯一一家生产多管火箭炮系统的全流程企业，并拥有自己的铸造厂。该公司负债超过176亿卢布。控股公司旗下的一些企业已被出售。

但2021年，该厂获得了一份价值400亿卢布的国家国防订单，有效期至2027年。2022年，该厂向陆军交付了配备“旋风-G”和“旋风-S”多管火箭炮系统的作战车辆。同年，该厂的机械和装配生产线将班次增加到三班，并开始招聘员工。

2022年5月9日，俄罗斯“旋风-S”多管火箭炮在红场阅兵式上亮相。（Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty Images）

2023年3月，彼尔姆边疆区检察院对该公司的破产状态提出质疑。地方当局表示，他们预计俄罗斯国家技术集团公司（Rostec）和联邦工业和贸易部将投资200亿卢布，用于帮助该工厂进行现代化改造。

目前，俄罗斯最新的特种专用设备制造商 Remdiesel 工厂正在申请收购 Motovilikha Plants 控股公司。

“由于国家国防订单数额巨大，收购这家工厂很有吸引力，” Motovilikha 公司前任总经理伊万·科斯京告诉《生意人报》。

另一家拥有国家订单的工厂是米亚斯机械制造厂，该厂生产弹道导弹部件以及导弹系统的控制设备。该厂负债23.8亿卢布，并于2022年宣布破产。破产管理人阿纳托利·谢利舍夫原本打算出售该厂资产，但债权人在2023年5月拒绝出售。据该厂管理层称，2023年工作量将会增加，合同签订率将比2022年提高15%，并且该厂还将招聘新员工。

但据专门研究破产问题的经济学家亚历山大·阿布拉莫夫 (Alexander Abramov) 称，州政府的辩护令并不能挽救这家企业，他将此类合同描述为“一种义务”，而不是“一条生命线”。

阿布拉莫夫告诉《防务新闻》：“拒绝国防订单合同是不可能的。”

此外，据独立国防工业专家、工程师谢尔盖·斯梅斯洛夫称，如果一家公司不参与产品的开发，而只是生产产品，那么该公司通常不会获得分配给该技术的大部分资金。

斯梅斯洛夫告诉《防务新闻》：“这之所以成为可能，是因为自苏联时代以来，许多企业都拥有（重复的）产能。当（国家可以选择）在运转良好的工厂‘A’或半闲置的工厂‘B’生产某种产品时，就会选择设备齐全的工厂。”

2022 年 10 月破产禁令结束后，国家杜马议员谢尔盖·米罗诺夫向总理米哈伊尔·米舒斯京和首席军事检察官瓦列里·彼得罗夫请愿，请求帮助阻止国防企业破产。

米罗诺夫告诉《防务新闻》，由于这份请愿书，“其中一些（国防企业）进行了重组——进行了结构调整，以防止关闭和停止生产。”

俄罗斯国家杜马（俄罗斯立法机构下议院）的其他代表提议，将破产公司的资产转移给在军事动员和战时成功履行国家国防订单的企业。

2023年2月14日，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京（左）会见了“公正俄罗斯——爱国者——追求真理”党主席谢尔盖·米罗诺夫。（图片来源：Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images）

“在执行国防订单的过程中，存在着一个庞大的合作金字塔。即使是小型企业——或者那些处于供应商第三或第四层级、仅与国家国防订单间接相关的企业——陷入破产程序，也会给国家预算带来巨大的混乱风险，”国家杜马工业和贸易委员会主席弗拉基米尔·古捷涅夫在2022年10月警告说。

俄罗斯政府制定了一项计划，拟在2022年至2024年期间将国有企业重新私有化。目前，所有被考虑的公司均未进入破产程序，但大多数公司要么面临债权人提出的破产索赔，要么财务状况不稳定。

这项计划涉及十几家国防企业。例如，卡尔采夫计算机综合体研究所（该研究所研发包括“舍尔申”无人机在内的硬件和软件）20%的股份由国家出售。

名单上还有辛比尔斯克弹药厂、电子战科学技术中心、星辰机电厂、空间通信公司和几家船舶修理厂。

一些企业已经尝试出售全部或部分资产，但尚未找到买家。这很可能是因为只有没有外国股东、拥有处理机密信息许可和武器制造许可证的俄罗斯组织才能购买国防企业的资产。买家通常需要承诺维持生产并履行现有的国家国防合同。

韦泽曼认为，政府的计划可能会适得其反。他警告说，政府给予国有企业的任何临时支持都可能帮助它们超越那些不得不自力更生的公司。

“这些公司最终也可能倒闭，”他说。“然而，腐败也可能起到一定作用：订单可能会流向那些有‘关系’的公司，而那些没有‘关系’的公司则不得不独自解决问题，得不到多少支持。”

马克西姆·斯塔恰克是《防务新闻》的俄罗斯特派记者。他曾任俄罗斯国防部编辑，也曾担任北约驻莫斯科新闻办公室专家。他还曾为大西洋理事会、欧洲政策分析中心、皇家联合军种研究所等机构报道俄罗斯核问题和国防问题。