US Space Force needs more to effectively deter, win wars

One of the oft repeated phrases by political and military leaders during National Defense Authorization Act and defense budget rollout is how important it is to get the bill passed so we give our men and women in uniform everything they need to be successful in deterrence and warfighting. Providing what our armed forces require, given the threats facing our nation, is very important and should be the main focus of Congress and the White House. Unfortunately, the Space Force has not been given all it requires to deter and/or win a war for space superiority in great power conflict.

First, current policy has restrained the Space Force from generating the requirements and resource requests necessary to achieve a credible deterrence and warfighting Space Force. Instead, current policy and strategic frameworks like the U.S. Space Priorities Framework focuses the service on enable and support missions for the joint force (i.e., terrestrial military operations). As a result, the service has not developed space deterrence and warfighting force postures that enable space superiority against our adversaries, but rather have continued on the path of graceful degradation via under attack .

This type of thinking, while arguably rational for the 1990s, is wholly inadequate for an era of rapidly developing and deploying Chinese, Russian, and Iranian space forces and ongoing counterspace operations against the U.S. and its allies. These operations, while non-kinetic, occur “ every single day ,” according to former vice chief of space operations, Gen. David Thompson .

Second, due to this mentality of supporting the joint force, the service is not deploying the weapons systems necessary for a credible deterrent against a near peer like China. Regardless of what side of the counter-space continuum you look (non-kinetic or kinetic), the Space Force either does not have the variety of anti-satellite and counter-space weapons systems to match what the adversary is deploying, or lacks sufficient numbers to have any real effect in a major great power conflict.

For example, China has deployed or is expected to deploy in the near term kinetic anti-satellite missile units; jammers of various kinds (satellite communications, GPS, etc.); and on-orbit anti-satellite technology, including those capable of aggressive rendezvous and proximity operations as well as the ability to capture and move U.S. and allied assets from their orbital posts and into disposal orbits.

If that was not enough, China has also demonstrated its capability and willingness to use a fractional orbital bombardment system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles with either conventional or nuclear payloads. This provides China with escalation dominance , which is key to credible deterrence in a great power competition environment.

As an example of how we lack credible numbers of counter-space weapons, the Space Force has a few Counter Communications System and Bounty Hunter jamming systems. These weapons systems, while supporting combatant commander requirements over the past few decades, exist in insufficient numbers to have much effect in a great power war in the Pacific. Even if all of these units were deployed to the Indo-Pacific region, there are not enough to address all adversarial orbital targets overflying the operating areas of U.S. terrestrial forces and our allies. As a result, we are putting our guardians in harm’s way without sufficient equipment to achieve meaningful effects in combat, much less the ability to gain space superiority in a high-stakes conflict.

Third is the budget for the service. While many have lauded the largest budget increases for the Space Force, the priorities and resources are insufficient. The majority of the budget is research and development , which is fine, but it is beyond time to move more capability into operational and maintenance lines and deploy capabilities for deterrence and warfighting, not just for continued space-support missions.

Finally, the Space Force is hindered by law from recruiting sufficient military personnel due to congressional limitations imposed before its establishment in 2019. This has led to insufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate space support, space deterrence and warfighting systems needed to defend American interests in space. Thus, a never-ending cycle of re-optimizing the service or military departments happens every few years to make it look like major changes are being made, when in reality the service is just trying to find ways to do more with less.

This passive and inadequate approach will cede freedom of access and maneuver advantage in space to the adversaries of this nation and its friends. Congress should act quickly to remedy this situation and require the development of true warfighting capabilities necessary for the Space Force to be a fully coequal provider of combat forces in the joint force and not simply a service provider.

The Space Force was established to address the threat in space, not to be the help desk of the other services. The Space Force must have the funding, personnel and, most of all, the weapons to address the threats facing our nation today and into the future.

Christopher Stone is a senior fellow for space deterrence studies at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies think tank. He previously served as special assistant to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy. This commentary does not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Defense Department.

在《国防授权法案》和国防预算公布期间，政界和军界领导人反复强调，通过该法案至关重要，这样才能确保我们的军人拥有在威慑和作战中取得成功所需的一切资源。鉴于我国面临的威胁，为武装部队提供所需资源至关重要，也应是国会和白宫的首要任务。然而，令人遗憾的是，太空部队尚未获得在大国冲突中威慑和/或赢得太空优势战争所需的全部资源。

首先，现行政策限制了太空军提出必要的需求和资源申请，而这些需求和资源申请对于建立一支可信的威慑和作战能力至关重要。相反，现行政策和战略框架，例如《美国太空优先框架》，将太空军的重点放在为联合部队（即地面军事行动）提供支援和支持任务上。因此，太空军未能发展出能够使自身在太空领域取得优势的威慑和作战能力，反而继续走上了在遭受攻击的情况下逐渐衰落的道路。

这种思维方式在20世纪90年代或许还算合理，但对于中国、俄罗斯和伊朗太空力量快速发展和部署，以及针对美国及其盟友持续开展反太空行动的时代而言，则完全不适用。据前太空作战副部长戴维·汤普森将军称，这些行动虽然不涉及军事行动，但“每天都在发生”。

其次，由于这种支持联合作战的心态，太空军没有部署必要的武器系统来对付像中国这样的近乎势均力敌的对手，从而无法形成可信的威慑。无论从反太空作战的哪个方面来看（非动能或动能），太空军要么缺乏与对手部署的种类相匹配的反卫星和反太空武器系统，要么数量不足，无法在大国冲突中发挥任何实际作用。

例如，中国已经部署或预计在近期部署动能反卫星导弹部队；各种干扰器（卫星通信、GPS 等）；以及在轨反卫星技术，包括能够进行侵略性交会和近距离作战的技术，以及能够捕获美国及其盟国资产并将其从轨道位置转移到处置轨道的技术。

如果这还不够，中国还展示了其使用部分轨道轰炸系统的能力和意愿，该系统配备高超音速滑翔飞行器，可携带常规或核弹头。这使中国在局势升级中占据优势，而这对于在大国竞争环境中实现可信的威慑至关重要。

例如，太空部队仅有少量反太空武器系统和“赏金猎人”干扰系统，这便体现了我们反太空武器数量不足的问题。这些武器系统虽然在过去几十年中满足了作战指挥官的需求，但数量太少，在太平洋大国战争中难以发挥显著作用。即使将所有这些系统全部部署到印太地区，也无法应对所有飞越美国地面部队及其盟国作战区域的敌方轨道目标。因此，我们让我们的守护者身处险境，却缺乏足够的装备来取得有效的作战效果，更遑论在高风险冲突中夺取太空优势。

第三点是太空军的预算。虽然许多人称赞太空军预算大幅增长，但其优先事项和资源仍然不足。预算的大部分用于研发，这固然没错，但现在是时候将更多能力投入到作战和维护领域，并部署威慑和作战能力，而不仅仅是用于持续的太空支援任务。

最后，由于国会在2019年太空军成立前设定的限制，太空军在招募足够军事人员方面受到法律阻碍。这导致训练有素的人员数量不足，无法操作维护美国在太空利益所需的太空支援、太空威慑和作战系统。因此，每隔几年就会对太空军或军事部门进​​行一次无休止的重新优化，以营造出正在进行重大变革的假象，而实际上，太空军只是在试图以更少的资源完成更多的工作。

这种被动且不足的做法将使我国及其盟友的对手在太空中失去自由通行权和行动优势。国会应迅速采取行动纠正这一局面，并要求太空部队发展真正的作战能力，使其成为联合作战部队中完全平等的作战力量提供者，而不仅仅是服务提供者。

太空军的成立是为了应对太空威胁，而不是作为其他军种的后勤支援机构。太空军必须拥有足够的资金、人员，以及最重要的武器装备，才能应对我们国家当前和未来面临的威胁。

克里斯托弗·斯通是国家威慑研究所（National Institute for Deterrence Studies）的高级研究员，专攻太空威慑研究。他曾担任国防部负责太空政策的副助理部长的特别助理。本文观点不代表美国国防部的立场。