Yemen’s government is on the attack against the Houthis. What has changed?

Yemeni forces are trying to reverse Houthi gains, aided by heavier air power and renewed international support.

A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon during what government forces say was an advance against the Iran-backed Houthis, near Dhubab, Taiz governorate, Yemen, October 5, 2026 [Giants Brigades/Handout via Reuters]

Yemen’s internationally recognised government wants to show that it has finally taken the initiative against the Houthis in the country’s long-running war.

The announcement of Operation Dawn of Yemen on Monday to restore state authority across the country was quickly followed by a military offensive on the southern Red Sea coast.

list 1 of 3 What would it take for the Yemen offensive to succeed?

list 2 of 3 Saudi Arabia says East-West pipeline pumping 5.8 million bpd

list 3 of 3 Pakistan, Turkiye join Saudi deterrence against Houthis: What that means

The initial aim is to reverse gains made by the Houthis last month, when the Iranian-backed group took control of one of the world’s most important waterways, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait . But the ultimate goal of the operation is to retake the areas of the country held by the Houthis for more than a decade, including the capital, Sanaa, which they seized by force in 2014 and later imposed their own government.

It is a lofty ambition, and the achievements so far have been modest – most notably a limited advance into areas near Bab al-Mandeb.

Still, the attacks indicate that the Saudi-backed Yemeni government operation is being conducted in a more organised manner – particularly notable after last month’s capitulation and loss of the Red Sea coast to the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (Arabic for Supporters of God).

The main issues faced by government forces in early September included a lack of cohesiveness among the groups fighting against the Houthis and a lack of military preparedness, as well as what analysts have described as Houthi infiltration of government forces’ communications.

It is too early to say whether those problems have been resolved, but the inability of the Houthis to secure the highlands overlooking the areas they conquered in the southern Red Sea has left them vulnerable to a counteroffensive.

There are a number of other factors that, when taken together, suggest the government’s shift to the attack may bring about more success than it has enjoyed since fighting resumed in Yemen in July, ending a fragile truce that had been in place since 2022.

Most notable has been the involvement of Saudi Arabia, which is providing heavy aerial support. On Monday, the Saudi-led coalition supporting the Yemeni government said that 100 fighter jets had participated in the offensive, its first acknowledgment in four years – since a 2022 truce – that it had resumed air attacks against the Houthis, despite reports of strikes in September.

The air strikes have aided government forces attacking the Houthis on multiple fronts aside from the Red Sea coast, including Taiz, Marib and al-Jawf.

Maged al-Madhaji, chairman of the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, told Al Jazeera that the “rate and accuracy of the air strikes” was higher than it had previously been, even compared with the start of the Saudi-led coalition’s anti-Houthi bombing campaign in 2015.

Coupled with intelligence from the United States, the strikes were more efficient and coordinated with ground forces. A US official told Al Jazeera on Monday that 200 US advisers were stationed in Saudi Arabia in support of the campaign.

Elias Hanna, a retired Lebanese general, said the coordination revealed a unified command structure that was vital to military success.

“[There is] a central leadership managing operations and coordination between the ground forces and the air forces,” he told Al Jazeera on Monday. “The air force attacks, but ground forces then have to occupy the territory, remain there, and control it.”

The US expertise, Hanna added, essentially provided an “intelligence bank” of targets that would be able to repeatedly attack Houthi positions.

Another factor that has so far set the government offensive apart from the fighting in early September has been the prominent role taken by the Giants Brigades.

Previously trained by the United Arab Emirates and now backed by Saudi Arabia, the force had been present during the losses to the Houthis in the Red Sea, but in smaller numbers. This time it has been leading the battle in the area and in Taiz’s al-Waziyah district, which overlooks the port city of Mocha.

The Giants Brigades previously defeated the Houthis in Shabwah in 2022 and drove them out of the southeastern coastal governorate, as well as parts of Marib and al-Bayda east of Sanaa.

“They are the most experienced with the Houthis’ fighting methods,” said al-Madhaji, “because they are the force that has engaged them the most across different theatres of operations – some on flat terrain and some mountainous .”

“In practice, this is the first time we have seen Saudi operational management, together with forces that had been under Emirati management, produce effective results,” added al-Madhaji. “That suggests the operations room has become unified and that operational coordination between the different sides has become more effective.”

International support

Less attention has been paid to the fighting in Marib and al-Jawf, two largely desert governorates east of Sanaa, but government forces have also claimed advances there.

Developments there could prove crucial to what the government has said is its ultimate aim: the recapture of Sanaa, held by the Houthis since 2014. Increased coordination between ground forces, air power and intelligence gathering is the only way a multi-pronged assault towards the capital could be managed, although that still appears to be distant.

The Houthis themselves cannot be discounted. Their forces have so far held firm and regrouped after the losses on Monday in the southwestern town of Dhubab on the Red Sea, and continue to advance towards the government-held city of Taiz, one of the country’s most important centres.

Morale on the government side is fragile – more setbacks, particularly in Taiz, would change the narrative once again.

The Houthis also have strong missile and drone capabilities – strengthened over the past four years – and have already increased their attacks on government forces as well as Saudi Arabia. Forcing them out of territory they have recently claimed is difficult, but forcing them out of territory they have held for years – like the major port city of Hodeidah – will be even harder.

Yet unlike in previous escalations of the conflict, the government and Saudi Arabia have stronger international backing.

The Houthis can attack Red Sea shipping to demonstrate the damage they can inflict if attacked, but that also highlights the dangers of allowing the group to retain control in the region, particularly as Iran conducts a similar policy on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, in the Strait of Hormuz.

The United Kingdom has already said it will provide defensive support to Saudi Arabia, and on Monday the kingdom’s mutual-defence pact with Turkiye and Pakistan was also activated . Ankara has not confirmed any troop deployments, but Islamabad has said that it was involved in support roles, including “reconnaissance”.

That international support may prove vital – both diplomatically and militarily – to the success of the anti-Houthi operation, one that is likely to drag on for many months.

在更强大的空中力量和重新获得的国际支持的帮助下，也门军队正试图扭转胡塞武装取得的战果。

2026年10月5日，在也门塔伊兹省杜巴布附近，一名也门政府军战士使用车载武器射击，政府军称这是对伊朗支持的胡塞武装的一次进攻。[巨人旅/路透社供图]

也门国际公认的政府希望表明，在该国旷日持久的战争中，它终于对胡塞武装掌握了主动权。

周一宣布启动“也门黎明行动”，旨在恢复也门全国的政权，随后迅速在红海南部沿岸发动了军事进攻。

列表 1/3：也门攻势要想成功需要哪些条件？

沙特阿拉伯称，东西输油管道日输油量为580万桶（共3条记录中的第2条）。

巴基斯坦和土耳其加入沙特打击胡塞武装的行列（共3份名单，此为第3份）：这意味着什么？

此次行动的初步目标是扭转胡塞武装上个月取得的进展。当时，这个由伊朗支持的组织控制了世界上最重要的水道之一——曼德海峡。但行动的最终目标是夺回胡塞武装占领十多年的地区，包括首都萨那。胡塞武装于2014年武力夺取萨那，并随后在那里建立了自己的政府。

这是一个远大的目标，但迄今为止取得的成就却很有限——最显著的进展是在曼德海峡附近地区取得的有限进展。

不过，这些袭击表明，沙特支持的也门政府的行动正在以更有组织的方式进行——尤其是在上个月向胡塞武装（又称安萨尔真主，阿拉伯语意为“真主的支持者”）投降并失去红海沿岸之后，这一点尤为值得注意。

9月初，政府军面临的主要问题包括：与胡塞武装作战的各派系之间缺乏凝聚力，军事准备不足，以及分析人士所说的胡塞武装对政府军通信的渗透。

现在断言这些问题是否已经解决还为时过早，但胡塞武装无法控制俯瞰他们在红海南部征服地区的高地，这使得他们很容易受到反攻。

还有许多其他因素综合起来表明，政府转向进攻可能会比自 7 月也门战事重燃以来取得的成功更多，也门战事结束了自 2022 年以来一直存在的脆弱停火。

最引人注目的是沙特阿拉伯的介入，沙特提供了强大的空中支援。周一，支持也门政府的沙特领导的联军表示，有100架战斗机参与了此次攻势。这是自2022年停火以来，该联军四年来首次承认恢复对胡塞武装的空袭，尽管此前有报道称9月份也曾发生过空袭。

除了红海沿岸地区外，空袭还帮助政府军在包括塔伊兹、马里卜和焦夫在内的多个战线上攻击胡塞武装。

萨那战略研究中心主席马吉德·马德哈吉告诉半岛电视台，“空袭的频率和准确性”比以前更高，甚至比沙特领导的联军在 2015 年开始对胡塞武装进行轰炸行动时还要高。

结合美国的情报，空袭行动更加高效，并与地面部队协调一致。一位美国官员周一告诉半岛电视台，有200名美国顾问驻扎在沙特阿拉伯，为此次军事行动提供支持。

黎巴嫩退役将军埃利亚斯·汉纳表示，这种协调展现了统一的指挥结构，这对军事胜利至关重要。

他周一告诉半岛电视台：“有一个中央领导机构负责管理地面部队和空军之间的行动和协调。空军负责进攻，但地面部队随后必须占领该区域，驻守并控制该区域。”

汉纳补充说，美国的专业技术实际上提供了一个“情报库”，其中包含可以反复攻击胡塞武装阵地的目标。

迄今为止，政府军的攻势与 9 月初的战斗相比，另一个显著的不同之处在于巨人旅发挥了重要作用。

这支部队此前由阿联酋训练，现由沙特阿拉伯支持。在红海地区与胡塞武装交战的失利中，他们也曾参与其中，但人数较少。这一次，他们主导了该地区以及塔伊兹省瓦齐亚区（俯瞰摩卡港）的战斗。

巨人旅此前曾在 2022 年于舍卜沃击败胡塞武装，并将他们赶出了东南部沿海省份，以及萨那以东的马里卜和贝达的部分地区。

“他们对胡塞武装的作战方式最有经验，”马德哈吉说，“因为他们是在不同的作战区域——有些是平原地区，有些是山区——与胡塞武装交战次数最多的部队。”

“实际上，这是我们第一次看到沙特作战指挥部门与之前由阿联酋指挥的部队合作，取得有效成果，”马德哈吉补充道。“这表明作战指挥中心已经统一，各方之间的作战协调也变得更加有效。”

国际支持

人们对马里卜和焦夫这两个位于萨那以东、以沙漠为主的省份的战斗关注较少，但政府军也声称在那里取得了进展。

那里的事态发展可能对政府所说的最终目标至关重要：夺回自 2014 年以来一直被胡塞武装占领的萨那。加强地面部队、空军和情报收集之间的协调是管理向首都发起多管齐下进攻的唯一途径，尽管这似乎仍然遥遥无期。

胡塞武装本身也不容小觑。他们的部队在周一于红海沿岸西南部城镇杜巴布遭受损失后，迄今为止已坚守阵地并重整旗鼓，继续向政府控制的城市塔伊兹推进，塔伊兹是该国最重要的中心之一。

政府方面的士气很脆弱——如果再有挫折，尤其是在塔伊兹的挫折，局势将再次改变。

胡塞武装还拥有强大的导弹和无人机能力——过去四年里这些能力得到了加强——并且已经加大了对政府军和沙特阿拉伯的袭击力度。要将他们赶出近期占领的领土已经很困难，但要将他们赶出多年来一直占据的领土——例如重要的港口城市荷台达——则更加困难。

然而，与以往冲突升级的情况不同，政府和沙特阿拉伯获得了更强大的国际支持。

胡塞武装可以袭击红海航运，以此展示如果遭到攻击他们能够造成的破坏，但这同时也凸显了允许该组织继续控制该地区的危险性，尤其是在伊朗在阿拉伯半岛另一侧的霍尔木兹海峡实施类似政策的情况下。

英国已表示将向沙特阿拉伯提供防御支持，周一，沙特与土耳其和巴基斯坦的共同防御条约也正式生效。安卡拉方面尚未证实任何部队部署，但伊斯兰堡方面表示，沙特参与了包括“侦察”在内的支援行动。

国际支持对于打击胡塞武装的行动的成功至关重要——无论是在外交上还是军事上——而这场行动很可能会持续数月之久。