Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2026

Ukrainian officials continue to report disruptions to US assistance to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 19 that Ukrainian forces continue to experience disruptions to Starlink and Starshield services on various sectors of the frontline.[1] Zelensky noted that Starshield-enabled Ukrainian drones stop functioning at a speed of between 130 and 161 kilometers per hour, affecting the operations of Ukrainian intermediate-range drones, jet-powered drone interceptors, and frontline logistics. Zelensky also stated that the United States supplies Ukraine with 12 Patriot ballistic missile interceptors per month and suggested the United States is delaying deliveries of Patriot interceptors purchased for Ukraine under the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 19 that Ukraine’s partners only provided advance warning for the second of two waves of Russian ballistic missile strikes overnight on October 18 to 19, amid continued reports that Ukraine is not receiving advance warnings of the first wave of ballistic missile strikes from partners.[3]

Devastating Russian drone and missile strikes on the night of October 18 to 19 heavily damaged energy and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine — killing at least four and wounding at least 55. [4] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 19 that Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles and Iskander-K cruise missiles and 269 strike (including 59 jet-powered) and decoy drones against Ukraine overnight on October 18 to 19.[5] These strikes follow intense Russian drone strikes during the day on October 18, in which Russian forces launched 463 Shahed and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol/Dan-T and Italmas loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones–likely in an effort to degrade Ukrainian air defenses in advance of the overnight strikes.[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 19 that Russian forces launched 16 ballistic missiles and over 200 drones (including jet-powered) primarily against Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast overnight, damaging residential, critical, and transportation infrastructure.[7] Russian forces also struck 28 substations and other energy infrastructure objects in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Ternopil, Odesa, and Rivne oblasts, causing power outages for approximately 550,000 households in 15 oblasts across Ukraine.[8] Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretsky stated on October 17 that Russia has conducted daily strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure since mid-July 2026, totaling 2,147 strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities since July 16.[9] Russia’s ongoing long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure continues to degrade Ukraine’s energy sector and disproportionately harms civilians.[10]

Daytime Russian strikes are also inflicting significant civilian casualties. Koretsky stated that Russian forces also struck a park with families in Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv Oblast, during the day on October 19, killing at least six people, including two children, and injuring at least 14.[11]

The Kremlin is reportedly pushing for a trilateral meeting between the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), likely as part of a dual-pronged effort to present itself as a diplomatic peer while supporting structures that challenge Western-led international organizations. The Wall Street Journal reported on October 19, citing people familiar with the discussions and a former Russian intelligence officer briefed on the matter, that Russian President Vladimir Putin used an October 9 phone call with US President Donald Trump to propose a trilateral summit with PRC President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the November 18-19 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit.[12] The people familiar with the discussions stated that Putin hopes to promote a resolution to the war in Ukraine that would favor Russia. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia is engaging in discussions about a potential meeting. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also acknowledged that these discussions continue, but stated that no such meeting has been finalized.[13] This proposed trilateral summit would allow Putin to push his vision for an end to the war in Ukraine on the international stage, framing Russia as a diplomatic peer to the United States and the PRC. The summit would also advance Putin’s concept of an alternative Eurasian security architecture — a vague idea that Putin has promoted since Spring 2024.[14] Putin continues using members of the Adversary Entente, including the PRC, as the base of this architecture, which aims at weakening NATO and the West.[15] Putin also likely intends to further improve his image to US President Donald Trump in an effort to extract unilateral concessions from the United States that favor Russia without taking meaningful steps to conclude a peace in Ukraine, and intends to do so by inserting Russia into the US-PRC relationship.

Recent aggressive Russian military satellite maneuvers are a continuation of Russia’s space policy against third country satellites since at least 2022. Russia recently maneuvered its Cosmos-2612 low earth orbit (LEO) satellite to within just 26 meters of ICEYE-X36, a Finnish-American operated high-resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite that is providing Ukrainian forces with imagery intelligence, on October 19 following a series of maneuvers beginning in late September 2026.[16] Russia maneuvered several of its military satellites (launched in April 2026) to follow ICEYE-X36 in late May 2026, likely in an effort to either inspect, interfere with, or collect intelligence from ICEYE-X36. [17] These most recent Russian satellite maneuvers are further evidence of Russia’s reckless and aggressive space policy and its willingness to interfere with US and allied satellites supporting Ukraine since 2022.[18]

Ukrainian officials continue to report disruptions to US assistance to Ukraine.

Devastating Russian drone and missile strikes on the night of October 18 to 19 heavily damaged energy and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine — killing at least four and wounding at least 55.

Daytime Russian strikes are also inflicting significant civilian casualties.

The Kremlin is reportedly pushing for a trilateral meeting between the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), likely as part of a dual-pronged effort to present itself as a diplomatic peer while supporting structures that challenge Western-led international organizations.

Recent aggressive Russian military satellite maneuvers are a continuation of Russia’s space policy against third country satellites since at least 2022.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman tactical area, east of Dobropillya, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources published updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) of Ukraine’s October 17 – 18 strikes against Russian digital, energy, and logistics infrastructure in St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, and October 10-11 strikes against digital infrastructure in Vladimir Oblast. Satellite imagery published on October 19 shows significant damage to the equipment of the Russian VKontakte (VK) social media platform data center near St. Petersburg (roughly 854 kilometers from the international border) after the October 17-18 Ukrainian strike.[19] Additional satellite imagery published on October 19 shows that the October 17-18 strikes damaged three oil storage tanks at the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal (roughly 856 kilometers from the international border) and damaged one RVS-1000 oil tank and destroyed one RVS-5000 oil tank at the Ruchyi Oil Depot in St. Petersburg (865 kilometers from the international border).[20] The satellite imagery also shows damage to the road surface of the Southern Fairway Bridge (roughly 860 kilometers from the international border) and the lifting section of the Finnish Railway Bridge (roughly 859 kilometers from the international border) after Ukrainian strikes. Additional satellite imagery published on October 19 shows that Ukraine’s October 10-11 strikes against a Yandex data center in Vladimir City, Vladimir Oblast (roughly 600 kilometers from the international border) damaged five of the data center’s eight buildings, likely causing critical damage.[21]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 18 and 19 but did not advance. [22]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian radar station near Trubchevsk, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 25 kilometers from the international border).[23] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian strikes against Russian radar stations create gaps in Russian forces’ radar field and weakens Russia’s air defenses, allowing Ukrainian forces to more effectively use unmanned systems for strikes against both the Russian near and deep rear.

Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 18 and 19 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City. [24]

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 19 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced. [25]

Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 18 and 19 but did not advance. [26]

Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian logistics in the Kupyansk direction are forcing Russian troops to walk on foot to reach the line of contact. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on October 19 that Russian infiltration groups have to travel between 15 and 20 kilometers on foot to reach the line of contact due to months-long Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian logistics in the area.[27]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Borova. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 19 that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Makiivka, and a Russian milblogger posted a map that acknowledged Ukrainian advances northwest of Makiivka.[28]

Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest

Additional reporting from Ukrainian and Russian sources continues to clarify the extent of Ukrainian gains during Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 19 that Ukrainian forces have likely pushed Russian forces out of Myrne (northeast of Lyman), are operating on the western outskirts of Yampolivka (east of Myrne on the east [left] bank of the Zherebets River), and advanced toward Ivanivka (north of Myrne) and Terny (southeast of Ivanivka).[29] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced into northern Zarichne (south of Myrne), fought in southern Zarichne, and have likely advanced to the east bank of the Zherebets River south of Torske (immediately east of Zarichne).[30] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces lost and recaptured some positions in southern Zarichne.[31] Mashovets assessed that Ukrainian forces have also likely advanced up to the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River south of Myrne.[32] Mashovets acknowledged that some Russian assault groups hold positions in the Stavky-Kolodyazi-Myrne-Zarichne area (northeast to north of Lyman) but that Ukrainian forces have reduced the number of remaining Russian soldiers in the area in the past few weeks. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces are clearing Russian infiltration groups from forest areas east of Lyman, and a Russian milblogger acknowledged Ukrainian gains in this area.[33] Mashovets noted that the pace of Russian offensive operations in the Lyman direction has slowed in the past two or three weeks (from about September 28 or October 5 to October 19).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk and Druzhkivka on October 18 and 19 but did not advance. [35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 72nd Unmanned Systems Brigade (Central Grouping of Forces) are operating near Kramatorsk, according to a Russian milblogger – the first time ISW has observed this unit operating on the frontline in Ukraine.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south

Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Druzhkivka on October 18 and 19 but did not advance. [37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Shakhove, according to geolocated footage published on October 18.[38]

Russian forces continue to prioritize the Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions despite sustaining heavy casualties in these areas. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on October 19 that Russian forces have been trying to advance along the same route towards Dobropillya since mid-spring 2026 despite sustaining heavy losses.[39] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting intense offensive operations and constant drone, aviation, and artillery strikes near Pokrovsk in order to achieve tactical successes, and that Ukrainian forces destroy between 40 and 50 Russian servicemembers daily during such assaults.[40] The spokesperson reported that Russian military commanders send dozens of servicemembers on flag-raising missions in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions and film propaganda videos to showcase alleged military successes. The spokesperson stated that foggy weather is disorienting Russian servicemembers and forcing them to walk to Ukrainian positions.

Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 19.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 19 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area. [41]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 18 and 19 but did not advance. [42]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions south of Zaporizhzhia City, as Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions southeast of Zaporizhzhia City and northeast of Orikhiv. Ukrainian forces recently cleared southwestern Malokaterynivka (south of Zaporizhzhia City) of Russian infiltrators contrary to Russian claims, according to geolocated footage published on October 18 that shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in central Malokaterynivka.[43] Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian position east of Stepnohirsk (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City), according to geolocated footage published on October 18, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[44] Russian forces also conducted a flag-raising mission in eastern Omelnyk (northeast of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on October 19, during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission and likely an effort to support the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) October 19 claim that Russian forces seized Omelnyk.[45] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the 38th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Omelnyk.[46]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 19.

Russia is reportedly using a new method to protect its shadow fleet vessels against Ukrainian strikes and European interception efforts. The Financial Times reported on October 19 that Russian shadow fleet tankers are likely coordinating “spoofing” efforts — a method of using identical devices on two separate vessels to transmit false Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel positions — to circumvent Western sanctions aimed at degrading Russian oil revenues and to avoid Ukrainian strikes.[47]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[48]

See topline text for information about Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21435; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2112167314451804582 [2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-18/zelenskyy-says-trump-is-pushing-ukraine-to-capitulate-to-russia [3] https://suspilne dot media/1430939-poperedzenna-pro-balistiku-na-kiiv-znovu-spersu-ne-nadijslo-vid-partneriv-prote-vdruge-voni-povidomlali-ignat/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/10/19/zminylysya-obstavyny-v-osnovnomu-pogodni-umovy-vidsotok-zbyttya-vorozhyh-reaktyvnyh-droniv-i-dali-zrostaye/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VFtoqKu1VAo; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/; https://www.google.com/goto?url=CAESpgEB6zswFYJO8hwV139dQnsmKVN1cAbLPkY1D6hBq-nMiE8a-idH_plmwDwA1xP69AUo5dbGuyKaO7BKOlsXcZgkcbXwSzNI85EdAFvpD7-KgignlYCvSlNFwQflzuMPA3K3bBP0CxM_TpwQX7N6D1d-KXldOq_v6JQE4gLfVPG4AMels73gnkUQzo1SA72TtK-go-M-Ktr3mJBmG8SqeMlcVPDni3p6 [4] https://kyivindependent dot com/3-killed-53-injured-in-russian-attacks-across-ukraine-over-past-day-as-550-000-households-lose-power/ [5] https://t.me/kpszsu/88273 [6] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42629 [7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21425; 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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2024 [16] https://www.iceye.com/newsroom/press-releases/ukraine-expands-partnership-with-iceye; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-satellite-kosmos-2612-closes-to-within-26-meters-of-iceye-x36-during-pursuit/; https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-russia-be-poised-use-orbit-weapon-against-commercial-satellite [17] https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Display/Article/4297159/space-threat-fact-sheet/; https://natlawreview.com/press-releases/russian-satellites-maneuver-co-planar-finnish-sar-satellite-supporting [18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-25/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-8/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/; [19] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/181; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2026/ [20] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/176; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2026/ [21] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2112086174114218166?s=20 ; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2112143585533698544?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/ [22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42623; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42625; https://t.me/wargonzo/37730; https://t.me/dva_majors/100668; https://t.me/severnnyi/9655 [23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42628 [24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42625 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9655 [25] https://t.me/wargonzo/37730 [26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42623 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42625 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20145 [27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/19/pihota-prosto-lyagaye-v-spalnyk-i-spyt-pid-kushhamy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorozhyh-shturmovykiv-zamuchuyut/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w [28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3655 ; https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=49.23034599560942%2C38.01591137586949&z=12 [29] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3655 [30] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3655; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3657 [31] https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.60944340613919%2C37.89403590940674&z=10; https://t.me/dva_majors/100660; https://t.me/grvZapad/20145 [32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3655 [33] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3655; https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.60944340613919%2C37.89403590940674&z=10 [34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3657 [35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42623 ; 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https://x.com/Vlad_23456/status/2111915413315473573?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/ [44] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2112157141469458455 ; https://www.instagram.com/reels/DerHpvyMSat/ ; https://x.com/matej0210110461/status/2112158890242585054 [45] https://t.me/voin_dv/21650 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3706 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13262 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2112096008952054240 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/68334 [46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48965 [47] https://www.ft.com/content/f9dd0c26-3de3-4ecc-8a08-7d08f0946d08?syn-25a6b1a6=1 [48] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

乌克兰官员持续报告美国对乌克兰的援助中断。乌克兰总统泽连斯基10月19日报告称，乌克兰军队在多个前线区域持续遭遇“星链”（Starlink）和“星盾”（Starshield）服务中断。[1] 泽连斯基指出，配备“星盾”系统的乌克兰无人机在时速130至161公里之间时停止运行，影响乌克兰中程无人机、喷气式无人机拦截器以及前线后勤保障的运作。泽连斯基还表示，美国每月向乌克兰提供12枚“爱国者”（Patriot）弹道导弹拦截器，并暗示美国正在推迟交付根据“优先乌克兰需求清单”（PURL）计划为乌克兰购买的“爱国者”拦截器。[2]乌克兰空军发言人尤里·伊格纳特上校于 10 月 19 日表示，乌克兰的伙伴只提前预警了 10 月 18 日至 19 日夜间俄罗斯两波弹道导弹袭击中的第二波，而不断有报道称，乌克兰没有收到伙伴对第一波弹道导弹袭击的预警。[3]

10月18日至19日夜间，俄罗斯无人机和导弹对乌克兰发动毁灭性袭击，严重破坏了乌克兰各地的能源和民用基础设施，造成至少4人死亡，至少55人受伤。[4] 乌克兰空军于10月19日报告称，俄罗斯在10月18日至19日夜间向乌克兰发射了数量不详的“伊斯坎德尔-M”和“S-400”弹道导弹、“伊斯坎德尔-K”巡航导弹以及269架攻击无人机（包括59架喷气式无人机）和诱饵无人机。[5] 此前，俄罗斯在10月18日白天也发动了密集的无人机袭击，俄军发射了463架“沙赫德”和“非洲菊”型攻击无人机、“班德罗尔/丹-T”和“伊塔尔马斯”巡飞弹以及“帕罗迪亚”型诱饵无人机——这很可能是为了在夜间袭击前削弱乌克兰的防空能力。[6]乌克兰总统泽连斯基于10月19日表示，俄罗斯军队连夜向基辅市和基辅州发射了16枚弹道导弹和200多架无人机（包括喷气式无人机），破坏了居民区、关键基础设施和交通基础设施。[7] 俄罗斯军队还袭击了文尼察州、沃伦州、基洛沃格勒州、基辅市、尼古拉耶夫州、日托米尔州、赫梅利尼茨基州、哈尔科夫州、捷尔诺波尔州、敖德萨州和罗夫诺州的28个变电站和其他能源基础设施，导致乌克兰15个州的约55万户家庭停电。[8] 乌克兰总理科列茨基于10月17日表示，自2026年7月中旬以来，俄罗斯每天都对乌克兰能源基础设施进行袭击，自7月16日以来，已对乌克兰能源设施进行了2147次袭击。[9]俄罗斯持续对乌克兰能源基础设施进行远程打击，这进一步削弱了乌克兰的能源部门，并对平民造成了不成比例的伤害。[10]

俄罗斯白天的空袭也造成了大量平民伤亡。科列茨基表示，10 月 19 日白天，俄罗斯军队还袭击了哈尔科夫州新沃多拉哈的一个公园，那里有家庭，造成至少 6 人死亡，其中包括 2 名儿童，另有至少 14 人受伤。[11]

据报道，克里姆林宫正力推美国、俄罗斯和中华人民共和国（中国）举行三方会晤，这很可能是其双管齐下策略的一部分：一方面，它希望将自身塑造成外交上的平等伙伴；另一方面，它又希望支持那些挑战西方主导的国际组织的机构。《华尔街日报》10月19日援引知情人士和一位了解此事的俄罗斯前情报官员的话报道称，俄罗斯总统普京在10月9日与美国总统特朗普的通话中提议，在11月18日至19日举行的亚太经合组织（APEC）峰会期间，与中国国家主席习近平举行三方峰会。[12] 知情人士表示，普京希望推动一项有利于俄罗斯的乌克兰战争解决方案。克里姆林宫发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫表示，俄罗斯正在就此次潜在会晤进行磋商。美国国务卿马可·卢比奥也承认相关磋商仍在进行，但他表示，尚未最终确定会晤日期。[13]此次拟议的三方峰会将使普京能够在国际舞台上推行其结束乌克兰战争的愿景，并将俄罗斯塑造成与美国和中国地位相当的外交伙伴。峰会还将推进普京提出的“欧亚安全架构”构想——这一模糊的概念自2024年春季以来一直被普京提出。[14] 普京继续利用包括中国在内的“敌对联盟”成员国作为这一架构的基础，其目标是削弱北约和西方。[15] 普京可能还希望进一步改善其在美国总统唐纳德·特朗普眼中的形象，以期从美国获得有利于俄罗斯的单方面让步，而无需采取任何实质性措施来解决乌克兰问题。他打算通过将俄罗斯纳入美中关系来实现这一目标。

近期俄罗斯咄咄逼人的军用卫星机动行动，是俄罗斯自至少2022年以来针对第三国卫星太空政策的延续。俄罗斯于2026年10月19日将其“宇宙-2612”低地球轨道（LEO）卫星机动至距离ICEYE-X36仅26米处。ICEYE-X36是一颗由芬兰和美国运营的高分辨率合成孔径雷达（SAR）卫星，为乌克兰军队提供图像情报。此前，俄罗斯自2026年9月下旬开始进行了一系列机动行动。[16] 2026年5月下旬，俄罗斯又调动了数颗于2026年4月发射的军用卫星跟踪ICEYE-X36，其目的可能是为了检查、干扰或收集ICEYE-X36的情报。 [17] 俄罗斯最近的卫星机动进一步证明了俄罗斯鲁莽和咄咄逼人的太空政策，以及自 2022 年以来俄罗斯干预美国及其盟国支持乌克兰的卫星的意愿。[18]

乌克兰官员持续报告称，美国对乌克兰的援助遭到中断。

10 月 18 日至 19 日夜间，俄罗斯无人机和导弹袭击对乌克兰造成毁灭性破坏，严重损毁了乌克兰各地的能源和民用基础设施——造成至少 4 人死亡，至少 55 人受伤。

俄罗斯白天发动的空袭也造成了大量平民伤亡。

据报道，克里姆林宫正在推动美国、俄罗斯和中华人民共和国（中国）举行三方会晤，这可能是其双管齐下努力的一部分，一方面将自己塑造成外交上的平等伙伴，另一方面支持挑战西方主导的国际组织的机构。

近期俄罗斯咄咄逼人的军事卫星行动，是俄罗斯自2022年以来针对第三国卫星的太空政策的延续。

乌克兰军队最近在多布罗皮利亚以东的莱曼战术区和扎波罗热州西部取得了进展。

我们不会详细报道俄罗斯的战争罪行，因为西方媒体已对此进行充分报道，而且这些罪行不会直接影响我们正在评估和预测的军事行动。我们将继续评估并报道这些犯罪活动对乌克兰军队和乌克兰民众的影响，特别是对乌克兰城市地区战斗的影响。我们强烈谴责俄罗斯违反武装冲突法和日内瓦公约的行为以及反人类罪行，尽管我们并未在这些报告中详细描述这些罪行。

乌克兰在俄罗斯联邦的行动

开源情报（OSINT）来源发布了乌克兰10月17日至18日对圣彼得堡、列宁格勒州俄罗斯数字、能源和后勤基础设施以及10月10日至11日对弗拉基米尔州数字基础设施的袭击的最新战场破坏评估（BDA）。10月19日发布的卫星图像显示，在10月17日至18日乌克兰的袭击之后，位于圣彼得堡附近（距国际边界约854公里）的俄罗斯VKontakte（VK）社交媒体平台数据中心的设备遭到严重破坏。[19] 10月19日公布的更多卫星图像显示，10月17日至18日的袭击损坏了圣彼得堡石油码头（距国际边界约856公里）的三个储油罐，并损坏了圣彼得堡鲁奇石油仓库（距国际边界865公里）的一个RVS-1000型储油罐，摧毁了一个RVS-5000型储油罐。[20] 卫星图像还显示，乌克兰袭击后，南部航道桥（距国际边界约860公里）的路面和芬兰铁路桥（距国际边界约859公里）的升降段也遭到破坏。10月19日公布的更多卫星图像显示，乌克兰10月10日至11日对弗拉基米尔州弗拉基米尔市（距国际边界约600公里）的Yandex数据中心的袭击损坏了该数据中心八栋建筑中的五栋，可能造成了严重破坏。[21]

俄罗斯的支持行动：北方轴心国

10月18日和19日，俄军在苏梅州北部进行了有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[22]

乌克兰军队继续对布良斯克州境内的俄罗斯军事目标进行中程打击。乌克兰总参谋部10月19日报告称，乌克兰军队袭击了位于布良斯克州特鲁布切夫斯克附近的一座俄罗斯雷达站（距国际边界约25公里）。[23] 乌克兰总参谋部指出，乌克兰对俄罗斯雷达站的打击会在俄罗斯军队的雷达场中制造缺口，削弱俄罗斯的防空能力，从而使乌克兰军队能够更有效地利用无人系统对俄罗斯近后方和纵深目标进行打击。

俄罗斯的支持行动：哈尔科夫州

10月18日和19日，俄军继续在哈尔科夫州北部发动进攻，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在哈尔科夫市东北部发动了反击。[24]

10 月 19 日，一位俄罗斯军事博主声称，俄军继续在韦利基布尔鲁克方向进行有限的进攻行动，但 ISW 没有观察到俄军推进的证据。[25]

俄罗斯的支持行动：奥斯基尔河

10月18日和19日，俄军继续在库皮扬斯克方向进行有限的进攻行动，但没有取得进展。[26]

乌克兰无人机对库皮扬斯克方向的俄罗斯后勤设施发动袭击，迫使俄罗斯军队徒步前往接触线。10月19日，在库皮扬斯克方向作战的乌克兰营副营长报告称，由于乌克兰无人机对该地区俄罗斯后勤设施进行了长达数月的袭击，俄罗斯渗透小组不得不徒步行进15至20公里才能到达接触线。[27]

乌克兰军队最近向博罗瓦东南方向推进。乌克兰军事观察员科斯蒂安廷·马绍韦茨于 10 月 19 日报告称，乌克兰军队向马基伊夫卡方向推进，一位俄罗斯军事博主发布了一张地图，证实了乌克兰军队向马基伊夫卡西北方向的推进。[28]

俄罗斯主要行动：夺取乌克兰要塞带并完成对顿涅茨克州的占领

俄军下属主要行动一：从西北方向包围要塞带

来自乌克兰和俄罗斯方面的更多报道继续阐明了乌克兰在“维瓦尔第行动”中于莱曼方向取得的进展。乌克兰军事观察员科斯蒂安廷·马绍韦茨于10月19日报告称，乌克兰军队可能已将俄军逐出米尔内（莱曼东北部），正在扬波利夫卡西部郊区（米尔内以东，热列别茨河东岸）作战，并向伊万尼夫卡（米尔内以北）和捷尔尼（伊万尼夫卡东南）推进。[29] 马绍韦茨指出，乌克兰军队推进至扎里奇内北部（米尔内以南），在扎里奇内南部作战，并可能已推进至托尔斯克以南（扎里奇内正东）的热列别茨河东岸。[30] 俄罗斯军事博客作者也声称，俄军在扎里奇内南部失守并重新夺回了一些阵地。[31]马绍韦茨评估认为，乌克兰军队可能已经推进到米尔内以南的杰列别茨河西岸（右岸）。[32] 马绍韦茨承认，一些俄罗斯突击队在斯塔夫基-科洛迪亚齐-米尔内-扎里奇内地区（莱曼东北部至北部）占据阵地，但乌克兰军队在过去几周内减少了该地区剩余的俄罗斯士兵人数。马绍韦茨报告称，乌克兰军队正在清除莱曼以东森林地区的俄罗斯渗透部队，一位俄罗斯军事博客作者也证实了乌克兰在该地区取得的进展。[33] 马绍韦茨指出，过去两到三周（大约从9月28日或10月5日到10月19日），俄罗斯在莱曼方向的进攻步伐有所放缓。[34]

俄军第二主力行动——从东面进攻要塞带

10月18日和19日，俄军继续在斯拉维扬斯克和德鲁日基夫卡以东地区发动进攻，但没有取得进展。[35]

作战序列：据一位俄罗斯军事博主称，俄罗斯第 72 无人系统旅（中央部队群）的部分兵力正在克拉马托尔斯克附近作战——这是 ISW 首次观察到该部队在乌克兰前线作战。[36]

俄军下属主要行动#3——从南部向要塞带推进

10月18日和19日，俄军继续在德鲁日基夫卡以东和东南方向发动进攻，但没有取得进展。[37]

俄军下属主要行动#4——从西南方向包围要塞带

根据 10 月 18 日发布的地理定位视频显示，乌克兰军队最近向多布罗皮利亚以东推进。乌克兰军队最近向沙霍韦西北推进。[38]

尽管在多布罗皮利亚和波克罗夫斯克方向遭受了重大伤亡，俄军仍继续将这两个方向列为优先作战目标。10月19日，一支在多布罗皮利亚方向作战的乌克兰旅报告称，自2026年春季中期以来，俄军一直试图沿同一路线向多布罗皮利亚推进，尽管损失惨重。[39] 另一支在波克罗夫斯克方向作战的乌克兰旅发言人报告称，俄军正在波克罗夫斯克附近进行猛烈的进攻行动，并持续进行无人机、航空兵和炮兵打击，以取得战术上的胜利。乌克兰军队在这些打击行动中每天击毙40至50名俄军士兵。[40] 该发言人还报告称，俄军指挥官派遣数十名士兵在波克罗夫斯克和多布罗皮利亚方向执行升旗任务，并拍摄宣传视频，以展示所谓的军事胜利。发言人表示，大雾天气导致俄罗斯军人迷失方向，迫使他们步行前往乌克兰阵地。

俄罗斯支援行动：进军第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克州

10 月 19 日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告新巴甫洛夫卡方向有地面活动。

10 月 19 日，俄军继续在奥列克桑德里夫卡方向进行有限的进攻行动，但并未取得进展，因为乌克兰军队在该地区进行了反击。[41]

俄罗斯的支持行动：南方轴心

10月18日和19日，俄军在胡利亚波列方向发动进攻，但没有取得进展。[42]

近期，乌克兰军队在扎波罗热市以南推进或巩固了阵地，与此同时，俄罗斯军队在扎波罗热市东南和奥里希夫东北部进行了渗透行动。根据10月18日发布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队近期清除了扎波罗热市以南马洛卡捷琳尼夫卡西南部的俄罗斯渗透者，该视频显示乌克兰军队在马洛卡捷琳尼夫卡市中心升起了一面旗帜。[43] 根据10月18日发布的地理定位视频，乌克兰军队近期袭击了扎波罗热市东南斯捷普诺戈尔斯克以东的俄罗斯阵地，ISW评估认为这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动。[44]根据 10 月 19 日发布的地理定位视频显示，俄罗斯军队还在奥梅尔尼克东部（奥里希夫东北部）进行了一次升旗行动。ISW 评估认为，这是一次俄罗斯渗透行动，很可能是为了支持俄罗斯国防部 10 月 19 日关于俄罗斯军队占领奥梅尔尼克的说法。[45] 一位俄罗斯军事博主将奥梅尔尼克的占领归功于第 38 近卫摩托化步兵旅（第 35 合成集团军，东部军区）的部分兵力。[46]

10月19日，俄罗斯和乌克兰方面均未报告赫尔松方向有地面活动。

据报道，俄罗斯正在使用一种新方法来保护其影子舰队免受乌克兰的打击和欧洲的拦截行动。《金融时报》10月19日报道称，俄罗斯影子舰队的油轮可能正在协调“欺骗”行动——即在两艘不同的船上使用相同的设备来传输虚假的自动识别系统（AIS）船舶位置——以规避旨在削弱俄罗斯石油收入的西方制裁，并避免乌克兰的打击。[47]

俄罗斯空袭、导弹和无人机行动

注：自 8 月 11 日起，乌克兰军方停止定期报告俄罗斯发射的导弹数量和拦截的导弹数量。[48]

有关俄罗斯对乌克兰发动袭击的信息，请参见正文。

白俄罗斯的重大活动

没有什么重大事项需要报告。

注：ISW 不接收任何来源的机密材料，仅使用公开信息，并广泛参考俄罗斯、乌克兰和西方媒体的报道和社交媒体，以及市售卫星图像和其他地理空间数据作为报告的基础。所有参考资料均列于每份更新报告的尾注中。

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