Ethiopia’s Tigray war: Where do the UAE and Saudi Arabia stand?

The Tigray conflict puts the UAE’s backing of Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic role under scrutiny.

Members of the pro-government Tigray Peace Force patrol Mekelle, Ethiopia, on October 4, 2026, a day after federal and allied forces entered Tigray's capital [File: AFP]

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

A Saudi navy frigate sails alongside US 5th Fleet ships during operations to support security in the Red Sea, where rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have raised concerns about wider regional stability [File: Reuters]

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.

提格雷冲突使阿联酋对埃塞俄比亚的支持以及沙特阿拉伯的外交作用受到密切关注。

2026年10月4日，在联邦军队和盟军进入提格雷州首府默克莱的第二天，亲政府的提格雷和平部队成员在默克莱巡逻。[图片：法新社]

埃塞俄比亚首都亚的斯亚贝巴——随着埃塞俄比亚提格雷地区再次爆发冲突，威胁到非洲之角的稳定，阿联酋公开支持埃塞俄比亚联邦政府以及沙特阿拉伯在地区外交方面的记录正受到密切关注。

这两个海湾大国在非洲之角都拥有战略利益，但它们扮演的角色有所不同。阿联酋公开支持埃塞俄比亚政府，而沙特阿拉伯此前曾帮助促成埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚关系缓和，据报道，沙特阿拉伯还曾提出在2025年为两国进行调解。

战火重燃，威胁到2022年11月签署的《比勒陀利亚和平协议》的存续。该协议结束了埃塞俄比亚联邦政府与提格雷武装之间的战争。随着与厄立特里亚的紧张关系加剧了冲突升级的风险，阿布扎比和利雅得的立场也让我们得以窥见外部势力在这场危机中的利益所在。

阿联酋：明确的联盟，尚未证明的影响力

9月25日，阿联酋谴责提格雷人民解放阵线（提人阵）及其盟友武装团体对埃塞俄比亚联邦部队发动袭击、占领提格雷机场以及在邻近的阿法尔和阿姆哈拉地区局势升级。

阿联酋国务部长谢赫·沙赫布特·本·纳哈扬·阿勒纳哈扬对埃塞俄比亚政府和人民表示声援，重申支持该国主权和领土完整，并呼吁停止敌对行动，保护平民，遵守《比勒陀利亚协议》。

该声明明确了阿布扎比的公开立场：支持埃塞俄比亚联邦政府，同时呼吁缓和局势并展开对话。声明并未说明阿联酋是否提供军事援助，也未说明是否已促使冲突各方承诺结束战斗。

阿联酋在非洲之角也拥有商业利益。迪拜环球港务集团（DP World）运营着索马里兰的柏培拉港，一条计划于2025年开通的航线将该港口与阿联酋的杰贝阿里港连接起来，为服务于埃塞俄比亚等内陆目的地的货物运输提供了一条新的通道。自1993年厄立特里亚独立以来，埃塞俄比亚一直是一个内陆国家，严重依赖吉布提进入国际贸易。

这些商业联系有助于解释阿布扎比对地区稳定的关注及其与亚的斯亚贝巴的关系。然而，这并不能证明阿联酋能够影响提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF），说服厄立特里亚缓和局势，或改变埃塞俄比亚的军事考量。

阿布扎比能在多大程度上利用其与联邦政府的关系来促使联邦政府对冲突做出政治回应，目前尚不清楚。

沙特阿拉伯：外交经验丰富，但参与前景不明朗

沙特阿拉伯尚未公开宣布其对提格雷最新冲突的立场。

根据 Critical Threats 10 月 1 日的分析，该王国尚未就这场再次爆发的战争发表公开评论，尽管它在今年早些时候曾进行外交努力，以缓和埃塞俄比亚联邦政府与提格雷人民解放阵线之间的紧张关系。

沙特阿拉伯此前曾试图调解埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚之间的冲突。2025年11月，查塔姆研究所报道称，有消息人士透露，鉴于两国在海上通道和地区安全问题上的紧张局势不断升级，利雅得方面已主动提出调解两国关系。

德国社会工作党智库在 2026 年 6 月的一份分析报告中指出，沙特此前的调解努力失败了，部分原因是谈判没有解决埃塞俄比亚对厄立特里亚阿萨布港的利益问题。

在支持红海安全行动期间，一艘沙特海军护卫舰与美国第五舰队舰艇并肩航行。埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚之间日益紧张的局势引发了人们对更广泛地区稳定的担忧。[图片：路透社]

沙特阿拉伯王国的更广泛的区域立场也至关重要。苏凡中心2026年8月的一份分析报告指出，沙特阿拉伯和埃及支持厄立特里亚，反对埃塞俄比亚获取红海出海口的野心。

这只是对区域联盟的评估，但并不能证明沙特阿拉伯正在向厄立特里亚或提格雷人民解放阵线提供军事支持。

沙特阿拉伯高度重视红海安全，红海是国际航运和沙特石油出口的重要通道。随着紧张局势升级，利雅得是否会在外交层面发挥更积极的作用，目前尚不明朗。

埃及与埃塞俄比亚之间的竞争加剧了地区紧张局势。

埃及在危机中的角色受到其与埃塞俄比亚之间关于埃塞俄比亚复兴大坝（GERD）的长期争端以及其与厄立特里亚日益密切的关系的影响。

开罗方面也强调，红海的治理和安全责任在于沿岸国家，阿斯马拉也持相同立场。由于埃塞俄比亚寻求可靠的出海通道，这一问题加剧了地区紧张局势。

9 月，埃塞俄比亚陆军总司令比尔哈努·朱拉元帅指责埃及和苏丹支持与联邦政府作战的武装团体，其中包括提格雷人民解放阵线（提人阵）。

据半岛电视台9月28日报道，他的言论并未提供任何证据来证实这一指控。埃及外交部发言人纳德尔·扎基随后重申了开罗对国家主权和不干涉内政的承诺，驳斥了埃及背离这些原则的说法。

他没有直接回应有关埃及支持提格雷人民解放阵线的具体指控。

尽管如此，埃及与厄立特里亚的关系已成为地区格局的重要组成部分。2026年6月8日，埃及总统阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西在开罗会见了厄立特里亚总统伊萨亚斯·阿费沃基。

据埃及总统府称，会谈内容涵盖双边合作、非洲之角局势发展和红海安全。

两国领导人还强调了协调对于维护地区稳定的重要性。会晤重点强调了开罗和阿斯马拉之间更紧密的合作，但并未证实两国是否参与了提格雷地区新一轮的冲突。

对开罗而言，与埃塞俄比亚的争端不仅限于提格雷，还延伸到尼罗河以及非洲之角的权力平衡。

埃及与厄立特里亚的关系以及与亚的斯亚贝巴的分歧构成了更广泛的区域背景，但这并不能证明埃及直接介入了这场新一轮冲突。这些区域关系是否会影响战局走向，目前尚不明朗。

从提格雷到更广泛的区域危机

风险不仅限于提格雷州。埃塞俄比亚对海上通道的追求已成为与厄立特里亚关系紧张的根源，厄立特里亚的红海沿岸拥有阿萨布港。亚的斯亚贝巴方面认为，可靠的出海通道是国家优先事项，而阿斯马拉方面则拒绝接受任何对其主权的威胁。

埃塞俄比亚指责厄立特里亚向边境派遣军队并支持武装团体。厄立特里亚否认这些指控，并呼吁联合国安理会进行干预。这些指控仍存在争议，但两国关系的恶化加剧了埃塞俄比亚北部地区再次爆发冲突的风险。

更大规模的对抗可能使更多平民面临风险，使人道主义援助准入更加复杂，并扰乱区域贸易和安全。此外，这也将考验外部伙伴能否在不显得支持任何一方军事目标的情况下，鼓励各方保持克制。

阿联酋与亚的斯亚贝巴的密切关系可能为外交接触提供渠道，而沙特阿拉伯在地区外交方面的良好记录则可能为重启对话提供契机。然而，现有公开证据并未表明两国目前正主导遏制危机的行动。

影响力必须通过结果来衡量。

不应仅仅因为阿联酋公开支持埃塞俄比亚联邦政府，而沙特阿拉伯的立场较为隐晦，就将两国视为采取对立战略。它们的利益和外交手段有所不同，但证据表明，任何一方都未能对战局产生决定性影响。

评估他们的贡献应看他们能否帮助促成缓和局势、重启政治对话以及降低埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚之间的紧张关系的具体措施。公开声明、商业利益和过去的外交成就或许能创造接触的机会，但它们不能取代实地进展。

《比勒陀利亚协议》仍然是提格雷政治解决的框架，但冲突再度爆发凸显了在根本争端持续存在的情况下维持和平的难度。持久的解决方案主要取决于各方自身。外部伙伴可以通过鼓励各方保持克制和支持可信的谈判来做出贡献。

目前来看，阿联酋公开与埃塞俄比亚的立场以及沙特阿拉伯的外交记录为双方提供了不同的潜在接触渠道。但两国能否将这些关系转化为对缓和局势做出切实贡献，仍有待观察。