After Pretoria peace deal, old enemies in Ethiopia’s Tigray find new ground

The 2022 peace deal ended the war but left key disputes unresolved, giving the TPLF room to regroup as tensions return.

Ethiopia’s 2022 Pretoria Agreement ended the Tigray war but left key political, territorial and security disputes unresolved, allowing the TPLF to regroup and reposition as tensions have resurfaced [Ben Curtis/AP] (AP)

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – When Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022, it was meant to end two years of devastating war.

The agreement called for a permanent cessation of hostilities, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Tigrayan forces, political dialogue and the return of displaced people. Article 7 also required the TPLF to refrain from conscription, training, deployment and mobilisation of military forces, as well as preparations for renewed conflict.

Nearly four years later, the large-scale war has ended, but many of the disputes that fuelled it remain unresolved.

More significantly, the period since 2024 has seen the TPLF reposition itself politically and organisationally while retaining military leverage and developing new relationships.

The sequence is striking: TPLF contacts with Eritrean officials, including reported meetings in Dubai and Zalambessa; a renewed struggle over political control in Tigray; reports of recruitment and mobilisation; new clashes involving Tigrayan forces; and the emergence of Tsimdo, a loose convergence of groups opposed to the federal government.

Taken together, the developments raise a question over whether Pretoria became less a completed transition to peace than a period in which the TPLF could regroup and reposition itself while the underlying conflict remained unresolved.

There is no evidence that the TPLF entered the agreement with a predetermined plan to use it as a tactical pause. But the events since 2024 suggest that the movement has retained an organisational and security role that Pretoria was supposed to diminish.

What happened to disarmament?

Article 6 established the process for disarming, demobilising and reintegrating TPLF fighters. Tigrayan forces handed over heavy weapons after the agreement, and thousands of former combatants have entered demobilisation programmes.

But the process did not fully dismantle the region’s military structures.

In 2026, reports emerged of renewed recruitment and forced mobilisation in Tigray. If confirmed, such activity would go beyond the incomplete implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process and directly challenge Article 7’s ban on conscription and mobilisation.

The distinction between organised mobilisation and the views of Tigray’s civilian population is important.

There is no basis for assuming that Tigrayans as a whole support a return to war. Many are still living with the consequences of the last conflict.

The Pretoria peace deal ended Ethiopia’s Tigray war but left political and territorial disputes unresolved, as the TPLF has sought to reassert its influence and build new strategic relationships [Getty Images] (Getty)

A civilian source in Tigray, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said: “The people of Tigray want peace; we don’t want a second war.”

For those civilians, reports of recruitment carry a simple implication: the possibility of being pulled back into a conflict they believed had ended.

How did the TPLF reposition itself?

The change was not only in the military.

From 2024, the TPLF was increasingly consumed by an internal struggle over its direction after the war. The internal meetings and political manoeuvring formed part of a wider contest over the movement’s future.

The struggle eventually reached Tigray’s political institutions.

Getachew Reda was removed as head of the interim administration in 2025 and replaced by Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede.

Then, in May 2026, the Tigray regional council was reinstated and elected Debretsion Gebremichael as president, strengthening the position of the faction around him.

The developments showed that the TPLF remained a powerful political force in Tigray. Instead of a settled post-war political order emerging, the region was again caught in a struggle over authority while the security question remained unresolved.

When did politics turn back into fighting?

By early 2026, political tensions were accompanied by military developments.

Tigray Defence Forces-aligned troops crossed the Tekeze River into the disputed Tselemt district in January and clashed with Ethiopian federal forces. Later, TDF-aligned fighters took control of Alamata and Korem after a federal command post withdrew.

By August, fighting had again broken out in western Tigray near the Sudanese border, in another serious breach of the peace agreement.

The federal government and the TPLF blamed each other for the escalation, while responsibility for initiating the clashes remained disputed.

But the renewed fighting demonstrated that organised armed forces were still capable of mobilising and contesting territory.

The incomplete disarmament has therefore become more consequential as the political disputes left unresolved by Pretoria have begun to coincide with renewed military activity.

Why are former enemies finding common ground?

The repositioning has extended beyond Tigray.

Eritrea and the TPLF fought a devastating border war from 1998 to 2000. Eritrean forces later fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal government against the TPLF during the 2020-22 Tigray war.

Yet the post-Pretoria period has brought reports of closer contacts between Eritrea and elements of the TPLF.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting the TPLF and using it as a proxy. Eritrea rejects that characterisation.

A broader realignment is reflected in the emergence of Tsimdo, a loose convergence of groups opposed to the federal government.

Recent reporting has identified cooperation involving the TPLF, Fano, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and other armed groups. Fano leader Zemene Kassie has confirmed the existence of such a coalition while saying Eritrea is not currently part of it.

The significance of Tsimdo lies not simply in whether its members share the same political programme, but in what they appear willing to put aside to cooperate.

Major disputes remain unresolved: displaced people have yet to return to some contested areas, including Welkait, while territorial claims continue to divide Tigray and Amhara actors.

Yet groups that once fought on opposing sides now appear willing to set aside some of those differences when cooperation can increase pressure on the federal government.

Ethiopia’s Tigray region remains caught between an unfinished peace process and renewed political and military tensions nearly four years after the Pretoria agreement ended the war [Yasuyoshi Chiba / AFP]

That raises a further question about the TPLF’s post-Pretoria strategy. The organisation appears to be rebuilding its political influence while retaining links to military structures, even as many Tigrayans remain displaced and fear renewed mobilisation.

The emerging convergence points to a potentially widening gap between the strategic calculations of political and armed actors and the immediate interests of civilians still dealing with the consequences of war.

The groups have different histories and political ambitions, and their cooperation may not last. But their willingness to find common ground against Addis Ababa matters.

For the TPLF, Tsimdo offers another arena in which to build political and strategic relationships beyond Tigray.

What did Pretoria leave unresolved?

The war displaced about 1.9 million people. Many remain unable to return, particularly to disputed areas including Welkait, Tsegede, Humera and Raya.

Those territorial disputes remain closely tied to the return of displaced Tigrayans, while the political relationship between Tigray and the federal government remains unsettled.

The federal government has also failed to deliver on important elements of the post-war settlement. But those failures do not erase the TPLF’s commitments under Pretoria.

Article 6 envisaged the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of its fighters. Article 7 banned conscription, mobilisation and preparations for renewed conflict.

The record since 2024 does not prove that Pretoria was deliberately used by the TPLF to buy time.

It does, however, show a movement that has remained politically organised, fought to regain control of Tigray’s institutions, retained links to armed structures and found new potential partners as the settlement stalled.

Pretoria ended the large-scale war. It did not settle the struggle over power, territory and security that lay beneath it.

For Tigrayans, however, the calculations are simpler.

A young man from Tigray, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said: “The fear of being drafted is what’s making many youth lose hope.”

2022 年的和平协议结束了战争，但留下了一些关键的争端尚未解决，这给了提格雷人民解放阵线 (TPLF) 在紧张局势再次出现时重新集结的空间。

2022 年埃塞俄比亚比勒陀利亚协议结束了提格雷战争，但关键的政治、领土和安全争端仍未得到解决，这使得提格雷人民解放阵线得以重整旗鼓，并在紧张局势再次出现时重新部署。[本·柯蒂斯/美联社] (美联社)

埃塞俄比亚亚的斯亚贝巴——2022 年 11 月，埃塞俄比亚联邦政府和提格雷人民解放阵线 (TPLF) 签署了《比勒陀利亚协议》，旨在结束长达两年的毁灭性战争。

该协议要求永久停止敌对行动，提格雷武装力量解除武装、复员和重返社会，开展政治对话，并让流离失所者返回家园。第七条还要求提格雷人民解放阵线停止征兵、训练、部署和动员军队，以及停止为再次发生冲突做准备。

近四年过去了，这场大规模战争已经结束，但引发战争的许多争端仍然没有得到解决。

更重要的是，自 2024 年以来，提格雷人民解放阵线在政治和组织上进行了重新定位，同时保持了军事影响力并发展了新的关系。

这一过程令人瞩目：提格雷人民解放阵线与厄立特里亚官员接触，据报道在迪拜和扎兰贝萨举行了会晤；提格雷地区重新爆发了政治控制权争夺战；有报道称提格雷人民解放阵线正在招募和动员人员；提格雷武装力量卷入了新的冲突；以及反对联邦政府的松散团体联盟“齐姆多”的出现。

综合来看，这些事态发展引发了一个问题：比勒陀利亚与其说是向和平过渡的完成，不如说是提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）重整旗鼓、重新定位自身，而根本冲突仍未解决的时期。

没有证据表明提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）在签署协议时就已预先计划将其用作战术性休战。但自2024年以来的事态发展表明，该组织仍然保持着比勒陀利亚方面本应削弱的组织和安全作用。

裁军进程怎么了？

第六条规定了解除提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）武装人员武装、复员和重返社会的程序。协议达成后，提格雷部队移交了重型武器，数千名前战斗人员参加了复员计划。

但这一过程并未彻底瓦解该地区的军事结构。

2026年，有报道称提格雷州再次出现征兵和强制动员的迹象。如果属实，这种行为不仅超出了解除武装、复员和重返社会（DDR）进程尚未完全落实的范畴，而且直接挑战了《欧洲人权公约》第七条关于禁止征兵和动员的规定。

区分有组织的动员和提格雷平民的观点非常重要。

没有理由假设提格雷人整体上支持重燃战火。许多人至今仍在承受上次冲突的后果。

比勒陀利亚和平协议结束了埃塞俄比亚的提格雷战争，但政治和领土争端仍未解决，因为提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）一直在寻求重新确立其影响力并建立新的战略关系。[Getty Images]（Getty）

一位不愿透露姓名的提格雷平民消息人士告诉半岛电视台：“提格雷人民渴望和平；我们不希望再次发生战争。”

对于这些平民来说，有关征兵的报道意味着一件事：他们有可能被重新卷入一场他们认为已经结束的冲突中。

提格雷人民解放阵线是如何重新定位自身的？

这种变化不仅仅发生在军队。

自2024年起，提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）日益陷入战后发展方向的内部斗争。这些内部会议和政治角力，构成了围绕该运动未来走向的更广泛斗争的一部分。

这场斗争最终波及到了提格雷的政治机构。

2025 年，格塔丘·雷达被免去临时行政长官职务，由塔德塞·韦雷德中将接任。

然后，在 2026 年 5 月，提格雷地区委员会恢复运作，并选举德布雷齐翁·格布雷米凯尔为主席，从而加强了他周围派系的地位。

事态发展表明，提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）在提格雷地区仍然是一支强大的政治力量。战后，该地区并未形成稳定的政治秩序，而是再次陷入权力斗争，安全问题依然悬而未决。

政治何时又变回了战争？

到 2026 年初，政治紧张局势伴随着军事发展。

今年1月，提格雷国防军的部队越过特克泽河进入有争议的特塞莱姆特地区，并与埃塞俄比亚联邦军队发生冲突。随后，在联邦指挥部撤离后，提格雷国防军控制了阿拉马塔和科雷姆两地。

到 8 月，提格雷西部靠近苏丹边境的地区再次爆发战斗，这是和平协议的又一次严重违约。

联邦政府和提格雷人民解放阵线互相指责对方导致局势升级，而冲突的起因仍存在争议。

但重新爆发的战斗表明，有组织的武装力量仍然能够动员起来并争夺领土。

因此，不完全裁军的后果变得更加严重，因为比勒陀利亚方面遗留的政治争端开始与军事活动的复苏同时发生。

为什么昔日的敌人如今找到了共同点？

重新部署的范围已经扩展到提格雷以外。

厄立特里亚和提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）在 1998 年至 2000 年期间爆发了一场毁灭性的边境战争。后来，在 2020-2022 年的提格雷战争期间，厄立特里亚军队与埃塞俄比亚联邦政府并肩作战，对抗提格雷人民解放阵线。

然而，比勒陀利亚会议之后，有报道称厄立特里亚与提格雷人民解放阵线的部分成员之间联系更加密切。

埃塞俄比亚指责厄立特里亚支持提格雷人民解放阵线（提人阵）并将其作为代理人。厄立特里亚否认了这一指控。

更广泛的重组体现在 Tsimdo 的出现上，Tsimdo 是反对联邦政府的各个团体的松散联盟。

近期报道指出，提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）、法诺、奥罗莫解放军（OLA）及其他武装团体之间存在合作。法诺领导人泽梅内·卡西证实了这一联盟的存在，但表示厄立特里亚目前并未加入其中。

Tsimdo 的意义不仅在于其成员是否拥有相同的政治纲领，还在于他们为了合作愿意放弃什么。

主要争端仍未解决：流离失所者尚未返回一些争议地区，包括韦尔凯特，而领土主张继续使提格雷和阿姆哈拉各方势力分裂。

然而，曾经在对立面交战的团体现在似乎愿意搁置一些分歧，因为合作可以加大对联邦政府的压力。

尽管比勒陀利亚协议结束了战争，但近四年过去了，埃塞俄比亚的提格雷地区仍然处于未完成的和平进程和再次出现的政治和军事紧张局势之中。[Yasuyoshi Chiba / AFP]

这引发了关于提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）在比勒陀利亚会议后的战略的另一个问题。该组织似乎正在重建其政治影响力，同时又与军事机构保持联系，尽管许多提格雷人仍然流离失所，并担心再次发生动员。

这种正在形成的趋同趋势表明，政治和武装行为体的战略考量与仍在应对战争后果的平民的直接利益之间可能存在越来越大的差距。

这些团体有着不同的历史和政治抱负，他们的合作未必能够长久。但他们愿意寻求共同立场来对抗亚的斯亚贝巴，这一点至关重要。

对于提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）而言，齐姆多提供了另一个在提格雷以外建立政治和战略关系的舞台。

比勒陀利亚留下了哪些未解决的问题？

战争导致约190万人流离失所。许多人至今仍无法返回家园，特别是包括韦尔凯特、特塞格德、胡梅拉和拉亚在内的争议地区。

这些领土争端仍然与流离失所的提格雷人的回归密切相关，而提格雷与联邦政府之间的政治关系仍然悬而未决。

联邦政府也未能履行战后协议中的一些重要条款。但这些失误并不能抹杀提格雷人民解放阵线在比勒陀利亚时期所作出的承诺。

第六条设想解除其战斗人员的武装、复员和重新融入社会。第七条禁止征兵、动员和为再次发生冲突做准备。

2024 年以来的记录并不能证明提格雷人民解放阵线故意利用比勒陀利亚来争取时间。

然而，这确实表明，这场运动在政治上仍然保持着组织性，为重新控制提格雷的机构而奋斗，与武装组织保持着联系，并在和解陷入僵局时找到了新的潜在合作伙伴。

比勒陀利亚会议结束了这场大规模战争，但并未解决战争背后隐藏的权力、领土和安全之争。

但对于提格雷人来说，计算就简单多了。

一位来自提格雷的年轻人匿名接受半岛电视台采访时表示：“害怕被征召入伍让许多年轻人失去了希望。”