Opinion: The ministerial price of bringing Kla Tham into government

If Thammanat’s Kla Tham Party joins Anutin’s government, the invitation will come from Bhumjaithai. Bhumjaithai would therefore most likely surrender some of its ministerial posts to accommodate Kla Tham’s nominees and avoid upsetting Pheu Thai. The aim would be to strengthen the coalition, not create another dispute within it.

That would require setting aside earlier grievances. Kla Tham’s initial exclusion followed a dispute over constituencies it had reportedly agreed not to contest against Bhumjaithai, alongside disagreements over ministerial demands. Bringing it back would mean deciding that its 58 MPs now offer enough political value to overcome those differences.

There is already a basis for cooperation. Kla Tham backed the fiscal 2027 budget, which passed its final House reading on September 10 by 338 votes to 144. Its break with the opposition’s position prompted its removal from the opposition whip committee. Formal entry into the coalition would increase the government’s reported strength from 292 MPs to 350, providing a larger cushion before the coming censure debate.

Turning that support into a cabinet agreement would be more difficult. If Varawut Silpa-archa loses the industry portfolio, Bhumjaithai would have a strong incentive to offer him another ministerial position rather than alienate his sizeable faction. Surasak Phancharoenworakul could similarly be moved from tourism and sports. But finding alternative posts for displaced ministers would raise another question: is the reshuffle intended to improve government performance or merely satisfy its political partners?

Surasak Phancharoenworakul

Surasak’s record deserves scrutiny in that context. The proposed foreign tourist entry fee has risen from 300 to 450 baht, while the government has cut the standard visa-free stay from 60 to 30 days for visitors from 60 countries and territories. Previously, visitors under the 60-day scheme could apply for a further 30-day extension, allowing a total stay of up to 90 days. The government argues that tighter entry rules address abuse and that the fee would fund tourism improvements. Yet additional costs and shorter stays also risk discouraging visitors. Airlines have resisted collecting the levy, and concerns have been raised about its effect on price-sensitive travellers. Moving Surasak elsewhere would not resolve those policy questions.

For Pheu Thai, meanwhile, Kla Tham’s entry would matter even if its ministerial quota remained intact. Based on the reported totals, a coalition with Kla Tham but without Pheu Thai’s 74 MPs would still command 276 seats. That calculation assumes the other partners remain, but it illustrates how Pheu Thai could become less essential to the government’s survival—and lose bargaining power as a result.

The EC’s decision in the alleged 2024 Senate selection collusion case creates a different dynamic. By declining to pursue Bhumjaithai ministers and executives, it eased an immediate legal threat to the governing party. It also gives Pheu Thai more room to remain in the coalition. Having defended the investigation undertaken while it led the government, Pheu Thai can argue that it fulfilled its responsibilities and must leave the outcome to the legal process. That may ease pressure to withdraw over the allegations, even if doubts persist. Pheu Thai could therefore face less pressure to leave while having less influence if it stays.

These calculations should not crowd out scrutiny of how ministers are chosen. The appointments of Sabida and Jeseth Thaiseth, Pattana Promphat and Chaichanok Chidchob have fuelled “nepo baby cabinet” criticism because of their connections to powerful political families. Family ties do not prove incompetence, but an influential surname should not substitute for suitability for office. Any deal with Kla Tham should strengthen the government’s ability to govern, rather than simply redistribute posts among political networks.

That distinction matters as the government faces criticism over delayed flood warnings and ineffective relief. Anutin said on September 30 that he was not considering a reshuffle or inviting Kla Tham, saying flood relief took priority. Yet the opposition’s planned October censure motion gives Bhumjaithai a reason to seek parliamentary insurance. How Kla Tham votes will show whether its budget support extends to keeping the government in office.

A larger majority could protect Anutin in Parliament. The ministerial price of securing it should nevertheless be judged against what the public receives in return. Recycling ministers and accommodating factions cannot replace competent flood management, effective tourism policies or credible answers to allegations.

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如果塔玛纳的克拉探党加入阿努廷的政府，邀请将来自泰自豪党。因此，泰自豪党很可能会放弃部分部长职位，以接纳克拉探党的提名人选，并避免激怒为泰党。此举旨在加强执政联盟，而非在联盟内部制造新的纷争。

这需要搁置之前的恩怨。克拉坦党最初被排除在外，是因为双方就其据称已同意不与泰自豪党竞争的选区以及部长人选要求存在争议。如果克拉坦党重返议会，则意味着该党58名议员如今拥有足够的政治价值来弥合这些分歧。

双方已具备合作基础。克拉谭党支持2027财年预算案，该预算案于9月10日以338票赞成、144票反对在国会最终审议中获得通过。由于其与反对党立场相左，该党被逐出反对党党鞭委员会。正式加入联合政府将使政府议员人数从292人增至350人，从而在即将到来的不信任投票前获得更大的缓冲空间。

将这种支持转化为内阁协议则更为困难。如果瓦拉武特·西尔帕阿查失去工业部长一职，泰自豪党将有强烈的动机为他提供另一个部长职位，而不是疏远他庞大的派系。苏拉萨·潘查伦沃拉库尔也可能从旅游和体育部长职位调离。但为这些被调离的部长寻找替代职位会引发另一个问题：此次改组的目的是为了提升政府绩效，还是仅仅为了安抚其政治伙伴？

苏拉萨克·潘查伦沃拉库尔

在此背景下，苏拉萨克的记录值得仔细审视。拟议的外国游客入境费已从300泰铢上涨至450泰铢，同时政府将来自60个国家和地区的游客的标准免签停留时间从60天缩短至30天。此前，享受60天免签政策的游客可以申请再延长30天，总停留时间最长可达90天。政府辩称，更严格的入境规定可以遏制滥用行为，并且征收的费用将用于改善旅游业。然而，额外的费用和更短的停留时间也可能导致游客减少。航空公司一直拒绝收取这项费用，人们也担心这会对价格敏感型旅客造成影响。将苏拉萨克迁至他处并不能解决这些政策问题。

与此同时，对为泰党而言，即便其部长席位保持不变，克拉探党的加入也至关重要。根据已公布的席位总数，即使剔除为泰党的74名议员，与克拉探党组成的联合政府仍将拥有276个席位。这一计算的前提是其他联盟伙伴保持不变，但也表明为泰党对政府生存的重要性可能会降低，并因此失去谈判筹码。

选举委员会在2024年参议院选举涉嫌串谋案中的决定，造成了不同的局面。通过拒绝追究泰自豪党部长和高管的责任，选举委员会减轻了执政党面临的直接法律威胁。这也让为泰党有更多空间留在执政联盟中。为泰党在执政期间曾为相关调查进行辩护，因此可以辩称其已履行职责，必须将结果交由法律程序裁决。即使疑虑依然存在，这或许也能减轻因这些指控而退出执政联盟的压力。因此，如果为泰党继续留在执政联盟，其面临的退出压力可能会较小，但影响力也会有所下降。

这些考量不应掩盖对部长遴选过程的审查。萨比达·泰塞特、杰塞特·泰塞特、帕塔纳·普罗姆帕特和柴查诺·奇乔布的任命，因其与权势显赫的政治家族关系密切，引发了“裙带关系内阁”的批评。家族关系并非能力不足的证明，但显赫的姓氏不应取代胜任公职的能力。与克拉·塔姆达成的任何协议都应着眼于提升政府的执政能力，而非仅仅在政治网络间重新分配职位。

这一区别至关重要，因为政府正因洪水预警延迟和救灾不力而面临批评。阿努廷9月30日表示，他目前没有考虑改组内阁或邀请克拉·塔姆，称救灾是当务之急。然而，反对党计划在10月提出的不信任动议，让泰自豪党有理由寻求议会支持。克拉·塔姆的投票将表明，其对预算的支持是否足以维持政府的执政。

更大的多数席位或许能保住阿努廷在议会的席位。然而，为确保这一席位而付出的部长级代价，应当与公众从中获得的利益进行权衡。频繁更换部长和迁就各派系，都无法取代有效的防洪措施、高效的旅游政策或对指控的可信回应。

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