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军事分析研究机构

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2026

Ukrainian forces continue to face in-motion speed restrictions to SpaceX's technology Starlink and Starshield.

ISWFiona Noonan查看原文 ↗
俄罗斯攻势评估，2026年10月20日

Ukrainian forces continue to face in-motion speed restrictions to SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) that limit Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian piston engine-driven and jet-powered strike drones. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on October 19 that the 160 kilometers per hour (around 100 miles per hour) in-motion speed restrictions to Ukraine’s satellite internet service as part of the Starshield package remain in place.[1] Beskrestnov emphasized that the Starshield in-motion speed restrictions disrupt data transmission to Ukrainian drones used to intercept Russian piston engine-driven Geran drones since the helicopters fly faster than 160 kilometers per hour. Beskrestnov noted that the Starshield speed restrictions limit Ukraine’s jet-powered interceptor drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 19 that Ukraine continues to experience speed restrictions on Starlink and Starshield services in various sectors of the frontline that undermine Ukraine’s frontline logistics, intermediate-range strikes, and counter-drone air defense operations.[2] Starshield is a more secure, jam-resistant, and military-oriented version of the Starlink satellite network that SpaceX designed for government use, while Starlink serves civilian and commercial purposes.[3] Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or any other Starlink services over Russian territory, as SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to within Ukraine’s international borders.[4] Data from Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) between July 1, 2026, and October 19, 2026, indicates that the Starshield in-motion speed restriction, which Ukrainian forces first reported on October 14, has significantly degraded Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign targeting primarily Russian logistics across the frontline.

Zelensky stated on October 20 that the intelligence sharing with Ukraine for early warnings of Russian missile strikes “is now working.”[5] ISW observed that Ukrainian forces did not receive early warnings ahead of some Russian missile strikes overnight on October 12 to 13, October 13 to 14, and October 18 to 19.[6]

Ukrainian forces continue to publish further details about Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi – a counteroffensive operation that fundamentally disrupted the Russian campaign for Donetsk Oblast by defeating the northern pincer that the Russian military intended to use to encircle the Fortress Belt from the north. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi reported on October 19 that Ukrainian forces reached the Zherebets River, significantly shortening the frontline, and can defend along a convenient line with denser infantry concentrations and more advantageous drone and artillery positions.[7] Biletskyi added that Russian forces will have to cross the Zherebets River again to resume any future offensive operations in the Lyman direction. Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi successfully thwarted Russia‘s northern pincer in the Lyman direction, through which the Russian forces intended to bypass Lyman through Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman), ultimately linking in Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast, with a separate Russian encirclement effort from the southwest in the Dobropillya direction.[8] Biletskyi noted that Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi disrupted Russia’s campaign plan to conduct such an operational encirclement and forced Russian forces to adopt a frontal assault approach east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk – forcing Russian forces to attack head on the best-prepared Ukrainian defenses – an attack vector which will be far more difficult and costlier.[9]

Operation Vivaldi and other Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts in the Oleksandrivka and Kupyansk directions in 2026 have enabled Ukraine to contest the operational initiative across the frontline, virtually halting Russian advances.[10] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces suffered a net loss of 122 square kilometers between September 1, 2026, and October 16, 2026, and seized about 100 square kilometers since January 1, 2026.[11] Biletskyi reported on October 19 that Operation Vivaldi degraded the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), which was part of the Russian contingent previously operating from a bridgehead on the right (western) bank of the Zherebets River, to the extent that the division effectively ceased to exist as an organized military force.[12] Russian forces will have to reconstitute the 144th Motorized Rifle Division for any future offensive operations in the Lyman direction, which will impose further constraints on already costly Russian force generation. Russia has been facing increased combat losses since Summer 2026, with Russian forces losing over 40,000 killed and wounded in several months.[13] Russia’s voluntary recruitment force generation system that relies on contract recruitment has become increasingly costly, and, as average contract prices have significantly risen since 2022, to the point that Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly reluctantly considering ordering another unpopular involuntary reservist call-up.[14]

Senior Kremlin officials reaffirmed Russian support for Iran and explicitly defined the United States as Russia’s long-term adversary, despite the recent unilateral US concession to Moscow – offering Russia a diesel export waiver. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on October 19 during a press conference with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi that Russia and Iran share “similar or closely aligned” positions on most regional and international issues.[15] Lavrov also condemned US “illegal aggressive actions” and “unprovoked aggression” against Iran and emphasized that Russia “does not intend to abandon” its economic and investment agreements with Iran. Lavrov claimed that trade turnover between Russia and Iran increased by more than 10 percent in the first eight months of 2026. Lavrov’s statements reflect Russia’s commitment to existing and long-standing cooperation with Iran, including through technology sharing and assistance in the development of Iran’s nuclear programs.[16] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on his Max channel, a Russian messenger platform that requires Russian or Belarusian phone numbers for registration, on October 20 that Russia and the United States have been and will remain “systemic adversaries” and claimed that the Russia-US diesel deal only benefits the United States.[17] Lavrov’s and Medvedev’s statements demonstrate the Kremlin’s complete lack of sincere interest in normalizing relations with the United States and reaffirm the Kremlin’s continuous commitment to maintaining and deepening its long-standing cooperation with Iran.

Former Commander of the Ukrainian 60th Ingulets Separate Mechanized Brigade Major Dmytro Rohozyuk became the acting commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps (AC) while Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi continues to command Ukraine’s Center Group of Forces (GoF) in Donetsk’s Fortress Belt.[18] The 3rd AC emphasized that this new appointment means that Rohozyuk is the temporary acting commander of the 3rd AC and that Biletskyi has not permanently ceased his association with the 3rd AC by taking up a new command role over the new Ukrainian formation overseeing the defense of the eastern flank of the Fortress Belt.[19]

Ukrainian forces continue facing in-motion speed restrictions to SpaceX’s low-earth orbit satellite communication technology (Starlink and Starshield) that limits Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian piston engine-driven and jet-powered strike drones.

Ukrainian forces continue publishing further details about Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi – a counteroffensive operation that fundamentally disrupted the Russian campaign for Donetsk Oblast by defeating the northern pincer that the Russian military intended to use to encircle the Fortress Belt from the north.

Senior Kremlin officials reaffirmed Russian support for Iran and explicitly defined the United States as Russia’s long-term adversary, despite the recent unilateral US concession to Moscow – offering Russia a diesel export waiver.

Former Commander of the Ukrainian 60th Ingulets Separate Mechanized Brigade Major Dmytro Rohozyuk became the acting commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps (AC) while Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi continues to command Ukraine’s Center Group of Forces (GoF) in Donetsk’s Fortress Belt.

Russia launched 165 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces advanced east of Sumy City, and Russian forces advanced south of Orikhiv.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on October 19 to 20. Footage published on October 20 shows a large fire at the Nikolskoye Linear Production and Control Station (LPDS) in Novonikolskoye, Michurinsky Raion, Tambov Oblast (roughly 340 kilometers from the international border) following Ukrainian strikes, according to open-source intelligence (OSINT) Telegram channels.[20] Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshev acknowledged on October 20 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified business in Michurinsky Raion overnight.[21]

Russian technology companies are seeking regulatory relief under an emergency legal framework amid Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian data centers. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on October 20 that the Association of Internet Trade Companies (AKIT) sent a letter to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on October 15 requesting an emergency regulatory framework that would allow retailers to continue selling and shipping goods during disruptions to government information systems, registries, and communications networks.[22] AKIT sent the letter following Ukrainian drone strikes against Yandex data centers on October 8, 9, and 10; a Sberbank data center on October 13; and a VKontakte (VK) social media platform data center on October 18.[23] The letter proposes that the Russian government allow companies to temporarily accumulate transaction data without transmitting it to government systems and suspend penalties for missed data reporting deadlines. The letter also requests permission for Russian companies to temporarily store Russians’ personal data in data centers in “friendly” countries when affected companies cannot maintain operations within Russia. This letter is further indication that Ukrainian strikes against Russian digital infrastructure are having a substantive effect within the Russian business and digital environment, as Ukraine seeks to deny Russia the ability to fund its war in Ukraine.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Sumy City. Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions in a forested area northeast of Velyki Prykil (east of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 20 and in an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian forces struck Russian servicemembers north of Zemlyanyi Yar (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on October 19, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[26]

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 20 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 20 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[28]

Russian forces may be experiencing increased challenges in the Kupyansk direction, as the effects of Operational Vivaldi in the Lyman direction create cascading effects across other areas of the frontline. A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on October 20 that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction face significant challenges reinforcing and consolidating their positions due to the density of Ukrainian drones.[29] The source added that Russian reinforcements often travel along known routes, leading to Ukrainian drones interdicting them before they can arrive at forward positions. The source also reported that Russian forces operating near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) face a similarly challenging situation, but that Russian military command is not providing effective support to these personnel or facilitating their withdrawal.[30] Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction may be facing supply and manpower problems as the cascading effects of Operation Vivaldi become apparent, and units previously assigned to the Kupyansk direction are redeployed to address Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman.[31]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 19 and 20 but did not advance.[32]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

See topline text for further reporting on Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi and Ukrainian advances in the Lyman direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 19 and 20 but did not advance.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations in, west, and northwest of Kostyantynivka on October 19 and 20 but did not advance.[34]

Russian forces are continuing to intensify offensive operations towards Serhiivka (west of Pokrovsk).[35] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 20 that Russian forces have strengthened reserves in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) and have intensified offensive operations toward Serhiivka.[36] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces conducted multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) strikes against Serhiivka on October 19 and recently conducted a flag-raising mission in central Serhiivka. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces have intensified infiltration attempts in the area, prioritizing these missions during foggy and rainy conditions, despite these conditions also enabling Ukrainian forces to resupply their own frontline positions.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Dobropillya. Russian forces conducted a flag-raising mission at the DTEK Almazna Coal Mine in central Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on October 19, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 20.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 20.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions northwest and southwest of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember northeast of Novoselivka (southwest of Hulyaipole) and a Russian servicemember and equipment in central Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole), according to geolocated footage published on October 19, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[38]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to make exaggerated claims of advances in the Hulyaipole direction. The Russian MoD claimed on October 20 that the Russian Eastern GoF seized Tymoshivka (northwest of Hulyaipole and at least 12 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[39] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of Tymoshivka.[40] The Russian MoD and milbloggers’ reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[41]

Russian forces appear to be attempting mechanized and motorized assaults in the Hulyaipole direction. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on October 19 that Russian forces conducted motorized and mechanized assaults using motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), armored combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles over the past week. The commander noted that Russian forces are accelerating attempts to fulfill an exaggerated reality of Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.[42]

Russian forces recently advanced and conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Orikhiv. Russian forces recently advanced in southern Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on October 19.[43] Ukrainian forces struck Russian forces in central Novodanylivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 19, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 154th Separate Guards Reconnaissance Battalion (104th Airborne [VDV] Division) are operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[45] ISW last observed elements of the 154th Battalion operating in Kherson Oblast as of September 2024.[46]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 20.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[47]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 19 to 20, particularly targeting energy facilities in western Ukraine . The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 20 that Russian forces launched 165 Shahed- (including 105 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions overnight from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea; and the Sea of Azov.[48] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 115 drones (including 73 jet-powered ones), that unspecified air vehicles struck 30 locations, and that air vehicle debris fell on 13 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy facilities in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv oblasts, while Russian strikes caused electricity outages in Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Lviv, Odesa, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts.[49]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7819

[2] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-proviv-onlajn-zustrich-iz-dvopartijnoyu-ta-dvopala-106957; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2026/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[5] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2112631708608868714

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTu7TqGmyg0; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1431767-bileckij-pidsumuvav-vivaldi-so-rozkazav-pro-slovansk-kramatorsk-taemnicu-ta-uspih-na-lugansini/

[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTu7TqGmyg0; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1431767-bileckij-pidsumuvav-vivaldi-so-rozkazav-pro-slovansk-kramatorsk-taemnicu-ta-uspih-na-lugansini/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/

[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTu7TqGmyg0; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1431767-bileckij-pidsumuvav-vivaldi-so-rozkazav-pro-slovansk-kramatorsk-taemnicu-ta-uspih-na-lugansini/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/

[12] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/144-dyvizija-rf-vivaldi/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/

[15] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2155766/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2155766/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/94251 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/94246

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/why-you-cant-be-an-iran-hawk-and-a-russia-dove-2/ ; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The20Russia-Iran20Coalition20Deepens20013025.pdf

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/401202 ; https://ria dot ru/20261020/medvedev–2125539399.html ; https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/7230984/ ; https://tass dot ru/politika/28231869

[18] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/tretij-armijskyj-korpus-ocholyv-rogozyuk/; https://suspilne dot media/1431719-tretij-armijskij-korpus-otrimav-novogo-komandira-hto-takij-dmitro-rogozuk/

[19] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/andrij-biletskyj-uv-tsentr-zberigshy-posad/

[20] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33035; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2112422081195364645 https://t.me/supernova_plus/61723

[21] https://t.me/PervyshovEA/5150

[22] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/9042310

[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2026/

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[25] https://t.me/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT/24199; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13274

[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13270; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/4813

[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/37750

[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/37750; https://t.me/severnnyi/9663; https://t.me/grvZapad/20151; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42633

[29] https://t.me/grvZapad/20152

[30] https://t.me/grvZapad/20154

[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42633; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42630; https://t.me/grvZapad/20151

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42630

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42633 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42630 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37750

[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/20/%C2%ABvygaduye-%E2%80%9Eipsoshni%E2%80%9C-shtuchky-koly-ne%C2%A0mozhe-fizychno-zahopyty%C2%BB%C2%A0%E2%80%94-na%C2%A0pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-vidpravlyaye-shturmuvaty-v%C2%A0doshh/

[37] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2112457049288405261 ; https://t.me/yamorpeh/60

[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13268; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1336516088441241; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2838126699891880\; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2112249780818567316?s=20

[39] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28232747

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49020 ; https://t.me/sashakots/65264; https://t.me/voin_dv/21667

[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/

[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/19/%c2%abshtovhayut-vpered-cze%c2%a0pevna-agoniya%c2%bb%c2%a0%e2%80%94-na%c2%a0gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-%c2%abkvaplyatsya-i%c2%a0diyut-neoberezhno%c2%bb/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w

[43] https://x.com/klinger66/status/2112418656151822618; https://t.me/ombr65/864; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2112539574043828426

[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2112230882375614885; https://t.me/ombr65/864

[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/100746

[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_18/

[47] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[48] https://t.me/kpszsu/88680

[49] https://t.me/Taras_Pastukh/2094 ; https://t.me/onyshchuksvitlana/35229 ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/33744 ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/33747 ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/13011 ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5557 ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5558 ; https://t.me/dtek_ua/4653 ; https://t.me/dtek_ua/4656

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