Can new defense minister nominee's US ties help navigate alliance challenges?新任国防部长提名人与美国的关系能否帮助应对联盟挑战?
Defense minister nominee Kang Shin-chul is drawing attention not only for his extensive military career, but also for his experience working closel...

Defense minister nominee Kang Shin-chul is drawing attention in Seoul for his close working relationship with U.S. commanders, especially Gen. Xavier Brunson. His ties may help as South Korea and the United States negotiate OPCON transfer and joint exercises. Kang has avoided a fixed timeline, saying the transfer should strengthen the alliance.
Kang and Brunson served together at the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command for about nine months, from December 2024 until September 2025.
Brunson posted on X that Kang made the forces more cohesive, capable and prepared, and called him family.
The government is seeking to complete the Full Operational Capability assessment for the future combined command this year and move toward setting a target year for OPCON transfer.
Published Sep 8, 2026 2:41 pm KST
CFC experience could help Kang navigate OPCON, joint exercises
Gen. Xavier Brunson, left, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, poses with Kang Shin-chul, then-deputy commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, in a photo posted on Brunson’s X account in March 2025. Captured from X
Defense minister nominee Kang Shin-chul is drawing attention not only for his extensive military career, but also for his experience working closely with U.S. commanders — particularly Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and U.S. Forces Korea.
Military and defense officials who have worked with Kang describe him as someone who understands how the U.S. military thinks and prefers coordination over pushing his own position. That experience could prove useful as Seoul and Washington face sensitive negotiations over the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and joint military exercises.
Kang and Brunson served together at the CFC for about nine months, from Brunson’s arrival in Korea in December 2024 until Kang stepped down as deputy commander in September 2025.
Their rapport was evident in a message Brunson posted on X when Kang left the post.
“Our forces are more cohesive, capable & prepared because of you,” Brunson wrote alongside a photo of the two generals. “I’m a better Commander for your example of meeting expectations.”
He ended the message on a personal note: “You’re always family. Katchi Kapshida! We Go Together!”
A military official who has worked with Kang said U.S. generals also held him in high regard for his knowledge of strategy and policy and his grasp of military affairs.
Having served at the presidential office, the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CFC, Kang understands both Seoul’s position and how the U.S. military approaches alliance issues, the official said.
He also knows how bilateral consultations work and how to explain Korea’s position to the U.S. side.
A graduate of the Korea Military Academy, Kang previously served as chief director of strategic planning and chief director of operations at the JCS before being promoted to four-star general and appointed as CFC deputy commander in 2023. He later became ambassador to Saudi Arabia before President Lee Jae Myung nominated him as defense minister on Aug. 30.
The Ministry of National Defense building is seen in Yongsan District, Seoul, Aug. 14. Newsis
Another military source familiar with Kang’s tenure at the CFC said he likely played an important role in helping Brunson understand the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and the workings of the alliance after the U.S. general arrived in Korea.
That familiarity could soon be put to the test.
The government is seeking to complete the Full Operational Capability (FOC) assessment for the future combined command this year and move toward setting a target year for OPCON transfer. The allies conducted FOC-related assessments during last month’s Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise.
But Seoul and Washington still have issues to work through over the conditions and timing of the transfer.
The Lee administration is pushing to complete the transfer before the president’s term ends, while Brunson has said he submitted a road map to the U.S. Department of Defense aimed at meeting the necessary conditions by the first quarter of 2029.
Kang, for his part, has avoided committing to a specific timeline. He told reporters last week that OPCON transfer should be pursued “in a way that strengthens the Korea-U.S. alliance,” emphasizing that the transfer itself is possible because of the alliance.
A military official said Kang’s experience gives him an advantage in such discussions because “he would understand the U.S. position while also understanding what the Korean side wants.”
Officials who have worked with Kang also describe him as a listener rather than a commander who tries to impose his views. He is widely regarded within the military as well-read and intellectually curious.
Still, Kang's rapport with Brunson has its limits. Brunson is not the defense minister’s direct counterpart and major alliance decisions ultimately depend on policy choices made in Seoul and Washington.
One military official cautioned that a personal relationship cannot override decisions made at the presidential or defense secretary level. Kang's familiarity with how Brunson works, the official said, would be more useful in understanding each other’s concerns and finding common ground than in changing policy itself.
Kang’s intellectual bent could also present a different challenge. His abstract answers to reporters have recently drawn criticism, including his response to a question about integrating Korea’s military academies: “We were ourselves in the past, we are ourselves now, and we will be ourselves in the future.”
An official who has worked with Kang said his knowledge and ability to coordinate are clear strengths, but added that as defense minister, he may need to communicate policy in a more direct and understandable way.
韩国国防部长提名人康信哲因与美国指挥官,特别是泽维尔·布伦森将军的密切工作关系,在首尔备受关注。随着韩美就作战指挥权移交和联合演习进行谈判,康信哲的人脉关系或将有所助益。康信哲并未设定具体的移交时间表,而是表示移交应有助于加强韩美同盟关系。
康和布伦森在韩美联合司令部共事约九个月,从 2024 年 12 月到 2025 年 9 月。
布伦森在 X 上发帖称,康让部队更加团结、更有能力、准备更充分,并称他为家人。
政府希望在今年完成未来联合司令部的全面作战能力评估,并朝着设定作战指挥权移交目标年份迈进。
发布于2026年9月8日下午2:41(韩国标准时间)
CFC经验或可帮助康应对作战指挥和联合演习
照片中,驻韩美军司令泽维尔·布伦森将军(左)与时任美韩联合司令部副司令姜信哲合影。这张照片于2025年3月发布在布伦森的X账号上。照片截取自X账号。
国防部长提名人康信哲不仅因其丰富的军旅生涯而备受关注,还因其与美国指挥官(特别是韩美联合部队司令部(CFC)和驻韩美军司令泽维尔·布伦森将军)密切合作的经验而备受关注。
与康共事过的军方和国防官员形容他了解美军的思维方式,并且更倾向于协调而非强行推进自身立场。鉴于首尔和华盛顿正就战时作战指挥权移交和联合军事演习等敏感问题进行谈判,康的经验或许能派上用场。
从布伦森于 2024 年 12 月抵达韩国到康于 2025 年 9 月卸任副司令一职,康和布伦森在 CFC 共事了大约九个月。
从康离开 X 后布伦森在 X 上发布的一条消息可以看出,他们之间关系融洽。
“因为你,我们的部队更加团结、更有能力、准备更充分,”布伦森在两位将军的合影旁写道。“你树立了达到预期目标的榜样,让我成为了一名更好的指挥官。”
他在信息结尾附上了一句私人寄语:“你们永远都是家人。Katchi Kapshida!我们在一起!”
一位曾与康共事的军方官员表示,美国将军们也高度评价他,认为他精通战略和政策,对军事事务了如指掌。
这位官员表示,康曾在总统府、国防部、联合参谋本部和联合参谋本部任职,因此他既了解首尔的立场,也了解美军如何处理联盟问题。
他还了解双边磋商的运作方式,以及如何向美方解释韩国的立场。
康毕业于韩国陆军士官学校,曾任联合参谋本部战略规划总局局长和作战总局局长,后晋升为四星上将,并于2023年被任命为联合部队司令部副司令。之后,他出任驻沙特阿拉伯大使,直到8月30日被李在明总统任命为国防部长。
8月14日,首尔龙山区国防部大楼。(Newsis)
另一位熟悉康在CFC任职期间情况的军方人士表示,在美军将领布伦森抵达韩国后,康很可能在帮助布伦森了解朝鲜半岛的安全环境和联盟运作方面发挥了重要作用。
这种熟悉感可能很快就会受到考验。
美国政府力争在今年完成未来联合司令部的全面作战能力(FOC)评估,并着手设定作战指挥权移交的目标年份。盟军在上个月的“乙支自由之盾”演习中进行了与FOC相关的评估。
但首尔和华盛顿在转让的条件和时间方面仍存在一些问题需要解决。
李政府正努力在总统任期结束前完成移交,而布伦森表示,他已向美国国防部提交了一份路线图,旨在到 2029 年第一季度满足必要条件。
康先生则一直避免给出具体时间表。他上周告诉记者,作战指挥权的移交应该“以加强韩美同盟的方式”进行,并强调正是由于韩美同盟的存在,移交才成为可能。
一位军方官员表示,康的经历使他在这类讨论中具有优势,因为“他既能理解美国的立场,也能理解韩方的意愿”。
与康共事过的官员也形容他是一位善于倾听的指挥官,而非试图强加自己观点的指挥者。军方普遍认为他博览群书,求知欲强。
然而,康与布伦森的关系并非一成不变。布伦森并非国防部长的直接对等官员,而重大的联盟决策最终取决于首尔和华盛顿的政策选择。
一位军方官员提醒说,私人关系不能凌驾于总统或国防部长层面的决定之上。这位官员表示,康对布伦森工作方式的了解,更有利于双方理解彼此的顾虑并找到共同点,而不是改变政策本身。
康的理性倾向也可能带来另一种挑战。他最近对记者的抽象回答招致批评,包括他对韩国军事院校整合问题的回答:“我们过去是我们自己,我们现在是我们自己,将来我们也会是我们自己。”
一位曾与康建民共事的官员表示,他的知识和协调能力是明显的优势,但也补充说,作为国防部长,他可能需要以更直接、更易懂的方式传达政策。