Top NATO commander urges sea change in training, deterrence, spending

French Adm. Pierre Vandier has led the Allied Command Transformation, one of NATO’s two strategic commands, responsible for identifying future capability and interoperability requirements, since September 2024. Now based in Norfolk, Virginia, he was previously the French Chief of the Naval Staff and the Vice Chief of Defense.

In an interview with Defense News, Vandier discussed his vision for modernizing the alliance’s approach to training, the need for greater risk taking and innovation in Europe, his top priorities for future systems, and his take on Russia’s new intermediate-range ballistic missile.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Since assuming this role, you have called for NATO to be more audacious with its training. What kind of changes will you implement in the training of allied forces and what new concepts are you hoping to see them tackle?

In training you have different levels – the first is getting people to know how to handle an aircraft, a ship, a battalion. The second level is to train the plans, where troops know the plans and how to carry them out. As such, on the first day [of training] you [already] know what the plan is. The problem with this is that plans are subject to change, in fact we often say that the plan is what is killed on the first day of war, so it is much more a question of being able to adapt.

Training is the chamber where innovation is brought in. Some ideas we are working on, include giving the red team more room to maneuver, letting them attack when they want, doing their own course of action, and letting them be innovative. When the reds are more straining on the blue team, the blues learn more, as the simulated enemy will do more things that are unexpected, such as attacking when they are resting, for instance.

I would sum up audacious training as making the OPFOR [adversary for training] great again in terms of what you are up for and against in an exercise. When you have more innovation tools and do not know in advance when you are going to be killed, it gives the blue team better lessons learnt. We are working on dedicated exercises and vignettes where new equipment will be brought in and given to the reds. Here I am thinking of unmanned and AI tools to put more pressure on the blues… Train for what is non-prepared and unexpected in order to boost the learning loop.

What we want to see more of is: no magic moves, no magic replenishment, no magic re-survival. I’ve done this when I was Chief of the Naval Staff in saying “no re-generation, no reload.” For instance, on the first day of the game, you lose a ship, then the ship goes ashore. It is frustrating for the people that are killed on the first day, but you are giving them an opportunity to learn more. Everybody learns more when you simulate real-life and when your logistics are real.

You’ve spoken about the need for Europe to take inspiration from how the United States invests in technological innovation, supply chains and risk taking. How do you institutionalize risk taking in NATO nations?

The way we have been designing our weapon systems [in Europe] is much more reliant on sophistication. For example, you say ‘I am building the next generation of tanks,’ you bring all the military engineers in to determine what the future of the tank could be. They work for years on this and in the end, they come up with a generous book of specifications and announce a contract, industry runs this for another decade, and ultimately you have a tank that you are not certain fulfills your goals as things have changed.

New technology had time to arrive – you’ve spent a lot of money, just to have a platform that is obsolete by design, and all because the time spent building it was too long.

Innovation will not change major, big platforms – making an aircraft, tank or ship will always be a matter of decades. However, all the things which are around such as optronics, AI, communication systems, and software, need to be run on a process that is much faster. The speed of technology is a matter of two to three years, which is maybe 10 times quicker than the huge, controlled procurement system in Europe.

We need an approach convergence between what I would say is “fail-safe,” which is the big stuff, where you know where the money goes and is very specific, and then a part that can be 10% to 15% “safe to fail.” That’s where you test, and if it doesn’t work, you just put it out and test again and find a quick fix.

This innovation loop is important because the more you test, the more you may find good solutions. Of course, you need to be clever, but you also need to accept that often the first thing you design is not going to be the good one.

That’s the most important thing, we need to be in a learning loop – the enemy is learning a lot, and we need to be learning more than it is. Innovation is not a smart bullet, but a reinvestment process where you put the good minds of good people and test things.

What factors do you think are responsible for European states not taking on more risks?

A lot of rules have been made in Europe regarding defense investments, which were under deep scrutiny for legal and financial control. First, it was seen as bad to spend on defense, and so the ratings of banks is not so good when defense is in their portfolio. Another element is the size of regulations, which are very complex, lengthy, and slow. You run into a lot of legal issues and contestation… It is a fragmented market.

The stakeholders make more money outside of the European Union than in it, so they fight to sell their stuff outside of the continent.

Last but not least, the way we spend money in Europe is very reluctant to lose something… In other words, we do not accept to test and lose. I was attending an event recently in the U.S., where they used the following scenario: imagine you have $100 million and you select a portfolio of ten start-ups, where ten million are attributed to each. You check in after two years, and realize some projects are dead and perhaps keep two out of the initial ten. You lose 80%, but out of the two remaining ones, you may make hundreds of millions. The probability of winning will make you richer.

For Europe, going on a defense-spending target of 3% of GDP means that all European Union nations combined should spend €100 billion more per year. That is a huge amount. So if you do things as you did before, you will produce the equipment of the past and not for the future, especially when it comes to AI, space, robots and unmanned systems.

I think a lot of European countries bank on U.S. or Western sufficiency to say, “Okay, I have paid my insurance” – but it’s not a matter of insurance, it’s a matter of existence. Europe needs to take defense issues seriously and not just as a sense of cost.

What are your top priorities for NATO when it comes to future capabilities and systems it must field?

Let me start by giving you some more context to what these priorities are. We have an ongoing war in Ukraine, where Russian efforts are not only there but are global against the West and include space, cyber, surface and subsurface, as we have seen in the Baltics recently, hybrid actions. Even if Russia loses a lot of people, they know how to adapt well. On average, they are losing 1,000 personnel per week in Ukraine.

This global competition is spreading outside of Europe. We are in a moment where the response time has been accelerated. What Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has to do is provide the warfighting environment for the nations of NATO. We need to bring some strategic foresight, comprehensive talks in order to tackle this environment and shape the forces by providing concepts in multi-domain operations. It’s much more than just making plans and being trained for those plans. Essentially, what we are trying to do is to have a better comprehension of what is going on to try to have a coup d’avance.

My main priorities are giving foresight to the stakeholders of NATO, which also include the political side. The second area is the re-synchronization efforts in relation to the Defense Planning Process, where at the next NATO summit the capability targets for the next year will be outlined and endorsed.

Another priority is bringing innovation into the field in a different way than it has been done before. In past years, investments in defense have drastically been reduced and so I see innovation as being much more a question of the civilian sector than it is of the military.

When you see figures of how much the U.S. spends on big tech research and development, it is maybe 50 times what Europe spends. The question for the military is to try to understand what kind of advantage they can bring from the tech sector into their operations. That means AI, space, robotics and all software and quick-running processes, where the digital backbone is essentially everything.

Russia recently carried out an attack in Ukraine with a new weapon dubbed the Oreshnik, an intermediate-range ballistic missile Russian officials said can reach any European target. What are your thoughts about this class of weapon and how does that concern the stability between Russia and NATO?

In the past four to five years, most of the stabilization tools we had built after the Cold War jumped out. One of the biggest ones was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), from which the U.S. and Russia withdrew.

We are back to the question we observed in the 1980s, where you may have long-range ballistic weaponry able to threaten Europe. As part of the Treaty, the parties were not allowed to build missiles of range between 500 to 1,000 kilometers, as well intermediate-range missiles flying up to 5,000 kilometers. Hence, the only long-range ones at the time were nuclear ballistic missiles.

We are now again in a period where these kinds of missiles are free to act – you’ve seen what happened with the Houthis, with Iran against Israel. For NATO, it raises the question of balance between deter and defend. You’ve seen the limits of the Iron Dome in Israel, given the size of Europe, the idea to get rid of the threat by creating a European Iron Dome is just unfeasible. It is just like batteries for electricity – it simply will not happen.

The kind of initiative like the European Long-Strike Approach, or ELSA, [launched in 2024 between France, Germany, Italy and Poland to create a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 1,000-2,000km] is the way to think about the future. Perhaps discussions will be more open one day for strategic stability.

What sort of equipment does the alliance need to have in its arsenal to be able to respond and address that kind of threat?

Deep fires. You need to reciprocate. Stability is the ability to reciprocate. If Russia has means to strike Europe at the depth of 2,000 km, you need to be able to answer. Deterrence is a way to put pressure on the enemy before it comes to you. He has to think of the consequences of his actions before he commits them. It’s exactly the opposite that we see today – today we witness a sort of fait accompli all the time.

If you have more uncertainty, more dilemma and the consequences of attacking or not attacking, then you have deterrence. Because you know that you might suffer harder than you expect attacking for a minor win, or minor gain. You will have some square kilometers in a country but then you might trigger something really bad for you.

You have called for Europe to wake up and for countries to invest more in their militaries. Many experts argue the invasion of Ukraine should have been the necessary wake-up call, yet some still appear on the fence about making the necessary investments and changes. What do you believe will be enough to achieve this?

Three Western prophecies just went down: the first one is the belief that liberal trade will bring democracy, we have seen that doesn’t work. The second is the idea that interdependence will bring peace and the last is that disarmament will drive to peace.

I was recently giving a lecture to Franco-German industry leaders and chief executives. I said to them, you are just like the dinosaurs – you see the smoke of volcanoes and just say you are in changing times. Most Europeans are herbivores, they think there is sufficient grass to feed from. This is not the case. We need to be more awake and invest because it is not only about making some more shells to support Ukraine. It’s to be ready on the new warfighting domains where we may suffer a lot.

Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo was a Europe correspondent for Defense News. She covers a wide range of topics related to military procurement and international security, and specializes in reporting on the aviation sector. She is based in Milan, Italy.

自 2024 年 9 月以来，法国海军上将皮埃尔·旺迪耶一直领导着北约两大战略司令部之一的盟军转型司令部，负责确定未来的能力和互操作性需求。他目前驻扎在弗吉尼亚州诺福克，此前曾担任法国海军参谋长和国防部副部长。

在接受《防务新闻》采访时，范迪尔谈到了他对联盟训练方式现代化的愿景、欧洲需要承担更大风险和进行创新、他对未来系统的首要任务以及他对俄罗斯新型中程弹道导弹的看法。

为了篇幅和清晰度，本次采访内容经过编辑。

自担任此职以来，您一直呼吁北约在训练方面采取更大胆的举措。您将在盟军训练中实施哪些改革？您希望看到他们掌握哪些新概念？

训练分为不同阶段——第一阶段是让士兵掌握如何操作飞机、舰艇或营级单位。第二阶段是训练作战计划，让士兵了解计划并能执行。因此，在训练的第一天，士兵就已经知道作战计划是什么。但问题在于，计划随时可能变更，事实上，我们常说“计划在战争第一天就被摧毁了”，所以关键在于能否灵活应变。

训练是创新的温床。我们正在研究的一些想法包括：给予红队更大的行动空间，允许他们自主选择攻击时机，制定自己的行动方案，并鼓励他们进行创新。当红队给蓝队施加更大的压力时，蓝队就能学到更多，因为模拟敌人会做出更多出其不意的举动，例如趁蓝队休息时发动攻击。

我会把大胆的训练概括为：让假想敌（OPFOR）在演习中再次展现其强大实力，充分发挥其应对各种挑战的能力。当拥有更多创新工具，且无法预知何时会遭遇“死亡”时，蓝队就能从中吸取更深刻的教训。我们正在开展专门的演习和情景模拟，届时将引入新装备并提供给红队使用。我指的是无人机和人工智能工具，它们能给蓝队施加更大的压力……训练内容应涵盖所有意料之外的情况，从而加速学习循环。

我们希望看到的是：没有魔法般的行动，没有魔法般的补充，也没有魔法般的复活。我担任海军参谋长时就说过“不重生，不重装上阵”。例如，在游戏的第一天，你损失了一艘船，然后这艘船搁浅了。这对第一天就阵亡的人来说很沮丧，但这给了他们更多学习的机会。当你模拟现实，当你的后勤保障真实可靠时，每个人都能学到更多。

您曾谈到欧洲需要借鉴美国在技术创新、供应链和风险承担方面的投资经验。您认为北约国家该如何将风险承担制度化？

欧洲武器系统的设计方式更加依赖于技术细节。例如，如果你说“我要建造下一代坦克”，你会召集所有军事工程师来探讨坦克的未来发展方向。他们为此投入数年时间，最终制定出一份详尽的技术规格书，并宣布签订合同。之后，工业界会继续推进该项目十年之久，最终你得到的坦克却无法确定是否真的能够满足你的目标，因为情况已经发生了变化。

新技术需要时间才能成熟——你花了很多钱，结果却得到了一个设计上就过时的平台，而这一切都是因为开发时间太长了。

创新不会改变大型平台——制造飞机、坦克或舰船始终需要数十年时间。然而，诸如光电技术、人工智能、通信系统和软件等所有相关技术，都需要以更快的速度运行。技术的发展速度以两到三年为单位，这或许比欧洲庞大而受控的采购体系快十倍。

我们需要一种方法，将我所说的“万无一失”的方案（这是最重要的部分，资金的去向非常明确，而且非常具体）与允许有10%到15%的“容错空间”的方案相结合。在容错空间里，我们可以进行测试，如果出现问题，就立即投入使用，再次测试，并找到快速的解决方案。

这种创新循环至关重要，因为测试越多，找到好解决方案的可能性就越大。当然，你需要聪明才智，但也要接受这样一个事实：你设计的第一个方案往往并非最佳方案。

最重要的是，我们需要保持学习循环——敌人正在不断学习，而我们需要比他们学得更多。创新不是灵丹妙药，而是一个持续投入的过程，需要汇聚优秀人才的智慧，不断进行测试。

你认为导致欧洲国家不愿承担更多风险的原因是什么？

欧洲针对国防投资制定了许多规则，这些投资受到严格的法律和财务监管。首先，国防开支被视为不良行为，因此，如果银行的投资组合中包含国防投资，其信用评级往往不高。另一个因素是监管法规的庞大，这些法规非常复杂、冗长且执行缓慢。你会遇到很多法律问题和争议……这是一个分散的市场。

利益相关者在欧盟以外赚的钱比在欧盟内多，所以他们努力将产品销往欧洲大陆以外的地方。

最后但同样重要的是，欧洲人的消费方式非常不愿意承受损失……换句话说，我们不愿尝试，也不愿承担失败的风险。我最近在美国参加了一个活动，会上他们举了这样一个例子：假设你有1亿美元，你选择投资10家初创公司，每家投资1000万美元。两年后，你发现一些项目已经失败，可能只保留了最初的10个项目中的2个。你损失了80%，但剩下的两个项目可能会为你带来数亿美元的收益。成功的概率会让你变得更富有。

对欧洲而言，如果国防开支目标设定为GDP的3%，这意味着欧盟所有成员国每年加起来要多花1000亿欧元。这是一笔巨款。因此，如果继续沿用以往的做法，我们生产的将是过时的装备，而不是面向未来的装备，尤其是在人工智能、太空、机器人和无人系统等领域。

我认为很多欧洲国家都指望美国或西方国家有足够的实力来承担责任，然后说：“好了，我已经付了保险费了。”——但这并非保险问题，而是生死攸关的问题。欧洲需要认真对待国防问题，而不能仅仅从成本的角度出发。

对于北约未来的能力和必须部署的系统而言，您认为首要任务是什么？

首先，我想先为大家介绍一下这些优先事项的背景。乌克兰战争仍在持续，俄罗斯的行动不仅限于此，而是遍及全球，针对西方，涵盖太空、网络、地面和水下等多个领域，正如我们最近在波罗的海地区所见，这是混合行动。即使俄罗斯损失惨重，他们也懂得如何迅速调整。平均而言，他们在乌克兰每周损失约1000名人员。

这场全球竞争正在欧洲以外蔓延。我们正处于一个反应时间被加速的时代。盟军转型司令部（ACT）的任务是为北约各国提供作战环境。​​我们需要具备战略远见，开展全面对话，以应对当前的环境，并通过提供多域作战理念来塑造部队。这远不止制定计划和进行相关训练那么简单。本质上，我们努力的目标是更好地了解正在发生的事情，从而抢占先机。

我的主要工作重点是为北约各利益相关方（包括政治层面）提供前瞻性指导。第二个重点是重新协调国防规划进程，届时将在下次北约峰会上制定并批准下一年度的能力目标。

另一项重点工作是以一种不同于以往的方式将创新引入该领域。近年来，国防投资大幅削减，因此我认为创新更多地是民用领域而非军事领域的问题。

当你看到美国在大型科技公司研发上的投入数据时，你会发现它可能是欧洲的50倍。对军方而言，关键在于如何从科技领域获得优势，并将其运用到实际作战行动中。这涵盖了人工智能、太空技术、机器人技术以及所有软件和快速运行的流程，而数字化基础架构在这些领域至关重要。

俄罗斯最近在乌克兰发动了一次袭击，使用了名为“奥列什尼克”（Oreshnik）的新型武器。俄罗斯官员称，这是一种中程弹道导弹，可以打击任何欧洲目标。您如何看待这类武器？它对俄罗斯与北约之间的稳定有何影响？

过去四五年间，冷战后我们建立的大部分稳定机制都失效了。其中最重要的机制之一是《中导条约》（INF），美国和俄罗斯都退出了该条约。

我们又回到了上世纪80年代提出的问题，即是否存在能够威胁欧洲的远程弹道武器。根据条约规定，缔约国不得制造射程在500至1000公里之间的导弹，以及射程达5000公里的中程导弹。因此，当时唯一的远程导弹就是核弹道导弹。

我们现在又一次面临这类导弹可以自由行动的时期——你们都看到了胡塞武装和伊朗对以色列的所作所为。对北约而言，这引发了威慑与防御之间平衡的问题。鉴于欧洲的幅员辽阔，你们也看到了“铁穹”系统在以色列的局限性，试图通过建立欧洲“铁穹”系统来消除威胁的想法根本不切实际。这就像电池之于电力——根本不可能实现。

像“欧洲远程打击方案”（ELSA）这样的倡议（法国、德国、意大利和波兰于2024年启动，旨在研发射程1000-2000公里的陆基巡航导弹）才是思考未来的正确方向。或许有一天，为了战略稳定，各方会展开更加开放的讨论。

为了应对和解决这类威胁，联盟需要配备哪些类型的装备？

纵深打击。你必须做出回应。稳定就在于拥有回应的能力。如果俄罗斯有能力打击纵深2000公里的欧洲，你就必须有能力予以回应。威慑就是在敌人进攻你之前对其施加压力。他必须在采取行动之前考虑其后果。而我们今天看到的恰恰相反——今天我们目睹的是一种既成事实。

如果你面临更多不确定性、更多进退两难的抉择，以及进攻或不进攻的后果，那么你就能起到威慑作用。因为你知道，为了蝇头小利而发动进攻，可能会让你遭受比预期更大的损失。你或许能占领一个国家的几平方公里，但却可能引发对你极其不利的后果。

您曾呼吁欧洲觉醒，各国加大对军事的投入。许多专家认为，入侵乌克兰本应是必要的警钟，但仍有一些国家在是否进行必要的投资和改革方面犹豫不决。您认为需要采取哪些措施才能实现这一目标？

西方三大预言刚刚破灭：第一条是认为自由贸易会带来民主，我们已经看到这条路行不通；第二条是认为相互依存会带来和平；最后一条是认为裁军会带来和平。

我最近给法德两国的工业领袖和首席执行官们做了一场演讲。我对他们说，你们就像恐龙一样——看到火山冒烟，就说自己身处变革的时代。大多数欧洲人就像食草动物，以为草料足够多。事实并非如此。我们需要更加清醒，加大投资，因为这不仅仅是制造更多炮弹来支援乌克兰的问题。我们还要为可能遭受重创的新战争领域做好准备。

伊丽莎白·戈斯林-马洛曾任《防务新闻》欧洲通讯员。她的报道涵盖军事采购和国际安全等广泛领域，尤其擅长航空领域的报道。她常驻意大利米兰。