Why Spain’s new Sahrawi citizenship law matters to Morocco西班牙新的撒哈拉公民法为何对摩洛哥至关重要
The new citizenship bill for Sahrawis touches a sensitive fault line in Madrid’s ties with Rabat.
![Spain’s proposed citizenship route for Sahrawis is bringing its colonial legacy in Western Sahara back into the political spotlight and testing its delicate ties with Morocco [Hannah McNeish/Al Jazeera]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/8d1149e7cdf94ed8a61cd5e6a5b15659_18.jpeg?resize=770%2C513&quality=80)
The new citizenship bill for Sahrawis touches a sensitive fault line in Madrid’s ties with Rabat.
Spain’s proposed citizenship route for Sahrawis is bringing its colonial legacy in Western Sahara back into the political spotlight and testing its delicate ties with Morocco [Hannah McNeish/Al Jazeera]
Spain’s Congress has approved a bill that would open a special route to Spanish citizenship for Sahrawis born in Western Sahara while the disputed territory was under Spanish occupation.
The bill passed by 168 votes to 31, with 145 abstentions. It must still go through the Senate before it can become law.
So what exactly would the measure do, and why is Morocco watching it closely?
What does the bill do?
The proposed law would allow people born in Western Sahara before September 29, 1977, to apply for Spanish nationality through a special procedure without having to meet the normal residency requirements. First-degree descendants would also be covered.
It would also shorten the duration of the residence requirement for eligible Sahrawis legally living in Spain. Instead of the usual 10 years, they would be able to apply after two years.
Supporters describe the measure as a way of addressing what they see as a historical injustice.
Spain was the colonial power in Western Sahara until it ended its administration of the territory in 1976. The territory has remained disputed ever since, with Morocco considering it part of its sovereignty, while the separatist Polisario Front seeks independence.
Why does Morocco care?
The law would not change the territorial status of Western Sahara. It would not recognise an independent Sahrawi state, nor would Spanish citizenship give its holders sovereignty over the territory.
The concern in Rabat is instead about the relationship the law could create between Spain and people with direct links to Western Sahara.
Reuters has reported that between 70,000 and 110,000 people could eventually qualify, although estimates vary. Anyone who obtains Spanish nationality would also become a European Union citizen and acquire the rights that come with that status.
Potential beneficiaries could include eligible Sahrawis living in Western Sahara as well as members of the Sahrawi refugee population around Tindouf in Algeria, where the Polisario Front is based.
For Morocco, that could mean a larger community of Spanish and EU citizens with personal or family ties to an issue at the centre of its relationship with Madrid.
Why is the timing important?
The bill comes after a significant change in Spain’s policy towards Western Sahara.
In 2022, Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s government backed Morocco’s autonomy proposal for the territory, describing it as the most serious, realistic and credible basis for resolving the dispute.
That decision helped repair relations between Madrid and Rabat after a major diplomatic crisis. Since then, the two countries have strengthened cooperation on migration, security, trade and other areas.
The new citizenship measure does not formally change Spain’s support for the autonomy proposal. Madrid can argue that supporting autonomy as a political solution is one matter, while dealing with the consequences of its former colonial rule is another.
But the two issues are difficult to separate completely from Morocco’s perspective because both concern Western Sahara.
What is the debate inside Spain?
The bill has also divided Spain’s political parties.
The governing Socialist Party and its allies in Sumar supported it. The conservative People’s Party abstained, while Vox voted against it.
The disagreement has centred partly on how Spain should address the legacy of its former rule in Western Sahara and on the legal route proposed for granting nationality.
The debate is important to the Moroccan side because it shows that the measure is not simply a technical change to Spanish nationality law. It has also become part of a discussion inside Spain about its colonial past and its relationship with Western Sahara.
Moroccan and international media have also focused on the measure. While Moroccan media have highlighted its potential implications for Spain’s policy towards Western Sahara and its relations with Rabat, Reuters has reported that the move could further strain relations between Spain and Morocco.
Does the bill recognise the Polisario?
No. The proposed nationality route does not recognise the Polisario Front or an independent Sahrawi state.
Nor does acquiring Spanish citizenship indicate support for the Polisario. Nationality is a legal status, and Sahrawis hold different political positions.
The connection to the Polisario is nevertheless relevant because many Sahrawi refugees live around Tindouf, where the Polisario has its headquarters and administers the refugee camps.
If eligible people from those communities acquire Spanish nationality, they would become Spanish and EU citizens while retaining their existing personal and political identities.
Why is Spain referring to its colonial past?
Spain was the colonial power in Western Sahara until it ended its administration of the territory in 1976.
Supporters of the bill argue that people born in the territory during Spanish rule were left in a difficult legal position after Spain withdrew. They therefore present the measure as a way of addressing what they consider a historical wrong.
Spain has used historical ties in nationality policy before.
In 2015, it introduced a procedure allowing Sephardic Jews who could establish their Sephardic origin and a special connection with Spain to apply for Spanish nationality. The measure was linked to the expulsion of Jews from Spain beginning in 1492.
That precedent is relevant to the Moroccan debate because Spain has previously used historical ties to establish a special route to nationality.
And what about Ceuta and Melilla?
This is where the issue becomes particularly sensitive for Morocco.
Morocco considers Ceuta and Melilla an integral part of its territory and sovereignty. The two cities are located on Morocco’s northern coast in North Africa and are under Spanish administration.
Spain rejects Morocco’s claim and considers the cities Spanish territory. Successive Spanish governments have maintained that their sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla is not negotiable.
The Moroccan argument here could be about how historical ties are treated.
If Spain can draw on its historical and colonial relationship with Western Sahara to create a special nationality route for Sahrawis, and has previously used historical ties with Sephardic Jews, whose connection to Spain dates back more than five centuries, Morocco could ask why its own historical and geographical relationship with Ceuta and Melilla should be considered irrelevant when it makes its claim to sovereignty over the two cities.
For eight centuries, Muslim dynasties, including the Almoravids and Almohads, ruled parts of the Iberian Peninsula.
Morocco’s potential argument is therefore narrower: if historical ties can help establish present-day legal rights, then history and geography can also form part of the case it makes about two cities located on the North African coast.
What would the law change for Morocco?
In territorial terms, very little.
The citizenship measure would not change who controls Western Sahara, determine the territory’s final status or alter the United Nations-led political process. Nor does it, in itself, change Spain’s official position in support of Morocco’s autonomy proposal.
Its significance lies mainly in the relationship between Spain and Morocco. The measure brings Spain’s colonial history in Western Sahara into a broader domestic political debate, raising questions about how that history should be addressed and what its growing political significance could mean for the delicate relationship between Madrid and Rabat.
针对撒哈拉人的新公民法案触及了马德里与拉巴特之间关系中的敏感断层线。
西班牙提议给予撒哈拉人公民身份,这使其在西撒哈拉的殖民历史再次成为政治焦点,并考验着其与摩洛哥之间微妙的关系。[汉娜·麦克尼什/半岛电视台]
西班牙国会批准了一项法案,该法案将为在西撒哈拉争议地区被西班牙占领期间出生的撒哈拉人开辟一条获得西班牙公民身份的特殊途径。
该法案以168票赞成、31票反对、145票弃权获得通过。但它仍需参议院审议才能成为法律。
那么这项措施究竟会起到什么作用?摩洛哥又为何密切关注此事?
该法案的内容是什么?
拟议的法律将允许1977年9月29日之前出生于西撒哈拉的人通过特殊程序申请西班牙国籍,而无需满足通常的居住要求。他们的直系后裔也将适用。
此举还将缩短符合条件的、合法居住在西班牙的撒哈拉人的居住年限要求。他们只需居住两年即可申请,而非通常的十年。
支持者认为,这项措施是为了解决他们眼中的历史不公正现象。
西班牙曾是西撒哈拉的殖民统治者,直到 1976 年结束对该地区的统治。此后,该地区一直存在争议,摩洛哥认为它是其主权的一部分,而分离主义的波利萨里奥阵线则寻求独立。
摩洛哥为何如此在意?
该法律不会改变西撒哈拉的领土地位。它既不承认撒哈拉独立国家,西班牙公民身份也不会赋予持有者对该领土的主权。
拉巴特方面担心的是,这项法律可能会在西班牙和与西撒哈拉有直接联系的人们之间建立怎样的关系。
路透社报道称,最终可能有7万至11万人符合入籍资格,但具体数字有所不同。任何获得西班牙国籍的人也将成为欧盟公民,并享有欧盟公民身份所赋予的权利。
潜在受益者可能包括居住在西撒哈拉的符合条件的撒哈拉人,以及居住在阿尔及利亚廷杜夫(波利萨里奥阵线所在地)附近的撒哈拉难民。
对摩洛哥而言,这可能意味着会有更多与摩洛哥和马德里关系核心问题有个人或家庭联系的西班牙和欧盟公民。
为什么时机很重要?
该法案是在西班牙对西撒哈拉政策发生重大变化之后出台的。
2022年,佩德罗·桑切斯首相领导的政府支持摩洛哥提出的该地区自治方案,称其为解决争端最严肃、最现实、最可信的基础。
这一决定有助于修复马德里和拉巴特之间在一次重大外交危机后的关系。此后,两国在移民、安全、贸易和其他领域加强了合作。
新的公民身份措施并未正式改变西班牙对自治方案的支持。马德里方面可以辩称,支持自治作为一种政治解决方案是一回事,而处理其前殖民统治遗留的问题则是另一回事。
但从摩洛哥的角度来看,这两个问题很难完全分开,因为它们都与西撒哈拉有关。
西班牙国内争论的焦点是什么?
该法案也导致西班牙各政党出现分歧。
执政的社会党及其在苏马尔的盟友支持该提案。保守的人民党弃权,而Vox党投了反对票。
分歧的部分焦点在于西班牙应该如何处理其在西撒哈拉的统治遗留问题,以及授予国籍的法律途径。
这场辩论对摩洛哥方面至关重要,因为它表明这项措施并非仅仅是对西班牙国籍法的一次技术性修改,它也成为了西班牙国内关于其殖民历史及其与西撒哈拉关系的讨论的一部分。
摩洛哥和国际媒体也对这一举措给予了关注。摩洛哥媒体强调了此举可能对西班牙西撒哈拉政策及其与拉巴特的关系产生的影响,而路透社则报道称,此举可能进一步加剧西班牙和摩洛哥之间的紧张关系。
该法案是否承认波利萨里奥阵线?
不。拟议的国籍路线不承认波利萨里奥阵线或独立的撒哈拉维国家。
获得西班牙国籍并不代表支持波利萨里奥阵线。国籍是一种法律身份,撒哈拉人持有不同的政治立场。
尽管如此,与波利萨里奥阵线的联系仍然很重要,因为许多撒哈拉难民居住在廷杜夫附近,而波利萨里奥阵线的总部就设在那里,并管理着难民营。
如果这些社区中符合条件的人获得西班牙国籍,他们将成为西班牙和欧盟公民,同时保留其现有的个人和政治身份。
西班牙为何提及它的殖民历史?
西班牙曾是西撒哈拉的殖民统治者,直到 1976 年结束对该地区的统治。
该法案的支持者认为,西班牙统治时期出生在该地区的人在西班牙撤军后陷入了艰难的法律境地。因此,他们提出这项措施是为了纠正他们认为的历史错误。
西班牙此前也曾在国籍政策中利用历史渊源。
2015年,西班牙推出了一项新程序,允许能够证明其塞法迪犹太人血统并与西班牙有特殊联系的塞法迪犹太人申请西班牙国籍。这项措施与1492年开始的西班牙驱逐犹太人事件有关。
这一先例与摩洛哥的辩论相关,因为西班牙以前曾利用历史联系建立获得国籍的特殊途径。
那么休达和梅利利亚呢?
对摩洛哥而言,这个问题尤其敏感。
摩洛哥视休达和梅利利亚为其领土和主权不可分割的一部分。这两座城市位于北非摩洛哥北部沿海地区,目前由西班牙管辖。
西班牙拒绝摩洛哥的主权声索,并认定休达和梅利利亚是西班牙领土。历届西班牙政府都坚持认为,其对休达和梅利利亚的主权不容谈判。
摩洛哥方面的论点可能与如何处理历史关系有关。
如果西班牙可以利用其与西撒哈拉的历史和殖民关系,为撒哈拉人创造一条特殊的国籍途径,并且此前也曾利用与塞法迪犹太人的历史联系(塞法迪犹太人与西班牙的联系可以追溯到五个多世纪以前),那么摩洛哥可以质问,为什么它自身与休达和梅利利亚的历史和地理关系在它声称对这两个城市拥有主权时,就应该被视为无关紧要。
八个世纪以来,包括阿尔摩拉维王朝和阿尔摩哈德王朝在内的穆斯林王朝统治着伊比利亚半岛的部分地区。
因此,摩洛哥的潜在论点更为狭窄:如果历史联系可以帮助确立当今的法律权利,那么历史和地理也可以成为其对位于北非海岸的两座城市所作论证的一部分。
摩洛哥的法律会做出哪些改变?
从领土角度来看,微乎其微。
这项公民身份措施不会改变西撒哈拉的控制权归属,也不会决定该地区的最终地位,更不会改变联合国主导的政治进程。此外,它本身也不会改变西班牙支持摩洛哥自治方案的官方立场。
其意义主要在于西班牙与摩洛哥之间的关系。这项措施将西班牙在西撒哈拉的殖民历史纳入更广泛的国内政治辩论,引发了关于应如何处理这段历史以及其日益增长的政治意义可能对马德里和拉巴特之间微妙关系产生何种影响的讨论。