At the negotiating table and on the battlefield, Russia and Ukraine are at an impasse

Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

It’s like two theatrical performances unfolding side by side, before an audience of one.

The peace process surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reached a remarkable impasse.

On one stage, European allies and Kyiv are scrambling to turn US demands and threats into something resembling a plan that might satisfy President Donald Trump. On the other, the Kremlin has its own show: envoy Kirill Dmitriev offers business opportunities designed to appeal to a mercantile US president, draw him further into Moscow’s orbit and allow Russia’s crawling frontline advance to proceed. Trump’s envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, flit between the two productions. Yet the two plots remain separate and contemptuous of each other, with no denouement in sight.

Heiko Junge/NTB/AFP/Getty Images

When Trump speaks of a deal with Russia, one fact outweighs all others: Moscow’s idea of peace is basically victory. The Kremlin has been blunt about its demands, even in their least maximalist form. Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Ukraine to surrender the Donbas without further fighting. He has also long entertained Ukraine’s demilitarization, a pledge never to join NATO and a change of leadership in Kyiv — all impractical or impossible in wartime. Russia’s pragmatist-in-chief has therefore settled on the Donbas as an attainable negotiating goal, while pressure grows on Kyiv to concede.

Why does Zelensky not simply yield? Reasons to do so grow as what remains of the Donbas becomes less habitable by the day. Russian drones stalk Kramatorsk, the largest population center, hunting civilians around the clock. Sloviansk, Dobropillia and Kostyantynivka are either ruins or targets for Russian glide bombs: places of great military importance, but little remaining civilian life.

Yet the clearest case for why Ukraine cannot simply abandon the Donbas came from none other than Trump’s National security adviser, and possible successor, Marco Rubio. Russia controls all but 11% of the Donetsk region, while Ukraine describes the remainder as the “defensive line that they’ve embedded themselves in,” he said , in an interview with Breitbart News. “They argue, and military strategists say is true, that it is the last defensible line… From there, it’s just a straight shot into Kyiv.” He added that Russia is not really advancing and has therefore switched to “applying extraordinary pain on the people of Ukraine through drone strikes, through ballistic missile strikes, trying to destroy their energy infrastructure, their electricity.” Ukraine, in turn, is striking Russian refineries.

He acknowledged Kushner and Witkoff’s efforts, but ultimately concluded: “We’d like the war to end, but ultimately we also have other priorities around the world we’re focused on as well.”

Rubio spent 45 minutes on the phone with Zelensky on Tuesday, suggesting he may be more invested in the outcome than this closing remark implies. But his lowered expectations reflect the reality of these two separate onstage peace performances. Ukraine wants to survive; Russia wants to win, and still believes it can.

If one of the sounder minds in the White House sees peace as a long shot at best, what did the past 10 days of US-Ukrainian fallout achieve? Did it get Trump any closer to the deal he says he wants?

Trump has offered a striking array of pro-Russian incentives to draw Moscow towards a peace whose terms he has yet to define. It looks like pressure for its own sake — and to Putin’s immediate advantage.

The list of Trump gifts to Moscow is extensive: a sudden diesel deal likely to throw billions into Putin’s war chest; an energy ceasefire (unilaterally announced by Trump and apparently unknown to either side), that slowed Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries for several days. There were also restrictions on vital Starlink technology that affected Ukraine’s defensive and offensive operations; limits on intelligence sharing that left Ukraine without warning of ballistic missile attacks for at least several nights; and repeated calls for Zelensky to leave office. Add to that the monthslong collapse of US financial support for Ukraine, with Europe now paying for military aid. If Putin could write US policy, it might look much like this.

Speaking in a news conference in Oslo after meeting with Witkoff in person and Kushner virtually, Zelensky said he hoped for a positive word from Rubio soon on the US-made Patriot air defense system and Starlink, while also saying that his country was “thankful that intelligence sharing” with the United States “now works.” Witkoff heads to Russia tomorrow and the nature of what he will present to Putin remains unclear.

Why now? The political damage Trump is inflicting on himself and his Republican colleagues ahead of the midterms is palpable. Some are struggling to distance themselves from this profoundly anti-American barrage of pro-Russian policies. Equally striking is how unsustainable or impractical many of these measures are. The diesel deal will not lower US pump prices quickly and European restrictions , will probably limit how much cash it can deliver to Putin. The energy ceasefire was brief, absurd, and further undermined Trump’s credibility. Restrictions to Starlink, Starshield, the military-grade version of Starlink controlled by the US government, and intelligence sharing appear to come and go, leaving Ukrainian troops in the lurch, while Rubio echoes Trump’s denial that any such limits ever existed.

This flurry of baffling activity makes sense only when seen through the US political prism. It is addressing the world after the midterm elections.

Zelensky has dispensed with the canard that pandering to Trump works. Ukraine is emotionally more adjusted to the idea of losing US support and going it alone, aware that survival is preferable to friendship with a fickle US. Europe knows there is a limited window now left in which Trump can do damage, and that whatever comes next is better. Even if it is more of the same, at least Europe and Ukraine will have had longer to prepare to go it alone.

Most troubling is Trump’s timing and thinking. He is only doing damage to his party and legacy. But with Republicans still in control of the House and Senate, and 2028’s race to succeed him not yet begun in earnest, perhaps he sees this as his last unbridled moment to express in practical ways his sympathy to someone apparently oddly important to him, as a US president: Vladimir Putin.

Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

这就像两场戏剧表演同时上演，而观众只有一位。

围绕俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的和平进程陷入了严重的僵局。

一方面，欧洲盟友和基辅正忙于将美国的要求和威胁转化为某种可能令特朗普总统满意的方案。另一方面，克里姆林宫也在上演自己的戏码：特使基里尔·德米特里耶夫兜售旨在吸引这位精明的美国总统的商业机会，将其进一步拉入莫斯科的势力范围，并允许俄罗斯缓慢推进其在前线的扩张。特朗普的特使史蒂夫·威特科夫和贾里德·库什纳则在两场戏之间来回穿梭。然而，这两条线索始终各自独立，彼此蔑视，看不到任何结局的迹象。

Heiko Junge/NTB/法新社/盖蒂图片社

当特朗普谈到与俄罗斯达成协议时，有一个事实凌驾于其他一切之上：莫斯科对和平的理解本质上就是胜利。克里姆林宫对其要求毫不含糊，即便在其最温和的表述中也是如此。俄罗斯总统普京希望乌克兰在不发生进一步战斗的情况下放弃顿巴斯地区。他还长期以来一直考虑乌克兰非军事化、承诺永不加入北约以及基辅领导人更迭——所有这些在战时都不可行或根本不可能。因此，这位务实的俄罗斯领导人将顿巴斯视为一个可实现的谈判目标，与此同时，基辅面临的让步压力也越来越大。

泽连斯基为何不肯屈服？随着顿巴斯残余地区日益变得不适宜居住，他屈服的理由也越来越多。俄罗斯无人机日夜盘旋在最大的人口中心克拉马托尔斯克，搜寻平民。斯拉维扬斯克、多布罗皮利亚和科斯蒂扬蒂尼夫卡要么已成废墟，要么成为俄罗斯滑翔炸弹的目标：这些地方军事意义重大，但几乎没有平民居住。

然而，最能说明乌克兰为何不能轻易放弃顿巴斯的，莫过于特朗普的国家安全顾问、可能的继任者马可·卢比奥。他在接受布莱巴特新闻网采访时表示，俄罗斯控制着顿涅茨克地区除11%以外的所有领土，而乌克兰则将剩余部分描述为“他们固守的防线”。“他们辩称，军事战略家也认同这一点，这是最后的防线……从那里，直插基辅。”他还补充说，俄罗斯实际上并没有推进，因此转而“通过无人机袭击和弹道导弹袭击，给乌克兰人民带来巨大的痛苦，试图摧毁他们的能源基础设施和电力供应”。而乌克兰则反过来打击俄罗斯的炼油厂。

他肯定了库什纳和维特科夫的努力，但最终总结道：“我们希望战争结束，但最终我们也有其他世界各地需要优先关注的事情。”

鲁比奥周二与泽连斯基通了45分钟电话，这表明他可能比这番总结性讲话所暗示的更关心最终结果。但他降低的预期反映了双方在和平舞台上截然不同的表现的现实。乌克兰想要生存；俄罗斯想要胜利，并且仍然相信自己能够做到。

如果白宫里比较理智的人都认为和平的可能性微乎其微，那么过去十天美乌关系的紧张局势究竟取得了什么成果？它是否让特朗普离他声称想要达成的协议更近了一步？

特朗普提出了一系列引人注目的亲俄优惠政策，试图以此拉拢莫斯科达成和平协议，但他尚未明确和平的具体条款。这看起来像是为了施压而施压——而且眼下最有利于普京。

特朗普送给莫斯科的礼物清单可谓琳琅满目：一项突如其来的柴油交易很可能让普京的军费库暴涨数十亿美元；一项能源停火协议（由特朗普单方面宣布，双方显然都不知情），使乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击减缓了数日。此外，还有对关键的星链技术的限制，影响了乌克兰的防御和进攻行动；情报共享的限制，导致乌克兰至少连续几个晚上未能收到弹道导弹袭击的预警；以及一再呼吁泽连斯基下台。再加上美国对乌克兰长达数月的财政援助中断，如今欧洲正在为乌克兰的军事援助买单。如果普京能够制定美国政策，那大概就是这个样子。

在奥斯陆与维特科夫会面（面谈）并与库什纳进行视频会晤后，泽连斯基在新闻发布会上表示，他希望卢比奥尽快就美国制造的“爱国者”防空系统和“星链”项目发表积极评论。他还表示，俄罗斯“感谢与美国的情报共享机制如今运转良好”。维特科夫将于明日前往俄罗斯，他将向普京汇报的内容目前尚不清楚。

为什么是现在？特朗普在中期选举前夕，其所作所为对自身及其共和党同僚造成的政治损害显而易见。一些人正努力与这一系列反美亲俄政策划清界限。同样引人注目的是，其中许多措施都缺乏可持续性或不切实际。柴油协议不会迅速降低美国汽油价格，而欧洲的限制措施可能会限制其能输送给普京的资金数额。能源停火协议短暂而荒谬，进一步损害了特朗普的信誉。对星链、星盾（美国政府控制的军用版星链）以及情报共享的限制似乎时有时无，令乌克兰军队陷入困境，而卢比奥却附和特朗普的说法，否认存在任何此类限制。

只有从美国政治的角度来看，这一系列令人费解的举动才能说得通。这是中期选举后美国向世界发出的指令。

泽连斯基已经摒弃了讨好特朗普就能奏效的谬论。乌克兰在情感上已经更好地适应了失去美国支持、单干的局面，他们明白，生存比与反复无常的美国保持友谊更为重要。欧洲也明白，特朗普能够造成破坏的窗口期已经所剩无几，接下来的一切都比现在要好。即便未来依然是老样子，至少欧洲和乌克兰也有更多的时间为单干做好准备。

最令人担忧的是特朗普的时机选择和想法。他这样做只会损害他的政党和政治遗产。但由于共和党仍然掌控着众议院和参议院，而且2028年的总统大选尚未真正开始，或许他认为这是他最后一次可以肆无忌惮地以实际行动表达对一位对他而言似乎格外重要的人物——美国总统弗拉基米尔·普京——的同情的机会。