The Pentagon needs fresh ideas for evading Taiwan logistics pitfalls

“Every time I pass a bulldozer, I want to stop and kiss it,” said Adm. William Halsey, the commander of the South Pacific in 1945. He had lived the adage that logistics wins wars, overcoming the four tyrannies of distance, water, time, and scale, on the way to victory.

The Indo-Pacific remains an unforgiving theater of operations to this day, and, when combined, the four tyrannies interact to undermine U.S. deterrence against China—most notably, the deterrent effect of airpower . Pentagon planners need to understand this interactive effect and seek solutions that address the entire problem, not just each individual component.

First, the “tyranny of distance” works against U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The continental United States stands twice the distance from bases in the Indo-Pacific as it is from those in Europe. This distance extends supply lines, resulting in a larger portion of the force being allocated to support functions (“tail”) rather than combat roles (“tooth”). In contrast, China’s closer proximity to the combat zone simplifies its logistics, allowing it to rapidly concentrate combat power. This asymmetry favors Beijing to the detriment of U.S. deterrence.

Second, the vast Pacific Ocean – or the “tyranny of water” – not only increases the distances that U.S. aircraft and naval vessels must close to put their weapons within range of targets, it also severely constrains basing options. Short-legged fighter jets lack the necessary fuel to complete missions in the Taiwan Strait , for example, and return to limited bases in the region. In-flight refueling would extend their operational ranges, but tankers make attractive targets for Chinese missiles.

As a result, the U.S. Air Force finds itself in danger of not being able to generate sufficient sorties to deny a Chinese victory. In pushing tankers back, the People’s Liberation Army could achieve air denial, and possibly even air superiority, without ever defeating U.S. air superiority fighters in combat. Given that achieving air superiority is critical to Beijing’s theory of victory, especially in a Taiwan scenario, the constraints of maritime geography, as well as Chinese missile threats, substantially weaken U.S. deterrence.

Third, successful extended deterrence depends on rapidly projecting massive combat power into the region. But U.S. forces and capabilities will not matter if they arrive too late to the fight. This is the “tyranny of time.” U.S. warplanes can fly across the Pacific from the West Coast in a matter of hours, but they require tanker support along the route, adding 24 to 48 hours of lead time.

Moreover, it would take months to deploy large numbers of U.S. forces and weapons into the theater. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, even with a continuous presence in the Middle East, and no enemy interference, it still took six months to build up U.S. personnel and the “iron mountain” of materiel required to support initial combat operations. More fundamentally, time was on the United States’ side. The United States held the initiative, commencing military operations at the time and place of its own choosing. In the Indo-Pacific, China would most likely hold this advantage.

Finally, in the event of a conflict with China, U.S. logistics operations would be staggering in scale and complexity. The “tyranny of scale” is not linear — there is not a one-to-one correspondence between additional “tooth” and “tail.” Limited ramp space, for example, would require military planners to employ aircraft from more operating bases, which would increase both aerial-refueling requirements and on-the-ground sustainment needs (e.g., maintenance and servicing, support facilities, and weapons storage sites, etc.).

The planning and execution of logistics operations at scale is no easy task. Even with months of careful planning, the July exercise Mobility Guardian 23 encountered complications. For example, one C-17 aircraft only made it to Hawaii because of mechanical issues, while others fell behind schedule at various points. These incidents are all manageable in isolation, but they compound one another to quickly have a cascading effect.

Of course, Beijing is planning to make it a whole lot worse. The real danger is that Chinese leaders calculate a window exists for them to achieve a fait accompli before the United States has sufficient combat power in the region. The ability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain the U.S. military is thus key to effective deterrence.

Unfortunately, the logistics problem defies simple solution, complicated by the fact that solving one tyranny often makes the others worse. For example, the United States could deploy more forces forward to try to address the tyrannies of distance and time. Without additional basing options, however, these forces would end up concentrated at large bases and vulnerable to an adversary’s first strike. To mitigate this threat, the United States could try to distribute its forces more widely within the first island chain, but a distributed force posture exacerbates the challenges of operating across large swaths of water and increases the complexity and scale of logistics and sustainment.

Instead of trying to solve each part of the logistics problem independently, the Pentagon should develop an integrated approach to cope with the four tyrannies simultaneously. Doing so requires new ways of thinking, along with making hard choices and accepting risks that the individual military branches would prefer to avoid. There are no silver bullets to make the logistics and sustainment that underwrite U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific any easier, faster, or more efficient and effective.

Col. Maximilian K. Bremer, U.S. Air Force, is the director of the Special Programs Division at Air Mobility Command.

Kelly Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center, an adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University, and a nonresident fellow at the Brute Krulak Center of the Marine Corps University.

This commentary does not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marine Corps, or Marine Corps University.

“每次我路过推土机，我都想停下来亲吻它，”1945 年南太平洋司令威廉·哈尔西海军上将说道。他亲身经历了“后勤赢得战争”这句格言，克服了距离、水、时间和规模这四大障碍，最终取得了胜利。

时至今日，印太地区依然是一个危机四伏的战场。四大强权相互交织，削弱了美国对中国的威慑力——尤其是空中力量的威慑作用。五角大楼的决策者们需要理解这种相互作用，并寻求能够解决整个问题而非仅仅针对某个单一因素的方案。

首先，“距离的桎梏”对美国在印太地区的威慑力构成威胁。美国本土距离印太地区的军事基地是距离欧洲基地的两倍。这种距离拉长了补给线，导致更多兵力被分配到后勤支援（“尾部”）而非作战（“牙齿”）。相比之下，中国距离战区更近，简化了后勤保障，使其能够迅速集中作战力量。这种不对称性有利于北京，削弱了美国的威慑力。

其次，浩瀚的太平洋——或者说“水域的桎梏”——不仅增加了美国飞机和舰艇将武器部署到目标射程内所需的距离，也严重限制了其基地选择。例如，航程较短的战斗机缺乏完成台湾海峡任务所需的燃料，并且只能返回该地区有限的基地。空中加油可以延长其作战航程，但加油机很容易成为中国导弹的攻击目标。

因此，美国空军面临着无法出动足够多架次飞机来阻止中国取得胜利的危险。解放军可以通过击退加油机，在不与美国空中优势战斗机进行空战的情况下，实现空中封锁，甚至可能取得制空权。鉴于取得制空权对北京的胜利理论至关重要，尤其是在台湾问题上，海洋地理的限制以及中国的导弹威胁，都极大地削弱了美国的威慑力。

第三，成功的延伸威慑取决于能否迅速将大规模作战力量投射到该地区。但如果美军的兵力和能力到达战场太晚，一切都将徒劳无功。这就是所谓的“时间暴政”。美国战机可以在数小时内从西海岸飞越太平洋，但沿途需要加油机支援，这会增加24至48小时的准备时间。

此外，将大量美军部队和武器部署到战区需要数月时间。在2003年入侵伊拉克之前，即使美军在中东地区持续驻军，且没有敌方干预，也需要六个月的时间才能集结起美军人员和储备支持初期作战行动所需的“铁山”物资。更重要的是，时间对美国有利。美国掌握着主动权，可以自主选择发动军事行动的时间和地点。而在印太地区，中国很可能拥有这一优势。

最后，一旦与中国发生冲突，美国的后勤行动规模和复杂程度将令人震惊。“规模的暴政”并非线性发展——增加“牙齿”和“尾巴”之间并非一一对应。例如，有限的停机坪空间将迫使军事策划者从更多作战基地调动飞机，这将增加空中加油的需求以及地面保障需求（例如，维护保养、支援设施和武器储存场所等）。

大规模后勤行动的规划和执行绝非易事。即使经过数月的精心筹划，7 月份的“机动卫士 23”演习也遭遇了诸多波折。例如，一架 C-17 运输机因机械故障才勉强抵达夏威夷，而其他飞机也在不同阶段出现延误。这些事件单独来看都可控，但它们相互叠加，迅速产生连锁反应。

当然，北京方面正计划让情况变得更糟。真正的危险在于，中国领导人认为，在美国在该地区拥有足够的作战力量之前，他们有机会一举成真。因此，动员、部署和维持美国军队的能力是有效威慑的关键。

不幸的是，后勤问题难以简单解决，而且由于解决一个难题往往会加剧其他难题，情况变得更加复杂。例如，美国可以向前线部署更多兵力，以应对距离和时间的限制。然而，如果没有额外的基地选择，这些部队最终会集中在大型基地，容易受到敌方的先发制人打击。为了降低这种威胁，美国可以尝试在第一岛链内更广泛地部署兵力，但分散部署的兵力会加剧在广阔水域作战的挑战，并增加后勤保障的复杂性和规模。

五角大楼不应试图独立解决后勤问题的各个部分，而应制定一套综合方案，同时应对这四大难题。这需要全新的思维方式，以及做出艰难的抉择和承担各军种都不愿承担的风险。没有任何灵丹妙药能够让支撑美国在印太地区威慑的后勤保障工作变得更容易、更快捷、更高效。

美国空军上校马克西米利安·K·布雷默是空军机动司令部特种项目处处长。

Kelly Grieco 是史汀生中心“重塑美国大战略计划”的高级研究员，乔治城大学安全研究兼职教授，以及海军陆战队大学布鲁特·克鲁拉克中心的非常驻研究员。

本评论并不一定反映美国国防部、美国空军、美国海军陆战队或海军陆战队大学的观点。