SPACECOM needs more capabilities to target space adversaries: Whiting惠廷:美国太空司令部需要更多能力来打击太空对手
SPACECOM also is focusing on developing the baseline capabilities, such as space domain awareness and satellite communications, to undertake cislunar operations, said Gen. Stephen Whiting.

US SPACECOM Commander Gen. Stephen Whiting. (Space Foundation via Flickr)
MAUI — US Space Command (SPACECOM) does not have all the capabilities it needs to target adversary space systems in a conflict, the command’s top officer said today.
“To be able to negate threats in space, we must be able to find, fix, track, and target those threats. Targeting in the space domain is maturing, but it still has a long way to go,” SPACECOM Commander Gen. Stephen Whiting told the annual Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies (AMOS) conference.
“We don’t have robust target folders like the Joint Force does in other domains,” he said.
In addition, “once a target is engaged” SPACECOM needs “real-time battlespace awareness in order to execute battle management,” he said.
Offensive actions against adversary space systems during a conflict is one function that falls under the concept of “space control,” Whiting explained.
Space control, in turn, is a “cornerstone” of US military operations given the proliferation of adversary space systems and counterspace capabilities.
“It encompasses the full spectrum of activities needed to actively contest and control the space domain, with the ultimate goal of achieving space superiority. This isn’t passive defense; it’s proactive warfighting that includes active or passive measures, kinetic or non-kinetic fires, and reversible or nonreversible effects. At its core, space control involves offensive and defensive actions collectively known as counterspace operations,” Whiting explained.
Space control, however, isn’t possible without robust space domain awareness (SDA) , he said.
“Just as Sun Tzu reminded us to know the enemy, ourselves, the terrain, and the weather for complete victory, SDA integrates those multi-disciplinary insights to turn orbital data into the actionable intelligence that underpins surveillance, protection, prevention, and negation. Without it, we’re navigating blind in a contested domain where threats can emerge from any orbit or angle,” Whiting said.
“SDA truly is the bedrock of space control ,” he added.
SPACECOM also is increasingly looking to fill gaps in baseline technologies ― first and foremost, SDA ― required for operations in the vast volumes of cislunar space and even farther, Whiting said.
Due to the laws of physics, objects in space farther away from the Earth are subject to differing levels of gravity, magnetic interference and solar radiation that affect how spacecraft operate.
“[A]s we expand our operations into cislunar space and beyond, we must ensure the SDA architecture is scalable—otherwise, we risk leaving deep space unmonitored and vulnerable to exploitation by our opponents,” he said.
Further, he said the US military lacks capabilities for positioning, navigation and timing; satellite communications; and “even a standard format for discussing positional states in cislunar space.”
“This represents a concern, and USSPACECOM is focused on addressing it,” Whiting said.
美国太空司令部司令斯蒂芬·惠廷将军。(图片来自太空基金会Flickr)
毛伊岛——美国太空司令部(SPACECOM)最高指挥官今天表示,该司令部并不具备在冲突中打击敌方太空系统所需的所有能力。
“为了能够消除太空威胁,我们必须能够发现、定位、跟踪和打击这些威胁。太空领域的目标定位技术正在日趋成熟,但仍有很长的路要走,”美国太空司令部司令斯蒂芬·惠廷将军在一年一度的毛伊岛先进光学和空间监视技术(AMOS)会议上表示。
他说:“我们没有像联合部队在其他领域那样强大的目标文件夹。”
此外,他还表示,“一旦目标被锁定”,太空司令部就需要“实时战场态势感知,以便执行作战管理”。
怀廷解释说,在冲突期间对敌方太空系统采取进攻行动是“太空控制”概念下的一项职能。
鉴于敌方太空系统和反太空能力的扩散,太空控制反过来又成为美国军事行动的“基石”。
“它涵盖了积极争夺和控制太空领域所需的全部活动,其最终目标是取得太空优势。这并非被动防御;而是主动作战,包括主动或被动措施、动能或非动能火力以及可逆或不可逆的影响。太空控制的核心在于进攻和防御行动,这些行动统称为反太空作战,”怀廷解释道。
他表示,如果没有强大的空间领域感知(SDA),空间控制是不可能的。
“正如孙子兵法告诫我们,要取得全面胜利,就必须知敌知己、知地知天、知风,SDA(战略数据评估)整合了这些多学科的洞见,将轨道数据转化为可操作的情报,从而支撑监视、保护、预防和应对。如果没有它,我们就如同在充满威胁的领域盲目航行,威胁可能来自任何轨道或角度,”怀廷说道。
“SDA 确实是太空控制的基石,”他补充道。
惠廷表示,美国太空司令部也越来越希望填补基础技术方面的空白——首先是空间数据采集技术——这些技术是开展近月空间乃至更远空间作业所必需的。
由于物理定律,距离地球越远的太空物体受到的重力、磁场干扰和太阳辐射程度越不同,这些因素都会影响航天器的运行。
他说:“随着我们将业务扩展到地月空间及更远的地方,我们必须确保SDA架构具有可扩展性——否则,我们就有可能使深空无人监控,容易受到对手的利用。”
此外,他还表示,美国军方缺乏定位、导航和授时能力;卫星通信能力;以及“讨论地月空间位置状态的标准格式”。
“这令人担忧,美国太空司令部正集中精力解决这个问题,”怀廷说。