Opinion: Anger Without a Common Front

The Election Commission’s handling of the Senate collusion case will deepen public distrust, but anger alone will not produce a mass protest. Thailand’s opposition forces are divided, its major parties have little appetite for sustained street action, and many activists who once mobilised large crowds are now imprisoned, in exile or fighting criminal cases.

The EC referred only 77 of 427 respondents to the Supreme Court’s Election Cases Division and for criminal proceedings. They include 26 serving senators, 36 voters and 15 alleged participants. No Bhumjaithai executive, MP or political officeholder was referred, despite an earlier recommendation to prosecute 229 people, including 21 politicians connected to the party.

The decision reinforces suspicions that minor figures were sacrificed while those accused of organising or benefiting from the alleged operation escaped scrutiny.

Yet no political force appears capable of turning that suspicion into a broad and sustained movement.

Political scientist Punchada Sirivunnabood, dean of Mahidol University’s Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, similarly argued that the decision would reduce public confidence but was unlikely by itself to bring large crowds onto the streets. Opposition groups are moving in different directions, while much of the anger remains confined to social media.

The divide between the two most visible protest camps is particularly difficult to bridge.

iLaw, civil-society groups and pro-democracy activists see the case as another example of institutional failure and elite manipulation.

iLaw Director Yingcheep Atchanont

Sondhi Limthongkul, a former Yellow Shirt leader, approaches it from a conservative, royalist and nationalist tradition. The two sides disagree fundamentally over the military, the monarchy and Section 112. Shared criticism of the EC does not create a common political project.

Sondhi’s rally at the Israeli Embassy

Before the ruling, Sondhi said he could call a major rally on September 18 or 19 if the EC cut off the case before it reached senior figures. He did not state clearly that all 229 suspects had to be referred, but his warning centred on the possibility of the alleged organisers being protected.

That is largely what happened. Only 77 people were referred, while the politicians implicated in the original investigation escaped action. Sondhi criticised the outcome, but he did not treat it as the decisive trigger he had advertised. He neither launched an urgent mobilisation nor promptly confirmed the threatened rally.

The muted follow-through suggests that the Senate case was an afterthought within his broader “Take Our Thailand Back” campaign rather than its central cause. His hesitation gives him room to postpone the rally, claim that the 77 referrals represented sufficient action or redirect attention to another grievance.

This is consistent with Sondhi’s stated objective.

He has said he does not want to overthrow the Anutin government, only pressure it and make it uncomfortable. The administration is a conservative, nationalist and royalist government much closer to his worldview than any progressive alternative. He can attack selected policies and institutions without building a movement powerful enough to threaten the government itself.

His campaign is also too scattered to become a focused movement against Senate collusion.

It has concentrated heavily on foreigners, nominee ownership, foreign tourists, Israeli nationals and Chabad activities. His protest outside the Israeli embassy, attended by several hundred people, featured antisemitic signs and sweeping rhetoric about Jews. Its demands extended to the war in Gaza, an issue disconnected from the integrity of Thailand’s Senate selection.

Unless Sondhi abruptly changes direction, his movement appears more likely to follow nationalist and anti-foreigner themes than develop into a coherent campaign over the Senate case.

The progressive camp is not showing signs of mass mobilisation either.

Hundreds joined iLaw’s September 13 march in Bangkok calling on the EC to prosecute all 229 original suspects. People’s Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, party deputy leader Parit Wacharasindhu and other party figures participated, but the party has not announced a sustained street campaign. A separate protest in Chiang Mai, where activists painted their faces blue and displayed 229 coffee cups, was small and symbolic.

Pheu Thai will not fill the gap.

It is part of the Bhumjaithai-led government and has no incentive to organise protests against its own administration. Its ministers have instead suggested that the EC decision improved government stability.

The People’s Party may continue supporting civil-society activities, but parliamentary scrutiny remains more likely than a call for its supporters to take to the streets.

The pro-democracy movement has also been weakened by years of legal attrition.

Human-rights lawyer Arnon Nampa remains imprisoned under cumulative sentences spanning decades. Jatupat “Pai Dao Din” Boonpattararaksa has repeatedly been denied bail in a remaining lèse-majesté case. Tantawan “Tawan” Tuatulanon was sentenced to two years under Section 112 but granted bail pending appeal on August 31, following previous periods of detention and two prolonged hunger strikes. Parit “Penguin” Chiwarak, Panupong “Mike” Jadnok and Benja Apan have left Thailand amid continuing prosecutions.

Some veteran figures who might once have helped organise or legitimise a wider movement have also lost public standing.

Sexual-misconduct allegations against Somyot Prueksakasemsuk and Sombat Boonngamanong have damaged confidence in an older generation of pro-democracy activists. Somyot apologised while disputing parts of the complainant’s account, while Sombat denied the allegations against him. Neither case has produced a judicial finding, but the controversy has exposed serious internal disputes over consent, power and accountability.

The movement is therefore facing more than ordinary protest fatigue.

Imprisonment, exile and prosecution have removed experienced younger organisers, while allegations against veteran figures have weakened alternative leadership. Recent turnout reflects that decline: the iLaw march and Sondhi’s embassy protest drew hundreds, not tens of thousands, while the Chiang Mai action was smaller still.

Punchada’s assessment is consequently the more credible scenario.

Public confidence will continue to fall while the dispute moves through the courts, parliamentary scrutiny and possible malfeasance complaints against the EC. Much will also depend on the evidence submitted to the court. As she warned, a weak case file will accomplish little.

Thailand has plenty of anger over the Senate case, but no common front.

Sondhi does not want to overthrow a government broadly aligned with his worldview, and his limited response to the EC ruling shows that the case is not his main priority. The progressive movement has been depleted, while parts of its veteran leadership have been compromised. The People’s Party has not committed to street mobilisation, Pheu Thai is part of the government, recent protests have been small, and no new trigger has emerged that can bridge the country’s ideological divisions.

Unless that changes, the EC ruling will further damage trust in Thailand’s political institutions without producing a mass movement capable of challenging them.

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选举委员会对参议院勾结案的处理方式将加深公众的不信任，但仅凭愤怒本身并不会引发大规模抗议。泰国的反对派力量四分五裂，主要政党缺乏持续街头行动的意愿，许多曾经动员过大量民众的活动人士如今身陷囹圄、流亡海外或面临刑事指控。

选举委员会仅将427名受访者中的77人移交最高法院选举案件庭进行刑事诉讼。这些人包括26名现任参议员、36名选民和15名涉嫌参与选举的人员。尽管此前曾建议起诉包括21名与泰自豪党有关联的政治人物在内的229人，但泰自豪党的任何一位高管、国会议员或政治官员均未被移交。

这一决定加深了人们的怀疑，即一些无关紧要的人物被牺牲了，而那些被指控组织或从该行动中获益的人却逃脱了审查。

然而，似乎没有任何政治力量能够将这种怀疑转化为一场广泛而持久的运动。

玛希隆大学社会科学与人文学院院长、政治学家潘查达·西里文纳布德也持类似观点，认为该决定会降低公众信心，但本身不太可能引发大规模街头抗议。反对派团体正朝着不同的方向发展，而大部分愤怒情绪仍然局限于社交媒体。

两个最引人注目的抗议阵营之间的分歧尤其难以弥合。

iLaw、民间社会团体和亲民主活动人士认为，此案是制度失灵和精英操纵的又一例证。

iLaw 总监 Yingcheep Atchanont

前黄衫军领导人桑迪·林通库尔（Sondhi Limthongkul）从保守主义、保皇主义和民族主义传统出发看待这个问题。双方在军队、君主制和第112条法案等根本问题上存在分歧。对选举委员会的共同批评并不能形成共同的政治纲领。

桑迪在以色列大使馆举行集会

在裁决公布前，桑迪表示，如果选举委员会在案件牵涉到高层人物之前就终止调查，他可能会在9月18日或19日举行大规模集会。他没有明确表示必须将全部229名嫌疑人移交调查，但他的警告主要集中在涉嫌组织者可能受到保护这一点上。

事情大致如此。只有77人被移交调查，而最初调查中牵涉到的政客却逍遥法外。桑迪批评了调查结果，但他并没有将其视为他所宣称的决定性导火索。他既没有发起紧急动员，也没有立即确认即将举行的集会。

后续行动的低调表明，参议院的这起案件只是他更广泛的“夺回泰国”运动中的一个附带事项，而非核心诉求。他的犹豫不决给了他推迟集会、声称77起转介案件已足够或将注意力转移到其他不满事项上的空间。

这与桑迪所宣称的目标一致。

他曾表示，他并不想推翻阿努廷政府，只是想给它施压，让它感到不安。这个政府是一个保守的、民族主义的、保皇派的政府，比任何进步的替代方案都更符合他的世界观。他可以针对特定的政策和机构发起攻击，而无需建立起足以威胁政府本身的强大运动。

他的竞选活动也过于分散，无法形成一场针对参议院勾结行为的集中运动。

该组织重点关注外国人、代持产权、外国游客、以色列公民和哈巴德运动。他在以色列大使馆外举行的抗议活动吸引了数百人参加，抗议活动中出现了反犹太主义标语和针对犹太人的激烈言论。他们的诉求甚至延伸到了加沙战争，而加沙战争与泰国参议院选举的公正性毫无关联。

除非桑迪突然改变方向，否则他的运动似乎更有可能遵循民族主义和反外国人的主题，而不是围绕参议院案件发展成一场连贯的运动。

进步阵营也没有表现出大规模动员的迹象。

9月13日，数百人参加了iLaw在曼谷举行的游行，呼吁选举委员会起诉所有229名最初的嫌疑人。人民党领袖纳塔蓬·伦帕尼亚武特、副领袖帕里特·瓦查拉辛杜和其他党内人士也参与了游行，但该党尚未宣布发起持续的街头运动。在清迈，另一场规模较小、象征意义较强的抗议活动中，活动人士将脸涂成蓝色，并展示了229个咖啡杯。

为泰党无法填补这一空白。

它是泰自豪党领导的政府的一部分，没有动机组织抗议活动反对自己的政府。相反，其部长们表示，选举委员会的决定提高了政府的稳定性。

人民党可能会继续支持公民社会活动，但议会审查的可能性仍然大于号召其支持者走上街头。

多年的法律斗争也削弱了民主运动的力量。

人权律师阿农·南帕（Arnon Nampa）仍因累计数十年的刑期被监禁。贾图帕·“派道丁”·汶帕塔拉拉克萨（Jatupat “Pai Dao Din” Boonpattararaksa）在冒犯君主罪一案中多次被拒绝保释。坦塔万·“塔万”·图阿图拉农（Tantawan “Tawan” Tuatulanon）因触犯《刑法》第112条被判处两年监禁，但在8月31日获得保释，等待上诉结果。此前，他曾多次被拘留，并进行了两次长时间的绝食抗议。帕里特·“企鹅”·奇瓦拉克（Parit “Penguin” Chiwarak）、帕努蓬·“迈克”·贾德诺克（Panupong “Mike” Jadnok）和本贾·阿潘（Benja Apan）在继续接受起诉的情况下已离开泰国。

一些曾经帮助组织或使更广泛运动合法化的资深人士也失去了公众声望。

针对颂育·普鲁克萨卡塞姆苏克和颂巴特·汶阿马农的性骚扰指控，损害了人们对老一代民主活动人士的信任。颂育在否认部分指控内容的同时，也公开道歉；而颂巴特则否认了对他的指控。两起案件均未得到司法判决，但这场争议暴露了该组织内部在同意、权力和问责等方面存在的严重分歧。

因此，这场运动面临的不仅仅是普通的抗议疲劳。

监禁、流放和起诉导致经验丰富的年轻组织者退出，而针对资深人士的指控也削弱了其他领导力量。近期的参与人数也反映了这种下降趋势：iLaw游行和桑迪在使馆前的抗议活动只吸引了数百人，而非数万人，而清迈的行动规模则更小。

因此，Punchada 的评估是更可信的方案。

随着争端在法庭审理、议会审查以及可能针对欧盟委员会的渎职指控中持续发酵，公众信心将持续下降。最终结果很大程度上取决于提交给法庭的证据。正如她所警告的，薄弱的案卷将难以取得任何进展。

泰国民众对参议院的案件感到非常愤怒，但尚未形成统一战线。

颂提并不想推翻一个与他世界观大体一致的政府，他对选举委员会裁决的有限回应表明，此案并非他的首要任务。进步运动的力量已经削弱，其部分资深领导人也已受到牵连。人民党尚未承诺组织街头动员，为泰党是执政党的一部分，近期的抗议活动规模较小，而且目前还没有出现能够弥合国家意识形态分歧的新契机。

除非情况有所改变，否则欧盟委员会的裁决将进一步损害人们对泰国政治机构的信任，而不会产生能够挑战这些机构的大规模运动。

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