Will Ethiopia’s neighbours intervene as Tigray war escalates?

Tigray’s renewed war is testing Ethiopia’s already strained regional ties.

Mekelle, Tigray’s regional capital, has been retaken by Ethiopian federal forces and allied fighters amid renewed fighting in the region [File: AFP]

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – After nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, Ethiopian federal forces entered the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle as forces from an alliance of rebel groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), withdrew from the city.

The fighting that erupted late last month has effectively ended the 2022 Pretoria ceasefire and the fragile peace that followed the devastating Tigray war.

But Mekelle’s capture may mark the end of conventional warfare rather than the end of the conflict. Fighting has continued elsewhere in Tigray, while reports of Eritrean troops entering northern Tigrayan towns have added a potentially more dangerous regional dimension.

Ethiopian federal forces used air power and ground forces to advance across Tigray. After suffering successive defeats around the towns of Alamata and Kobo, rebel forces withdrew into the surrounding countryside. They have pledged to continue fighting.

“We will confront the enemy on our terms and where we choose,” TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael said.

A war that may not be over

There are echoes of the war that began in 2020, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government declared victory after federal forces captured Mekelle. Tigrayan forces subsequently regrouped in the mountains, retook much of the region and recaptured the capital, prolonging the war for nearly a year and a half.

The renewed conflict could follow a similar trajectory, particularly if the TPLF and other armed groups succeed in turning the mountainous terrain into a prolonged armed rebellion. Ethiopia is already fighting insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, raising the prospect of its federal forces being stretched across multiple fronts.

But the battlefield reversals suffered by the rebels could have implications well beyond Tigray. They have raised concern in Egypt and among other Ethiopian rivals, according to Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an African analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute.

“Egypt views the Renaissance Dam, and any Ethiopian [army] move towards the Red Sea, as a strategic threat, so it has allied with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia against any Ethiopian unilateralism,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

“Ethiopia is seeking a sea outlet; Eritrea sees this as an existential threat.”

Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions

Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea won its war of independence in 1991, leaving Addis Ababa heavily dependent on neighbouring countries for access to international trade.

Abiy has increasingly made access to the Red Sea a strategic priority since 2023, raising concerns in Eritrea over Ethiopia’s ambitions, particularly over the port of Assab.

Ethiopia currently relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade, while also pursuing alternative arrangements, including through Kenya and Somaliland.

After being sworn in on Monday for another five-year term following his party’s victory in the June 1 election, Abiy again put the issue at the centre of his parliamentary address.

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” he told parliament.

The issue has increasingly become part of a wider regional contest.

A loose regional alignment

In recent months, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves sharing concerns over Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. On October 4, the leaders of the four countries met for a quadrilateral consultative summit in New Alamein, Egypt, where they discussed regional issues and pledged to strengthen political, economic and trade cooperation as well as consultation and coordination.

The meeting does not amount to a formal military alliance, and the four countries have different interests in their dealings with Addis Ababa. The summit’s joint declaration also called for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

But their concerns increasingly overlap around Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea, the Nile and the wider Horn of Africa.

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also deteriorated sharply since the Pretoria ceasefire. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats on October 1, accusing Asmara of hostile acts and involvement in the renewed fighting. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties, while denying that it supported the opposition alliance. Egypt and Sudan have also denied Ethiopian accusations that they are backing the alliance.

The Ethiopian army’s advance into Tigray has added another layer to that rivalry.

“The [Ethiopian army’s] advance in Tigray directly threatens [Eritrean President] Isaias [Afwerki] and the Eritrean state,” said Etana H Dinka, an assistant professor of African history at the University of Miami.

Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops during the 2020–22 Tigray war, but relations between Abiy and Isaias have since deteriorated. Eritrean troops have reportedly been seen in towns in northern Tigray, adding a potentially significant new dimension to the conflict. The Associated Press news agency reported Eritrean troops entering Adigrat and Idaga Hamus after crossing into Ethiopia, while Eritrea has neither confirmed nor denied the troop movements.

Eritrea’s role could be decisive

For Eritrea, the location of the fighting matters as much as its outcome.

A prolonged conflict in Tigray could keep Ethiopian forces tied down and limit Addis Ababa’s ability to pursue its Red Sea ambitions. But a decisive Ethiopian victory could leave the federal government with greater freedom to turn its attention towards regional rivals.

“With reports that Eritrean troops are moving into Tigray, Eritrea seems keen on boosting TPLF forces withdrawing northwards, so that the engagement between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers takes place in Tigrayan territory, and not in Eritrea,” said Mohamed Kheir Omer, a researcher focused on the Horn of Africa.

That could create an incentive for Eritrea to support forces capable of keeping the Ethiopian army tied down, without necessarily entering a direct confrontation of its own.

Sudan adds another layer

Sudan’s war adds another dimension to the regional rivalry.

Egypt has provided political backing and logistical and technical support to Sudan’s army, according to the Reuters news agency, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of atrocities in Darfur.

Ethiopia has faced accusations of facilitating support for the RSF. A Reuters investigation reported in February that Ethiopia was hosting a camp in its western Benishangul-Gumuz region where thousands of fighters linked to the RSF were being trained. Reuters cited eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, who said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support. The UAE denied the allegations, and Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s role.

Those competing relationships are part of a broader contest over the Nile, Sudan, the Red Sea and access to trade routes.

For Egypt, its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern. For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s search for a Red Sea outlet is viewed through the lens of national security. For Sudan’s neighbours, the conflict threatens to reshape regional power balances.

Will Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia intervene?

The shared interests of Ethiopia’s regional rivals do not necessarily translate into direct intervention.

Egypt has its own calculations over the Nile and Sudan. Eritrea has a direct security interest in developments in Tigray. Somalia is dealing with its own security challenges and a complicated relationship with Addis Ababa. Sudan remains consumed by its devastating civil war.

At the same time, Ethiopia’s federal forces now face the possibility of fighting on several fronts.

The TPLF, Amhara Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) have each sought to challenge the federal government in different parts of the country. If they can maintain pressure on the army while retreating from major population centres, the fall of Mekelle could prove to be only the first phase of a much longer conflict.

For Ethiopia’s rivals, the question is whether to exploit that vulnerability or avoid being drawn into another regional war.

The extent of any regional involvement may ultimately depend on whether the TPLF can keep federal forces tied down in Tigray, and away from the Eritrean border.

“It isn’t difficult to understand Cairo’s commitment to prevent Ethiopia from succeeding in the current warfare, whatever its army’s intended goals, including Abiy’s acclaimed access to the Red Sea, are,” University of Miami’s Dinka said.

The question now is whether those regional calculations will remain largely diplomatic or spill into the battlefield.

提格雷再次爆发战争，这正在考验埃塞俄比亚本已紧张的地区关系。

在提格雷地区战事再度爆发之际，埃塞俄比亚联邦军队及其盟军已重新夺回提格雷州首府默克莱。[图片：法新社]

埃塞俄比亚首都亚的斯亚贝巴——经过近两周的激烈战斗，埃塞俄比亚联邦军队进入了提格雷州首府默克莱，而包括提格雷人民解放阵线（提人阵）在内的反叛组织联盟的部队则撤出了该市。

上个月底爆发的战斗实际上结束了 2022 年比勒陀利亚停火协议，以及在毁灭性的提格雷战争之后脆弱的和平。

但梅克莱的陷落或许标志着常规战争的结束，而非冲突的终结。提格雷其他地区的战斗仍在继续，而有关厄立特里亚军队进入提格雷北部城镇的报道，更使这场冲突呈现出潜在的、更为危险的区域性局面。

埃塞俄比亚联邦军队利用空军和地面部队推进至提格雷州。在阿拉马塔和科博镇附近接连失利后，反叛武装撤退至周边乡村地区。他们誓言将继续战斗。

“我们将按照我们自己的方式，在我们选择的地点与敌人对抗，”提格雷人民解放阵线领导人德布雷齐翁·格布雷米凯尔说。

一场可能尚未结束的战争

这场战争让人想起2020年爆发的那场战争。当时，阿比·艾哈迈德总理的政府在联邦军队攻占默克莱后宣布取得胜利。随后，提格雷军队在山区重整旗鼓，夺回了该地区的大部分地区，并重新占领了首府默克莱，使战争持续了近一年半的时间。

如果提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）和其他武装团体成功地将山区变成一个长期武装叛乱的地区，那么新一轮冲突的走向可能与之前类似。埃塞俄比亚已经在阿姆哈拉州和奥罗米亚州与叛乱分子作战，这使得其联邦军队面临多线作战的风险。

但叛军在战场上遭遇的挫败可能产生远超提格雷地区的影响。据布卢姆斯伯里情报与安全研究所的非洲分析师霍萨马尔丁·易卜拉欣称，这些挫败已经引起了埃及和其他埃塞俄比亚对手的担忧。

易卜拉欣告诉半岛电视台：“埃及将复兴大坝以及埃塞俄比亚军队向红海的任何行动视为战略威胁，因此埃及与厄立特里亚、苏丹和索马里结盟，反对埃塞俄比亚的任何单边主义行为。”

“埃塞俄比亚正在寻求出海口；厄立特里亚则认为这是对其生存的威胁。”

埃塞俄比亚的红海野心

自厄立特里亚在 1991 年赢得独立战争以来，埃塞俄比亚一直是内陆国家，这使得亚的斯亚贝巴严重依赖邻国才能进入国际贸易。

自 2023 年以来，阿比越来越重视进入红海，将其视为一项战略要务，这引起了厄立特里亚对埃塞俄比亚野心的担忧，尤其是对阿萨布港的担忧。

埃塞俄比亚目前严重依赖吉布提进行海上贸易，同时也在寻求其他途径，包括通过肯尼亚和索马里兰。

在6月1日的大选中，他的政党获胜，阿比于周一宣誓就职，开始他的第二个五年任期。在就职典礼上，阿比再次将该问题置于议会讲话的中心位置。

“本着互惠互利的原则，我们将努力确保埃塞俄比亚拥有通往海洋的出口，”他告诉议会。

这个问题已日益成为更广泛的区域性竞争的一部分。

松散的区域联盟

近几个月来，埃及、厄立特里亚、苏丹和索马里对埃塞俄比亚的地区野心表示担忧。10月4日，这四个国家的领导人在埃及新阿拉曼举行四方磋商峰会，讨论了地区问题，并承诺加强政治、经济和贸易合作以及磋商与协调。

此次会晤并不构成正式的军事联盟，而且这四个国家在与亚的斯亚贝巴的交往中各自拥有不同的利益。峰会的联合声明还呼吁尊重主权和领土完整，互不干涉内政，并以和平方式解决争端。

但他们日益关注的是埃塞俄比亚在红海、尼罗河和更广阔的非洲之角的野心。

自比勒陀利亚停火协议签署以来，埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚的关系急剧恶化。10月1日，埃塞俄比亚关闭了其驻厄立特里亚大使馆并驱逐了厄立特里亚外交官，指责阿斯马拉方面采取敌对行动并参与了新一轮冲突。厄立特里亚随即断绝了与埃塞俄比亚的外交关系，同时否认支持反对派联盟。埃及和苏丹也否认了埃塞俄比亚关于其支持该联盟的指控。

埃塞俄比亚军队向提格雷的推进，使这种敌对关系又增添了一层新的色彩。

迈阿密大学非洲历史助理教授埃塔纳·H·丁卡表示：“埃塞俄比亚军队在提格雷的推进直接威胁到厄立特里亚总统伊萨亚斯·阿费沃基和厄立特里亚国家。”

在2020年至2022年的提格雷战争期间，厄立特里亚军队曾与埃塞俄比亚军队并肩作战，但此后阿比和伊萨亚斯之间的关系恶化。据报道，厄立特里亚军队出现在提格雷北部城镇，这可能为这场冲突增添了新的重大变数。美联社报道称，厄立特里亚军队越境进入埃塞俄比亚后，进入了阿迪格拉特和伊达加哈穆斯，但厄立特里亚方面既未证实也未否认这一军事行动。

厄立特里亚的作用可能至关重要。

对厄立特里亚而言，战斗地点与战斗结果同样重要。

提格雷地区的长期冲突可能会牵制埃塞俄比亚军队，限制亚的斯亚贝巴实现其红海野心的能力。但如果埃塞俄比亚取得决定性胜利，联邦政府则可能拥有更大的自由度，将注意力转向地区竞争对手。

“有报道称厄立特里亚军队正在向提格雷州推进，厄立特里亚似乎热衷于加强向北撤退的提格雷人民解放阵线部队，以便让埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚士兵在提格雷州境内交战，而不是在厄立特里亚境内交战，”专注于非洲之角的研究员穆罕默德·凯尔·奥马尔说。

这可能会促使厄立特里亚支持能够牵制埃塞俄比亚军队的力量，而无需直接与其发生冲突。

苏丹又增添了一层含义。

苏丹战争为地区竞争增添了新的维度。

据路透社报道，埃及向苏丹军队提供了政治支持、后勤和技术支持，而快速支援部队（RSF）则被指控在达尔富尔犯下暴行。

埃塞俄比亚一直被指控为快速支援部队（RSF）提供支持。路透社2月份的一项调查报道称，埃塞俄比亚在其西部贝尼尚古勒-古穆兹州设立了一个营地，数千名与快速支援部队有关联的武装人员正在那里接受训练。路透社援引包括一名埃塞俄比亚高级政府官员在内的八位消息人士的话称，阿联酋资助了该营地的建设，并提供了军事教官和后勤支持。阿联酋否认了这些指控，路透社表示无法独立核实阿联酋在其中扮演的角色。

这些相互竞争的关系是围绕尼罗河、苏丹、红海和贸易路线的更广泛争夺的一部分。

对埃及而言，与埃塞俄比亚就埃塞俄比亚复兴大坝的争端仍然是一项重大的战略关切。对厄立特里亚而言，埃塞俄比亚寻求红海出海口的举动被视为关乎国家安全。对苏丹的邻国而言，这场冲突有可能重塑地区力量平衡。

埃及、厄立特里亚、苏丹和索马里会进行干预吗？

埃塞俄比亚地区竞争对手的共同利益并不一定会转化为直接干预。

埃及对尼罗河和苏丹局势另有考量。厄立特里亚在提格雷的事态发展中拥有直接的安全利益。索马里正面临自身的安全挑战，并且与亚的斯亚贝巴的关系错综复杂。苏丹仍深陷于毁灭性的内战之中。

与此同时，埃塞俄比亚联邦军队现在面临着在多条战线上作战的可能性。

提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）、阿姆哈拉法诺和奥罗莫解放军（OLA）分别在全国各地挑战联邦政府。如果他们能在撤离主要人口中心的同时继续向军队施压，那么梅克莱的陷落可能仅仅是一场旷日持久冲突的第一阶段。

对于埃塞俄比亚的竞争对手来说，问题在于是否应该利用这一弱点，还是应该避免卷入另一场地区战争。

任何地区介入的程度最终可能取决于提格雷人民解放阵线能否将联邦军队牵制在提格雷，使其远离厄立特里亚边境。

“不难理解开罗为何致力于阻止埃塞俄比亚在当前的战争中取得成功，无论其军队的预期目标是什么，包括阿比所宣称的进入红海的通道，”迈阿密大学的丁卡说。

现在的问题是，这些区域性考量将主要停留在外交层面，还是会蔓延到战场上。