Despite long history with Netanyahu, Trump hedges as Israel vote nears

US president has not endorsed Israeli prime minister ahead of October 27 election amid shifting public sentiment.

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are seen in Jerusalem [File: Evelyn Hockstein/Getty]

Washington, DC, United States – Since first entering the White House in 2017, US President Donald Trump has delivered on a right-wing Israeli wish list and pursued a foreign policy that has helped buoy Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political fortunes.

The Israeli leader has, in turn, portrayed himself as the best steward of Israel’s most significant foreign relationship, weathering a handful of public criticisms and leaked discontents from Trump that have yielded little concrete policy change.

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But despite the pair’s long history, Trump has so far taken a decidedly ho-hum approach to the October 27 Israeli election . The vote sees Netanyahu’s Likud party and the far-right coalition it leads under increasing threat from Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot and an opposition bloc he seeks to build.

It is an – at least public – ambivalence likely fuelled by shifting political winds in both the US and Israel, as well as the evolving relationship between Trump and Netanyahu, according to Yousef Munayyer, head of the Palestine/Israel programme at the Arab Center Washington DC.

“He seems to be keeping greater distance from it than you would think,” Munayyer told Al Jazeera, “given Trump’s past endorsements of right-wing allies, given the history of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship, and just how close Trump and Netanyahu have been”.

The US president thrice dodged a direct endorsement of Netanyahu in a recent Time magazine interview, even as he defended the Israeli prime minister’s leadership ahead of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on southern Israel.

On Eisenkot, he conceded, “I don’t hear bad things.”

To be sure, Trump’s actions towards Israel – and Netanyahu in particular – have often spoken far louder than his words.

During his first term from 2017 to 2021, Trump moved the US embassy to Jerusalem, recognised Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and spearheaded a series of normalisation agreements with Arab countries that sought to circumvent the Israel-Palestine issue.

During his second term that started in January 2025, he continued to surge even the most destructive US weapons to Israel amid its genocide in Gaza, escalated a crackdown on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and, as a crown jewel, entered a global economy-rattling war with Iran .

Trump has also called for Netanyahu to be pardoned in his ongoing corruption trial, while hosting the Israeli leader at least seven times since returning to the White House last year, far more than any other world leader.

Throughout their relationship, hints of discord over Netanyahu’s obstruction of Washington’s push for a more lasting peace in Gaza and an end to the war with Iran have never materialised into actual policy changes.

“It’s a relationship they’ve carefully choreographed for public consumption, and the few juicy bits that we’ve learned have been almost entirely of Trump’s choosing,” said Michael Omer-Man, Israel-Palestine director at the Washington, DC-based DAWN think tank, who did not rule out a sweeping US gesture to boost Netanyahu in the final stretch of the race.

“I don’t think that Trump’s abandoned Netanyahu,” he told Al Jazeera. “But he’s also a realist, and he’s seen a lot of his preferred candidates in various countries lose elections as well as win them.”

The stakes may just not be that high for Trump, Omer-Man assessed.

Eisenkot has promised a more moderate approach than Netanyahu’s, particularly when it comes to stemming rampant settler violence in the occupied West Bank. But those changes are largely aimed at boosting Israel’s standing among European governments and the global public, with little bearing on already permissive relations with the Trump administration.

“I don’t think we would see a whole lot of change vis-a-vis the US, because there doesn’t seem to be a whole lot of friction in the relationship,” he said.

“An Eisenkot government might stop taking over every single hilltop in the West Bank; they might allow more [aid] into Gaza,” he said, “but they’re not going to reverse any of the steps that have already been taken.”

‘Enemies versus friends’

Mairav Zonszein, a senior analyst on Israel at the International Crisis Group, also pointed to the shifting context surrounding Trump and Netanyahu’s relationship.

Trump’s reticence reflects, in part, a divide within the Trump administration over Netanyahu’s government, which reflects a wider Republican Party divide as US midterm elections approach.

“It’s probably a combination of the Iran war and the split in the Trump administration with people like [Vice President JD] Vance, who have come out very much against Netanyahu’s role in pushing for the US to strike Iran,” said Zonszein.

Public opinion polls have repeatedly suggested support for Israel remains high among Republicans, but has ticked down in recent years. Confidence in Netanyahu has also declined within the party.

At the same time, the perception of Trump’s influence has shifted in Israel, with Netanyahu’s critics seizing on the US role in constraining Israeli operations in Lebanon that threatened to derail a June memorandum of understanding that briefly paused the US-Israel war on Iran.

An Israeli Democracy Institute poll released in June found only 44 percent of Jewish Israelis thought Israel’s security was a top consideration for Trump, down from 61 percent in March, shortly after the US and Israel launched the war with Iran.

For his part, Netanyahu has avoided the billboards boasting his close relationship with Trump this election cycle, a departure from his approach in years past, Zonszein explained.

Instead, he has featured who he considers to be Israel’s top regional and international foes, including Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani.

Netanyahu, Zonszein said, is highlighting “his enemies versus his friends”.

由于公众情绪转变，美国总统尚未在10月27日大选前公开支持以色列总理。

美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡在耶路撒冷被拍到。[图片：Evelyn Hockstein/Getty]

美国华盛顿特区——自 2017 年首次入主白宫以来，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普实现了以色列右翼的愿望清单，并奉行外交政策，这有助于提升以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的政治前途。

以色列领导人则把自己塑造成以色列最重要的外交关系的最佳管理者，顶住了特朗普的一些公开批评和泄露的不满，但这些批评和不满并没有带来多少具体的政策改变。

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列表 2/3：以色列人现在是否感觉比 2023 年 10 月 6 日更安全？

和平委员会计划斥资24亿美元重建加沙，此前以色列造成七人死亡。

尽管两人渊源颇深，但迄今为止，特朗普对10月27日的以色列大选一直持漠不关心的态度。此次选举中，内塔尼亚胡领导的利库德集团及其极右翼联盟将面临来自亚沙尔党领导人加迪·艾森科特及其试图组建的反对派联盟日益增长的威胁。

据华盛顿特区阿拉伯中心巴勒斯坦/以色列项目负责人优素福·穆纳耶尔称，这种至少在公众眼中是矛盾的，很可能是由于美国和以色列政治风向的转变，以及特朗普和内塔尼亚胡之间不断变化的关系所致。

“考虑到特朗普过去对右翼盟友的支持，考虑到特朗普与内塔尼亚胡的关系历史，以及特朗普和内塔尼亚胡关系如此密切，他似乎与此事保持着比你想象中更大的距离，”穆纳耶尔告诉半岛电视台。

美国总统在最近接受《时代》杂志采访时三次回避直接支持内塔尼亚胡，尽管他在2023年10月7日哈马斯领导的袭击以色列南部之前为以色列总理的领导能力辩护。

关于艾森科特，他承认：“我没听到什么不好的消息。”

可以肯定的是，特朗普对以色列——尤其是对内塔尼亚胡——采取的行动，往往比他的言辞更有说服力。

在 2017 年至 2021 年的第一个任期内，特朗普将美国大使馆迁至耶路撒冷，承认以色列吞并戈兰高地，退出 2015 年伊朗核协议，并牵头与阿拉伯国家达成一系列关系正常化协议，试图绕过以巴问题。

在他于 2025 年 1 月开始的第二个任期内，他继续向以色列输送最具破坏性的美国武器，以应对以色列在加沙的种族灭绝，加大了对国际刑事法院 (ICC) 的镇压力度，并且，作为其政绩的重头戏，发动了一场撼动全球经济的与伊朗的战争。

特朗普还呼吁赦免内塔尼亚胡，以结束他正在进行的腐败审判。自去年重返白宫以来，他至少七次接待了这位以色列领导人，远远超过其他任何世界领导人。

在他们交往的过程中，尽管内塔尼亚胡阻挠华盛顿推动加沙实现更持久的和平以及结束与伊朗的战争，双方之间仍存在分歧，但这些分歧从未转化为实际的政策变化。

“这是他们精心策划的、旨在向公众展示的关系，而我们了解到的少数几个劲爆消息几乎完全是特朗普自己选择的，”总部位于华盛顿特区的智库 DAWN 的以色列-巴勒斯坦事务主任迈克尔·奥默-曼说道。他不排除美国会在竞选的最后阶段采取全面行动来提振内塔尼亚胡。

“我不认为特朗普抛弃了内塔尼亚胡，”他告诉半岛电视台。“但他也是个现实主义者，他见过很多他支持的候选人在不同国家赢得选举，也见过他们输掉选举。”

Omer-Man 评估认为，对特朗普来说，风险可能并没有那么高。

艾森科特承诺采取比内塔尼亚胡更为温和的策略，尤其是在遏制被占领的西岸地区猖獗的定居者暴力方面。但这些改变主要旨在提升以色列在欧洲各国政府和国际社会中的地位，对以色列与特朗普政府之间本已较为友好的关系影响甚微。

“我认为我们与美国的关系不会发生太大变化，因为两国关系似乎并没有太多摩擦，”他说。

“艾森科特政府或许会停止占领西岸的每一座山顶；他们或许会允许更多援助进入加沙，”他说，“但他们不会推翻已经采取的任何措施。”

“敌人与朋友”

国际危机组织以色列问题高级分析师迈拉夫·宗斯泽因也指出，特朗普和内塔尼亚胡的关系背景正在发生变化。

特朗普的沉默在一定程度上反映了特朗普政府内部对内塔尼亚胡政府的分歧，而随着美国中期选举的临近，这种分歧也反映了共和党内部更广泛的分裂。

“这可能是伊朗战争和特朗普政府内部的分裂共同作用的结果，像（副总统）万斯这样的人强烈反对内塔尼亚胡推动美国打击伊朗，”宗斯泽因说。

民意调查多次显示，共和党人对以色列的支持率仍然很高，但近年来有所下降。共和党内部对内塔尼亚胡的信任度也有所下降。

与此同时，以色列对特朗普影响力的看法发生了转变，内塔尼亚胡的批评者抓住美国在限制以色列在黎巴嫩的军事行动中所扮演的角色，指出此举有可能破坏6月份签署的谅解备忘录，该备忘录曾短暂暂停了美以对伊朗的战争。

以色列民主研究所6月份公布的一项民意调查显示，只有44%的以色列犹太人认为以色列的安全是特朗普的首要考虑因素，低于3月份的61%，当时正值美国和以色列对伊朗发动战争之后不久。

Zonszein解释说，内塔尼亚胡在本届选举周期中避免使用广告牌吹嘘他与特朗普的密切关系，这与他过去几年的做法截然不同。

相反，他重点介绍了自己认为以色列在地区和国际上的主要敌人，包括真主党总书记纳伊姆·卡西姆、土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安和纽约市市长佐赫兰·马姆达尼。

宗斯泽因说，内塔尼亚胡是在强调“他的敌人与他的朋友之间的区别”。