Brazil’s left reinvented the right’s online playbook. It helped Lula win巴西左翼重新演绎了右翼的网络策略,这帮助卢拉赢得了选举。
For three weeks in October, Veridiana Cunha became a so-called “soldier” for a digital army fighting to reelect Brazil’s leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

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For three weeks in October, Veridiana Cunha became a so-called “soldier” for a digital army fighting to reelect Brazil’s leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva .
Every few minutes, the 48-year-old would interrupt her day job in São Paulo as a copy editor and check WhatsApp for new instructions. She even reactivated an Instagram account she hadn’t used since 2022 and learned how to post on X for the first time for the cause.
“I’d edit a text, then go to the army. Edit another text, then go to the army,” she told CNN of a WhatsApp channel, led by Congressman André Janones, that became a virtual campaign headquarters during the final weeks of Brazil’s presidential campaign.
Cunha was one of millions of Brazilians who joined the channel called “Lula’s Army.” Their mission: to reverse Lula’s first-round defeat on October 4 to the right-wing senator Flávio Bolsonaro, scion of former President Jair Bolsonaro.
And they succeeded. Lula won the election on October 25 , which analysts partly attribute to the eleventh-hour strategy of harnessing a digital playbook long associated with Brazil’s right of using WhatsApp to amplify political messaging and mobilize voters.
From coordinated social media campaigns to reclaiming national symbols, the online strategy mobilized many to vote for Lula, in an effort that experts say offers a striking example of how the Brazilian left learned to fight the right on its turf.
WhatsApp is a powerful force in Brazilian politics. Jair Bolsonaro’s s uccessful presidential campaign in 2018 was supported by extensive networks of private groups that spread videos, political messages and disinformation.
Amanda Perobelli/Reuters
But ahead of the October 4, first-round vote, Lula’s campaign had struggled to compete with the right’s digital operation. While Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign had long made social media a central part of its strategy, Lula’s team underestimated its importance, according to Lucas Fernandes, a political analyst at BMJ Consultores Associados.
“The right understood this and applied it on several fronts, not just to Flávio’s candidacy, while the left failed to make that transition,” Fernandes said, highlighting social media as one of the key factors for Flávio’s victory in the first round.
That changed after Lula’s defeat when Janones, 42, emerged as a central figure in this new playbook.
The congressman for the state of Minas Gerais created the WhatsApp channel in April. After Lula’s first-round loss to Bolsonaro, Janones transformed it into a virtual command center, issuing coordinated instructions to supporters who were suddenly confronting the possibility of losing the presidency .
Viktor Chagas, a professor at Fluminense Federal University who researches political communication, described Janones as a politician who “fights the far right with the same resources it uses,” resorting to emotionally charged messages, aggressive language and, at times, content of dubious origin.
It was a strategy he deployed on the channel, which saw it swell from 50,000 followers before the first-round vote to nearly 11 million in three weeks as Janones rallied supporters to help Lula stage a historic comeback.
Within Congress, Janones is known for his combative style, which he dubbed “cultural Janonism,” adopting tactics associated with Bolsonarism, according to Chagas. This included provocative language, emotionally charged posts, and attacks on his adversaries. It also turned Janones into a polarizing figure, who last year was suspended by Congress for three months for offensive statements against another combative lawmaker, the right-wing politician Nikolas Ferreira.
Through videos, audio messages and social media posts, Janones instructed his followers to promote hashtags, comment on livestreams, share videos, like posts, publish photos making the “L” hand gesture in support of Lula, and recruit new members.
He called for a panelaço — a traditional Brazilian form of protest in which people bang pots and pans — during Flávio Bolsonaro’s highly anticipated interview on TV Globo, as a way to boycott the broadcast. Janones also urged supporters to avoid commenting on opponents’ posts, warning that engaging with their content could inadvertently boost its visibility through social media algorithms.
The pace was so intense that Janones went so far as to condemn resting unless the “soldier” could find a replacement for the “missions.” On October 17, he wrote on the channel: “If there is a substitute soldier, the change is authorized. Pass him the cell phone. Rest and come back in ten minutes.”
Chagas described the strategy as a form of “gamification,” which fostered a sense of collective purpose. According to the academic, that structure gave progressive digital activism a level of coordination that had been absent even during Lula’s successful campaign in 2022.
Bolsonaro’s strategy focused on disseminating content from a few major influencers, while “Lula’s Army” had a centralized command that instructed its members to create and disseminate their own content as well as official lines.
Janones not only told them what to share but taught them how to do it, experts noted.
Leonardo Magalhães Firmino, chief executive of research firm IPSE Global, compared the method to training thousands of small social media managers.
But the rise in online activity also raised concerns about misinformation. In one widely circulated image by the left, Brazilian soccer legend Ronaldo appears to be wearing a national team jersey bearing Lula’s ballot number, 13, and making the “L” gesture. The image was manipulated by artificial intelligence and posted by a Colombian artist, according to Brazilian fact-checking outlet Agência Lupa. Ronaldo’s representatives said it had been used without his authorization.
While Janones’ tactics tend to pursue democratic ends, Chagas argues that they could also degrade public debate by reducing complex political discussions to a constant confrontation.
CNN reached out to Janones, who has previously denied spreading disinformation, for comment.
Pablo Porciuncula/AFP/Getty Images
On the channel, Janones called himself “general,” assigned daily “missions” to Lula’s supporters, and urged them to take the campaign beyond their own social media.
The tactics frustrated Bolsonaro’s supporters. On October 11, a supreme court judge ordered the suspension of the WhatsApp group following a complaint by Bolsonaro’s campaign for alleged disinformation. The decision was later overturned.
Lula’s victory was decided by factors beyond the digital battle : electoral participation, the redistribution of votes from eliminated candidates, and geographical changes in support for candidates .
But Janones’ online mobilization was fundamental to Lula’s victory, says Firmino.
“I have no doubt. Without that, I don’t think the comeback would have happened,” he told CNN. “He organized the militancy, he gave them a method. I think that’s the main point.”
According to Firmino, the right underestimated Janones’ strategy, saying that he only spoke with Lula supporters . But that was the point: the goal was to speak directly with the “soldiers” who were already converted, not the undecided.
The “soldiers” were the ones who would take the message beyond the channel and to their family, friends, undecided voters, and those thinking about abstaining, he said.
For Cunha, the missions meant much more than a political cause. Her mother, a longtime Lula supporter, became seriously ill in August and she spent weeks by her side in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, so she did not vote in the first round. Back in São Paulo for work, she needed a distraction and a purpose, which she found in digital mobilization.
“The Army saved Brazil, it saved Lula and it saved me a little too,” she said. Participating in the campaign allowed her to feel closer to her mother and continue fighting for a cause they both shared.
But one of her greatest satisfactions came on election day, when a friend, who was thinking of abstaining, finally went to the polls and voted for Lula. “I managed to change a vote,” Cunha said.
No one can determine how many stories like hers translated into additional votes on a national scale. But for Cunha, the victory had an unexpected consequence: After three weeks spent almost entirely campaigning, getting back to normal proved harder than she imagined.
“I think we’re living through a kind of post-traumatic stress from the Army, like we’ve really gone to war,” she said. “We’re exhausted, but we want more missions. We feel like we can conquer the world.”
Rodrigo Paiva/Getty Images
10 月份的三个星期里,维里迪亚娜·库尼亚成为了一支数字军队的所谓“战士”,这支军队致力于帮助巴西左翼总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦连任。
这位48岁的女子每隔几分钟就会放下她在圣保罗的文字编辑工作,查看WhatsApp上的最新指示。她甚至为了这项事业重新激活了自2022年以来就没用过的Instagram账号,并第一次学习如何在X平台上发帖。
“我会编辑一条短信,然后去服兵役。再编辑一条短信,然后去服兵役,”她告诉 CNN,在巴西总统竞选的最后几周,由国会议员安德烈·雅诺内斯领导的一个 WhatsApp 频道成为了一个虚拟竞选总部。
库尼亚是加入名为“卢拉军团”频道的数百万巴西人之一。他们的使命是:扭转卢拉在10月4日首轮选举中败给右翼参议员弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗(前总统雅伊尔·博尔索纳罗之子)的局面。
他们成功了。卢拉在10月25日赢得了选举,分析人士认为,这部分归功于他在最后一刻采取的策略,即利用长期以来与巴西右翼相关的数字策略——使用WhatsApp来扩大政治信息传播和动员选民。
从协调一致的社交媒体宣传活动到重新夺回国家象征,这一网络策略动员了许多人投票支持卢拉。专家表示,这一努力提供了一个引人注目的例子,说明巴西左翼是如何学会在其地盘上与右翼作斗争的。
WhatsApp在巴西政坛拥有强大的影响力。雅伊尔·博尔索纳罗在2018年总统竞选中的成功,离不开庞大的私人群组网络的支持,这些群组传播视频、政治信息和虚假信息。
阿曼达·佩罗贝利/路透社
但在10月4日首轮投票前,卢拉的竞选团队一直难以与右翼的数字化运作抗衡。BMJ Consultores Associados的政治分析师卢卡斯·费尔南德斯表示,虽然弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗的竞选团队长期以来一直将社交媒体作为其战略的核心组成部分,但卢拉的团队低估了社交媒体的重要性。
费尔南德斯说:“右翼理解了这一点,并将其运用到多个方面,不仅仅是弗拉维奥的候选资格,而左翼却未能完成这种转变。”他强调,社交媒体是弗拉维奥在第一轮选举中获胜的关键因素之一。
卢拉战败后,情况发生了变化,42岁的雅诺内斯成为这套新战术体系的核心人物。
米纳斯吉拉斯州的国会议员在四月份创建了这个WhatsApp频道。在卢拉首轮败给博索纳罗后,亚诺内斯将其改造成一个虚拟指挥中心,向突然面临失去总统宝座可能性的支持者们发布协调一致的指示。
弗鲁米嫩塞联邦大学研究政治传播的教授维克托·查加斯将亚诺内斯描述为一位“用极右势力所用的资源与之对抗”的政治家,他诉诸于情绪化的言论、攻击性的语言,有时甚至使用来源可疑的内容。
这是他在频道上采取的策略,在第一轮投票前,频道粉丝只有 5 万,但在三周内,粉丝数量就激增至近 1100 万,因为 Janones 动员支持者帮助 Lula 上演了历史性的复出。
在国会内部,贾诺内斯以其好斗的风格而闻名,他称之为“文化贾诺内斯主义”,并采用了与博尔索纳里主义相关的策略,查加斯指出。这包括使用挑衅性语言、发表情绪激烈的帖子以及攻击对手。这也使贾诺内斯成为一个极具争议的人物,去年他因发表针对另一位好斗的议员——右翼政客尼古拉斯·费雷拉的冒犯性言论而被国会停职三个月。
Janones 通过视频、音频信息和社交媒体帖子,指示他的追随者推广话题标签、评论直播、分享视频、点赞帖子、发布做出“L”手势以支持 Lula 的照片,并招募新成员。
在弗拉维奥·博尔索纳罗备受瞩目的环球电视台采访期间,他呼吁民众以敲击锅碗瓢盆的方式进行抗议——这是一种传统的巴西抗议形式。贾诺内斯还敦促支持者不要评论反对者的帖子,并警告说,与他们的内容互动可能会无意中通过社交媒体算法提高其曝光率。
节奏如此之快,以至于雅诺内斯甚至谴责休息,除非“士兵”能找到人替他执行“任务”。10月17日,他在频道上写道:“如果有替补士兵,换人是允许的。把手机给他。休息一下,十分钟后再回来。”
查加斯将这种策略描述为一种“游戏化”形式,它培养了一种集体目标感。这位学者认为,这种结构赋予了进步派数字行动主义一种协调性,而这种协调性甚至在卢拉2022年成功竞选期间都未曾出现过。
博索纳罗的策略侧重于传播少数主要影响者的内容,而“卢拉军团”则有一个集中指挥部,指示其成员创建和传播自己的内容以及官方立场。
专家指出,雅诺内斯不仅告诉他们要分享什么,还教他们如何分享。
研究公司 IPSE Global 的首席执行官 Leonardo Magalhães Firmino 将这种方法比作培训数千名小型社交媒体经理。
但网络活动的激增也引发了人们对虚假信息的担忧。在一张被左翼广泛传播的图片中,巴西足球传奇人物罗纳尔多似乎身穿印有卢拉选票号码13的国家队球衣,并做出了“L”手势。据巴西事实核查机构Agência Lupa报道,这张图片是由人工智能篡改,并由一位哥伦比亚艺术家发布。罗纳尔多的代表表示,这张图片未经他授权就被使用。
尽管 Janones 的策略倾向于追求民主目标,但 Chagas 认为,这些策略也可能将复杂的政治讨论简化为持续不断的对抗,从而损害公共辩论。
CNN联系了此前否认散布虚假信息的贾诺内斯,希望他能对此发表评论。
Pablo Porciuncula/AFP/Getty Images
在频道上,贾诺内斯自称“将军”,每天给卢拉的支持者布置“任务”,并敦促他们将竞选活动扩展到他们自己的社交媒体之外。
这些策略令博索纳罗的支持者感到沮丧。10月11日,最高法院一名法官在博索纳罗竞选团队投诉该WhatsApp群组涉嫌散布虚假信息后,下令暂停该群组的使用。但该决定后来被推翻。
卢拉的胜利是由数字战场之外的因素决定的:选举参与率、被淘汰候选人的选票重新分配以及候选人支持率的地域变化。
菲尔米诺表示,雅诺内斯的网络动员对卢拉的胜利至关重要。
“我对此毫不怀疑。如果没有他,我认为他们不可能东山再起,”他告诉CNN。“他组织了武装力量,他给了他们一种方法。我认为这才是关键所在。”
菲尔米诺认为,右翼低估了亚诺内斯的策略,声称他只与卢拉的支持者交谈。但这正是关键所在:目标是直接与那些已经转变立场的“战士”对话,而不是与那些摇摆不定的人对话。
他说,这些“战士”会将信息传递到频道之外,传递给他们的家人、朋友、尚未决定投票意向的选民以及那些考虑弃权的人。
对库尼亚来说,这些行动的意义远不止于政治层面。她的母亲是卢拉的长期支持者,8月份身患重病,库尼亚在巴西米纳斯吉拉斯州陪伴母亲数周,因此错过了第一轮投票。回到圣保罗工作后,她需要一些事情来分散注意力,也需要找到新的目标,而她最终在数字动员中找到了答案。
“军队拯救了巴西,拯救了卢拉,也拯救了我,”她说。参与这项活动让她感觉与母亲更加亲近,并能继续为她们共同的事业而奋斗。
但她最大的满足感之一出现在选举日当天,一位原本打算弃权的朋友最终还是去了投票站,投了卢拉的票。“我成功地改变了一张选票,”库尼亚说。
没有人能确定有多少像她这样的故事最终转化为全国范围内的额外选票。但对库尼亚来说,这场胜利却带来了一个意想不到的后果:在几乎全身心投入竞选活动的三周之后,回归正常生活比她想象的要困难得多。
“我觉得我们现在正经历着一种军队创伤后应激障碍,就像我们真的上过战场一样,”她说。“我们筋疲力尽,但我们还想执行更多任务。我们感觉自己可以征服世界。”