Turkey’s policy changes could see defense biz grow with Gulf rivals

ANKARA, Turkey — Turkey is reversing policies with Gulf rivals in the hope that local defense companies can return to the lucrative Saudi and Emirati markets.

Deep political divergences harmed Turkish relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in recent years, including clashing policies over the civil wars in Syria and Libya; the Muslim Brotherhood’s legitimacy in Egypt; support of the military group Hamas in Gaza; the blockade of Qatar; and the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and some of its neighbors through the Abraham Accords.

More directly, an official Saudi boycott of Turkish goods brought down trade volume with Turkey to $189 million last year from $3.2 billion in 2019. That boycott ended in January 2022.

Analysts agree that, faced with declining approval ratings , Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan needs to lure foreign investment and boost mutual trade partnerships to improve the economy ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2023.

Turkey has changed course several times in its foreign policies:

On Syria, the Turkish government is leaning further toward its Gulf neighbors in their anti-Iran approach. Tehran’s support of the Damascus regime in the civil war is driving Ankara’s decision.

In Libya, several foreign parties involved in the civil war withdrew. Geopolitically speaking, it was Turkey against the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The Egyptian government continues to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has received support in Turkey. But Erdoğan is reversing course and beginning to curb Muslim Brotherhood activity on Turkish soil.

Turkey has also become less vocal in its ideological support of Hamas. In addition, there are reports that Ankara has banned Hamas-controlled activity in Turkey that would harm Israel.

The blockade of Qatar — a move that saw Turkish policy clash with those of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt — ended in 2021.

Parallel to Turkey’s efforts to reconcile with Gulf states and Egypt, Erdoğan has initiated a charm offensive to improve relations with Israel. He has invited Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Turkey — a de facto end to Turkey’s protest of the Abraham Accords.

In efforts to reconcile, Erdoğan in November hosted Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In February, Erdoğan visited Abu Dhabi where Turkish and Emirati delegations signed 13 cooperation agreements, including for their defense industries. The president is now gearing up for a fence-mending visit to Saudi Arabia in which he hopes to sign agreements that would lure Gulf investment into cash-strapped Turkey.

“Every country with friendly ties with Turkey is a natural market for Turkish weapons systems,” a Turkish presidential aide said. “Reconciliation with countries [with which] we had difficult relations will mean [a] win-win [for] business, especially in defense industry.”

During Erdoğan’s visit to Abu Dhabi, Emirati officials pledged to invest $10 billion in Turkey’s defense, agriculture, information technology, construction, energy, food, real estate and health industries in the next several years.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, right, and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan pose as they attend a signing ceremony for agreements between the two countries in Ankara on Nov. 24, 2021. (Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images)

“The first of the planned UAE investments will come into Turkey’s defense industry,” said Nail Olpak, president of Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Board. “We see a particularly great appetite to invest in Turkish defense industry.”

Two-way trade between Turkey and the UAE was worth $8 billion in 2021. Olpak estimates annual trade will grow by 40 percent in the years ahead.

“There is great potential [in defense industry],” said Anil Şahin, a Turkish defense analyst. “Of course, a prerequisite to happier days is sustainable normalization in political relations.”

An official with a defense exports portfolio told Defense News that cooperation between Turkey and Gulf clients could include both armed and unarmed air-, sea- and ground-based drones; missile systems; naval platforms; helicopters; remotely controlled gun stations; air defense systems; and armored vehicles. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because the individual was not authorized to speak to the media.

Last year, Al Jasoor — a joint venture between Emirati defense conglomerate Edge Group and Turkish firm Otokar — launched their six-wheel drive amphibious armored vehicle Rabdan, a variant of the eight-wheel drive infantry fighting vehicle with the same name that entered service with Emirati forces in April 2021.

But Gulf states won’t want to rush into things, an Arab diplomat in Ankara told Defense News.

“The Gulf states have reason not to [make] haste, to make irreversible decisions to invest in Turkey,” the diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity because the individual was not authorized to speak to the media. “They will want to make sure Erdoğan does not change course once again.”

Burak Ege Bekdil was the Turkey correspondent for Defense News.

土耳其安卡拉——土耳其正在改变对海湾竞争对手的政策，希望本土国防企业能够重返利润丰厚的沙特和阿联酋市场。

近年来，土耳其与沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国之间存在深刻的政治分歧，损害了双方的关系，这些分歧包括在叙利亚和利比亚内战问题上的政策冲突；穆斯林兄弟会在埃及的合法性问题；对加沙地带哈马斯军事组织的支持；对卡塔尔的封锁；以及以色列通过《亚伯拉罕协议》与其一些邻国实现外交关系正常化等问题。

更直接地说，沙特阿拉伯对土耳其商品的官方抵制导致去年沙特与土耳其的贸易额从 2019 年的 32 亿美元下降到 1.89 亿美元。该抵制于 2022 年 1 月结束。

分析人士一致认为，面对不断下降的支持率，土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安需要吸引外国投资并加强双边贸易伙伴关系，以在2023年6月总统和议会选举之前改善经济。

土耳其的外交政策已经多次改变方向：

在叙利亚问题上，土耳其政府在反伊朗立场上越来越倾向于其海湾邻国。德黑兰在叙利亚内战中对大马士革政权的支持是促使安卡拉做出这一决定的原因。

在利比亚，参与内战的几个外国势力撤出了利比亚。从地缘政治角度来看，这场内战主要针对土耳其、阿联酋、沙特阿拉伯和埃及这四个国家。

埃及政府继续打压穆斯林兄弟会，该组织在土耳其获得了支持。但埃尔多安正在改变策略，开始遏制穆斯林兄弟会在土耳其境内的活动。

土耳其在意识形态上对哈马斯的支持也减少了公开表态。此外，有报道称安卡拉已禁止哈马斯控制的、可能损害以色列利益的活动在土耳其境内进行。

对卡塔尔的封锁——这一举动导致土耳其的政策与阿联酋、沙特阿拉伯和埃及的政策发生冲突——于 2021 年结束。

在土耳其努力与海湾国家和埃及和解的同时，埃尔多安也发起了一场魅力攻势，以改善与以色列的关系。他邀请以色列总统伊萨克·赫尔佐格访问土耳其——这实际上标志着土耳其对《亚伯拉罕协议》抗议的结束。

为了缓和两国关系，埃尔多安于去年11月接待了阿布扎比王储穆罕默德·本·扎耶德·阿勒纳哈扬。今年2月，埃尔多安访问阿布扎比，土耳其和阿联酋代表团签署了13项合作协议，其中包括国防工业领域的合作。目前，埃尔多安总统正积极筹备对沙特阿拉伯的访问，希望借此机会修复与沙特阿拉伯的关系，并签署一些协议，以吸引海湾国家对资金短缺的土耳其进行投资。

一位土耳其总统助理表示：“所有与土耳其保持友好关系的国家都是土耳其武器系统的天然市场。与那些曾经关系紧张的国家实现和解，对企业而言将是双赢，尤其是在国防工业领域。”

在埃尔多安访问阿布扎比期间，阿联酋官员承诺在未来几年内向土耳其的国防、农业、信息技术、建筑、能源、食品、房地产和医疗保健行业投资 100 亿美元。

2021年11月24日，土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安（右）和阿布扎比王储穆罕默德·本·扎耶德·阿勒纳哈扬在安卡拉出席两国协议签署仪式时合影。（Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images）

土耳其对外经济关系委员会主席奈尔·奥尔帕克表示：“阿联酋计划的首笔投资将投向土耳其国防工业。我们看到他们对投资土耳其国防工业有着非常浓厚的兴趣。”

2021年土耳其和阿联酋之间的双边贸易额为80亿美元。奥尔帕克预计，未来几年两国每年的贸易额将增长40%。

土耳其国防分析师阿尼尔·沙欣表示：“国防工业潜力巨大。当然，实现更美好未来的前提是政治关系的可持续正常化。”

一位负责国防出口的官员告诉《防务新闻》，土耳其与海湾客户的合作可能包括武装和非武装的空中、海上和地面无人机；导弹系统；海军平台；直升机；遥控火炮站；防空系统；以及装甲车辆。这位官员要求匿名，因为他没有被授权接受媒体采访。

去年，阿联酋国防集团 Edge Group 和土耳其公司 Otokar 的合资企业 Al Jasoor 推出了六轮驱动两栖装甲车 Rabdan，这是同名八轮驱动步兵战车的衍生车型，该战车于 2021 年 4 月开始在阿联酋军队服役。

但一位驻安卡拉的阿拉伯外交官告诉《防务新闻》，海湾国家不会想仓促行事。

这位外交官表示：“海湾国家有理由不急于做出不可逆转的投资土耳其的决定。”他要求匿名，因为他没有被授权接受媒体采访。“他们希望确保埃尔多安不会再次改变路线。”

布拉克·埃格·贝克迪尔是《防务新闻》的土耳其记者。