[COVER STORY] Should Korea join Trump's war on Iran?

Korea should contribute to international efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz, experts said in Foreign Affairs, but only in noncombat roles. They said Seoul should avoid direct confrontation with Iran and frame any move as protecting freedom of navigation and energy supplies. The experts also urged careful timing and broader international coordination. Possible roles include maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel and mine-detection capabilities.

Min Jeong-hun said about 60 percent to 70 percent of Korea’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

The experts said Korea’s role should be limited to noncombat missions such as maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel and mine detection and clearance capabilities.

Shin Beom-chul said Korea should consider joining maritime security efforts led by countries such as the United Kingdom and France rather than U.S. combat operations.

Jang Ji-hyang said Korea’s participation should be presented as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy and maritime security commitment, not as an attempt to curry favor with Washington.

Shin said Washington’s pressure over Hormuz was partly linked to delays in Korea’s promised investment in the U.S.

Published Sep 8, 2026 4:22 pm KST

Updated Sep 8, 2026 6:04 pm KST

Korea should join Hormuz mission but avoid combat role: advocates

ROKS Soyang, an 11,000-ton logistics support ship of the ROK Navy, is seen during its commissioning ceremony in 2018. The vessel is being considered for deployment to the Strait of Hormuz as part of a possible military contribution to the U.S.-led mission. Yonhap

Korea should make a military contribution to international efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz but limit its role to noncombat missions, experts said, citing the need to manage its alliance with the United States, protect the country’s energy and maritime interests and uphold freedom of navigation.

Experts stressed that Korea should avoid direct military confrontation with Iran, ensure that its contribution is not perceived as joining the war and carefully consider the timing of its involvement.

“Korea will need to make some contribution, considering its relationship with the U.S.,” said Min Jeong-hun, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

“At the same time, Korea has sufficient justification for contributing, given its direct interest in maintaining freedom of navigation and stable energy supplies,” he added, noting that around 60 percent to 70 percent of the country’s crude oil imports pass through the strait.

Jang Ji-hyang, a senior research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, similarly said participation would be consistent with Korea’s longstanding commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation under its Indo-Pacific strategy, rather than describing the move as an attempt to curry favor with Washington.

“As a middle power and an advanced country directly affected by the situation, Korea has a role to play when the international community acts to ensure freedom of navigation,” she said.

However, Jang cautioned against terms such as “sending troops” or “joining the war,” stressing that Korea’s role should be presented as part of a broader international effort based on established principles.

Shin Beom-chul, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, supported participation in principle but said Seoul should not rush into a deployment.

“Korea should instead consider joining maritime security efforts led by countries such as the United Kingdom and France, with an emphasis on international cooperation and postconflict stabilization rather than participation in U.S. combat operations,” he said.

The experts broadly favored limiting Korea’s military role to noncombat missions, with all three citing maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel and capabilities for mine detection and clearance as possible options.

“Such a contribution would likely be sufficient to meet Washington’s expectations,” Shin said.

As for Iran, which has effectively controlled the strait since the U.S. and Israel began the war, Min said Seoul should maintain close communication with Tehran and explain that its involvement is necessary to protect Korea’s interests in the waterway, while making clear that it would not deploy combat forces or engage in direct military confrontation.

Jang said Seoul should also broaden the basis for its contribution beyond relations with the U.S. and Iran by highlighting Korea’s ties with Gulf countries.

“The Gulf countries are directly affected by regional instability, and Korea’s military contribution could be framed as helping key regional partners as well as protecting freedom of navigation,” she said.

Min said responding to U.S. President Donald Trump’s demands for a military contribution could create room for Seoul to seek progress on pending issues between the two allies involving security, diplomacy, investment and trade.

“If we do what Trump wants most, then we can ask for what we want as well,” he said, adding that such reciprocal steps could help “open the way” for broader cooperation.

Shin offered a somewhat different assessment.

He argued that Washington’s pressure over Hormuz stemmed partly from delays in Korea’s promised investment in the U.S. and that Seoul should therefore prioritize resolving the investment issue before moving ahead with any deployment.

“If we deal with the U.S. investment first, Trump may no longer demand a deployment,” Shin said, pointing out that Washington has not placed the same demand on Japan.

He said Korea should first coordinate with Trump on investment and other bilateral issues, while slowing the pace of discussions over Hormuz and pursuing any eventual participation through a broader international framework.

专家在《外交事务》杂志上表示，韩国应为维护霍尔木兹海峡安全做出国际贡献，但仅限于非战斗角色。他们指出，首尔应避免与伊朗直接对抗，并将任何行动都定位为保护航行自由和能源供应。专家还敦促韩国谨慎把握时机，并加强国际协调。韩国可能的角色包括派遣海上巡逻机、后勤支援舰艇以及提供扫雷能力。

闵正勋表示，韩国约有 60% 至 70% 的原油进口要经过霍尔木兹海峡。

专家表示，韩国的作用应仅限于非战斗任务，例如海上巡逻机、后勤支援船以及水雷探测和清除能力。

申范哲表示，韩国应该考虑加入由英国和法国等国领导的海上安全行动，而不是参与美国的作战行动。

张智香表示，韩国的参与应该被视为其印太战略和海上安全承诺的一部分，而不是为了讨好华盛顿。

申东赫表示，华盛顿就霍尔木兹海峡问题施加的压力，部分原因在于韩国对美投资承诺的延迟兑现。

发布于2026年9月8日下午4:22（韩国标准时间）

更新于2026年9月8日 下午6:04（韩国标准时间）

韩国应参与霍尔木兹岛任务，但避免承担作战角色：倡导者

韩国海军排水量11000吨的后勤支援舰“昭阳”号于2018年服役仪式上亮相。该舰正被考虑部署至霍尔木兹海峡，以期为美国领导的维和行动提供军事支持。（韩联社）

专家表示，韩国应为维护霍尔木兹海峡的国际安全做出军事贡献，但应将其作用限制在非战斗任务中，理由是需要管控与美国的联盟关系，保护国家的能源和海洋利益，并维护航行自由。

专家强调，韩国应避免与伊朗发生直接军事对抗，确保其参与不被视为加入战争，并谨慎考虑介入的时机。

“考虑到韩国与美国的关系，韩国需要做出一些贡献，”韩国国立外交学院教授闵正勋表示。

“与此同时，鉴于韩国在维护航行自由和稳定能源供应方面拥有直接利益，韩国有充分的理由做出贡献，”他补充道，并指出该国约 60% 至 70% 的原油进口都要经过该海峡。

峨山政策研究所高级研究员张智香也表示，韩国的参与符合其印太战略下对海上安全和航行自由的长期承诺，而不是试图讨好华盛顿。

“作为一个中等强国和一个直接受到当前局势影响的发达国家，韩国在国际社会采取行动保障航行自由时，应该发挥作用，”她说。

然而，张先生告诫不要使用“派兵”或“参战”之类的措辞，强调韩国的作用应该被视为基于既定原则的更广泛的国际努力的一部分。

世宗研究所高级研究员申范哲原则上支持韩国参与，但表示首尔不应仓促部署。

他说：“韩国应该考虑加入由英国和法国等国领导的海上安全行动，重点是国际合作和冲突后稳定，而不是参与美国的作战行动。”

专家们普遍倾向于将韩国的军事角色限制在非战斗任务中，三位专家都提到了海上巡逻机、后勤支援船以及水雷探测和清除能力作为可能的选项。

申表示：“这样的捐助很可能足以满足华盛顿的期望。”

至于自美以开战以来一直有效控制该海峡的伊朗，闵表示，首尔应该与德黑兰保持密切沟通，并解释其介入对于保护韩国在该水道的利益是必要的，同时明确表示不会部署作战部队或进行直接军事对抗。

张表示，首尔还应拓宽其贡献的基础，使其不再局限于与美国和伊朗的关系，而是要强调韩国与海湾国家的关系。

她表示：“海湾国家直接受到地区不稳定的影响，韩国的军事贡献可以被解读为帮助重要的地区伙伴以及保护航行自由。”

闵表示，回应美国总统唐纳德·特朗普提出的军事贡献要求，可能会为首尔创造空间，使其能够在两国盟友之间悬而未决的安全、外交、投资和贸易问题上寻求取得进展。

“如果我们做特朗普最想做的事，那么我们也可以要求我们想要的东西，”他说，并补充说，这种互惠措施有助于“开辟道路”，促进更广泛的合作。

Shin提出了略有不同的看法。

他认为，华盛顿对霍尔木兹岛施加的压力部分源于韩国对美国承诺的投资迟迟未能兑现，因此首尔应该优先解决投资问题，然后再推进任何部署。

申表示：“如果我们先解决美国的投资问题，特朗普可能就不会再要求部署了。”他指出，华盛顿并没有对日本提出同样的要求。

他表示，韩国应首先与特朗普在投资和其他双边问题上进行协调，同时放慢霍尔木兹海峡问题的讨论步伐，并通过更广泛的国际框架寻求最终参与。